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ABSTRACT
‘Weak’ alibi evidence is the second leading cause of false convictions 
although psychological research on this issue is scarce. Understanding the 
factors contributing to the provision of false alibi witness testimony will highlight 
whether judicial instructions about alibi witness evidence are required to ensure 
fair investigations and trials. Utilising experimental and quasi-experimental 
research this thesis represents the first systematic investigation into the 
influences upon alibi witness deception.
Study 1 set out to explore the factors influencing perceptions of 
deceptive alibi witness evidence in order to highlight the variables requiring 
further analysis later in the thesis. The study found that perceptions of false 
alibi evidence acceptability were influenced by an interaction between the type 
of deceptive evidence provided by the alibi witness (lie, false confession, 
evasion, omission) and the alibi witness’ perceptions of the defendant’s guilt 
(guilty, innocent, unsure of guilt). A qualitative content analysis supported these 
quantitative findings and also suggested that perceptions of the criminal justice 
system, knowledge of legal sanctions and the relationship between defendant 
and alibi witness were important in alibi evaluations. These factors were 
investigated further in the subsequent studies.
Although study 1 highlighted the importance of deception type in alibi 
witness deception, the alibi research to date has examined solely alibi witness 
lies meaning there is no existing measure of alibi witness deception types that 
could be utilised in the thesis. Thus study 2 details the development of the 
False Evidence Questionnaire (FEQ) which found that alibi witness deception to 
consists of two factors; Omissions and Commissions. This supported the 
significant effect of deception type found in study 1. To further explore the role 
of attitudes to the criminal justice system in alibi witness deception study 2 also 
developed a multifaceted questionnaire; the Attitudes towards the Police and 
Courts Questionnaire (APCQ), to improve on previous one-dimensional 
measures of attitudes to the criminal justice system. The APCQ had five factors; 
Police Institution, Court Functioning, Punishment, Treatment of the Accused, 
Personal Safety. The structures of the FEQ and APCQ were demonstrated to 
be reliable and have a strong theoretical underpinning.
Study 3 revealed that the APCQ Police Institution factor and participant 
age significantly predicted both the Commissions factor of the FEQ. Moreover, 
the APCQ Police Institution factor, participant age and the APCQ Court 
Functioning factor also predicted FEQ Omissions. These findings suggest that 
by improving perceptions of the police, false alibi witness evidence may be 
discouraged. Study 4 explored whether the significant effect of age could be 
attributed to increased awareness of legal sanctions amongst older adults. 
Flowever, the study found that FEQ Omissions and Commissions are not 
influenced by punishment awareness illustrating that educating the public about 
the sanctions for false alibi evidence is unlikely to deter this behaviour. Study 5 
used a mock police interview to gain a more ecological valid measure of the 
relationship between alibi witness and defendant upon alibi witness honesty.
This revealed a significant association between unmotivated alibi witnesses 
(individuals with no/limited prior relationship to the defendant) and honesty in
i
mock police interviews. Surprisingly, motivated alibi witnesses (individuals with 
an existing relationship with the defendant) were not found to have a significant 
association with either honesty or deception in the interviews. These findings 
support the conceptualisation of alibi witness deception as an altruistic act 
influenced by estimations of reciprocation likelihood. The study also found alibi 
witness intended honesty and actual honesty in the police interview were 
correlated, therefore validating the use of prospective questionnaire methods as 
utilised in studies 3 and 4. The final study demonstrated that although alibi 
witness motivation had a significant effect on mock juror perceptions of alibi 
witness honesty, this bias did not affect perceptions of defendant reliability or 
case verdicts. Nonetheless, judicial directions may be necessary to counteract 
juror scepticism towards motivated alibi witnesses.
The thesis represents a unique development in the understanding of 
deceptive alibi witness evidence, the findings of which direct implications for 
criminal justice practice as well as future alibi research.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I couldn’t have completed this thesis without the help of a whole host of 
people. My thanks go firstly to my supervisors for encouraging me to start the 
PhD and supporting me along the way. I also wish to thank Adam Wilson for 
his legal know-how which was invaluable in creating the study materials. My 
research assistants Kirsten, Kirsty, Bryony, Emily, Lisa and Hannah were 
fabulous, as was Geoff’s help with the Chapter 7 data collection. The PhD 
students at Hallam were wonderful in supporting me through this process. In 
particular, Dave Moore was a great help with the stats and always managed to 
cheer me up when things got stressful, and Sophie Taylor was always a smiley 
face. More recently, the psychology team at Teesside has been great in 
helping me find time to work on the PhD and encouraging me when things got 
stressful. Since starting this project I have faced immense challenges, both 
personally and professionally, and my family have been there supporting me 
every step of the way. In particular I wish to thank my big brother whose pride 
in me was a huge motivator, and my mum for giving up her holiday to proof read 
the thesis. Last but certainly not least I wish to thank Ian for always knowing 
the right thing to say and keeping me focused on The Plan’.
PUBLICATIONS ARISING FROM THE THESIS
Journal Articles
Fawcett, H. (2009). On False Alibis. Forensic Update, 97, 31- 34.
Conference Presentations
Fawcett, H., Garner, I. & Walkington, Z. (2009). Understanding the provision of 
false alibis. Presentation given at the Annual Conference of the 
European Association of Psychology and Law, Italy 2nd-5th September, 
Sorrento, Italy.
Fawcett, H., Garner, I. & Walkington, Z. (2010). Juror reactions to alibi
evidence. Presentation given at the Annual Conference of the European 
Association of Psychology and Law, 15th-18th June University of 
Gothenburg, Sweden.
Fawcett, H., Garner, I. & Walkington, Z. (2010). An analysis of mock-juror
reactions to alibi evidence. Presentation given at the Annual Conference 
of the Psychology Postgraduate Affairs Group Annual Conference, 21st- 
23rd July, Sheffield Hallam University, Sheffield.
Fawcett, H., Garner, I. & Walkington, Z. (2012).The suspect-alibi witness 
relationship. Presentation given at the Annual Conference of the 
European Association of Psychology and Law, University of Cyprus, 
Cyprus, 10th-13th April.
Academic Seminars
Fawcett, H., Garner, I. & Walkington, Z. (2008). Alibi witnesses: assessing 
motivations for and reactions to false alibi evidence. Presentation to 
psychology department Sheffield Hallam University, 19th November, 
Sheffield, UK.
ABBREVIATIONS AND SPECIALIST 
TERMINOLOGY
Abbreviations
Analysis of Variance
Attitudes towards the Police and Courts Questionnaire 
British Psychological Society 
Criminal Justice System 
Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 
False Evidence Questionnaire
Experiences in Close Relationships-Revised questionnaire 
(developed from Brennan, Clark, & Shaver, 1998)
Juror Bias Scale (Kassin & Wrightsman, 1983)
Multivariate Analysis of Variance 
NEO Five Factor Inventory (Costa & McCrae, 2010) 
Principle Components Analysis 
State Trait Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger, 1983)
Specialist Terminology
Defendant: The term defendant is used to collectively refer to suspects and 
defendants throughout the thesis. The exception to this is where the terms 
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Alibi: A defence under section 6A(3) of the Criminal Procedure and 
Investigations Act 1996 (CPIA) that the suspect/defendant was in a particular 
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been committed.
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Alibi Witness and Defence Witness: Throughout the thesis the term alibi 
witness is used interchangeably with the term defence witness to collectively 
refer to:
■ individuals who are interviewed by the police or that testify in court 
about the suspect’s/defendant’s whereabouts at the time of the 
alleged crime.
■ individuals who conceal from the police and/courts information that 
implicates the suspect/defendant in a crime.
■ individuals who give false information to the police/courts which is 
intended to divert suspicion from the suspect/defendant.
Motivated Alibi Witness: An alibi witness who has a prior relationship with the 
defendant who could be perceived by others to have a motivation to lie for the 
defendant. For example; the parent, sibling, child, spouse or friend of the 
defendant.
Unmotivated Alibi Witness: An alibi witness who has either no relationship, or 
a limited relationship, with the defendant prior to the case. These individuals 
would be perceived by most people to have no personal motivation to lie for the 
defendant. Examples of unmotivated alibi witnesses include; strangers, 
colleagues and shop assistants.
Timely Alibi: A timely alibi is an alibi defence which involves the presentation of 
an alibi witness during the police investigation into the offence, allowing police 
to interview the alibi witness, and assess the authenticity of the alibi story.
Ambush Alibi: An alibi witness who does not come to vouch for the 
defendant’s innocence until the case is in court. The delay in providing this 
evidence prevents police investigation of the alibi witness’ story and thus allows 
the alibi witness to ambush the court.
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CHAPTER 1: THESIS AIMS AND 
OBJECTIVES
False alibi evidence has the potential to allow guilty suspects to evade 
conviction or cause innocent individuals to be falsely convicted. On this point 
Connors, Lundregan, Miller and McEwen (1996) concluded that of the 28 
American cases in which advances in DNA analysis led to innocence project 
assisted exonerations, seven involved “weak” alibi evidence. Weak alibi 
evidence was classed as alibis supported by a motivated individual, such as a 
relative of the defendant, or alibis having no corroboration at all. Subsequent 
examination of further American DNA exoneration cases prompted Wells, Small, 
Penrod, Malpass, Fulero and Brimacombe (1998) to conclude that weak alibi 
evidence was second only to mistaken eyewitness testimony in producing false 
convictions. More recent experimental research generally reveals a negative 
bias amongst mock jurors regarding alibi evidence in general and specifically 
towards motivated alibi witnesses (witnesses testifying on the behalf of the 
defendant). It is therefore clear that juror biases about weak alibi witness 
testimony are hindering the administration of justice (Wells et al., 1998).
Complexities in the recording and charging of this offence mean that the 
occurrence of deliberately false alibi witness testimony is unknown. This is 
compounded by the lack of academic alibi research (Granhag, Stromwall & 
Jonsson, 2003). This is remarkable given the vast body of eyewitness 
testimony research (Loftus, 1979; see also Kassin, Tubb, Hosch & Memon,
2001; Wells & Olson, 2003), The Innocence Project DNA exonerations data 
(Connors et al., 1996; Wells et al., 1998) and the plethora of research 
examining suspect deception (Vrij, 2000, 2008; see also Granhag & Stromwall, 
2004; Klaver, Lee, Spidel, & Hart, 2009). Despite the potential for alibi witness 
deception to validate guilty suspects’ denials, little research has examined 
corroborating alibi testimony. Research into alibi witness deception would not 
only bridge a gap in the research literature, but reveal whether the negative alibi 
bias held by alibi evaluators is warranted or requires challenging.
1
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Reporting of real life false alibi cases illustrate very negative public 
reactions to deceptive alibi witnesses. For example public outcry against 
Maxine Carr was so severe that she was forced to take a new identity to ensure 
her safety and in an analysis of press reporting, Jones & Wardle (2008) found 
that Carr was more vilified than the murderer her false alibi sought to protect. 
Individuals that have conversely reported an offender to the police rather than 
conceal their offences have been similarly vilified. In a high profile case, Carol 
Saldinack reported her sons to the police when she discovered they had 
attacked a man on a night out. The fact that she did not conceal their offence 
provoked the media to ask 'was Carol Saldinack right to turn her two sons in to 
the police?' Saldinack later received a Pride of Britain Special recognition award 
for her actions, illustrating the view that her conduct was extraordinary. Thus 
real life cases illustrate the complex manner in which defence witnesses are 
viewed by the general public, and the need for further research in this area.
The alibi research conducted to date has focused upon two key 
components of alibi evidence; who people think would corroborate their false 
alibi (Culhane, Hosch & Kehn, 2008; Olson & Charman, 2011; Olson & Wells, 
2004a), and the effect of alibi evidence upon police (Dahl, Brimacombe & 
Lindsay, 2009; Dahl & Price, 2011) and juror (Golding, Stewart, Yozwiak,
Djadali & Sanchez, 2000; Allison, Matthews, Michael & Choi, 2009; Mathews & 
Allison, 2010; Shpurik & Meissner, 2004) alibi evaluators. However, very little is 
known about the factors that contribute to alibi witnesses engaging in deception, 
as research from the alibi witness perspective is lacking. There is an obvious 
need to develop a more thorough understanding of the dispositional and 
situational features of deceptive alibi witness testimony to establish whether the 
negative alibi biases indicated in the research literature are valid, or whether 
judicial instructions are required to ensure a fair investigation and trial (Burke, 
Turtle & Olson, 2007). This thesis aims to develop understanding of false alibi 
evidence from the perspective of the alibi witness. It will address the situational 
and individual factors affecting alibi witness honesty, as well as consider 
whether these features are reflected in alibi evaluator beliefs. The thesis aims 
to acquire new understanding that will prompt improvements in both police and 
courtroom practice. It is necessarily exploratory in nature given that it is the first
2
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investigation of false alibi evidence from the alibi witness perspective. Thus it is 
acknowledged that this thesis will generate many new questions and stimulate 
further in-depth psychological research into alibi witness testimony, rather than 
provide definitive solutions. It is important therefore that the findings are treated 
with the level of caution appropriate for exploratory research.
Considering the difficulties in accessing those convicted of providing 
false alibi testimony and the unrepresentative, biased and unreliable data this 
would present (Loftus & Guyer, 2002), the positivist epistemology1 and 
experimental methodology favoured in the alibi witness research is unsurprising 
(see for example Allison, Mathews, Michael & Choi, 2009; Burke & Turtle, 2004; 
Culhane & Hosch, 2004; Culhane, Hosch & Kehn, 2008; Dahl, Brimacombe & 
Lindsay, 2009). Further research has utilised a questionnaire approach to 
determine the type of evidence suspects have to support their alibis (for 
example Olson & Wells, 2004b) and police attitudes to alibi witness evidence 
(Dysart & Strange, 2012). This questionnaire and experimental approach is 
necessary and valid given the complexities inherent within the behaviour 
studied and the relatively recent commencement of this research topic. 
Therefore this thesis continues the positivist approach through using 
experimental and quasi-experimental research to examine alibis from the alibi 
witness perspective to ascertain what influences individuals to provide 
deceptive alibi testimony, how alibi witnesses deceive the police and courts and 
who provides false alibis. This enables comparison of actual false alibis (alibi 
provider perspective) and perceptions of weak and false alibis (Allison,
Mathews, Michael & Choi, 2009; Mathews & Allison, 2010; Shpurik & Meissner, 
2004). Berman and Cutler (1996) suggest that a valid approach in forensic 
psychology research is to “... identify important phenomena that have 
implications for both the legal system and psychology and then bring existing or 
new psychological theory to bear on the issue” (p. 171). The contemporary 
nature of the alibi witness research means alibi specific theory is still under 
development (Olson & Wells, 2004b). Accordingly, previously applied cognitive
1 By positivist epistemology it is meant that that thesis is grounded on the premise that 
generalizable theory can be developed from empirical analysis which employs a rigorous 
experimental design.
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and social psychological theory (Hosch, Culhane, Jolly, Chavez & Shaw, 2011)
is used to frame the thesis and aid understanding of the creation and evaluation
of deceptive alibi witness testimony.
The specific objectives of the thesis are:
1. To determine whether the type of deception used by alibi witnesses 
influences perceptions of alibi witness testimony acceptability (Chapter 3)
2. To examine factors that shape perceptions of false alibi acceptability which 
will be manipulated in the subsequent chapters of the thesis (Chapter 3)
3. To develop a measure of intentions to provide false evidence for loved ones 
(Chapter 4)
4. To develop a questionnaire to measure attitudes towards the criminal justice 
system (Chapter 4)
5. To discover whether negative attitudes towards the criminal justice system 
shape the intentions of the general population to provide false evidence for a 
loved one (Chapter 5)
6. To discover whether experience of the criminal justice system shapes the 
intentions of the general population to provide false evidence for a loved one 
(Chapter 5)
7. To establish whether ignorance of the pertinent legislation affects the 
honesty of evidence intended to be provided to the criminal justice for a 
loved one by the general population (Chapter 6)
8. To discover the effect of relationship between defendant and alibi witness 
upon alibi witness honesty (Chapter 7)
9. To assess the impact of alibi timing and the relationship between defendant 
and alibi witness upon juror verdicts (Chapter 8)
4
Thesis Overview
Literature Review Chapters
Chapter 2: Alibi Witness Testimony: A Review of the Relevant Literature
This chapter introduces the topic of alibi witness testimony and discusses 
the research conducted to date on this topic. The real life practice implications 
posed by research on this topic are highlighted, and new directions for alibi 
research attention are suggested. Thus the importance of understanding alibi 
witness testimony and false testimony in terms of miscarriages of justice, 
promoting effective police interviewing and ensuring adequate judicial 
instructions are discussed. The literature specific to alibi testimony is critically 
evaluated and related theory and research applied to increase understanding of 
this complex area. The literature review chapter outlines the research 
questions that remain unanswered. Moreover, the chapter explains how the 
thesis as a whole will add to understanding. It therefore contextualises the 
questions, methods and findings of the subsequent research chapters.
Methodology Chapters
Chapter 3: Defining Deceptive Alibi Witness Testimony
The thesis is predominantly concerned with establishing the factors that 
induce individuals to provide false alibi evidence. Contradictory case evidence 
reveals that individuals are criticised for reporting others’ crimes, and criticised 
for concealing them. The factors influencing these complex perceptions of alibi 
witness honesty/dishonesty are however unclear. The scarce research on this 
topic means the variables inducing the provision of false alibi witness evidence 
are similarly unknown. For this reason Chapter 3 explores general views of 
alibis with differing potential dispositional and situational motivations. 
Quantitative measurement of deceptiveness and justifiability of alibis addresses 
how these various forms of alibi witness deception are perceived. Moreover, 
the variables reported to influence participant perceptions of alibi witness 
deception are used to inform the key variables for analysis in the later chapters.
5
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Chapter 4: Measuring Attitudes towards the Criminal Justice System and Alibi 
Witness Honesty
This chapter relates to the creation of two measures that are utilised in 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7. The thesis as a whole is interested in intentions to provide 
false evidence for others. However, as there is no existing measure of 
intentions towards this specific behaviour, it was necessary to develop a 
measure of this. This chapter describes the development and validation of the 
False Evidence Questionnaire (FEQ) that is used later in studies to assess 
participant intentions to provide false evidence for others.
Flanagan, McGarrell and Brown (1985) suggest that perceptions of the 
police influences compliance with police directions. This suggests that negative 
views of the police could be involved in withholding information and false alibi 
witness testimony, a conclusion supported by the findings of Chapter 3. There 
are severe limitations associated with the existing methods and measures used 
to assess attitudes towards the police and criminal courts. Due to this, the 
Attitudes toward the Police and Courts Questionnaire (APCQ) was created.
The development and validation of this measure is described in this chapter. It 
is utilised in the subsequent Chapter 5.
Alibi Witness Perspective
Chapter 5: Attitudes towards the Criminal Justice System and Alibi Witness 
Honesty
Sarat (1977) and Walker (1977) suggest that a person's attitude towards 
the courts could be linked with their willingness to comply with the law. This 
clearly has implications for the willingness of witnesses and suspects to lie to 
the police, based upon whether they have favourable attitudes towards the 
police and criminal courts. This chapter therefore assesses how people view 
the police and criminal courts in general (using the APCQ developed in Chapter 
4), and whether having a negative opinion of the police and criminal courts will 
be associated with a greater willingness to deceive both of these institutions
6
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(using the FEQ, also developed in Chapter 4). As evidence suggests that those 
who have most contact with the police are most negative towards them, it also 
considers the effect that first-hand experience of the criminal justice system has 
upon both attitudes towards and willingness to deceive the police and criminal 
courts.
Chapter 6: Knowledge of the Law and Alibi Witness Honesty
Deterrence theory suggests that knowledge of the associated severity 
and probability of sanctions deters criminal behaviour (Robinson & Darley, 
2004). In relation to this, Rational Choice Theory suggests that people weigh 
up the benefits and drawbacks of behaviours. The applicability of these 
theories as an explanation of providing false evidence for others was tested in 
Chapter 6. As most people will not be aware of the legislation regarding 
deceiving the police and criminal courts, Chapter 6 manipulated this knowledge. 
Thus chapter 6 assessed the effect knowledge of the legislation and awareness 
of convictions of deceptive alibi witnesses upon intentions to provide false 
evidence for a loved one.
Chapter 7: The Impact of Relationship to Defendant upon Alibi Witness Honesty
Chapters 5 and 6 examine dispositional factors but Darley and Batson 
(1973) state that it is situational rather than dispositional factors that shape the 
decision to help others. One of the most obvious situational factors in the false 
alibi scenario is the relationship between the defendant and the false alibi 
provider. Evolutionary theories of altruism suggest that due to gene promotion, 
people have a greater motivation to help their family than non-family members 
(Hamilton, 1964). Similarly Kivivuori (2007) and Zahavi and Zahavi (1997) 
suggest that law breaking behaviour, such as false alibi provision, could be a 
gift signalling love and loyalty to a defendant. In support of this, Turner, Edgely 
and Olmstead (1975) found that rather than seeing honesty as the complete 
truth, participants saw honesty as the loyalty to a relationship. This evidence 
implies that alibi witnesses related genetically or romantically to a defendant are
7
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more likely than unrelated alibi witnesses to provide deceptive testimony (Burke 
& Turtle, 2004; Culhane & Hosch, 2004). Certainly previous research reveals 
juror scepticism towards these motivated alibi witnesses, although the accuracy 
of this bias is untested. Accordingly, Chapter 7 tests experimentally whether 
alibi witnesses and defendant relationship closeness influences the honesty of 
alibi witness testimony.
Juror Perspective
Chapter 8: Mock Juror Evaluations of Alibi Witness Evidence
Following on from the examination of whether the relationship between 
alibi witness and defendant influences false alibi provision, Chapter 7 assess 
how mock jurors evaluate motivated and unmotivated alibi evidence. Previous 
research suggests that jurors attribute very little weight to the testimony of 
motivated alibi witnesses, such as relatives of the defendant (Lindsay, Lim, 
Marando & Cully, 1986; Olson & Wells, 2004a), although there is scant 
research on this. Therefore Chapter 8 examines whether support can be found 
for the alibi scepticism hypothesis proposed by Olson and Wells (2004a). 
Furthermore, evidence suggests that although changes to alibi testimony do not 
strengthen a defendant's case (Culhane, 2005), little research has assessed the 
effect on trial outcome of a defendant concealing their alibi until court in order to 
ambush a trial. Despite this fact evidence shows that ambush alibis may be a 
frequent and attractive strategy for defendants to adopt (Olson & Wells, 2003; 
Turtle & Burke, 2003). This study therefore assesses how both timely and 
ambush alibis provided by motivated and non-motivated witnesses, are 
evaluated by jurors.
Chapter 9: General Discussion and Future Directions
The discussion chapter summarises the main findings of each chapter 
and illustrates how the thesis objectives have been met. Thus the advances in 
understanding about deceptive alibi witness testimony provision and evaluation 
are critically evaluated. The chapter links the findings back to existing theory
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and research to reveal where gaps in theoretical understanding still exist. This 
allows the contribution to knowledge made by the thesis as a whole to be made 
clear. In drawing together the findings of the thesis, those new unanswered 
questions posed that are beyond the scope of the current research are 
discussed. Moreover research strategies are presented to facilitate these 
issues being resolved in future. Finally the discussion chapter places the thesis 
findings in a real life context in presenting the implications of the research 
findings for Criminal justice sytem practice.
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CHAPTER 2: ALIBI WITNESS TESTIMONY: A
REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE
This chapter will examine the research literature pertaining to the act of 
providing false evidence for others. Although the research literature on false 
evidence is limited, there are many cases in which defence witnesses have 
been found guilty of providing false evidence. Sentencing decisions based on 
this false evidence have the potential for serious consequences, although it is 
difficult to gauge precise levels of occurrence due the format of crime reporting 
statistics. The literature has not addressed, why, how and when defence 
witnesses provide deliberate false evidence. Understanding how and why 
individuals provide false evidence is important if deceptive witnesses are to be 
detected, and public justice offences prevented. This chapter will first define 
what is meant by the terms alibi and alibi witnesses, before reviewing the 
psychological literature and legislation that pertains to them. As the research 
on this topic is limited, the chapter is speculative in terms of the potential 
influences upon deceptive alibi witness evidence.
Defining False Alibi Witness Evidence
An alibi is a defence under section 6A(3) of the Criminal Procedure and 
Investigations Act 1996 (CPIA) that the suspect/defendant was in a particular 
place at a particular time that meant that s/he was not, or unlikely to have been, 
at the place where an offence was committed at the time it is alleged to have 
been committed. Alibis can be provided by both suspects and defendants so 
for simplicity throughout this thesis they will, unless otherwise specified, 
collectively be referred to by the single term defendant. Although commonly 
understood to involve a claim that is corroborated by person or physical 
evidence, verification is not necessary for a defendant to have an alibi. Thus a 
false alibi may appear attractive to defendants, regardless of their guilt. A false 
alibi has the potential to enable a defendant to evade arrest and potentially 
commit further offences, mislead a court, put others in jeopardy of arrest and 
prevent the police from gathering vital evidence (Crown Prosecution Service,
10
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2011). Given the common perception that alibis require corroboration, getting 
another individual to support the false alibi (an alibi witness) may appear 
necessary to defendants. Thus providing or supporting a false alibi may be an 
attractive option for those wishing to assist a suspect or defendant to avoid 
conviction. However, an individual wishing to assist a defendant to avoid 
conviction can employ various verbal deceptive strategies. For example they 
may generate a false alibi, conceal relevant information when questioned by the 
police, or refuse to answer police questions.
The concealment or destruction of incriminating material evidence is a 
further way in which an individual may assist an offender to avoid conviction. 
However, not all cases will have physical evidence that can be tampered with. 
Moreover, it is only possible to assist a guilty defendant in this manner. In 
cases with no physical evidence or where the defendant is innocent, individuals 
can only assist the suspect/defendant through verbally manipulating evidence. 
Similarly, verbal manipulation of evidence (such as a false alibi or refusing to 
answer police questions) may be used in conjunction with the destruction or 
concealment of physical evidence.
Limited research has looked at false alibi witness testimony (Culhane, 
Hosch & Kehn, 2008; Dahl, Brimacombe & Lindsay, 2009; Dahl & Price, 2011; 
Olson & Charman, 2011), but none to date has examined the other verbal 
means of manipulating police perceptions of defendant culpability. Although not 
a false alibi in the strictest sense of the term, manipulation of evidence through 
other verbal strategies (such as omitting information when questioned or 
responding no comment) encourages the police/jurors to establish an erroneous 
belief regarding the suspect’s/defendant’s opportunity to commit the crime in 
question.
Given the limited research assessing alibi evidence (Granhag, Stromwall 
& Jonsson, 2003), and the high prevalence of deception research in forensic 
psychology (Vrij, 2008) it is logical to focus this exploratory thesis solely upon 
verbal deception by defence witnesses. Thus this thesis is concerned solely 
with the deception used by individuals who are not involved in the index offence, 
to assist a suspect or defendant to avoid conviction. As a defendant can be 
assisted through the concealment of crime relevant information as well as the
11
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fabrication of false evidence, throughout the thesis the term alibi witness will be 
used interchangeably with the term defence witness to collectively refer to:
■ individuals who conceal from the police and/courts information that 
implicates the suspect/defendant in a crime.
■ individuals who give false information to the police/courts which is 
intended to divert suspicion from the suspect/defendant.
■ individuals who are interviewed by the police or that testify in court 
about the suspect’s/defendant’s whereabouts at the time of the 
alleged crime.
Details of all the terminology and abbreviations employed in the thesis 
can be found on page iv.
The Legislation Pertaining to False Evidence Provision
Providing false and deceptive alibi evidence is not a distinct offence in 
itself. Deception by a defence witness is considered a public justice offence or 
a crime against the courts, as it is a crime that hinders the administration of 
justice. Thus an individual falsely convicted due to another’s false evidence is 
not able to bring a civil case against the perjurer (Justice, 1973). Accordingly, 
the view that false alibi provision is a victimless crime may contribute to the 
commission of this offence. Several Public Justice Offence charges are 
applicable to false alibi witness evidence; Wasting Police Time, Perverting the 
Course of Justice, Assisting an Offender, Concealing an Arrestable Offence and 
Perjury. These offences overlap, meaning that providing a false alibi for a 
defendant can result in a conviction of any one of several offences depending 
upon the guilt of the offender (that the alibi is provided for), the seriousness of 
the consequences and the context of the lies. Moreover, it is not solely alibi 
witnesses that can conduct these offences as defendants, eyewitnesses, and 
members of the public can be charged with public justice offences. This makes 
it very difficult to assess the frequency with which alibi witnesses provide false 
evidence. This point will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter. The 
public justice offences legislation allows for charges to be brought for both the 
fabrication of false information and the concealment of true information. Thus
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omitting key information is a criminal offence, although it is generally seen as 
less serious. Each of these offences will subsequently be briefly discussed.
Perverting the Course of Justice attracts a maximum penalty of life 
imprisonment and/or a fine. In order to commit this offence, the alibi witness’ 
deception must occur when the course of justice is in progress in the form of a 
police investigation, court case, or event from which it is reasonable to suppose 
that a police investigation will follow. Perverting the Course of Justice is a 
common law offence and thus has no specific governing legislation. As 
perverting the course of justice may apply to a wide range of acts, its use is 
reserved for only the most serious incidences of interference with the 
administration of justice. The attempt to pervert the course of justice does not 
need to be successful in order for an offence to have been committed. Thus a 
witness whose alibi is immediately discovered to be false can still be charged 
with perverting the course of justice even though they did not significantly 
disrupt the police investigation. For example, Laura Campbell was sentenced 
with two counts of perverting the course of justice and one of perjury for 
providing a false alibi and attempting to coerce a friend into supporting the alibi 
for the defendant in a murder case (R v Campbell, (2006)).
A charge of Wasting Police Time (Criminal Law Act 1967, section 5(2)) 
can be brought against an individual who provides false information in the 
course of a police investigation. The greatest possible penalty for this offence is 
six months imprisonment and/or a fine. The criteria for this offence are that the 
principal offender has committed an arrestable offence; the accused individual 
knows or believes that the principal offender has committed the offence; and the 
accused does an act with the intention to impede the apprehension or 
prosecution of the offender.
An individual who knows or believes a suspect to be guilty and impedes 
the police investigation of that suspect can be charged with Assisting an 
Offender (Criminal Law Act 1967 section 4(1)). The suspect must be guilty in 
order for a charge to be made and the alibi witness’ sentence is based upon the 
punishment applicable to the principal offence. Thus the alibi witness’ sanction 
ranges between three and ten years' imprisonment. Concealing an Arrestable 
Offence (Criminal Law Act 1967 section 58(5)) involves failure to disclose to the
police information that may assist the prosecution of the offender. This offence 
is associated with a maximum punishment of two years imprisonment.
An offence of Perjury occurs when a lawfully sworn witness in court 
makes a statement that they know or believe to be false that is important to the 
case being tried in the court (Perjury Act 1911, section 1(1)). This offence 
carries a maximum penalty of seven years imprisonment and/or a fine. 
Corroboration is always needed before an individual can be charged with 
perjury. Usually individuals committing perjury will also have committed the 
offence of perverting the course of justice. However, to avoid overloading of 
charges offenders are rarely charged with both offences. Instead a charge of 
perverting the course of justice is often used where the perjury is part of a 
series of acts aiming to pervert the course of justice.
The Crown Prosecution Service has considerable discretion in choosing 
which charge to bring against a suspected deceptive alibi witness. The general 
sentencing guidelines state that the charge:
■ should reflect the extent of the accused's involvement and responsibility
■ should allow the case to be presented in a clear and simple manner to 
the jury
■ should not result in overloading where many charges are brought against 
the individual in order to encourage a guilty plea to a small number of 
them, or to a lesser charge.
Additionally, guidelines specific to Public Justice Offences consider 
whether the conduct:
■ “was spontaneous and unplanned or deliberate and elaborately planned
■ was momentary and irresolute or prolonged and determined
■ was motivated by misplaced loyalty to a relative/friend or was part of a 
concerted effort to avoid, pervert, or defeat justice
■ whether the activities of the defendant drew in others
■ was intended to result in trivial or serious harm to the administration of 
justice
■ resulted in trivial or serious harm to the administration of justice.”
(Crown Prosecution Service, 2011)
Thus three key points arise from the evaluation of alibi witness deception 
whether it was an altruistic act motivated by loyalty, whether it intended to
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cause harm to justice and whether it was spontaneous. These variables are 
therefore seen by the CJS as key components of deceptive alibi witness 
culpability, although there is no empirical research examining alibi evidence 
from the alibi witness perspective. The former highlights the fact that some alibi 
witness deception may stem from a desire to help loved ones, suggesting that 
altruism may be a key factor in alibi witness deception. This is a variable that 
previous alibi research has also suggested as key to alibi witness deception 
(Hosch, Culhane, Jolly, Chavez & Shaw, 2011) and will be discussed at length 
in the future directions for alibi research section of this chapter. The latter are 
predicated upon whether alibi witnesses are aware that their deception is illegal, 
which given the lack of publicity around public justice offences, is certainly 
questionable. Thus the level of planning associated with deceptive alibi witness 
testimony unknown. It is not even clear whether they are aware that deception 
to the police and in court is a criminal offence, or whether they view their 
behaviour as an acceptable victimless crime. This is a point that future 
research should address and is again discussed in further detail later in the 
chapter. Understanding the role of these variables in the provision of false alibi 
witness evidence would aid understanding of the individual and situational 
factors affecting false alibi provision, and also facilitate an understanding of 
juror evaluations of alibi witness testimony. In turn this should highlight whether 
judicial directions to counteract juror biases towards alibi evidence are required.
Frequency of False Alibi Witness Evidence
Although it might be imagined that the sanctions associated with false 
evidence provision would discourage this behaviour, people are still regularly 
convicted of providing false evidence. Table 1 demonstrates that causing 
wasteful employment of the police is less common although these most recent 
has increased in the last ten years. More cases of perverting the course of 
justice were proceeded against than other types of public justice offences, 
although these numbers are decreasing. Proceeding in cases of perverting the 
course of justice offence may be more likely to be serve public interest due to 
the greater seriousness of this type of public justice offence.
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To put these statistics in context, between September 2010 and 
September 2011 a total of 1.58 million defendants were proceeded against in 
magistrates’ courts (Ministry of Justice, 2012). Moreover, as highlighted 
previously, it is not clear how many of these 25,314 public justice offences were 
committed by alibi witnesses compared to defendants and prosecution 
witnesses. Although this makes providing false evidence for others appear 
infrequent and unimportant, it is important to recognise the situationally 
dependant nature of this behaviour. False alibis must by their nature be told in 
relation to another index offence, meaning the situations in which they can 
occur are limited; an alibi will not be appropriate or plausible in all criminal 
cases. Thus the situational nature of false alibi provision means that 
convictions would not be expected to be as high as convictions for many other 
offences which can occur in a much wider range of contexts. Furthermore, 
levels of deception detection are low (Vrij, 2008), external disproving evidence 
is rarely available (Wells & Olson, 2003) and proving malicious intent on the 
part of the false evidence provider is difficult. Therefore the complexity of 
establishing the ground truth of alibis means there is potential for many cases to 
go undetected and thus untried.
Notwithstanding this fact, a legal database search reveals many 
instances of false evidence provision by defence witnesses (see for example R.
V Charlotte Irene Hall (1982); R v Moran and another (2005); R v Tracey (2007); 
R v T  (2011)) illustrating that this is a relatively frequent phenomenon that is 
worthy of academic study. Thus, although the statistics presented in Table 1 
suggest how widespread deception within the criminal justice system actually is, 
they may actually underestimate the scale of this problem. Certainly evidence 
from the Innocence Project in America (Connors, Lundregan, Miller & McEwen, 
1996; Wells, Small, Penrod, Malpass, Fulero & Brimacombe, 1998) suggests 
that alibi evidence is a major cause of miscarriages of justice and is a topic 
requiring further research.
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False Alibi Witness Evidence and Deception
Many different definitions of deception are utilised in the deception 
literature (Vrij, 2008) though most share the same broad feature; the deliberate 
intent to mislead. There are many subcategories of deception. For example 
Vrij (2008) distinguishes between outright lies, subtle lies and exaggerations. 
According to Vrij, lies involve communicating information that the speaker 
believes to be false. Conversely, subtle lies involve concealment of information 
which allows another to develop or maintain a false belief. Other research 
draws a broader dichotomy between deception through concealment and 
deception through fabrication as Galasiriski (2000) points out:
The passive deceiver does not say something that is true and 
relevant, inducing thereby a belief (or set of beliefs) that does not 
represent the whole (relevant) picture of reality in the addressee; thus, 
the passive deceiver does not prevent the addressee from acquiring the 
belief. The active deceiver, on the other hand, says something for the 
addressee to acquire such a belief. This is the key distinction between 
fabrications and omissions, (p. 22)
Thus false evidence provision does not necessarily have to involve an 
act of commission, rather the term is used subsequently to refer to both 
fabricated and concealed crime relevant information. Masip, Garrido and 
Herrero (2004) provide a comprehensive definition of deception which considers 
speaker motivation, means of deception and deception outcome; “the deliberate 
attempt, whether successful or not, to conceal, fabricate, and/or manipulate in 
any way factual and/or emotional information, by verbal and/or nonverbal 
means, in order to create or maintain in others a belief that the communicator 
himself or herself considers false” (Masip, Garrido & Herrero, 2004, p. 147).
This definition of deception will be utilised in the thesis.
Deception through Commission
A lie is a factually false statement that is believed to be false by speaker, 
that the speaker wants the hearer to believe is true (Bok, 1978). Thus false 
alibis in their strictest definition (a false claim that the defendant was in a 
particular place at a particular time that meant they could not committed crime
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under investigation) are situationally relevant lies. Alibis have the potential to 
persuade a jury against a guilty verdict, which has prompted some researchers 
to suggest that “an alibi is undoubtedly the strongest weapon in the hands of the 
defence” (Scheffer, 2003, p.330). Scheffer suggests that confronted with an 
alibi, the Crown Prosecution Service must accept that their case is greatly 
weakened. However, there is considerable research to demonstrate that not all 
alibi pleas carry this weight with jurors (i.e. Burke & Turtle, 2004; Culhane & 
Hosch, 2004; Culhane, Hosch & Kehn, 2008). However, as mentioned defence 
witnesses may assist a defendant through deceptive means other than 
fabricated stories about the defendant’s whereabouts.
Another way in which an individual may provide false evidence is through 
falsely confessing to a crime on another's behalf. Although by definition this 
form of statement is a lie (it involves a fabricated statement), the unique 
situational factors involved in explicitly implicating oneself in a crime appear 
quite different to other forms of lies. Evidence shows that false confessions are 
frequently offered to protect a friend or relative, a fact often revealed in 
interviews with juvenile defenders (Gudjonsson, 1992; Gudjonsson & MacKeith, 
1990). Gudjonsson and Sigurdsson (1994) state that in a sample of Icelandic 
prisoners claiming to have made a false confession in the past, 48% of them 
reported doing so in order to protect somebody else from arrest and prosecution. 
False confessions for the benefit of another can be seen as entirely distinct to 
other lies in this setting as they are an outright and clear way of deflecting 
suspicion away from the suspect. Furthermore, this form of false evidence 
arguably puts the alibi witness at more risk of prosecution than all other forms of 
false evidence provision. This is because if the police discover the confession 
is false, the false confessor stands the risk of being prosecuted under the public 
justice offence legislation (for example through being charged with assisting an 
offender or perverting the course of justice). Conversely, if the false confession 
is believed the confessor is likely to be prosecuted for the index offence. With 
other forms of lies a defence witness can put forward, the risk exists only in 
relation to the discovery of the deception. Thus false confessions can be seen 
to be fundamentally different to any other form of deception that can be 
conducted on the defendant's behalf as the false confession is more risky than
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other false evidence provision strategies. Finally this is the only strategy that a 
defence witness can employ that assists the defendant through directing police 
suspicion onto the individual themselves, rather than onto an unknown other.
For example, a successful false alibi (defined according to the alibi definition of 
6A(3) of CPIA) rules out the defendant from the police enquiries but does not 
implicate anyone else in the crime. Thus, false confessions and other forms of 
lies can be seen as distinct categories worthy of independent examination. For 
this reason alibi witness false confessions will be examined separately to false 
alibis within this thesis.
Deception through Omission
As stated previously the passive deceiver creates a false impression 
through omitting to verbalise pertinent information (Bok, 1989; Bradac, 1983; 
Galasinski, 2000; Metts, 1989). Thus alibi witnesses may deceive the police 
and courts through concealing their knowledge of the defendant’s guilt. 
Information can be omitted by defence witnesses in interviews with the police, in 
giving evidence in court, or through failure to initiate contact with the police.
This may be preferable to alibi witnesses compared to fabricating evidence as 
omissions can be more easily claimed as spontaneous, unplanned and 
momentary. These features of sentencing guidelines for public justice offences 
are associated with less serious and lower likelihood of charges being brought 
against the alibi witness (Crown Prosecution Service, 2011). However, this 
presumes that alibi witness’ have some awareness of the relevant sentencing 
guidelines, or a personal calculation of risk. This point necessitates further 
research and is discussed in more detail later in this chapter.
When asked a direct question by the police, rather than neglecting to 
mention some key information, individuals can avoid answering a question 
altogether (Galasinski, 2000). Bradac (1983) states that evasions are those 
messages that the speaker believes will fail to inform the addressee about a 
relevant belief, or which will inform the addressee of matters other than the 
relevant matters. Galasinski further classifies evasive responses as either 
covert or overt. Covert evasion can be classified as those instances where the 
speaker does not show that they are giving an uncooperative answer, for
example through subtly changing the topic. Conversely, overt evasion refers to 
a direct statement by the answerer stating that they will not cooperatively 
answer. This could be in the form of a direct challenge, an answer implying the 
legitimacy of the question is flawed or a sudden change of topic. Thus in the 
context of police interview, a response of no comment would be classed as an 
overt evasion. Although Galasinski (2000) asserts that the overtness of 
evasions prevent them from being deceptive, this is not the case for the 
situationally relevant no comment evasion. As suspects have the right to 
remain silent in interviews, a no comment response could be perceived as an 
alibi witness exercising their legal right, rather than attempting to mislead.
Either way, the incriminating information a witness may possess is kept from the 
interviewer. Thus evasion through a no comment response could be an 
effective way of assisting a defendant.
Deception Acceptability
Spranca, Minsk and Baron (1991) examined participant reactions to a 
series of scenarios in which a negative outcome occurred as a result of an 
individual behaving dishonestly through either omission or commission.
Findings illustrated that despite parity in consequences, omissions were 
consistently viewed by participants as more moral (on a 100 point scale) than 
commissions. In support of this, Schweizer and Croson (1999) discovered that 
participants reported being less likely to reveal a problem with a car they were 
selling when the prospective buyer did not specifically ask about that aspect of 
the car's functioning, compared to when they were asked about this aspect of 
the car's functioning. These results illustrate that in a variety of situations 
people feel more comfortable performing omissions than commissions.
Although very different deceptive situations to that of providing false evidence 
for others, they strongly suggest that omission of evidence to the police will be 
viewed as more acceptable than the commission of a lie. An explanation for 
this is provided by Kahneman and Tversky (1982) who found that less remorse 
was reported when bad consequences resulted from inaction than when it 
resulted from action. Thus it may be hypothesised that people will be more 
willing to help a defendant through concealing information, than through
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fabricating information. However, these studies generally had relatively trivial 
scenarios with minor negative outcomes in comparison with those associated 
with false evidence provision. For example selling a faulty car or computer, and 
allowing or encouraging a rival to unknowingly eat an ingredient they are 
allergic to. This questions the applicability of the omission-commission 
distinction findings to the serious situation of providing false evidence for others. 
An exception to this is one vignette utilised by Spranca et al. (1991) that 
assessed participant reactions to a scenario in which a witness either lies about 
who the guilty party in a traffic accident is (commission), or tells the police 
nothing at all (omission) in order to assist a friend (guilty party). They 
discovered that 68% of people rated the omission as less bad than the 
commission. This scenario is based upon the deception of alibi witnesses and 
therefore further supports the concept that alibi witnesses will be more likely to 
omit incriminating information than fabricate a false account in order to assist a 
loved one. Moreover, focus group research with members of the public has 
indicated that omitting to tell the police crime relevant information in order to 
protect a defendant was more acceptable than lying (Fawcett, 2006). Although 
very small in scale Fawcett’s research provides considerable support to the idea 
that alibi witnesses are more likely to assist a defendant through omitting 
information than fabricating information, and that omissions to benefit a 
defendant are generally viewed as more acceptable than fabrications.
Related to the role of consequences in shaping perceptions of deception 
acceptability, research has illustrated that honesty is influenced by perceptions 
of recipient ‘goodness’ (Lee, 2004). Lee examined deception by journalists, 
finding that they were more willing to lie when the recipient of the lie was viewed 
negatively. This suggests that attitudes towards the police and criminal courts 
may influence the likelihood of alibi witness deception also. However, no 
research to date has examined whether such a link between opinions of the 
criminal justice system and alibi witness deception exists. As more research 
has examined the motive to succeed in the lie than the more general motive of 
the deceiver, this is an area that needs further research (Burgoon, 1994; Seiter, 
Bruschke, & Bai, 2002). This is certainly a variable that should be examined in
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future. This is discussed in further depth in the future directions section of this 
chapter, and is examined empirically in Chapter 5 of the thesis.
Intentions of the deceiver have been demonstrated to influence 
perceptions of deception acceptability in a further way (see for example, 
Lindskold & Walter, 1983). For example, Seiter, Bruschke, & Bai, (2002) 
examined participant ratings of the acceptability of lying to friends, family, 
partners, teachers and bosses through lie vignettes. Analysis revealed that as 
the motive for the deception became less self-benefiting and more altruistic, 
ratings of the deception acceptability increased. In fact Seiter et al. found that 
motive of the liar accounted for more variance in ratings of lie acceptability than 
the other variables examined (relationship between the liar and target, and the 
culture of the participant). This suggests that alibi witness deception may be 
influenced by whether the defendant believes the defendant to be guilty, and 
whether the defendant is in fact guilty. Attempting to assist an individual 
believed to be innocent may be seen as more acceptable than lies told to assist 
a guilty defendant. This is because the false alibi provider can be seen to have 
good intentions in terms of both helping a partner, and in ensuring that an 
innocent individual avoids punishment. Defendant guilt and alibi witness 
perceptions of defendant guilt are explored in Chapter 3 of the thesis.
Due to the differences between fabrications, omissions and evasions 
highlighted in prior research this thesis will examine false alibi witness evidence 
provided through these means. Additionally, due to the fundamental differences 
between fabricating a false alibi story and falsely confessing to a crime to assist 
a defendant, a distinction will be drawn in the thesis between these two types of 
lies. Thus the thesis is concerned with false alibi witness testimony in the forms 
of omissions, no comment evasions, outright lies (including false alibis) and 
false confessions.
Detecting Deception
Although the research distinguishes between different forms of deception, 
it has almost exclusively focused upon lies at the expense of examining 
omissions. No research to date has specifically examined whether different
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forms of deception are easier to detect than others. This could account for 
individual differences in detection accuracy across the research literature; 
although the research literature often uses the terms deception and lies 
interchangeably, as highlighted previously, they are in fact separate concepts. 
Limited research has focused upon the detection of deception in real life cases, 
so called high stakes lies, in order to address the low ecological validity criticism 
of the laboratory based deception research. This research is limited in scope 
(Porter & ten Brinke, 2010) given the difficulty of access to the samples under 
question, and resultant difficulties in establishing the ground truth of their stories. 
For example studies have analysed the behaviour of individuals such as 
Saddam Hussein (Davis & Hadiks, 1995), Bill Clinton (Hirsch & Wolf, 2001) and 
Ian Huntley (Vrij, 2008) with the goal of revealing cues to deceit. The research 
illustrates that these liars did not behave in the nervous and fidgeting state that 
the public expects; instead they showed signs of behaviour control and 
cognitive effort (Vrij, 2008). This suggests that an explanation for poor 
detection of deception is the inaccurate cues relied upon by evaluators. This 
concept is supported by further research examining the truths and lies told by a 
range of real life serious offenders within their actual police interviews (Mann,
Vrij & Bull, 2002). The coding of the suspect’s interview footage showed that 
individual differences dominated the behaviour with no clear behaviour trends 
exhibited by all offenders in the sample. Although efforts were made to 
establish where individual lies were told by comparison with independent 
eyewitness accounts, this research is subject to hindsight bias and problems 
with establishing the ground truth of the case, as well as control over the real 
life interview dynamics.
Due to issues with establishing the ground truth, deception research has 
typically been conducted in the laboratory. This research requires participants 
to watch a series of video clips in which 'suspects' either truthfully or deceptively 
deny having stolen an item, and make a judgement as to whether they are lying 
or telling the truth. Conversely in some research examining the behaviour 
exhibited by liars, participants have provided truthful answers and false answers 
in turn when asked three questions pertaining to the actions of a witness, victim 
and thief in a mock crime video (Vrij, Edward & Bull, 2001). The validity of the
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deception detection paradigm is limited in that the guilty suspects have received 
prior instructions to steal and/or lie meaning their behaviour may not be entirely 
natural. However, these limitations are often necessary in order to ascertain the 
ground truth. Moreover, researchers have attempted to increase participant 
motivation and enhance the stakes of the lie situation by offering financial 
rewards for successful lying and punishment (loud white noise) for poor lying 
ability (Frank & Ekman, 1997). However, whether the prospect of these 
consequences is sufficiently severe to replicate the consequences of deception 
in actual suspect interviews is doubtful.
Nonetheless, these studies have revealed an average deception 
detection rate of just 54% (Vrij, 2000) for police and members of the public, 
illustrating that generally people detect deception at no better than chance level. 
Moreover, in a review of the deception detection research, Vrij (2000) found a 
truth bias in the detection of deception. Thus on average 67% of truths are 
correctly identified compared to an average of just 44% of lies. This truth bias is 
generally acknowledged to be the result of several factors; the availability 
heuristic, social presentation behaviour, social conversation rules, the 
falsifiability heuristic and the additional cognitive demands associated with 
inferring deception (Vrij, 2008). Although the truth bias is prevalent in members 
of the general public, Meissner and Kassin (2002) found evidence for an 
investigator bias towards deception judgements. This supports the availability 
heuristic as the general public are more frequently exposed to truthful 
statements (O’Sullivan, Ekman & Friesen, 1988), whereas the nature of their 
work primes police officers to be suspicious of suspect deception.
The fact that suspects are by their very nature suspected of committing 
an offence means police suspicion of these individuals is high. Defendants 
have a lot to gain through a successful lie as they may avoid conviction. 
Moreover, if their falsehood is discovered, they will probably be convicted for 
the index offence alone, or the index offence and their lies concurrently. 
Conversely, the deception of defence witnesses runs the risk of punishment, in 
exchange solely for the potential avoidance of conviction for the defendant. The 
alibi witness does not directly benefit through their deception even if it is 
successful. Thus the benefits associated with lying are arguably less for alibi
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witnesses, and their motive is less clear. In turn this may mean that police are 
inherently less suspicious of alibi witnesses, than of defendants. Moreover, 
although revealing the deception of an alibi witness may substantially weaken a 
defendant's case, it should not be used by jurors as proof of guilt (Judicial 
Studies Board, 2010). Therefore, although detecting lies by alibi witnesses 
could be beneficial to the prosecution, it could be argued that police have more 
incentive to detect the lies of a defendant, than the lies of an alibi witness. The 
detection of deception in defence witnesses has not been researched to date so 
it is uncertain whether the investigator bias extends to the presumption of 
deception in defence witnesses. Understanding why different types of 
deception are engaged in by alibi witnesses will be of interest to police officers 
in directing their suspicions towards those defence witnesses most likely to be 
deceptive. As police are generally not skilled at detecting lies, an 
understanding of who lies for others, and when and how they do so, may help 
police focus their investigation and suspicion towards those alibi witnesses most 
likely to be deceptive. This in turn, may facilitate the detection of deceptive 
defendants.
The act of appearing to be moral whilst avoiding the costs of being so is 
termed moral hypocrisy (Batson, Sager, Garst, Kang, Rubchinsky & Dawson, 
1997). Moral hypocrisy was first demonstrated in relation to assignment of self 
and others to positive and negative tasks (Batson, Sager, Garst, Kang, 
Rubchinsky & Dawson, 1997). Participants were asked to toss a coin and use 
this to assign themselves and another participant to positive and neutral tasks, 
without showing the results of the coin toss to anyone else. Results revealed 
that although only 1 in 20 participants believed assigning themselves to the 
positive task to be the most moral course of action, 90% of participants did so 
following the coin toss. This is far more participants assigned to the positive 
task than would be expected by chance (50%). The authors concluded that the 
private coin toss allowed participants to make their immoral behaviour (giving 
self the positive task irrespective of coin toss outcome) appear moral (the result 
of a fair coin toss). Thus in relation to deception and more specifically the 
current research, moral hypocrisy refers to appearing to be moral and loyal to a 
defendant, but avoiding the costs of doing so (prosecution) by only taking the
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lowest risk strategy (omission rather than fabrication). This suggests that alibi 
witnesses may favour omissions rather than commissions in order to assist a 
defendant.
The Alibi Witness Research to Date
The alibi witness research conducted to date is limited due to research 
attention being devoted to this topic only relatively recently. In the main the 
existing research has examined the availability of corroboration for false alibis, 
and the evaluations of alibi evidence in general by the police and jurors. 
Questionnaires have been used to assess who people think would corroborate 
their false alibi story, whereas experimental methods have been employed to 
test to the evaluation of various forms of alibi evidence by mock police officers 
and mock jurors. A review of this literature will now be presented followed by a 
review of additional variables implied by the existing research to be associated 
with false alibi witness evidence.
Alibi Generation
As illustrated in Figure 1, based upon evaluator reactions to range of alibi 
stories Olson (2004b) concluded that the construction and evaluation of alibis 
occurs in a set of sequential stages.
F ig u re  1: M o d e l o f th e  P ro c e s s  o f A lib i G e n e ra t io n  (a d a p te d  fro m  O ls o n , 2 0 0 4 b )
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The first two stages of the process refer to the alibi provider focused 
stages. For this reason they are said to occur in the alibi generation domain. 
Initially the alibi provider supplies an account of their whereabouts at the time of 
the crime in the story phase of the alibi. On this point, Skowronski, Betz, 
Thompson and Shannon (1991) found that although participants were good at 
recalling which day of the week an event occurred, they frequently cited the 
wrong week. A strength of this research is that although participants were 
asked to recall real life events, the ground truth of their recall could be 
corroborated in diaries kept by participants for the duration for the research. 
However, Burke, Turtle and Olson (2007) point out that an innocent individual is 
likely to be unaware that they will be required to provide an alibi for the time of a 
crime and so may be more susceptible to producing a hazy or inaccurate alibi. 
Moreover, Olson and Charman (2011) point out that poor memory may lead to 
either; an inability to recall one’s whereabouts; a mistaken account of one’s 
whereabouts; or a lack of support (or convincing support) for one’s alibi. 
Skowronski et al. required participants to record and recall only unique events 
meaning that this may not effectively replicate the experience of many innocent 
defendants, and alibi witnesses. Nonetheless, the research shows that even 
unique events, which are likely to be highly memorable, are not accurately 
recalled. This clearly demonstrates the potential for unintentionally false alibi 
witness evidence.
The alibi is corroborated through physical and/or person evidence in the 
subsequent validation phase of Olson's alibi generation model. Kurbat, Shevell 
and Rips (1998) investigated students’ memory for autobiographical events.
The results showed that when asked to produce corroboration of where they 
were on a given date, many participants provided evidence to show where they 
should have been (such as a university timetable) rather than proof they were 
actually there (such as CCTV footage of them in a class). They termed this 
tendency to reconstruct their whereabouts from diaries and external sources as 
the calendar effect. The calendar effect may be exacerbated if the individual is 
unaware at the time that they will later be required to state their whereabouts.
In support of this, Olson and Charman (2011) found that when questioned about 
their alibi just 48 hours after providing it participant’s alibis for a given date
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frequently changed. The frequency of changes was greater when the alibi was 
required for a date 3 months previously (42%), compared to 3 days previously 
(30%). This supports the suggestion that a genuine alibi story may drastically 
change over time as external sources (such as a diary or other’s accounts) are 
consulted to verify whereabouts at the critical time (Olson & Wells, 2003).
Olson and Charman acknowledge that participants were prevented from 
consulting their diary when providing their initial alibi, a circumstance which may 
not replicate real life practice. Thus these findings may slightly overestimate 
alibi changes in real life investigations.
Olson and Wells (2004b) discovered that participants tend to 
overestimate the ease with which alibi providers can produce evidence to 
support their alibi, a finding which prompted the development of the alibi 
scepticism hypothesis. Their results demonstrated that the experience of alibi 
construction appeared to cause evaluators to view others' alibis more leniently. 
However, as with all alibi generation research, a limitation of this study is the 
potentially low participant motivation to prove their whereabouts in comparison 
to a suspect or alibi witness in a real criminal investigation. However, this 
limitation is unavoidable given the ethical issues that enhancing ecological 
validity would create. Nonetheless, the findings illustrate that the process of 
constructing an alibi highlighted for participants how difficult providing 
corroboration for an alibi is.
In support of Olson and Well’s (2004b) findings, evidence shows that 
evaluators associate consistent evidence with reliable evidence (DePaulo, 
Lindsay, Malone, Muhlenbruck, Charlton & Cooper, 2003; Hartwig, Granhag, 
Stromwall & Vrij, 2005; Culhane, Hosch & Kehn, 2008). However, there is no 
significant association between deceptive evidence and inconsistencies (Vrij, 
2008) as liars attempt to appear consistent by memorising a set version of 
events. Nonetheless, poor memory and lack of preparation time could cause 
genuine alibis to appear less credible to alibi evaluators than false alibis as 
evaluators are unaware of the difficulty of alibi corroboration, and the changes 
to testimony this can lead to. This point is examined in more detail later in the 
chapter, when future directions of alibi research are considered.
Culhane, Hosch and Kehn (2008) asked participants to honestly state 
what physical evidence (such as tickets and receipts) and person evidence they 
could provide to demonstrate their whereabouts for a specified time. Results 
showed that significantly more participants could provide alibi witnesses than 
could provide physical evidence of their location. Moreover, Turtle and Burke 
(2003) illustrated in their sample of Canadian cases, that less than 14% of 
cases included physical alibi corroboration, compared to between 68% and 86% 
where an alibi witness was available. This illustrates the prevalence of alibi 
witnesses in court cases and the need to understand juror's reception of this 
evidence. Additionally questionnaires administered by Culhane, Hosch and 
Kehn (2008) found that the majority of participants believed that they could get 
someone to provide a false alibi on their behalf. Furthermore, almost all of 
these false alibi witnesses had a prior relationship with the defendant in that 
they were their friends, parents or romantic partners. This finding is supported 
by later research by Hosch, Culhane, Jolly, Chavez and Shaw (2011) whose 
survey found that participants were most willing to lie for a biologically related 
defendant, followed by a marriage related defendant and finally a socially 
related defendant. However, a limitation of this research is that it considered 
solely false alibis, rather than other forms of deception that alibi witnesses may 
use to assist a loved one accused of a crime. This highlights the need to 
assess intentions to engage in these more subtle forms of deception in order to 
assist a defendant.
The alibi literature has drawn a distinction between motivated alibi 
witnesses (individuals with an existing relationship with the defendant) and 
unmotivated alibi witnesses (those with no relationship with the defendant prior 
to the case), based upon the perceived motivation to lie for a defendant. The 
former is generally suggested to be weak evidence (Connors, Lundregan, Miller 
& McEwen, 1996; Culhane & Hosch, 2004; Golding, Stewart, Yozwiak, Djadali 
& Sanchez, 2000). As individuals spend the majority of their time with family 
members and friends it is only logical that these relations will be the most likely 
individuals to form genuine false alibi witnesses for a defendant. As Martin 
(1967) points out, most law abiding citizens are in bed with their spouse at 3am 
rather than out where strangers can see them. This would also imply that false
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alibis are more likely to be corroborated by alibi witnesses with a prior 
relationship with the defendant. However, in an experimental study Jolly (2010) 
found that relationship satisfaction, investment, commitment did not predict alibi 
witness evidence fabrication. Excepting that mentioned above, the research 
literature has not assessed the effect of the defendant/alibi witness relationship 
upon the honesty of alibi witness evidence. Instead it has focused more upon 
the effect of the relationship between defendants and alibi witnesses upon alibi 
evaluators, a point that will be returned to later in the chapter.
Alibi Evaluation
The third and fourth stages of Olson’s (2004b) model are focused upon 
how the alibi is received by others and so Olson terms these stages as the alibi 
believability domain. In the evaluation phase the truthfulness of the alibi story is 
evaluated by those encountering it, before a subsequent judgement of the 
defendant's guilt or innocence is made in the ultimate evaluation phase. If the 
alibi is judged as true in the evaluation phase the defendant must be seen as 
not guilty in the ultimate evaluation phase. However, as a belief that the 
defendant is guilty does not automatically follow from an evaluation that the alibi 
is false (it is not solely guilt that a defendant may not wish to reveal to others), 
the alibi believability phase can be said to have two distinct stages. The 
perceived veracity of an alibi can be affected by many factors, namely whether 
there is corroboration, the motivations of any alibi witnesses, the stage at which 
the alibi is disclosed, and any predisposed biases amongst jurors towards alibi 
evidence. The research pertaining to each of these variables will now be 
discussed.
Alibi Evaluation by the Police
Olson and Wells (2004b) categorised the true alibis of participants based 
upon how believable they were to mock-detective evaluators (
Figure 2). They created a series of alibi scenarios by manipulating the 
person and physical evidence available to support a suspects alibi. Findings
illustrated that an easily fabricated till receipt (physical evidence) was sufficient 
to render the alibi evidence irrelevant. Moreover, strong physical and person 
evidence supporting the defendant (a neutral person corroborating the alibi and 
a dated, timed security video capturing a clear image of the suspect) was 
associated with a mean believability score of only 7.4 out of a possible 10. This 
suggests that jurors require a significant amount of evidence from a variety of 
sources in order to exonerate a defendant. This lack of complete believability in 
the face of such strong evidence implies some support for the alibi scepticism 
hypothesis. However, the findings illustrated that not all alibis were viewed with 
equal scepticism suggesting that police evaluations of alibis may be more 
complex than simple blanket alibi scepticism.
F ig u re  2 : T a x o n o m y  o f A lib i C o rro b o ra tio n  (O ls o n  & W e lls , 2 0 0 4 b )
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Olson and Wells further discovered that alibi corroboration from an 
unmotivated stranger was seen as more credible than corroboration from an 
unmotivated familiar other (although this difference was not statistically 
significant). Although neither of these witnesses have a motive to lie, the 
stranger should be more likely than the familiar other to be honestly mistaken in 
their identification of the defendant. As previously mentioned, Culhane, Hosch 
and Kehn (2008) discovered that most people think that their friends, parents or 
romantic partner would support their false alibi. This would imply that false 
alibis are more likely to be corroborated by motivated alibi witnesses, than by 
unmotivated alibi witnesses. As previously discussed, although some alibis 
from motivated alibi witnesses are undoubtedly false, mere relationship 
between defendant and alibi witness does not necessarily guarantee the
falseness of an alibi (Culhane et al., 2008). Although a weak or false alibi may 
be evidence of an unreliable alibi provider and alibi witness, it is not evidence of 
guilt (Connelly, 1983).
Olson and Well’s findings support the concept that evaluators 
underestimate the difficulty of corroborating an alibi. This supports the research 
literature relating to eyewitnesses, suggesting that jurors also do not consider 
the potential of genuine identification and timing mistakes. Culhane (2005) 
investigated the effect of changes to alibi statements upon guilt ratings provided 
by student participants taking the role of detectives. Analysis revealed that 
changing the alibi statement has a detrimental effect upon believability ratings, 
regardless of whether the change strengthened or weakened the alibi. In fact 
Culhane found that defendants were evaluated more positively when they had 
no alibi, in comparison to defendants who later strengthened their initial alibi 
testimony. In addition to this, questionnaire data collected in America shows 
that 90% of participants believe that people who change their alibi after a police 
interview are probably lying (Culhane, Hosch & Kehn, 2008).
Dahl and Price (2011) found that although the relationship between alibi 
witness and suspect did not affect mock investigator decisions to arrest the 
suspect, participants were more likely to believe the suspect was innocent and 
their alibi was genuine when the alibi witness was 6 years old compared to an 
adult. This suggests that regardless of their relationship to the defendant 
children are thought to be honest, whereas adult motivated alibi witnesses are 
presumed to lie for a defendant. The research pertaining to the accuracy of 
child testimony in general is however mixed, with some demonstrating the belief 
that memory reliability increases with age, and other research finding no effect 
of age upon perceived witness accuracy (Magnussen et al., 2006).
Dahl, Brimacombe and Lindsay (2009) examined the impact of 
competing alibi witness and prosecution eyewitness statements upon mock 
detectives. The study revealed that mock detectives provided with both 
eyewitness and alibi witness statements did not differ in their ratings of suspect 
guilt compared to mock detectives that received only an eyewitness statement. 
Thus being presented with eyewitness evidence did not increase beliefs about 
suspect guilt. Furthermore, although weak alibis (supported by a close friend of
33
the defendant) did not impact upon decision making, a recency effect occurred 
when a strong alibi (supported by a colleague) was presented. Hence the most 
influential evidence was whichever evidence was heard last, the eyewitness or 
the strong alibi witness. Therefore the findings support the underestimation of 
ease of alibi corroboration mentioned previously (Olson & Wells, 2004a). This 
further suggests that the high cognitive load associated with interpreting a 
complex case prevents individuals from recalling earlier material unless it is 
remarkable in its strength.
However, student participants role-playing the part of detectives do not 
have the same experience and knowledge of legal procedures and guidelines 
as actual police officers, casting doubt on the veracity of these findings. 
Furthermore, gathering the impact of inconsistent testimony upon mock- 
detectives is of limited value as it is the Crown Prosecution Service rather than 
the police that decides whether a case is taken to court. Therefore even if 
police doubt the veracity of a defendant's testimony, other than repeat 
interviews, there is little they can do to affect the progression of the case. 
Moreover, this prior research has been solely conducted upon American and 
Canadian samples, and its representativeness of views and behaviour in the UK 
legal system is unclear. However, these findings (Culhane, 2005; Culhane, 
Hosch & Kehn, 2008) do suggest the existence of bias in relation to inconsistent 
testimony that is worthy of further investigation.
The only study to date that has examined the beliefs of actual police 
officers was conducted by Dysart and Strange (2012). They administered a 
survey with items based upon the taxonomy developed by Olson and Wells 
(2004b) in order to examine the beliefs about alibi evidence held by serving 
police officers. Just over 50% of the sample believed that it is easy for a 
suspect to construct a false alibi. Moreover, due to police officers’ desire to 
appear thorough and fair, the findings may actually underestimate the extent of 
alibi scepticism amongst police officers. Interestingly the concept that 
unmotivated alibi witnesses have no reason to lie for a suspect was challenged 
in that the participants were able to suggest several plausible reasons for 
deception from these individuals; distrust of the police and CJS, fear of the 
suspect, financial or social reward and sympathy for the suspect. However,
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these reasons did not appear to be considered to occur frequently as the police 
officers were most likely to perceive motivated alibi witnesses as being 
deceptive, supporting the findings of the experimental research utilising mock- 
detectives (i.e. Culhane, 2005). Furthermore, physical evidence, multiple alibi 
witnesses and unmotivated alibi witnesses were the evidence most commonly 
associated with believable alibis. These findings therefore replicate those found 
utilising a mock-detective paradigm and add considerable weight to the 
inference that evaluators are sceptical of alibi witnesses.
Dahl, Brimacombe and Lindsay (2009) suggest that the evaluations of 
jurors may be different to those of detectives. Accordingly, Sommers and 
Douglass (2007) compared the alibi evaluations of mock police and mock jurors. 
The findings showed that alibis were considered stronger when evaluated by 
mock detectives, presumably because the police have the opportunity to further 
investigate alibis and potentially find them to be genuine before charges are 
brought. Conversely, the fact that a defendant is still in court despite his alibi 
being investigated by the police automatically implies that his alibi is weak or 
false. Thus jurors may be more susceptible to alibi scepticism due to the 
inference that a weak alibi is indicative of defendant guilt.
Juror Evaluations of Evidence
More than 75% of Americans exonerated by DNA evidence were victims 
of mistaken eyewitness identification (Wells et al., 1998). Wells and Olson 
(2003) suggest that “the amount of time the culprit is in view, the lighting 
conditions, whether the culprit wore a disguise, the distinctiveness of the 
culprit’s appearance, the presence or absence of a weapon, and the timing of 
knowledge that one is witnessing a crime” (p. 281) can all adversely affect the 
accuracy of eyewitness evidence. However, jury studies have shown that jurors 
have very limited knowledge of the negative effect these factors can have upon 
eyewitness accuracy (Kassin & Barndoller, 1992). The evidence shows that 
when evaluating eyewitness evidence jurors often rely on factors that are not 
reliable indicators of accuracy (Wells & Murray, 1984). This means that jurors 
place a disproportionately large amount of faith in the accuracy of eyewitnesses
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(Fox & Walters, 1986; Dahl, Lindsay & Brimacombe, 2006; Boyce, Lindsay & 
Brimacombe, 2008), potentially to the detriment of the case. As alibi witnesses 
are a form of eyewitness, the research would suggest that their testimony will 
be very influential to jurors. However, when analysing actual cases in American 
courts, Cunningham and Tyrell (1976) discovered that the presence of up to 40 
witnesses testifying for the defence was insufficient to deter jurors from 
believing the testimony of a single eyewitness who expressed doubt over the 
accuracy of their own identification. Thus, when both the prosecution and the 
defence have eyewitnesses testifying, the evidence suggests that the 
eyewitness for the prosecution may be believed over the defence witness.
Alibi Instructions in Court
The Crown Court Bench Book (2010) was created by the Judicial Studies 
Board to provide judges with guidance as to the advice that they should give to 
jurors about certain legal proceedings. Although not legally binding, judges are 
advised to tailor their directions accordingly (Judicial Studies Board, 2010).
This book highlights the fact that in all criminal trials the prosecution is required 
to prove that the defendant is guilty, rather than the defendant to prove that he 
is innocent. Thus, when a defence of alibi is used, jurors should be instructed 
that there is no burden on the defendant to prove that he was elsewhere 
(Judicial Studies Board, 2010). Just as eyewitnesses are prone to mistakes in 
their testimony (Wells & Olson, 2003), so too can alibi witnesses make genuine 
mistakes about dates. Thus a false alibi is not necessarily deliberately 
deceptive. When it is decided that a false alibi was created solely to deceive 
the court, the fabrication can be used as evidence against the defendant. 
However, it is important that the jury be reminded that although the defendant 
has lied about where he was at the material time, it does not mean that he was 
where an identifying prosecution witness says he was. The report suggests that 
although there is a natural tendency for jurors to associate guilt from the belief 
that a defendant is lying, judges have a duty to remind jurors that this is not 
always the case. The Crown Court Bench Book states that a deliberately false 
alibi may be put forward for many reasons, including the belief that the truth will
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not be sufficient to render an acquittal. However, bearing in mind the paucity of 
alibi research, the research basis and accuracy of this instruction is unclear.
There is a little research to date that examines how jurors evaluate 
defence witnesses and their evidence. Evidence suggests that the way in 
which alibi evidence and testimony from an individual related to the suspect is 
viewed by the legal system may have an impact on the credibility associated 
with the testimony (Burke & Turtle, 2004; Culhane & Hosch, 2004; Olson & 
Wells, 2004b). Generally research has suggested that a widespread scepticism 
towards alibis may exist that prevents jurors from receiving alibi evidence in an 
open and unbiased manner (Olson & Wells, 2004b). Moreover, these studies 
have indicated that the closer the relationship between defendant and alibi 
witness, the less credence jurors give to that alibi (for example Culhane & 
Hosch, 2004). If this is the case, the false evidence may not assist the 
defendant's case at all if it is provided by a close friend or family member. 
However, it should be noted that these conclusions stem almost entirely from 
mock juror studies utilising student samples, and so their ecological validity is 
limited.
The Story Model of Evidence Evaluation
Pennington and Hastie's (1986, 1993) story model states that several 
stories may be constructed by jurors to make sense of the evidence with which 
they are presented. Stories will be rejected on the weight of contradictory 
evidence until a single logical and coherent story exists. Thus once this 
threshold is reached a story becomes convincing and is accepted as the true 
version of events, meaning any further evidence incongruent with this story is 
discounted. Therefore, new evidence introduced later in the case that suggests 
a new version of events may not be given full consideration by jurors.
The very fact that the defendant is in court despite having an alibi may 
imply to jurors that there is some question regarding the veracity of the alibi. In 
relation to this Gooderson (1977) points out that the term alibi is heavily loaded 
and rather than being another piece of trial evidence, an alibi is viewed as a 
point to prove. In accordance with this Olson and Wells (2004b) suggested that
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evaluators approach alibis with an inherent scepticism. The effect of alibi 
scepticism could also be compounded by the tendency for pre-existing belief to 
bias attention to and interpretation of later information, known as behavioural 
confirmation bias (Darley & Gross, 1983). The impact of behavioural 
confirmation bias has been demonstrated in the interview room, as Kassin, 
Goldstein and Savitsky (2003) discovered that interrogators who approached an 
interview with the presumption the suspect was guilty, did not re-evaluate this 
belief even when interrogating an innocent suspect who issued plausible (rated 
so by independent observers) denials. This effect has been consistently 
replicated in the research literature (Snyder, 1984; Vrij, 2008).
The innuendo effect is the idea that subtle negative hints and 
suggestions continue to have a negative effect, even after positive information 
has been put forward to negate them (Wegner, Wenzlaff, Kerker & Beattie,
1981). Wegner et al. discovered that incriminating innuendo exerts as strong 
an effect as incriminating statements upon opinions of the statement targets.
The innuendo effect would therefore suggest that the presence of the defendant 
in court despite having an alibi will bias jurors towards a belief in the 
defendant's guilt. In conjunction with the behavioural confirmation bias, this 
may lead jurors to view negatively all defendants with alibis. However, jurors 
are also likely to be highly motivated to reach the right decision due to the high 
stakes involved. Confirmation bias and the innuendo effect may therefore be a 
product of the artificial nature of the laboratory research which has relatively 
minor consequences compared to real life investigations and trials (Diamond, 
1997; Olson & Wells, 2004b). Diamond (1997) highlights that it is not possible 
to test for differences in real and mock juror motivation due to the limitations of 
research with real jurors. However, in support of mock jury research, Diamond 
points out that juror motivation may affect only limited aspects of juror behaviour.
In addition to the innuendo effect Koehler (1991) suggests that a 
temporarily accepted hypothesis is used as a reference framework to which all 
subsequent information is evaluated. Thus as the prosecution presents its case 
first, this story could be temporarily accepted by jurors and a 'guilty story' 
created. This fits in with Pennington and Hastie's model of evidence evaluation 
if the prosecution case is strong. Thus in the case of jurors, the prosecution’s
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case could bias jurors to overlook the defence evidence that contradicts this 
guilty hypothesis, even if a plausible alibi is offered. Accordingly, Pennington 
and Hastie suggest the prosecution story of events is only accepted when the 
prosecution presents a strong initial case. In support of this Shpurik and 
Meissner (2004) suggest that alibi evidence is only considered by jurors when 
there is little other evidence against the defendant. They discovered that when 
the defendant confessed voluntarily or under low pressure conditions, alibi 
evidence that exonerated the defendant did not influence mock juror verdicts. 
They took this as support for the construction of a strong guilty story preventing 
participants from considering contradictory alibi evidence. These findings have 
led Burke, Turtle and Olson (2007) to suggest that jurors be made aware of how 
behavioural confirmation bias could influence their attention to, and 
understanding of, the evidence presented. When the prosecution case is weak 
and little supporting evidence is offered Pennington and Hastie suggest the 
guilty hypothesis may not be accepted by jurors. In this instance multiple 
stories are constructed and jurors will be more receptive to later defence 
evidence such as alibi evidence.
In critique of this, however, Koehler (1991) also suggests that the 
consideration of an alternative hypothesis can actually decrease participants' 
confidence in the original hypothesis. Support for this hypothesis was found by 
Anderson and Sechler (1986) who discovered that considering the later 
hypotheses completely cancelled out the overconfidence in the original story. 
This finding has not however been consistently replicated, with other studies 
demonstrating only a slight reduction in confidence in the initial hypothesis 
(Anderson, 1982). A limitation of this research is that it has not been tested in 
relation to juror decision making. Instead Koehler presented a review of the 
literature which involved participants considering very different situations to 
those in the courtroom, such as relationships (Seligman, Fazio & Zanna, 1980) 
and election outcomes (Carroll, 1978). However, the diverse examples of 
temporarily accepted hypotheses shaping behaviour, strongly suggest that the 
effect will apply to juror decision making. This is something that has not 
specifically been examined in relation to alibi evidence. Instead the majority of 
research has focused upon corroboration by motivated and unmotivated alibi
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witnesses, with limited research examining the effect of alibi salaciousness and 
the stage at which an alibi is disclosed upon mock juror decisions.
Corroboration
Corroboration can be provided through both physical and person 
evidence that establishes the defendant's location at the time of the crime.
Burke, Turtle and Olson (2007) suggest that unlike uncorroborated eyewitness 
testimony, uncorroborated alibi evidence is unlikely to be believed by jurors.
Unmotivated alibi witnesses have no relationship to the defendant and 
thus no personal investment in the outcome of the case. Golding, Stewart, 
Yozwiak, Djadali and Sanchez (2000) found that a shop assistant alibi witness 
(unmotivated witness) lowered the guilty responses provided by participants 
and reduced participant ratings of victim believability in a mock trial of a child 
sexual abuse case. Thus unmotivated alibi witnesses appear to enhance the 
credibility of a defendant's alibi, despite the fact that unfamiliarity with the 
defendant may lead to poor identification accuracy. However, Olson and Wells 
(2004b) found that participants did not appear to consider the possibility of 
stranger alibi witnesses being unreliable due to mistakenly identifying the 
defendant. Just as people are unaware of the factors that influence eyewitness 
accuracy (Cutler, Penrod & Stuve, 1988), it appears they are also unaware of 
the factors other than relationship to defendant, which could affect alibi witness 
accuracy.
Further research has examined the effect of motivated alibi witnesses 
upon mock juror decision making. Although Jolly (2010) found that marriage 
status and relationship length between defendant and alibi witness had no 
effect upon mock juror decision making, most research has found a significant 
effect of alibi motivation upon mock juror evaluations. The fact that Jolly’s 
research is currently unpublished (information was taken from an abstract only) 
prevents details of the methodology being understood. Allison and Brimacombe 
(2010) compared juror decision making in mock assault and robbery cases 
when the defendant had either strong physical evidence to corroborate his alibi 
(inconclusive CCTV images of the defendant away from the crime scene) or
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weak alibi corroboration from his brother. Defendants with strong alibis were 
rated by the mock jurors as more believable and less likely to be guilty than 
those with weak alibis. Thus the motivated alibi witness was seen as less 
reliable than physical evidence. Similarly Burke and Turtle (2004) had 
participants rate the strength of motivated alibis with differing type of 
corroboration. Results showed that evidence against the defendant was 
perceived as stronger when no alibi corroboration was provided in comparison 
to when an alibi of being at the movies with one’s girlfriend was corroborated or 
uncorroborated by the girlfriend. Moreover, the defendant was seen as more 
believable when no corroboration for their alibi was presented. Fewer guilty 
verdicts were seen in the no alibi witness condition than when the defendant 
claimed to be with his girlfriend at the time of the crime. Thus it appears that a 
defendant who admits to having no corroboration for their alibi appears more 
innocent to jurors than a defendant who has corroboration from their girlfriend 
for their alibi.
Culhane and Hosch (2004) discovered that the perceived strength of an 
alibi was heavily influenced by the relationship between the defendant and the 
alibi witness in that mock jurors did not believe a motivated alibi witness who 
had a social relationship to the defendant. Following on from this study Hosch, 
Culhane, Jolly, Chavez and Shaw (2011) examined whether differences existed 
in mock juror evaluations of various motivated alibi witnesses. Their analysis 
revealed that mock jurors were most sceptical of the defendant’s biological 
relations, least sceptical of their social relations and intermediately sceptical of 
those related to the defendant by marriage. This again supports the concept 
that the relationship to the defendant is the most important factor in false alibi 
witness testimony. Hosch et al. suggest these findings reflect false alibi witness 
testimony as a form of altruism based on the theory of mutual reciprocity 
(Trivers, 1971) and kinship theory (Hamilton, 1964). The results held true when 
time spent with the defendant was held constant, suggesting that likelihood of 
favours being repaid was not the sole factor influencing perceptions of alibi 
witness deception likelihood. The role of altruism in alibi witness deception is 
discussed at length later in this chapter and investigated in Chapter 7 of the 
thesis, as little research has examined this explanation in detail.
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Salacious Alibis
In contrast to the innuendo effect Allison, Mathews, Michael and Choi 
(2009) discovered that suspects who admitted to engaging in salacious 
activities were thought to have stronger alibis than those with a non-salacious 
defence. In support of this, Mathews and Allison (2010) found that an alibi of 
watching an X-rated film, compared to watching a regular film led to higher 
ratings of defendant honesty, openness, and lower estimates of guilt likelihood. 
Community tolerance of the availability of explicit sexual materials to adults is 
generally high (Scott, Eide & Scovron, 1990) although the third person effect 
suggests that whilst people think pornography will have no effect on them 
personally, it may impact negatively on others (Diamond, 2009). As the aim of 
a false alibi is to make a defendant appear innocent, a false alibi is likely to 
imply the defendant is a respectable and law abiding individual. An alibi of 
‘watching a pornographic film’ does not immediately appear to meet this aim. 
However, this supports the assertion that unpopular or self-defeating messages 
are perceived as more persuasive than self-serving messages (Eagly, Wood, & 
Chaiken, 1978). Thus if an alibi shows the defendant in a negative way jurors 
infer that the alibi must be genuine. In conjunction with this, the alibi scepticism 
hypothesis suggests that jurors doubt the veracity of ‘regular’ alibis, meaning 
that a ‘negative’ alibi may actually be more beneficial to defendants than a 
positive or neutral alibi. Again, this research utilised a written mock trial 
summary as the stimulus material, which can be criticised for its ecological 
validity. Despite this, research has shown few differences due to trial modality 
in mock jury research (Bornstein, 1999) thus supporting the use of this 
methodology.
Stage of Disclosure
In accordance with section 6A(2) Criminal Procedure and Investigations 
Act 1996 the defence must give details of their defence statement if an alibi is 
involved. This allows thorough police investigation of the alibi meaning that the
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case against a defendant can be dropped if the alibi is found to be robust. This 
has the effect of saving the time and money associated with a lengthy court 
case (Epstein, 1964). However, it also provides the police with the opportunity 
to discredit false alibis and a defendant to be exonerated prior to their trial 
commencing (Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, 2008, p. 7). It may 
therefore be in the interests of defendants with a weak or false alibi to withhold 
this from the prosecution team and use it to ambush the trial. Kerans (1982) 
states "without notice of it (the alibi), the Crown is surprised and cannot rebut 
without an adjournment to investigate" (p. 47). This may give the defendant an 
advantage in court thus providing a clear incentive to defendants to delay 
revealing their alibi, especially if they have little or no corroborating evidence.
However, there is a case ruling that a defendant should not gain an 
advantage through attempting to ambush a trial (R v Chorley Justices (2006)) 
and laws stipulate that both the defence and prosecution disclose their evidence 
prior to trial. This allows the judge to rule as inadmissible any evidence that has 
not been disclosed prior to trial, and prevent the trial being ambushed. An 
analysis of Canadian cases demonstrated that revealing an alibi late in the 
investigation or trial was a common tactic, despite the requirement in most 
Canadian jurisdictions (and UK courts) that an alibi defence is revealed early in 
case proceedings (Turtle & Burke, 2003; the Criminal Procedure and 
Investigations Act 1996; the Criminal Justice Act 2003). In relation to this, 
Epstein (1964) found that 52% of American Prosecutors surveyed stated that 
alibi evidence not disclosed at an early stage was never or seldom excluded 
from court. However, demand characteristics may skew the findings of this self- 
report data. Nonetheless, in a speech given in 2008 (Lord Chief Justice of 
England and Wales, 2008) the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales stated 
that in very few instances had lack of disclosure prevented an alibi defence 
being heard in court, and offhand he could not think of a single instance. This 
may be due to the overriding objective of the criminal procedure rules (in both 
America and the UK) that criminal cases be dealt with 'justly.' A Judge's refusal 
to admit potentially exonerating evidence into court solely due to its late 
disclosure may not be considered just. The potential therefore exists for the 
prosecution team's case to be substantially weakened and guilty defendants be
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acquitted, due to lack of timely disclosure of alibi evidence by the defence team. 
Again the lack of research to support the comments of the Lord Chief Justice of 
England and Wales highlight the need for empirical research into alibi timing.
Connelly (1983) studied instructions to jurors regarding the stage at 
which a defence of alibi was put forward by a defendant in Canadian criminal 
trials. This analysis showed that when judging the veracity of an alibi, jurors 
can consider the timing of the alibi provision. As Kerans (1998) states, this may 
leave the court “inclined as a result to view the last-minute alibi with a baleful 
eye” (p. 47). In support of this, Berman and Cutler (1996) revealed that jurors 
were less likely to convict the defendant when they heard any kind of 
inconsistent testimony from prosecution eyewitnesses. Furthermore, Brewer, 
Potter, Fisher, Bond and Luszcz (1999) discovered that a witness whose 
statement in court was inconsistent with their previous statement was perceived 
as being significantly less accurate than witnesses who exaggerate, are 
inconsistent with other witnesses or recall items not previously recalled. This 
supports the previously mentioned general finding that inconsistent stories are 
viewed as deceptive (Vrij, 2008). Ambush alibis may arise out of a deliberate 
attempt to ambush the court, although a defendant may also want to check that 
their relation/friend will support their false alibi before providing it to the police. 
This may mean that their alibi witness is only presented relatively late in the 
investigation. Conversely, as mentioned an innocent defendant may only 
realise that they have a witness to their innocence late in the investigation as 
they reconstruct their whereabouts through referral to external sources 
(calendar effect). Thus to consider all ambush alibis as indicative of guilt is 
inappropriate. Given the numerous reasons for ambush alibis to occur, it is 
likely that they occur fairly frequently, although measuring their frequency is 
challenging. Understanding their impact upon jurors would therefore greatly 
enhance understanding in this area.
Summary of Evaluations of Alibi Evidence
Although alibi evaluation research is a developing field (Sommers & 
Douglass, 2007) the research upon lies told in collusion is still relatively
44
neglected in the research literature (Granhag, Stromwall & Jonsson, 2003).
Very little prior research has studied juror evaluations of alibi evidence, and 
none to date has addressed the process involved in an alibi witnesses’ decision 
to provide false testimony. There is an obvious need to explore this behaviour 
in detail, due to the potential uses this information could have in the applied field, 
and the gap in academic understanding that this would bridge. The research 
that does exist has suggested that jurors may possess a negative bias 
regarding alibi evidence and this is supported by evidence that jurors attribute 
more weight to the testimony of eyewitnesses, than they do to alibi witnesses 
(for example Lindsay, Lim, Marando, & Cully, 1986). Furthermore research 
indicates that in order to carry the most weight, person based alibis must come 
from an individual who is unmotivated. However, this classification of alibi 
witnesses as motivated and unmotivated stems from limited research and 
requires further verification. The fact that jurors possess biases suggests that 
judicial instructions may be required to counteract these biases; although at 
present there is little guidance for jurors regarding how to interpret alibi 
evidence. It is not even clear whether these biases possess any element of 
truth, or whether they are wholly erroneous. The evidence regarding stage of 
alibi disclosure indicates that defendants with weak alibis may favour delaying 
declaring their alibi in order to prevent a thorough police investigation. However, 
this research has looked at alibis provided by the defendant, and has not looked 
concurrently at the role of supporting alibi witnesses upon how this alibi 
evidence is received by jurors. Furthermore, all this knowledge is gained from 
rather a limited amount of research evidence and there is a real need for further 
research on this topic. Without further research, a more comprehensive 
understanding of alibi evaluation in the courtroom cannot be attained. Chapters 
7 and 8 of the thesis address the issues of alibi witness motivation and alibi 
timing.
Future Research Directions
With the potential for defendants to evade arrest and commit further 
offences, and put others at risk of wrongful conviction as outlined above, public 
justice offences pose a significant problem for the criminal justice system and
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the population in general. There is however a clear need to understand why 
individuals that are not involved in the index offence offend through providing 
false evidence for others. Due to the lack of prior studies on this topic, the 
current thesis is largely exploratory in nature. Based upon the emphasis placed 
by the public justice offence charging standards upon loyalty, planning and 
intended harm, the role of altruism and relationship between alibi witness and 
defendant, as well as understanding of the law are variables that alibi research 
should address. Moreover, deception type has been largely neglected in 
previous deception research, although this has the potential to greatly influence 
both the provision and evaluation of deceptive alibi witness evidence. 
Furthermore, the research pertaining to deception recipient suggests that and 
attitudes to the criminal justice system are also important in alibi witness 
deception. Attitudes to the criminal justice system, altruism and knowledge of 
the law will subsequently be discussed in turn, given their hitherto brief 
consideration previously in this chapter. Moreover, these variables are explored 
in detail in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 of the thesis.
Altruism
Just as the alibi research suggests that deceptive alibi witnesses may be 
motivated by altruism (for example Hosch, Culhane, Jolly, Chavez and Shaw, 
2011), the public justice offences charging standards consider “whether the 
conduct was motivated by misplaced loyalty to a relative/friend or was part of a 
concerted effort to avoid, pervert, or defeat justice” (Crown Prosecution Service, 
2011). This illustrates that the relationship between defendant and false 
evidence provider is presumed to be a primary motivation in many public justice 
offences. Although a body of research exists regarding the acceptability of lying 
to a partner (for example Boon & McLeod, 2001; Levine & McCornack, 1992; 
Metts, 1989), there is a distinct lack of research addressing lying for a partner, 
friend or family member. The obvious outcome of successful false alibi 
provision is the avoidance of punishment of the defendant. Thus the false 
evidence may facilitate the continuance of a relationship that may suffer if one 
party is in prison and unable to see the other partner regularly and freely. This 
could put an enormous strain on the relationship and lead to its breakdown.
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Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, providing false evidence on the behalf 
of the defendant could demonstrate selflessness, love and commitment to the 
relationship. Thus the chances of success of the evidence is not of significance, 
rather it is the illustration of solidarity and support that is of paramount 
importance. As mentioned previously, the extant alibi research suggests that 
false alibi witness evidence may be rooted in altruism. Thus the avoidance of 
‘being a grass’ or the preservation of a relationship may encourage participants 
to provide false evidence. Thus it is logical to explore the concept of altruism in 
order to improve understanding of false alibi witness evidence.
Many definitions to altruism have been offered, but it is generally agreed 
to be a behaviour that is costly to the altruist but bestows benefits on others 
(Trivers, 1971). Hosch, Culhane, Jolly, Chavez and Shaw (2011) argue that 
providing an alibi is an altruistic act, the costs of which are greater when the 
alibi corroborated is false. Hamilton's inclusive fitness rule of altruism (1964) 
states that when cost and benefit levels are held constant, degree of 
relatedness (between provider and recipient) predicts the probability of an 
altruistic act. Equation 1 summarises Hamilton’s rule.
E q u a tio n  1: H a m ilto n 's  R u le
r B  >  C
In this model, B refers to the benefit the recipient gains from the altruistic 
act, C refers to the cost to the altruist and r to the degree of relatedness 
between altruist and recipient. Thus the closer someone is to someone else, 
the less rewards and higher costs they will accept in order for the altruistic act to 
be worthwhile (Farsides, 2007). Kivivuori (2007) suggests that although it is 
generally seen as a factor that decreases crime, altruism may also explain the 
commission of certain crimes. According to Hamilton's rule, people should be 
more willing to provide a false alibi for those with whom they share a high 
degree of genetic relatedness. As the degree of relatedness in Hamilton's rule 
is based upon shared genes, the theory applies only to genetically related 
individuals, and not those related by marriage. Although many cases of 
providing false evidence for others reported in the media appear to involve 
family members and partners (for example R v Cordoso, 2007; R v Campbell,
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2006; R v Unwin, 2005), this data is anecdotal, and cases involving false 
evidence provision for non-family members have also been reported (Pervez v 
HM Advocate, 2006). There is not sufficient detail in the official statistics 
relating to this crime to determine whether individuals are more likely to provide 
false evidence for romantic partners than less close relations. Thus this thesis 
will examine experimentally the relationship between defendant and alibi 
witness upon alibi witness honesty.
Altruism exhibited to non-family members is theorised to be based on an 
assumption of mutual reciprocity (Trivers, 1971). Hence an individual performs 
an altruistic act under the assumption that their altruism will be rewarded at a 
later date. This means that reciprocal altruism is dependent on the frequency of 
interactions the altruist and recipient will have in the future. Based on this 
theory, scepticism towards an alibi witness should be dependent upon the 
closeness of the relationship between them and the defendant, as this is what 
dictates the opportunities for the altruism to be repaid.
A further evolutionary explanation for providing false evidence for non­
family members is costly signalling theory. This is the concept that altruistic 
behaviour that signals character (rather than abilities) is attractive to long-term 
romantic partners and friends (Zahavi & Zahavi, 1997). Utilising mock dating 
advertisements Barclay (2010) found that altruistic people were perceived as 
more attractive long term partners than people who were neutral for altruism, 
thus supporting the concept of altruism as a desirable relationship quality. It is 
argued that by exhibiting altruistic behaviour, the individual encourages 
commitment from the recipient. Thus by acting altruistically an individual can 
demonstrate that they view the recipient as being of high enough quality or 
status to make that action worthwhile despite costs existing to that behaviour 
(Bolle, 2001). An individual not romantically interested in the recipient would 
not take the trouble and personal risks involved in the altruistic act. Thus 
encountering these costs and persisting in the behaviour despite the 
consequences, demonstrates a dedication and loyalty that will engender the 
good will of the recipient. Therefore Kivivuori (2007) suggests that a criminal 
act could be interpreted as a gift for others. This applies not only when the 
proceeds of a crime are directly given to someone else, but also when the intent
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behind the crime is to help a person or a cause. Thus lying to assist someone 
despite awareness of the futility of that action is a further proof of the 
importance of the relationship to the risk taking false evidence provider. For 
these reasons, acting in an altruistic way for others is likely to be attractive and 
could thus lead to higher reproductive success for the altruist compared to 
others who did not signal in this manner. In essence, a failure to show loyalty 
through providing false evidence for a defendant could bring about the 
defendant terminating the relationship or the relationship struggling as one 
partner is sent to prison. Thus there could be a great attraction to providing 
false evidence to help a loved one, and a considerable cost associated with not 
being altruistic. This explanation of providing false evidence for others 
emphasises the relationship between defendant and alibi provider and suggests 
that individuals will be more likely to provide false evidence for romantic 
partners than other social acquaintances.
Support for these theories was found by Hosch et al. (2011) who 
assessed participant ratings of the credibility of alibis provided by individuals 
with genetic, social and marital (spouse orfamily-in law) relation to the 
defendant. Results illustrated that scepticism was significantly higher for those 
with a closer relationship to the defendant, thus supporting both Hamilton's rule, 
costly signalling theory and the theory of reciprocal altruism. However, 
closeness was shown to be more important in participant willingness to provide 
a false alibi than frequency of contact. Thus participants indicated that they 
would be significantly more likely to provide an alibi for their family or spouse, 
than for a social relation. However, this study required participants to state who 
they thought they would provide an alibi for, and therefore was based upon 
hypothetical situations. As previously highlighted, the relationship between 
intentions and attitudes and actual behaviour is not linear, thus highlighting a 
need to empirically test whether participants act in accordance with their 
planned behaviour, which will be done in this thesis.
The prisoner’s dilemma is the standard methodology used to investigate 
altruism. The prisoner's dilemma is simple game in which players must 
accumulate points. Each player operates without knowledge of the decision of 
the other. The different combinations of defect and cooperate possible for the
players accumulate different amounts of points (Figure 3). If both players co­
operate, both gain a reasonable amount of points (3 points each). This option is 
best for the common good, but not for individual success.
F ig u re  3 : S u m m a ry  o f P o in ts  a w a rd e d  fo r  e a c h  P o s s ib le  O u tc o m e  o f th e  P r is o n e r 's  D ile m m a
Player 2 Player 1
Co-operate Defect
Co-operate 33 05
Defect 5° 11
If both players defect, neither suffers, but similarly neither gains from co­
operation. The best strategy to gain points is to defect when the other player 
co-operates. In this situation the defector receives most points through the 
exploitation of the co-operator. They must then decide between individual 
interests and the common good. Only through several trials will each player 
learn the strategy of the other player, and discover whether they are better to 
cooperate or defect. Research on the prisoner's dilemma has shown the 
cooperation is increased when reciprocal cooperation is anticipated from a 
game partner. Moreover, those that cooperate presume that cooperation is a 
more common and normative response than do defectors (Kelley & Stahelski, 
1970). In support of this, Warneken and Tomasello (2009) suggest that helping 
others is part of the socialization process in most cultures, and is therefore 
perceived as the 'right' thing to do. Thus it could be that society expects people 
to lie to protect others, and exerts a certain pressure on people to do so. In 
support of this, Green, Farber, Ubel, Auger, Aboff, Sosman and Arnold (2000) 
asked doctors to rate how they would respond in a number of deception 
situations. Compliance rates ranged from 5-36% dependent upon the 
deception situation. When asked whether they would substitute their own urine 
for a colleague’s urine drug screen relatively few participants were willing to 
comply. Of those that were willing, self-report justifications emphasized the 
duty one has to friends and colleagues and the unreasonableness of mandatory 
drug screening policies. This research therefore implies that alibi witnesses
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may provide deceptive testimony due to a sense of loyalty towards the 
defendant.
Turner, Edgely and Olmstead (1975) asked participants to highlight the 
honest and dishonest statements they had made in a recent conversation with a 
relative, intimate or friend. Participants were required to state what they would 
have said in place of the dishonest statements if they had spoken completely 
honestly before being interviewed regarding the reasons for their dishonesty. 
Content analysis of these responses revealed that participants saw honesty as 
the loyalty to a relationship, rather than as the complete truth. Therefore 
information that is not completely true is judged as right, moral and honest if it 
allows the relationship to continue unimpeded. Thus it is important that the 
perception of deception acceptability is explored in detail if the reasons for 
providing false evidence for others are to be understood. On this point, 
witnesses that provide false evidence to assist a suspect may do so as they 
believe that this is a normal and socially acceptable response to the situation, 
although the evidence is support of this is scant. In support of this Norris and 
Dunnighan (2000) conducted interviews with British police officers on the use of 
police informants. Despite the assistance they provided, the informants were 
viewed very negatively as their behaviour lacked loyalty to family and friends. A 
dislike of ‘grassing up’ on people could therefore be involved in the decision to 
provide false evidence for others.
Research has shown that the perceived intentions of a deceiver influence 
others' judgements of the acceptability of that deceptive act. For example Bok 
(1978) suggests that the acceptability of lies is a function of their position on a 
continuum from altruistic to exploitative motivation. Those judged at the 
exploitative end of the scale are more likely to be deemed unacceptable than 
those acts of deception understood to stem from altruistic and good intentions. 
This is supported by Backbier, Hoogstraten and Terwogt-Kouwenhoven (1997) 
who found that motive of the liar in conjunction with the importance of the 
situation were influential in the judgment of lie acceptability. Thus the apparent 
selflessness of providing a false alibi may negate the perceived wrongs of this 
behaviour and result as it being seen as an acceptable act by both the doer, 
and those around them. This may especially be the case should the defendant
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be believed by the alibi witness to be not guilty. Here the false alibi provider 
could see themselves as aiding justice, rather than hampering it, and thus 
believe their actions are acceptable. However, the acceptability ratings 
gathered by Backbier et al. were in relation to simple vignettes in which 
deception to a friend or acquaintance occurred. These scenarios differed 
greatly to the situation of lying about a criminal offence, and mean that it is 
unclear as to whether the findings would be directly replicated in this context. 
Further research of this nature utilising false alibi scenarios is required before 
this point can be answered.
Although the research presented suggests that the public may view 
deception by alibi witnesses as an acceptable demonstration of loyalty and love, 
this neglects to consider the wider implications of the deception. False alibi 
witness evidence is a crime against justice, rather than a crime against the 
person. This may reinforce the conception of false evidence provision as a 
victimless crime. The lack of direct victim and the potential to help another may 
encourage people to provide false evidence to assist a defendant. However, 
providing false evidence does not just harm justice it also has the potential to 
put an innocent at risk of arrest and prosecution and, as the offender avoids 
criminal sanctions, put further people at risk of victimization. Thus, although 
false alibis are a crime against justice, they are not a victimless crime.
Moreover, providing false evidence is a criminal offence which puts the alibi 
witness at risk of prosecution. Thus it is relevant to consider whether deceptive 
alibi witnesses consider the legality of their deception, or whether they are 
ignorant of its consequences.
Legal Knowledge
Public Justice Offence charging standards consider whether the conduct 
was deliberate and was part of a concerted effort to avoid, pervert, or defeat 
justice (Crown Prosecution Service, 2011). This implies that some deceptive 
alibi witnesses are presumed to know that their actions are illegal. However, 
behaviours that are not so frequently in the public eye may not be commonly 
known to be unlawful (Anderson, 2002). Convictions for false alibi witness 
evidence are not reported in the media as commonly as other offences, such as
murder and burglary, and so it could be imagined that some instances of public 
justice offences may stem from ignorance of their illegality. In addition to this, 
the laws pertaining to false evidence provision are complex, and in some cases 
dependent upon a conviction being made for the index offence. Moreover, the 
necessity of proving both serious harm and that the conduct was not the result 
of misplaced loyalty but a deliberate act intended to pervert justice, make the 
public justice offences legislation complicated, and arguably not as clear to the 
untrained as the law in relation to murder or burglary for example. A lack of in- 
depth understanding of which deceptive behaviours are punishable, and what 
punishments are available, may therefore contribute to people providing false 
evidence for others.
The association between action and punishment is the basis of 
behavioural conditioning (Skinner, 1904-1990) whereby behaviours are shaped 
by the consequences they have for the individual. According to the principle of 
operant conditioning an offender punished for providing a false alibi is less likely 
to repeat that behaviour than individuals receiving no punishment. However, 
the fact that false alibi witness evidence is a very situation specific crime (a 
false alibi can only be provided if when the witness is aware that someone is 
suspected of a crime) suggests that personal experience of punishment or 
punishment avoidance is unlikely to be the sole variable accounting for false 
alibi witness testimony. Moreover, this theory offers a better explanation of 
repeat offending, than first time provision of false alibi witness testimony.
Building on Skinner’s research, Payne, Gainey, Triplett and Danner 
(2004) point out that the way in which people act in relation to the law is likely to 
be influenced by their attitudes and perceptions about the associated 
punishment. Deterrence is usually defined as the “preventative effect which 
actual or threatened punishment of offenders has upon potential offenders” (Ball, 
1955 p. 347). Stafford and Warr’s (1993) prevailing theory of deterrence 
suggests that both the personal experience of negative experiences of 
committing a crime and the more general awareness of other’s experiences of 
committing a crime, can both exert a deterrent effect on the individual.
Observing others avoiding sanction for an illegal behaviour is associated with
w u a p io i  c -. rv iiu i VVILMCC5 0  i c o m  i iu i l y . r \  m c v ic w  u i li ic  n c i c v ^ m  l i i c i c u u i c
reduced perceptions of own apprehension likelihood (Paternoster & Piquero, 
1995; Freeman & Watson, 2006).
Tonry (2001) suggests that there is absolutely no evidence that sanctions 
deter criminal behaviour, and Robinson and Darley (2004) express concern 
regarding the assumption of law makers that criminal laws have a deterrent 
effect. They point out that potential offenders are not always aware of the 
specifics and intricacies relating to the considered crime meaning an individual 
may accidentally break the law through ignorance or lack of in-depth 
understanding of the offence and associated punishments. In support of this, 
Freeman and Watson (2006) found that those who reported being relatively 
unconcerned regarding apprehension risks, were the most frequent repeat 
drink-drivers in their sample. Furthermore, Anderson (2002) found that 53% of 
a sample of prison inmates did not know or did not think about the punishment 
available for their crime at the time. Of these 18% were mistaken in their 
understanding of the sanctions at the time of their offence. A further 35% of 
criminals stated that that they did not even think about punishment when 
committing their crime and an additional 42% of the sample stated that they did 
not consider the likelihood of being caught at the time of their crime. Robinson 
and Darley (2004) suggest that even when offenders know the rules, the cost- 
benefit analysis appears to be tipped in favour of offending rather that 
abstaining. Certainly within Anderson's sample it appears that the rewards 
gained by committing the criminal act, were more salient and persuasive to 
offenders than the potential punishments. However, the fact that these 
offenders were in prison suggests that ignorance of the sanctions associated 
with their actions could have contributed to their apprehension. Whether 
offenders that avoid conviction similarly disregard the potential sanctions 
associated with their offending is, from this study, unclear. These findings 
should be treated with caution as claiming ignorance of the law may be 
evidence of the actor-observer effect (Gleitman, Fridlund & Reisberg, 1999) as 
offenders externalise blame and responsibility for their actions.
Evidence suggests that perceptions of punishment probability are more 
important than objective certainty of punishment (Brown & Esbenson, 1988). 
Brown and Esbenson suggest that those who have not committed offences
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have unrealistically high expectations of punishment certainty. Instead it seems 
that people base their knowledge of the law on what they believe the law should 
be, rather than what the law actually proscribes (Robinson & Darley, 2004). 
Thus it seems that people contravene the law when their personal sense of 
morality allows so. This could be pertinent to offences against justice as false 
testimony may not be deemed to contravene personal morals even if it breaks 
the law when done to protect a partner believed to be innocent. This tendency 
to ignore the consequences of a criminal act can be explained by the availability 
heuristic. This is a form of cognitive bias that relates to the tendency for 
individuals to base their decision making upon readily available information, 
without considering the probability of more salient but less prominent factors 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1973; Sherwin, 2006). Therefore those deciding to 
assist a defendant may base their decision upon the idea that they could help 
the defendant avoid prosecution. However, they may ignore or be ignorant of 
the more salient fact that they risk imprisonment themselves for providing false 
evidence. Thus the availability heuristic may account for the decision to provide 
false evidence to assist a defendant. It appears that knowledge and 
perceptions of punishments seem to influence law breaking behaviour in certain 
circumstances, and are a necessary factor to study in attempting to understand 
why alibi witnesses provide false evidence.
In contrast to this, Rational Choice Theory (Cornish & Clarke, 1986) 
suggests that the costs and benefits of an act are both rationally weighed up 
before a course of action is undertaken. For example, Anderson (2002) and 
Palmer (2003) suggest that older people are deterred from offending due to 
their greater life experience increasing their awareness of the sanctions for 
offending behaviour. However, Nagin and Paternoster (1993) suggest that 
according to Rational Choice Theory the costs and benefits associated with a 
crime are not stable but situationally based, and thus will vary between 
individuals. More recently Rational Choice Theory has acknowledged the fact 
that people are not perfectly accurate in their assessment of the values and 
costs of an action, and may make impulsive decisions (Palmer, 2003). This 
means that people may actually act in a manner that is most immediately 
satisfying to them, rather than follow the most logical and rational course of
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behaviour (Ward, Stafford & Gray, 2006). For example Maxine Carr claimed 
she provided Ian Huntley with a false alibi to protect him as she believed he was 
innocent. Within Rational Choice Theory is the supposition that individuals may 
perceive benefits to offending, even when they are fully aware of the associated 
legal costs. Thus in the instance of lying to assist a defendant, the potential to 
help a loved one avoid conviction and imprisonment may be sufficient benefit to 
outweigh the risk of being convicted and imprisoned oneself. Therefore the 
potential of false alibis to assist a defendant to avoid conviction may encourage 
the provision of false evidence for others, despite an awareness that this action 
could result in prosecution. This concept is investigated in Chapter 5 of the 
thesis.
Attitudes to the Criminal Justice System
Misleading the police may be another benefit for those who have 
negative attitudes towards the criminal justice system. Dysart and Strange 
(2012) found that distrust of the police and CJS was the main reason suggested 
by police as to why a stranger would provide a false alibi. Other research has 
highlighted the potential that poor attitudes towards the police have upon 
cooperation and intentions to obey the law (Elliott, Armitage & Baughan (2003). 
This evidence illustrates that attitudes towards the police should be considered 
as a factor potentially contributing to false alibi witness evidence. The literature 
pertaining to perceptions of the criminal justice system will briefly be reviewed 
and its applicability to false alibi witness testimony considered.
The commonly accepted definition of an attitude is that it is an 
individual’s “evaluation of the entity in question” Ajzen (1977, p. 889). Attitudes 
appear to predict behaviour if the attitude is strong, internally consistent and 
cognitively accessible (Krosnick & Petty, 1995). The relationship between 
attitudes and behaviour has been cited as having a respectable correlation 
coefficient of around .40 (Wallace, Paulson, Lord & Bond, 2005). However, 
other research has shown a weak relationship between attitudes and 
behaviours (Wicker, 1969). Ajzen (2002) suggests that attitudes influence 
behaviour in conjunction with perceived social norms and feelings of control. 
Thus measuring intended behaviours is a useful way of gathering initial data
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regarding the factors that influence the provision of false alibi evidence. There 
has been no research to date assessing the influence of attitudes towards the 
criminal justice system upon intentions to provide false evidence. However, 
good interactions with the police have been shown to foster a feeling of 
personal obligation and responsibility to assist the police (Tyler, 2001). Survey 
research suggests that holding positive views of the police is a strong 
determinant of willingness to act as a witness, report crimes and identify 
offenders (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). Conversely, poor interactions with the 
police foster hostility and defiance from the public which manifest themselves in 
non-compliance (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). Moreover, Elliott, Armitage and 
Baughan (2003) found that attitudes were positively associated with behavioural 
intentions to obey the speed limit. This would suggest that negative attitudes 
towards the police could be associated with intentions to provide deceptive 
evidence to assist a defendant. However, the accuracy of this conceptual leap 
has not been examined in the psychological literature. Thus one of the aims of 
this thesis is to examine whether negative views of the police and criminal 
courts are involved in deceptive alibi witness evidence.
Diffuse and Specific Support
Easton (1965) suggests that diffuse support is a general attitude toward 
an institution, whereas specific support refers to feelings about an institution 
based upon particular experiences with individuals within that organisation.
One aspect of diffuse support is the perceived legitimacy of the institution, 
which is defined by Sunshine and Taylor (2003) as a property of an authority or 
institution that leads people to feel that it is entitled to be deferred to and 
obeyed. They see people as legitimising the police through compliance with the 
law, compliance with requests of individual police officers, and accepting the 
policies that govern the actions of the police. On this point, Tyler (2004) asserts 
that it is the degree to which people view the police as a legitimate or rightful 
institution that influences their compliance to police requests and compliance 
with the law in general. In support of this a review of the relevant literature 
indicated that individuals that declare that they abide by the law in their
57
o i  ic ip ie i  c .. /-\Mui vv 111 ic a s  i t J b i im u i iy .  r t  n e v i e w  u i  m e  n e ie v c m i  u i e r c t i u r e
everyday lives perceive the police as legitimate (Tyler & Huo, 2002). 
Furthermore, perceived legitimacy and performance of the police have been 
demonstrated to predict co-operation with the police (Murphy, 2005). However, 
these studies have not focused upon cooperation of alibi witnesses (through 
providing honest evidence) so it is unclear as to whether attitudes to the 
criminal justice system affects alibi witness honesty, or whether the desire to 
help a defendant is the sole motivating factor in this behaviour.
White and Menke (1982) found that overall attitudes to the police differed 
when participants were asked questions that tapped into specific support when 
compared to items that assessed general support. Diffuse support for the 
police seemed to be higher than specific support, reflecting good will to the 
police in general but awareness of inadequate and corrupt individual officers. 
Brandi, Frank, Worden and Bynum (1994) found that diffuse and specific 
support for the police were linked, such that a single good interaction with a 
police officer was able to foster a positive view of the police in general. 
Conversely an overall good view of the police can lead to a neutral encounter 
with a single officer being evaluated more positively.
Instrumental and Normative Support
Hinds and Murphy (2007) suggest that public support for the police can 
be explained by instrumental and normative support. These approaches show 
considerable overlap with the concepts of diffuse and specific support. 
Instrumental factors relate to perceived efficacy of the police in controlling crime 
and criminal behaviour, police and the portrayal of significant probability of 
detection and sanction for law breakers. Hough and Roberts (1998) discovered 
that people who view the courts as too lenient in their sentencing have 
consistently been shown to have significantly less positive views of those 
issuing the sentences. Moreover, those individuals who perceive crime to be 
increasing are most critical of the courts, presumably due to beliefs that the 
courts are not punishing offenders adequately or deterring individuals from 
crime (Kaukinen & Colavecchia, 1999). Thus instrumental factors have been 
demonstrated to influence attitudes towards the courts.
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Opposed to this the normative perspective concentrates upon issues of 
procedural justice and the fairness with which police conduct themselves in 
each interaction with the public. Thus, according to this approach, the more 
polite and fair the police are perceived to be in an interaction, the more the 
police as a whole will be supported and viewed as legitimate. Poor interactions 
with the police foster hostility and defiance from the public which manifest 
themselves in non-compliance with the police (Tyler, 2003). Furthermore, Dean 
(1980) asserts that “the variable with the strongest influence on general service 
evaluations is citizen knowledge of police mistreatment of members of the 
public” (p. 457). Chermak, McGarrell and Grunewald (2006) discovered that 
general attitudes towards the police decreased as concerns about 
neighbourhood crime increased. Certainly, the fact that young people are more 
likely to be stopped by the police (Skogan, 2006) seems to be reflected in their 
more negative views of the police. This in turn may have an impact upon 
opinions of the police, and ultimately alibi witness honesty. Limited research 
suggests that young people may be more likely to engage in deception in 
general which may exacerbate the issue of poor interactions with the police.
For example Caspi and Gorsky (2006) found that self-reported deception 
decreased with age. However, this research examined solely deception online 
in a sample of online dating service users where the consequences are much 
more trivial than in the forensic setting. Previous research has not examined 
whether age influences deception in adulthood, mainly due to the emphasis 
upon deception detection. Nonetheless, this questions whether age will be 
linked to alibi witness deception, and it is certainly a variable to consider.
As compliance with the law has been demonstrated to be associated with 
positive views of the police, it could be hypothesised that negative attitudes will 
be associated with willingness to break the law. Yet, attitudes towards the 
criminal justice system have not been investigated in relation to alibi witness 
honesty, though the research implies that negative attitudes to the criminal 
justice system will be associated with willingness to provide false evidence.
Thus it is important that measures of attitudes towards the criminal justice 
system address both normative and instrumental support.
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Attitudes to the Courts
One could imagine that as the courts, police and prison system are all 
part of the same criminal justice system attitudes towards each element would 
be the same. Blumenthal (1972) found that the public more commonly blames 
the courts than the police for the problem of crime. Furthermore, Roberts (2007) 
found that levels of support for the courts are significantly lower than levels of 
support for the police. Kaukinen and Colavecchia (1999) suggest that this may 
be due to beliefs that the courts are not punishing offenders adequately or 
deterring individuals from crime. This is supported by Hough and Roberts 
(1998) who discovered that people who view the courts as too lenient in their 
sentencing have consistently been shown to have significantly less positive 
views of the courts who issue these sentences. This could be a product of the 
increased visibility of the police compared with others working within the 
criminal justice system (Orr & West, 2007). Flanagan, McGarrell and Brown 
(1985) state that “from a practical perspective, public perceptions of the criminal 
courts could actually affect the way in which the public perceive their role within 
the criminal justice system” (p. 68). This is based upon the assertions of Sarat 
(1977) and Walker (1977) that attitudes towards and faith in the functioning of 
the courts may deter vigilante justice, and thus influence their willingness to 
comply with the law.
A further component of attitudes to the criminal justice system that could 
affect alibi witnesses honesty is the pleasure of lying to those perceived as hard 
to fool (Ekman & Frank, 1993). Ekman and Frank (1993) suggest that although 
lying can induce nervousness, it can also lead to feelings of excitement and 
accomplishment which they term duping delight as the liar becomes aroused at 
the prospect of fooling others, and creating a false impression (Vrij, 2008). The 
fact some offenders chose to reveal to friends and family how the police failed 
to uncover their deception or crime (Ekman & Frank, 1993) implies that some 
pride may be associated with fooling the police. The investigator bias (Masip, 
Alonso, Garrido & Anton, 2005; Meissner & Kassin, 2002) and scepticism 
towards alibi witnesses (Dysart & Strange, 2012), coupled with negative 
attitudes to the police all support the assumption that the prospect of duping 
delight may actually encourage deception from alibi witnesses with negative
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views of the police. It is not suggested that the pleasure of lying to the police is 
the sole motive for false alibi witness evidence; instead it is suggested to be one 
of several factors that could contribute to an alibi witness’ decision to provide 
deceptive evidence.
It is apparent from the research presented that to consider the courts, 
police and prison service as one single entity is not accurate as people have 
varying attitudes towards each component. Attitudes towards each component 
could however, influence how people perceive their role in the criminal justice 
system, and the level of compliance to its rules they demonstrate. Thus 
possessing a negative attitude towards the criminal justice system, could impact 
upon willingness to provide deceptive testimony to assist a defendant. Due to 
the infancy of alibi research there is no research to date addressing this point, 
hence this thesis will consider this issue (Chapter 4 and Chapter 5).
Chapter Conclusion
The provision of false evidence for the benefit of another individual is a 
behaviour that is under researched and little understood. This behaviour has 
serious implications for the criminal justice system as it may lead to false 
acquittals, but also for society in general as guilty individuals avoid conviction.
A greater understanding of the provision of false evidence for another individual, 
and the motivations and circumstances surrounding this is therefore of great 
interest both academically and in the applied field. Thus Chapter 3 assesses 
whether the future research directions suggested in the current chapter are 
indeed important variables to public perceptions of deceptive alibi witnesses. 
Thus chapter 3 assesses whether defendant guilt, alibi witness perceptions of 
defendant guilt and deception type influence perceptions of alibi witness 
deception acceptability. The findings of this study are implemented in the 
subsequent investigations in Chapters 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the thesis.
Research suggests that, defendant guilt (both actual and perceived), 
knowledge of the law and its associated penalties, attitudes to the criminal 
justice system, and altruism and prior relationship with the defendant may all 
contribute to alibi witness deception. By understanding the factors contributing
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to false alibi provision, it is hoped that measures can be implemented in order 
that the false evidence can be discouraged from being provided. Moreover, by 
considering a range of forms of deception, rather than solely lies the thesis aims 
to produce a more thorough understanding of alibi witness deception. 
Additionally, evidence suggests that both police officers and jurors are sceptical 
of evidence provided by alibi witnesses with a prior relationship to the 
defendant. However, to date, very few studies have examined this and most 
have been based in America, where the legal system differs from that in the UK. 
A limited range of variables have been explored in the mock juror research, 
meaning that ambush alibis have not been examined. Thus research 
combining alibi witness motivation and timing will provide a rounded picture of 
the evaluation of alibi witness evidence. The thesis will therefore examine 
motivations for and reactions to false alibi evidence, in an attempt to improve 
upon the scarce alibi research. To reiterate Chapter two, the specific objectives 
of the thesis are:
1. To determine whether the type of deception used by alibi witnesses 
influences perceptions of alibi witness testimony acceptability (Chapter 3)
2. To examine factors that shape perceptions of false alibi acceptability 
which will be manipulated in the subsequent chapters of the thesis 
(Chapter 3)
3. To develop a measure of intentions to provide false evidence for loved 
ones (Chapter 4)
4. To develop a questionnaire to measure attitudes towards the criminal 
justice system (Chapter 4)
5. To discover whether negative attitudes towards the criminal justice 
system shape the intentions of the general population to provide false 
evidence for a loved one (Chapter 5)
6. To discover whether experience of the criminal justice system shapes the 
intentions of the general population to provide false evidence for a loved 
one (Chapter 5)
7. To establish whether ignorance of the pertinent legislation affects the 
honesty of evidence intended to be provided to the criminal justice for a 
loved one by the general population (Chapter 6)
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8. To discover the effect of relationship between defendant and alibi 
witness upon alibi witness honesty (Chapter 7)
9. To assess the impact of alibi timing and the relationship between 
defendant and alibi witness upon juror verdicts (Chapter 8)
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CHAPTER 3: DEFINING DECEPTIVE ALIBI 
WITNESS TESTIMONY
The second objective of the thesis is to discover some of the factors that 
shape perceptions of the justification of false alibis that can be manipulated in 
the subsequent chapters of the thesis. The paucity of research regarding why 
alibi witnesses provide false evidence means this cannot be done through 
secondary research alone. Following on from a review of the alibi literature 
(Chapter 2) it is suggested that the relationship between alibi witness and 
defendant, attitudes to the criminal justice system, guilt of the defendant, and 
knowledge of the law may potentially influence the honesty of alibi witness 
evidence. With the exception of the former no research has overtly linked these 
variables to alibi witness honesty evidence. Thus the current study aims to 
discover variables potentially affecting alibi witness honesty that can be 
manipulated in the subsequent chapters of the thesis. This chapter focuses 
upon three of these variables, defendant guilt, alibi witness perceptions of 
defendant guilt and the type of deception used by the alibi witness. In line with 
prior research the study focuses upon reactions to other’s deception as that 
“with regard to the evaluation of lies, we assume that the same factors that a 
sender weighs when involved in the decision whether or not to lie apply to the 
evaluation of a lie presented in a specific context” (Backbier, Hoogstraten & 
Terwogt-Kouwenhoven, 1997, p. 1050).
Research suggests that deception through omission and commission are 
not viewed as equally acceptable. For example, Backbier et al. (1999) found 
that participants reported that harmful omissions were less immoral or bad than 
harmful commissions. This may be because whilst omissions have the potential 
to result from ignorance, commissions usually do not. Rather “commissions 
usually involve more malicious motives and intentions than the corresponding 
omissions; and commissions usually involve more effort, itself a sign of stronger 
intentions” (Spranca, Minsk & Baron, 1991, p. 76). Furthermore, within the UK 
legal system guilt must be established beyond reasonable doubt in order for a 
guilty verdict to be returned. Omissions imply agency whereas the agency of 
the speaker is overt within commissions. The implied nature of the agency in
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omissions may be sufficient to create reasonable doubt and thus lead to 
acquittal. Based upon this, it would be predicted that false evidence provided 
through concealing information (omissions and no comment responses) will be 
seen as more acceptable than false evidence provided through commissions.
The apparent selflessness of providing a false alibi may negate the 
perceived wrongs of this behaviour and result in it being seen as an acceptable 
act by both the doer, and those around them. Moreover, attempting to assist an 
individual believed to be innocent may be seen as more acceptable than lies 
told to assist a guilty defendant. This is because the false alibi provider can be 
seen to have good intentions in terms of both helping a partner, and in ensuring 
that an innocent individual avoids punishment. Conversely, in helping a guilty 
offender the false evidence provider may be seen as possessing selfish motives, 
as they put the continuance of their relationship above the administration of 
justice and the safety of the public. It would be expected that individuals will be 
more likely to provide false evidence if society condones this behaviour, than if 
they condemn it. However research has not examined whether this trend 
remains consistent when the lies told are very serious in nature, as are lies told 
to the police for another person.
Although commissions (lies and false confessions) are viewed as more 
serious than omissions, it is unclear as to whether lies and false confessions 
are viewed as equally condemnable. As mentioned above, falsely confessing to 
protect someone could be seen as a selfless act (as punishment is highly likely 
regardless of whether the confession is believed) and thus be viewed as more 
acceptable than a pure lie. However, it may also be interpreted as a selfish act 
as it enhances the chances of the real offender avoiding conviction. However, 
no studies have sought to address how justified false confessions are viewed. 
Therefore, this study aims to assess reactions to various forms of deceptive 
evidence, including false confessions, provided to assist a defendant.
However, there is no empirical research regarding how false alibis are 
viewed by society at large. Reporting of false alibi witnesses in the media 
provides examples of censure when people have informed the police of their 
relative’s illegal actions (http://news.bbc.co.Uk/1/hi/england/7427624.stm). In 
one such case, the family of a mother who reported her son's drug possession
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to the police, branded her as spiteful and trying to attract attention. The social 
morality of reporting a crime (drug possession) seemed to be overlooked in the 
face of the immorality of reporting a family member (not showing loyalty). In a 
more high profile case, Carol Saldinack reported her sons to the police when 
she discovered they had attacked a man on a night out. Her actions were 
described as brave by police and but the media posed the question was Carol 
Saldinack right to turn her two sons in to the police? (ITV online discussion 
forums). As these discussion forums are used by members of the public to 
directly voice their opinions, the question can be seen to be a relevant one to 
the public. Universal support for her actions was not seen on this forum, 
implying that her actions were not unanimously viewed by the public in general 
as moral. Conversely, condemnation of alibi witnesses who have concealed a 
defendant’s offences has also been reported, for example in the case of Maxine 
Carr (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article501407.ece). These 
examples show that public evaluations of false alibi evidence are complex and 
need to be researched if an understanding of why people provide false 
evidence for others is to be reached. Therefore, it is important to gather general 
attitudes towards the perceived acceptability of false evidence provision. 
Moreover, it is necessary to discover how the false evidence provider’s belief in 
the defendant’s guilt influences these perceptions. Thus, this current research 
will not only show society’s views of false evidence provision, but also suggest 
whether this could be a factor influencing people to engage in this behaviour.
Summary
This chapter relates to objectives 1 and 2 of the thesis. In order to 
generate variables for research later in the thesis this chapter examines 
attitudes towards deception by alibi witnesses. This is necessary due to the 
paucity of research addressing reasons for and reactions to false alibi evidence 
and the fact that the evaluation of deception is linked to the provision of 
deception (Backbier, Hoogstraten & Terwogt-Kouwenhoven, 1997). To address 
this aim, participant reactions to vignettes featuring false evidence provision to 
the police will be assessed. The impact that the form of deception the alibi 
witness makes (lie, false confession, omission and evasion), the defendant guilt
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(falsely accused and suspected) and the belief of the alibi witness regarding the 
guilt of the defendant (guilty, innocent and unsure) upon participant ratings of 
alibi evidence will all be examined. For clarity, the term defendant will be used 
to refer to collectively refer to those falsely accused and those merely 
suspected by the police. Furthermore, a self-report measure will generate 
further information about situational and individual differences that influences 
perceptions of alibi witness deception. This will provide avenues for research in 
the subsequent chapters of the thesis, as the impact of these variables upon the 
provision of false alibi witness testimony is explored.
Hypotheses:
1. Alibi witness lies and false confessions will be rated as more deceptive than 
evasions and omissions
2. Alibi witness lies and false confessions will be rated as less justified than 
evasions and omissions
3. Alibi witnesses will be viewed as more deceptive when their statement to the 
police relates to a police suspect (no charges made) compared to someone 
who has been falsely accused
4. Alibi witnesses will be viewed as less justified when their statement to the 
police relates to a police suspect (no charges made) compared to someone 
who has been falsely accused
5. The statements of alibi witnesses will be rated as less deceptive when they 
believed the defendant is innocent compared to when they think he is guilty 
or are unsure of his guilt
6. The statements of alibi witnesses will be rated as more justified when they 
believe the defendant is innocent compared to when they think he is guilty or 
are unsure of his guilt
The hypotheses are modelled in Figure 4.
67
V_/l l a p i c i  . L y U I I M M I L j  U C L / C [ J U  V C  H I I U I  V V I I I  IC O O  I C O IN  I I U I  l y
F ig u re  4 : H y p o th e s is e d  T re n d  o f R e s u lts
Decreasingly Deceptive *
Increasingly Justified *
Deception Type
Lie False Confession Omission Evasion
Police Action
Suspect Falsely Accused
False Alibi Provider Belief Guilty Unsure Innocent
Method
Design and Materials
Vignettes
Vignettes were developed to provide false alibi scenarios to participants. 
The use of stories or vignettes in a questionnaire is not novel to the current 
study, rather they are a commonly used tool in gaining attitudes toward 
deception (see for example Green, Farber, Ubel, Auger, Aboff, Sosman & 
Arnold, 2000; Spranca, Minsk & Baron, 1991). The format of previous vignettes 
in this area was adhered to in terms of producing vignettes that were all short 
and concise. Each of the vignettes followed the same set structure and varied 
only on the basis of the independent variables manipulated. This gave the 
research an independent measures 4x3x2 design.
The variables of deception type (lie, false confession, no comment, 
omission), police action taken (suspected and wrongly accused) and alibi- 
witness belief (guilty, not guilty and unsure of guilt) were systematically crossed 
to create the twenty-four vignettes. The deception type variable related to the 
form of deception engaged in by the alibi witness in the vignette provided to 
participants. This variable had four levels which reflected the deception types 
developed in the literature review chapter (see for example Galasiriski, 2000).
In brief an evasion was the avoidance of answering the police question through 
responding no comment whereas an omission was a response that seemed 
semantically relevant but actually failed to communicate key information. A lie 
involved the provision of factually false information to mislead the police, and
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the final category of false confession was a lie in which the alibi witness falsely 
claimed they were responsible for the offence. Thus although not all of these 
levels were actual alibis, for ease the liar in the vignettes is subsequently 
referred to as an alibi witness regardless of the type of deception.
The first level of the ‘police action’ independent variable was suspect. In 
this level the police were said to suspect the alibi witness’ boyfriend of having 
committed the offence under investigation, although they had not charged him 
with this offence. In the second level of this variable the police were said to 
have wrongly accused the alibi witness’ partner of having committed the offence 
under investigation. The final variable, alibi witness belief, manipulated whether 
the alibi witness in the vignette believed her boyfriend to be guilty of the offence 
under question. The alibi witness belief variable had three levels pertaining to 
whether the alibi witness believed her boyfriend to be guilty of the offence, 
innocent of the offence, or whether she was unsure as to whether or not her 
boyfriend was guilty.
Gudjonsson and Sigurdsson (1994) found that the most common offence 
offenders reported wrongly confessing to, were property offences. Thus this 
crime was chosen to feature in the vignette. The alibi-witness was stated to be 
the girlfriend of the potential perpetrator (subsequently referred to as the 
defendant). This relationship was selected as Gudjonsson and Sigurdsson 
(1994) found that 48% of prisoners that stated they had wrongly confessed to a 
crime reported that they did so in order to protect a loved one from arrest and 
prosecution. Furthermore, Culhane, Hosch and Kehn (2008) found that when 
giving participants a specified time to provide an alibi for (i.e. tell me what you 
were doing and who you were with at 9pm last Wednesday night), most of the 
corroboration provided was from a motivated alibi witness (someone with a prior 
relationship to the defendant). Due to the complexity it would cause within the 
research design it was not possible to run the study with vignettes containing all 
possible permutations of sex of defendant and alibi witness. Thus the vignettes 
used all contained a male defendant and female alibi witness. It is appropriate 
that the role of alibi witness is filled by a female character as Sigurdsson and 
Gudjonsson (1996) found that the main reason convicted females falsely 
confessed to a crime, was in order to protect someone else. This is in contrast
to males whose false confessions more commonly resulted from avoiding police 
pressure and a desire to escape custody. Although this finding is based on self- 
report data from convicted offenders, there was little incentive to lie as very few 
of the alleged false confessions were for the offences for which they were 
currently serving time. Thus providing a female false alibi provider is realistic in 
the scenario, given that the vignette pertains to a single police question, rather 
than a prolonged interrogation and the presence of a false confession in one 
level of a dependant variable. This does however have implications for the 
interpretation of the study findings.
Maier and Lavrakas (1976) examined the role of the sex of the sender 
and listener in a lie story, and the sex of the participant evaluating the lie. 
Although the lie type showed no main effect, a significant interaction effect was 
found. Thus female participants saw lying by females as less reprehensible 
than lying by males, and conversely males rated lies by other males as more 
acceptable than lies by females. Thus this study has implications for the current 
research due to the predominance of females in the sample (46 males and 193 
females). Due to the relatively small sample of males and the effect this would 
have on the power of any calculations made, it is not possible to test whether 
the sex of participants influences the results. However, the results will be 
discussed in light of the sex of the study participants, with particular reference to 
a potential leniency effect resulting from the high proportion of female 
participants.
The motivations for the false evidence provider are not explicitly stated in 
the vignettes, leaving participants free to ascribe whatever motivation they 
perceive relevant to the deceivers' actions. This is because the perceived 
intentions of a deceiver influence others' judgements of the acceptability of that 
deceptive act (Bok, 1978). By leaving the false evidence providers intentions 
unclear, analysis of the self-report item will reveal the factors influential to the 
perceptions of false evidence acceptability. The vignettes in the current study 
were deliberately constructed to involve the police asking the alibi witness an 
indirect and open question, so that perceptions of a variety of commissions and 
omissions could be examined.
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Figure 5 shows an example vignette for the Evasion-Wrongly Accused- 
Guilty condition.
F ig u re  5 : E x a m p le  V ig n e t te  T a k e n  F ro m  th e  E v a s io n  - W ro n g ly  A c c u s e d  - G u ilty  C o n d it io n  
Andrew is wrongly accused by the police of burglaring a house. His girlfriend Sarah believes 
that Andrew burgled the house. Sarah was with him earlier in the evening but she cannot 
provide an alibi for the time of the crime. When the police ask Sarah "where was Andrew on the 
night the house was burgled?" Sarah says "no comment."
The dependant variables were the degree to which participants believe 
the deception engaged in by the alibi witness to be justified (deception 
justifiability) and the degree to which they believed the deception to be a lie 
(deception magnitude). Participants rated each of these variables on visual 
analogue scales scored between 0 (Lie/ Not Justified) and 100 (Truth/Justified). 
Item 3 was a self-report question requiring participants to freely explain the 
factors that influenced their belief regarding the justification of the deception. 
This item formed the basis of the content analysis.
A sample of the materials can be seen in Appendix 1.
Participants
A total of 240 participants were indiscriminately assigned through 
snowball sampling to one of 24 conditions. This resulted in ten participants in 
each condition. Ages ranged from 18 years to 76 years with a mean of 23.13 
years (SD= 9.92). The majority of the participants were female with 193 
females to 46 males (1 participant did not report their sex). The analysis 
showed that the sample consisted of predominantly students (212 participants 
or 88.3%). This full sample was utilised for the analysis of items 1 and 2, the 
alibi witness deceptiveness and justifiability respectively. Participants that did 
not provide a qualitative response to item 3 were subsequently screened out of 
the ensuing content analysis. This left a remainder of 229 participants ranging 
from 18 years of age to 72 years of age (M=22.87, SD= 9.35). There were 
considerably more females (n= 183) than males (n= 46). As in the original 
sample the participants were mostly students (89.3%).
Procedure
Participants were recruited through attendance at research methods 
classes and through snowball sampling. Participants received course credit for 
their participation where appropriate. Participants were informed that the study 
was examining how statements to the police are viewed. They were informed 
of the ethical rights in relation to participation through a detailed informed 
consent form. Participants that were happy to take part completed a consent 
form as part of the questionnaire booklet (see Appendix 1). Questionnaires 
from each condition were distributed until ten participants had been recruited to 
each of the conditions. No time restrictions were placed on the completion of 
the materials. After completing the questionnaire participants were given the 
opportunity to ask questions about the research, and were fully debriefed.
Procedure -  Content Analysis
A qualitative content analysis (Graneheim & Lundman, 2004; Haney, 
Russell, Gulek, & Fierros, 1998) was conducted on the self-report data collected 
in the study. The reasons provided by participants for their deception 
justification rating formed the units of analysis. Inductive coding was utilised in 
the analysis (Elo & Kyngas, 2008; Haney, Russell, Gulek, & Fierros, 1998) 
which involves coding categories emerging from the data rather than pre­
existing categories being used. This procedure was selected as the narrow alibi 
witness literature would not allow a comprehensive coding system to be 
developed prior to analysis. Moreover, using content analysis in this way 
allowed the richness of the data to be preserved. Stemler (2001) states that 
recording units are not usually defined in set units such as sentences or 
paragraphs, rather the most meaningful and reliably identifiable units for 
recording and analysis should be selected (Weber, 1990). These meaning units 
have been suggested by Graneheim and Lundman (2004) to relate to single or 
multiple words, sentences or paragraphs that are related through their content 
and context. In the current study no set word length for each meaning unit was 
established rather each sentence was split into the smallest possible unit of 
meaning. This system was established following discussion between the first
and second coders and in accordance with the direction of Graneheim & 
Lundman (2004) and Weber (1990). A meaning unit was defined as each 
individual justification and criticism provided by participants for the alibi witness’ 
deception. All of the responses in the dataset were coded in that every single 
sentence received at least one coding label. Where multiple reasons for their 
justification decision were provided, each of these was coded separately in 
order to maintain true to the participants responses. It should be noted however 
that each coding category was mutually exclusive in that any single piece of 
data could only be classified as belonging to one code (Krippendorff, 1980). An 
example of the initial data coding system is represented below in
Figure 6 where the codes are shown in brackets. This shows that the 
initial sentence was coded as having two meaning units both relating to the 
major theme of Relationship and the subtheme Love. The former meaning unit 
(“as he is her boyfriend”) reflects the idea that the deception is justified solely on 
the basis of the existing relationship between the alibi witness and defendant, 
whereas the latter (“she presumably doesn't want him to get into trouble”) 
reflects the concept that the deception is based on a desire to protect the 
defendant from trouble (see Appendix 2). Although these two meaning units 
both reflect the subtheme of Love, they do so for different reasons and therefore 
are coded as separate meaning units (see below for a discussion of the 
reliability of this coding system).
F ig u re  6 : E x a m p le  o f th e  C o d in g  U n its  Im p le m e n te d  in  th e  A n a ly s is
“Sarah has her own justification for providing an alibi as he is her boyfriend (Relationship - 
Love), therefore she presumably doesn't want him to get into trouble and possibly go to prison 
(Relationship - Love). This statement is also justifiable as Andrew was at her house that 
evening (Factual correctness of the Alibi Witness’ Statement), there is no indication in the story 
as to the police asking her between what times he was at her house {Criminal Justice System - 
Criminal Justice System Responsibility/Errors).”
Female student (19) in the wrongly accused, unsure of guilt, omission condition
As multiple justifications for the alibi witness’ actions could be provided 
by each participant, the total number of codes identified exceeded the number
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of participants in the study. This meant that the reliability of this inductive 
content analysis is problematic to establish due to reliability checks being based 
on the premise that there are a predefined number of coding units. On this 
point Weber (1990) suggests that “to make valid inferences from the text, it is 
important that the classification procedure be reliable in the sense of being 
consistent: different people should code the same text in the same way” (p.12). 
For this reason a research assistant independently conducted the initial data 
coding and assisted in the development of the coding checklist. The research 
assistant was briefed regarding the design, procedure and aims of the study 
before beginning any coding. The development of the coding system followed 
the sequential steps outlined by Haney, Russell, Gulek and Fierros (1988). 
Initially the two researchers reviewed the entire dataset and independently 
created initial checklists of features. As the coding system was emergent, new 
coding categories could be created throughout the analysis so regular checks of 
any changes to the coding system were undertaken and negotiation took place 
as to their inclusion. Discussion of the checklists with reference to examples in 
the data allowed any discrepancies to be reconciled and a pooled coding 
checklist to be created. Once this had been completed for all data and the 
coding system was considered exhaustive, the coding system was finalised. 
This involved similar categories being clustered into higher-level themes (Eby, 
Casper, Lockwood, Bordeaux & Brinley, 2005).
In accordance with Lombard, Snyder-Duch and Bracken’s (2002) 
recommendation, a pilot sample of 30 participants’ data was used to establish 
the reliability of the coding system. This pilot sample resulted in a total of 330 
coding judgements of which there were 44 disagreements. These decisions 
resulted in a coding system consisting of four themes each with several 
subthemes. Analysis of the two coder’s classification of the data revealed 
percentage agreements on the resulting codes/themes ranged from 68.29% to 
100%. Although percentage agreement fails to account for chance agreement 
(Lombard, et al., 2002) the emergent nature of the coding system and the lack 
of predefined units of analysis meant it was not possible to calculate a more 
precise measure of reliability. On this point Holsti (1969) states that “in 
formulating research design the analyst may be forced to strike some balance
between reliability and relevance of categories and units; the coefficient of 
reliability cannot be the sole criterion for making such decisions” (p. 142). Thus 
a discussion between the two coders was used to amend the coding system 
and settle prior disagreements as to the coding of the sample. One coder then 
proceeded to code the entire data set with the amended coding system.
A final inter-rater reliability check of the data from 30 participants was 
conducted 3 weeks after the coding of the whole data set. This second check 
of the data identified 77 statements in the sample data on which the two coders 
agreed on 73 occasions. The disagreements witnessed resulted from the 
second coder identifying an extra code in the data of four participants. Further 
discussion was utilised to allow these disagreements to be resolved, and as this 
agreement rate was high the coding system was accepted.
Ethics
The study was conducted in accordance with the governing principles of 
the Code of Human Research Ethics (2006) established by the British 
Psychological Society (BPS). This specific study was assessed and approved 
by the ethics committee at Sheffield Hallam University.
Results 
Quantitative Analysis
The Visual Analogue Scales
Data for the visual analogue scales was scored and tallied before being 
entered into SPSS 15.0 for Windows. Deception magnitude was scored on a 
continuum from zero to 100, with low scores indicating a belief that the 
statement in question was a lie, and a higher scores suggesting that the 
statement was perceived as a truth. Deception justification was scored in a 
similar way with low scores denoting a belief that the deception was not justified, 
whereas a high score showed a belief that the deception was justified.
Participant responses were classed as reflecting a view that the vignette 
deception was justified (>50) or not justified (<50) based upon splitting the scale 
on the central point. Similarly, responses were classed as more of a lie and
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more deceptive the closer they were to the ‘lie’ end of the second scale 
(represented by low scores).
Table 2Table 3 illustrates the mean scores for deception magnitude and 
deception justifiability in each level of each independent variable. In brief the 
table reveals that on average omissions are the least deceptive form of false 
alibi (M= 47.22, SD= 31.66), whereas false confessions (M= 20.26, SD= 21.32) 
are the most deceptive. Evasions are the most justified (M= 51.18, SD= 26.79) 
and lies were the least justified (M= 24.30, SD= 20.91) form of false alibi 
witness evidence. Interestingly, no form of deception is rated as completely a 
lie or completely unjustified. The entire visual analogue scale was used when 
rating the magnitude of the deception (range 0 - 100), indicating a construction 
of deception along a continuum rather than as an all or nothing event. Similarly 
ratings of deception justifiability had a range of 0 - 99, showing that almost the 
entire scale was used in response to this item.
T a b le  2 : M e a n  (S D ) D e c e p tio n  M a g n itu d e  a n d  D e c e p tio n  J u s t if ia b il ity  S c o re s  fo r E a ch  In d e p e n d e n t 
V a r ia b le  L e v e l
Variable Deception Magnitude3 Deception Justifiability5
Deception Type
Lie 21.22 (17.04) 24.30 (20.91)
Omission 47.22 (31.66) 48.52 (27.48)
Evasion 46.03 (22.71) 51.18 (26.79)
False Confession 20.26 (21.32) 32.20 (22.25)
Guilty 31.59 (28.69) 33.16 (25.86)
Witness Belief
Innocent 35.25 (24.83) 39.80 (25.54)
Unsure 34.21 (27.45) 42.19 (28.81)
Police action taken
Wrongly Accused 35.53 (27.78) 41.11 (27.47)
Suspect 31.83 (26.12) 36.99 (26.12)
Note. a0= lie and 100= truth, b0= not justified and 100= justified
Greatest variation in alibi witness deception magnitude and alibi witness 
justifiability scores can be seen within the deception type variable, suggesting 
that this variable has the strongest impact upon perceptions of alibi witness
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actions. Mean scores for all variable levels sit towards the lower end of the 
scales (with the exception evasion justifiability), revealing the general belief that 
false alibi witness evidence is deceptive and unjustified (see Table 2). It should 
be noted that the standard deviations are relatively high for responses to all 
items, demonstrating a considerable amount of variation in the scores. This is 
expected due to the conflicting views towards alibis and reporting crimes 
witnessed in the media. However, there is a need to treat these findings with 
caution given the exploratory nature of this study.
Analysis of mean ratings by condition (see Table 3) reveals that the alibi 
witness' comments to the police were judged on average as closest to a lie in 
the suspect-unsure-false confession condition (M= 9.50, SD= 11.57) and the 
suspect-guilty-lie condition (M= 12.20, SD= 14.37). Conversely the statement 
was judged most truthful in the wrongly accused-guilty-evasion condition (52.90, 
SD= 14.63) and the wrongly accused-unsure-evasion (M=54.60, SD= 23.82).
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Analysis of mean ratings by condition (see Table 3) reveals that 
perceived justifiability of the deceptive statement varied according to condition. 
The suspect-guilty-lie condition had the lowest mean score for lie magnitude 
(M=19.40, SD= 24.16), clearly on the not justified end of visual analogue scale. 
This condition rated the alibi witness statement on average the most close to a 
lie and the least justified. In contrast the highest mean score for this variable is 
observed in the wrongly accused-unsure-omission condition (M= 63.20, SD= 
24.90).
Magnitude-Justification Correlation
The relationship between the magnitude of deception and perceptions of 
alibi witness deception justification was analysed using a Spearman's rho 
correlation due to non-normal distribution of data. This revealed a weak but 
highly significant positive relationship between these two variables r= .366, 
p< .001, n=240. Thus, the closer to a lie a statement is believed to be, the less 
justified it is perceived.
The MANOVA
The data in the current study was found to breach several of the 
assumptions for conducting a MANOVA. Bartlett's Test of Sphericity was 
significant (p= .029) as was the Levene's test for the deception magnitude 
dependant variable, F(23, 216)= 2.779, p< .001. Although this would suggest 
that MANOVA may not be the appropriate test there is no non-parametric 
equivalent that can be utilised in its place. In fact, Bray and Maxwell (1985) 
point out that “it is unlikely that all the assumptions for MANOVA will be met 
precisely” (p. 33). Rather they suggest that these assumption violations should 
not cause a problem as MANOVA is rather robust when, as in the current study, 
sample sizes are equal (Bray & Maxwell, 1985). This is supported by Dancey 
and Reidy (2002) and Field (2009). Furthermore Olson (1974) suggests that 
Pillai's Trace is the most robust test statistic to all types of assumption violation.
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For this reason a MANOVA was conducted upon the data and Pillai’s Trace was 
consulted for interpretation in all instances.
The data were subjected to Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) 
using police action taken, alibi witness belief and deception type as the 
independent variables. Rating of alibi witness deception justifiability and 
deception magnitude formed the dependant variables. A significant main effect 
of deception type upon participant ratings of the deceptiveness and justifiability 
of the alibi witness was observed, V= .337, F(6, 432)= 14.607, p< .001, partial 
n2= .169 (large). No significant main effect of either police action taken,
V= .012, F(2, 215)= 1.360, p= .259, partial r|2= -012 (small), or alibi witness 
belief, V= .019, F(4, 432)= 1.027, p= .393, partial r|2= -009 (small), was seen 
upon ratings of alibi witness deceptiveness and justifiability.
The interaction between witness belief and deception type was found to 
be significant, V= .104, F(12, 432)= 1.967, p= .026, partial r|2= -052 (small). 
Flowever, the interaction between police action taken and alibi witness belief 
was not significant, V= .018, F(4, 432)= .981, p= .418, partial r|2= .009 (small). 
Furthermore the interaction between police action taken and deception type 
was not significant, V= .013, F(6, 432)= .457, p= .840, partial r|2= -006 (very 
small). Finally, the three-way interaction between police action taken, witness 
belief and deception type was also found to be not significant, V= .046, F(12, 
432)= .840, p= .609, partial g2= .023 (small).
The ANOVA
Deception type had a significant main effect upon deception magnitude, 
F(3, 216)= 23.754, p< .001, partial n2= -248 (large). Thus false confessions (M= 
20.26, SD= 21.32) and lies (M= 21.22, SD= 17.04) were deemed less truthful 
than evasions (M= 46.03, SD= 22.71) and omissions (M= 47.22, SD= 31.66). 
Similarly, there was a main effect of deception type upon deception justification 
ratings, F(3, 216)= 17.422, p<.001, partial rj2= .195 (large). In this instance lies 
(M= 24.30, SD=20.91) and false confessions (M= 32.20, SD= 22.25) were rated 
as less justified than omissions (M= 48.52, SD= 27.48) and evasions (M= 51.18, 
SD= 26.79). Therefore hypothesis 1 (alibi witness lies and false confessions
will be rated as more deceptive than evasions and omissions) and hypothesis 2 
(alibi witness lies and false confessions will be rated as less justified than 
evasions and omissions) received support.
However, the ANOVA revealed no significant main effect of police action 
taken on either deception magnitude, F(1, 216)= 1.454, p= .229, partial r f  = .007 
(very small), or deception justification F(1, 216)= 1.767, p= .185, partial r\2= .008 
(very small). Thus there was no effect of the police action taken variable, and 
hypotheses 3 (alibi witnesses will be viewed as more deceptive when their 
statement to the police relates to a police suspect (no charges made) compared 
to someone who has been wrongly accused) and 4 (alibi witnesses will be 
viewed as less justified when their statement to the police relates to a police 
suspect (no charges made) compared to someone who has been wrongly 
accused) were not supported. Similarly, no significant main effect of alibi 
witness belief upon either deception magnitude (F(2, 216)= .505, p= .604, 
partial r\2= .005 (very small)) or deception justification (F(2, 216)= 1.774, 
p= .172, partial r\2= .016 (small)) was found. Thus hypothesis 5 (the statements 
of alibi witnesses will be rated as less deceptive when they believed their 
boyfriend is innocent compared to when they think he is guilty or are unsure of 
his guilt) did not receive full support.
A significant interaction was found to occur between alibi witness belief 
and deception type upon deception justification F(6, 216)= 3.378, p= .003, 
partial r\2= .086 (medium), but not upon deception magnitude F(6, 216)= .893, 
p= .501, partial r\2= .024 (small). Moreover, alibi witness belief did not interact 
with police action taken upon either ratings of deception magnitude, F(2,
216)= .941, p= .392, partial r\2= .009 (small), or ratings of deception justification 
F(2, 216)= 1.293, p= .277, partial r\2= .012 (small). Police action taken and 
deception type did not interact significantly upon deception magnitude, F(3,
216)= .474, p= .701, partial r\2= .007 (very small), or deception justification, F(3, 
216)= .313, p= .816, partial r\2= .004 (very small), either. The three-way 
interaction between police action taken, witness belief and deception type was 
not significant on either the deception magnitude, F(6, 216)= 1.536, p= .168, 
partial q2= .041 (small), or deception justification variables, F(6, 216)= .248, 
p= .960, partial r)2= .007 (very small).
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Post Hoc tests
The significant interaction between alibi witness belief and deception 
type upon the deception justification variable was explored further. As there 
was a significant interaction, the main effects were not however analysed in 
more detail. In order to avoid unnecessary testing and associated inflation of 
type I error risk, the t-tests were conducted selectively based on the results of 
the ANOVA and the trends indicated by the associated profile plots. Due to the 
high number of tests conducted and the associated increased risk of type II 
errors (Bender & Lange, 2001), a corrected alpha level of .01 was implemented 
to realistically reduce the risk of type II errors.
Deception Type Justifiability According to Alibi Witness Belief
Figure 7 shows the pattern of results obtained for participants' ratings of 
the justifiability of different types of deception when the alibi witness thinks the 
defendant is innocent, guilty and when they are unsure of the defendant’s guilt.
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A significant difference was found in ratings of alibi witness deception 
justifiability when the alibi witness falsely confessed (M= 27.80, SD= 24.24) or 
omitted to tell the police information (M= 54.25, SD= 26.52) when the alibi 
witness was unsure of the defendant's guilt, t(38)= 3.292, p= .002, r= .47 
(medium to large)2. Similarly, false confessions by the alibi witness were 
judged as being significantly less justified than evasions when the alibi witness 
was unsure of defendant culpability, t(38)= -3.707, p= .001, r= .52 (large). A 
significant difference was found between the lie and evasion conditions when 
the alibi witness was unsure of the defendant's guilt, t(38)= -3.787, p= .001, 
r= .52 (large), such that the alibi witness' evasions (M= 58.60, SD= 28.17) were 
seen as more justified than their lies (M= 28.10, SD= 22.45). The alibi witness' 
omissions (M= 54.25, SD= 26.52) were also seen as more justified than their 
lies (M= 28.10, SD= 22.45) when the alibi witness was unsure of the 
defendants' guilt, t(38)= -3.365, p= .002, r= .48 (medium to large).
2 Effect size (r) calculated in accordance with Field (2009) using the conventions; .1 = 
small, .3= medium and .5= large.
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The alibi witness' evasions (M= 56.00, SD= 22.95) were seen as more 
justified than their lies (M= 21.70, SD= 22.67) when the alibi witness believed 
the defendant to be guilty, t(38)= -4.755, p< .001, r= .61 (large). A significant 
difference was also found between evasion (M= 56.00, SD= 22.95) and 
omission (M=33.10, SD= 24.84) when the alibi witness believed the defendant 
to be guilty, t(38)= -3.028, p= .004, r= .44 (medium). The alibi witness evading 
answering the police was seen as more justified than them making a false 
confession when the defendant was believed by the alibi witness to be guilty 
(M= 29.85, SD= 20.97), t(38)= -3.761, p= .001, r= .52 (large). However, no 
significant difference was found between lies (M=21.70, SD= 22.67) and 
omissions (M= 33.10, SD= 24.84) when the alibi witness believed the defendant 
to be guilty, t(38)= -1.516, p= .138, r= .18 (small).
A significant difference was found between the lie and omission 
conditions when the defendant was believed to be innocent, t(34.052)= -5.703, 
p< .001, r= .68 (large), such that the alibi witness' omissions (M= 58.20, SD= 
25.33) were seen as more justified than their lies (M= 23.10, SD= 17.77). No 
significant difference was found between any other level of the deception type 
variable within the innocent level of the witness belief variable (see Figure 7). 
These findings are summarised in Table 4.
T a b le  4 : S ig n if ic a n t D if fe re n c e s  in J u s t if ia b il ity  o f D e c e p tio n  T y p e s  D e p e n d e n t u p o n  A lib i W itn e s s  B e lie f in 
D e fe n d a n t G u ilt.
Alibi Witness 
Belief
Deception Justifiability According to 
Deception Type
Unsure False Confession < Omission*
False Confession < Evasion**
Lie < Evasion**
Lie < Omission**
Guilty Lie < Evasion*
Omission < Evasion*
False Confession < Evasion**
Not Guilty Lie < Omission**
Note. * p<. 01, ** p<001
84
Deception Justifiability According to Deception Type
Figure 8 illustrates that when the alibi witness omitted to tell the police 
information, they were viewed as more justified when they believed the 
defendant was innocent (M= 58.20, SD= 25.33), than when they believed he 
was guilty (M= 33.10, SD= 24.84), t(38)= -3.164, p= .003, r= .46 (medium). 
When the alibi witness was unsure whether the defendant was guilty or 
innocent, their omission to the police was judged as more justified than when 
they believed the defendant to be guilty (M= 54.25, SD= 26.52 and M= 33.10, 
SD= 24.84 respectively), t(38)= -2.603, p= .013, r= .39 (medium) although this 
reached only borderline significance (a = .01). However, when the alibi witness 
lied to the police, whether the alibi witness believed the defendant to be 
innocent, guilty or was unsure, had no effect upon perceptions of how alibi 
witness justifiability. Similarly, the alibi witness belief regarding the defendant’s 
guilt did not affect perceptions of deception justifiability when the alibi witness 
either falsely confessed or evaded the police questions. Thus partial support for 
hypothesis 6 (the statements of alibi witnesses will be rated as less justified 
when they believed the defendant is innocent compared to when they think he 
is guilty or are unsure of his guilt) was found.
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Content Analysis
Item 3 in the study asked participants to report all the factors that 
influenced their response to item 2 (how justified the alibi witness’ statement to 
the police). An inductive content analysis was conducted across the sample as 
a whole due to the small number of participants in each condition. The 
emergent themes (with subthemes in parentheses) were; the alibi witness’ 
relationship with the defendant (love, character reference); the accuracy of the 
alibi witness’ statement (guilt, factual correctness, alibi biases); beliefs 
regarding the criminal justice system (responsibility and errors, legality of alibi 
witness’ actions, appropriateness of statement) and other miscellaneous factors 
(health of witness/defendant, vignette information, other) shaped participants 
views of how justified the alibi witness’ statement to the police was. The coding 
system is summarised in Table 5 below and a full copy can be seen in Appendix 
2 .
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Table 6 illustrates that the most common theme overall was the accuracy 
of the alibi witness’ statement, highlighting the importance of perceptions of guilt 
and the way that the alibi witness deceived. Secondly, the relationship between 
the alibi witness and defendant emerged as important with love and loyalty for 
the defendant the dominating this theme. The legality of the alibi witness’ 
deception and the responsibility of the police for gathering good evidence 
emerged regularly from the data. Finally, a small number of outlandish ideas 
were found (such as the alibi witness being drunk or mentally ill) which were 
coded within the miscellaneous theme. A full list of the frequency of each 
theme within each condition of the study can be seen in Appendix 3. Each of 
the themes is discussed in detail in the ensuing discussion section of the 
chapter.
T a b le  6 : C o n te n t A n a ly s is  T h e m e  a n d  S u b th e m e  O c c u r re n c e
Theme/ Subtheme Frequency
Relationship 158
Love 131
Character reference 27
Accuracy of the alibi witness’ statement 346
Guilt of those involved 213
Factual correctness of the alibi witness’ statement 112
Alibi biases 21
Criminal Justice System 145
CJS responsibility/errors 36
Legality of alibi witness’ actions 38
Appropriateness of statement 71
Miscellaneous 27
Health of defendant/alibi witness 5
Vignette information 18
Other factors 4
Total 676
Discussion
The purpose of the current study was to discover whether the intentions 
of the alibi witness, the action taken against the defendant by the police and the
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type of deception engaged in, influence public perceptions of alibi witness’ 
actions. All of the vignettes in the study were rated, on average, as towards the 
not justified end of the scale (<50 on a 100 point scale where 0= not justified 
and 100= justified). The action taken by the police had no effect upon 
participant ratings of the justifiability or deceptiveness of the alibi witness’ 
statement. However, the belief of the alibi witness as to the defendant’s guilt 
interacted significantly with the type of deception engaged in by the alibi witness. 
False alibis in general were viewed as deceptive and unjustified. Additionally, 
whether the police wrongly accuse the defendant or merely suspect him of 
committing a crime does not influence ratings of alibi acceptability. Finally, 
deception through omission was viewed as more acceptable than deception 
through fabrication of evidence.
Deception Type
The variable that exerted the greatest impact upon participant ratings of 
the justifiability of the alibi witness' statement to the police is the type of 
deception the alibi witness engaged in. The results support both hypothesis 1 
(alibi witness lies and false confessions will be rated as more deceptive than 
evasions and omissions) and hypothesis 2 (alibi witness lies and false 
confessions will be rated as less justified than evasions and omissions). As 
anticipated, the closer to a lie the alibi witness’ statement was judged to be, the 
less justified the alibi witness was rated. In fact, no fabrication of evidence (lie 
or false confession) was viewed as towards the justified end of the scale 
(denoted by a mean score of >50 on the justifiability scale where not justified= 0 
and justified= 100). Overall, lies and false confessions were rated as less 
justified than omissions and evasions, and less truthful than omissions and 
evasions. This finding was supported by the results of the content analysis.
The factual correctness subtheme (112 occurrences or 16.57% of the data) 
related to evaluations of the alibi witness’ statement to the police based on its 
factual honesty, with lies being viewed as generally unacceptable. This theme 
is exemplified in the comments “it was a lie so it is not justified” (participant 38, 
suspect-guilty-lie condition) and “because she hasn’t lied she has just refused to 
answer the question” (participant 66, suspect-innocent-evasion condition).
Thus a truthful but misleading alibi witness (omission) was seen as more 
justified than a witness providing factually incorrect information to the police.
An omission does not suggest that the defendant was elsewhere at the 
time of the crime; rather it merely fails to add strength to this supposition. In 
contrast a fabrication has the potential to throw suspicion away from the 
defendant. For example falsely stating that a defendant was at the cinema with 
a friend at the critical time could be seen as strong evidence of innocence. This 
could result in the individual being removed from the suspect list. Arguably this 
alibi has more power to remove suspicion, than a simple omission. Thus it 
would appear that fabricating evidence would be most helpful to the defendant's 
case. However, evidence suggests that fabrications may actually be less 
preferable to alibi witnesses than omissions (Feinberg, 1984).
Dhami and Mandel (2010) investigated the relative power of benefits and 
drawbacks, outcomes and probabilities, and compensatory and non­
compensatory strategies in predicting engagement in criminal activity. Results 
showed that intention to engage in criminal activity (driving under the influence 
of alcohol) was best predicted by the perceived importance of the benefits that 
may be obtained, irrespective of their probabilities, or the drawbacks that may 
also be incurred. Omitting to tell information may be more beneficial for alibi 
witness as it stands more chance of being a successful strategy than fabricating 
evidence (Vrij 2008). Mann, Vrij and Bull (2002) point out that liars have to think 
hard in order to make their lies convincing, making lying cognitively more 
complex than truth telling. This cognitive demand theory of lying (Vrij, 2008) is 
based on the premise that whilst truth tellers must only rely on their recall, liars 
must ensure the information they provide fits in with what the interviewer 
already knows or could easily discover, as well as generate plausible false 
information. In support of this, participants in mock-suspect experiments report 
finding lying more cognitively demanding than truth telling (Vrij, Fisher, Mann, & 
Leal, 2006). Moreover, Vrij, Mann, Fisher, Leal, Milne and Bull (2008) 
discovered that increasing cognitive demands upon liars facilitated the detection 
of their deception. Bouman (2003) found that participants specifically instructed 
to conceal certain information in a staged interview experienced more 
discomfort and tension and poorer concentration than participants not instructed
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to conceal information. Although the experience of concealing caused 
discomfort this was not detected by interviewer, suggesting that omissions may 
be more likely to go undetected than fabrications. Unlike the police interview 
setting, this study used a low suspicion environment (interviewers were not 
aware that it was a deception study) and an innocuous topic (not revealing 
seeing an elephant at a visit to the zoo), thus limiting its application to 
concealment of crime relevant in formation. Nonetheless, coupled with the 
aforementioned research, Bouman’s findings suggests that it may be more in 
the interest of individuals wishing to assist a defendant, to omit informing the 
police of incriminating evidence than to fabricate evidence.
When omissions and commissions are detected, there is evidence that 
the law often treats them differently, suggesting that they are not equally 
condemnable (Feinberg, 1984). Spranca, Minsk and Baron (1991) point out 
that “omissions may result from ignorance, and commissions usually do not; 
commissions usually involve more malicious motives and intentions than the 
corresponding omissions; and commissions usually involve more effort, itself a 
sign of stronger intentions” (p. 76). Thus the logical inference to draw when a 
commission is found to be false is that it stems from a malicious intention, and 
that criminal charges should be brought against the maker of the statement. 
Consequently, omissions can be relatively easily explained away as the result 
of forgetting, ignorance or confusion (Spranca, Minsk & Baron, 1991). 
Furthermore, the Crown Prosecution Service consider the spontaneity of the 
conduct, the consequences, the motivation, others involved and the potential for 
serious harm to justice when deciding whether to press charges (Crown 
Prosecution Service, 2011). Due to the planning involved and the relative ease 
of presuming malicious intent, the chances of being prosecuted if the deception 
is detected are greater when fabricating rather than when omitting evidence for 
others. It may, therefore, be more in the interests of the witness to omit telling 
the police information that incriminates the defendant compared to fabricating 
innocence implying evidence. Consequently, proving an omission is deliberate, 
malicious and appropriately punishable with a legal sanction is challenging. An 
explanation of forgetting or being confused over the days and whereabouts of 
the defendant is relatively easy to accept, particularly if a great length of time
92
has elapsed between the event and the point of recall (police interview or court 
testimony). Thus an omission can be explained in such a way that the alibi 
supporter appears to be genuinely mistaken, rather than maliciously misleading 
the authorities. Presence of careful risk evaluation supports the underpinning 
Rational Choice Theory (Cornish & Clark, 1986).
Nevertheless, it should be noted that no form of deception was seen as 
completely justified by all participants. The significant correlation between 
deception magnitude and deception justification supports the idea that 
deception type influences perceived acceptability of deceptive alibi witness 
testimony. This finding reinforces research showing more favourable attitudes 
to omission of incriminating information, than fabrication of exonerating 
evidence by eyewitnesses to car collisions (Spranca, Minsk & Baron, 1991). 
However, the correlation between deception magnitude and deception 
justification in the current study is weak (.37) suggesting that factors other than 
solely the deception type influence assessments of alibi witness deception 
acceptability.
Police/CJS
Although it was anticipated that the police action taken variable (suspect, 
wrongly accuse) would affect ratings of deception justification and magnitude 
this was not found to be the case. Thus the quantitative analysis revealed no 
significant main effect of the action taken by the police against the defendant 
(suspect or falsely accuse) upon ratings of alibi witness deception magnitude or 
deception justifiability. It therefore appears that an innocence bias was present 
in assessments of defendant guilt in that both suspects and falsely accused 
defendants were perceived to be innocent. This innocence bias mirrors the 
truth bias has been extensively observed in the research literature pertaining to 
detecting deception (Bond & DePaulo, 2006; Vrij & Baxter, 1999; Vrij; 2008) and 
reflects the notion that defendants are innocent until proven guilty (Human 
Rights Act, 1998). The content analysis supports this assertion as the guilt 
subtheme (accuracy of the alibi witness’ statement major theme) reflected views 
that the justifiability of the alibi witness’ actions depended upon whether the 
defendant was actually guilty, or perceived by the alibi witness to be guilty, of
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the crime under investigation. Reference to guilt was made on a total of 213 
occasions representing 31.51% of all reasons stated by participants. Examples 
of this theme include “it is not justified if she thinks he did it” (participant 34, 
suspect-guilty-lie condition) and “not guilty” (participant 102, wrongly accused- 
guilty-evasion condition). Thus it appears that the defendant being merely 
suspected by the police did not lead participants to believe him guilty. Moreover, 
only one participant made explicit reference to the fact that the alibi witness’ 
deception may allow the defendant to reoffend; “regardless of how Sarah feels 
for Andrew, it would be in her best interests to say she can’t remember where 
he was at that particular time, as he may do worse things in the future” 
(participant 185, wrongly accuse -guilty-omission condition). This meant that 
hypothesis 3 (alibi witnesses will be viewed as more deceptive when their 
statement to the police relates to a police suspect (no charges made) compared 
to someone who has been falsely accused) and hypothesis 4 (alibi witnesses 
will be viewed as less justified when their statement to the police relates to a 
police suspect (no charges made) compared to someone who has been falsely 
accused) were not supported.
The belief that defendants are innocent until proven guilty is further 
reflected in the responsibility and errors subtheme, mentioned on 36 occasions 
(5.33%). This reflects the belief that it is the responsibility of the police to 
discover the truth, and it was their errors that prevented this from occurring. For 
example “witness statements are carried out by police who do not possess the 
skills to produce effective and non-biased (within reason) statements”
(participant 148, wrongly accused-innocent-false confession condition) and 
“also the police are asking a direct question pressing Sarah so if it was phrased 
differently she may have been more willing to cooperate” (participant 109, 
wrongly accused-guilty-evasion condition). Thus the poor phrasing of the police 
questions and the corruption of the police were deemed as justifying alibi 
witnesses making misleading statements. When surveying the alibi beliefs of 
serving American police officers Dysart and Strange (2012) found that officers 
were significantly more likely to ask broad questions (e.g. where you on 
Wednesday 8th February?) rather than refer to specific timeframes (e.g. where 
you between 8pm and 8.30pm on Wednesday 8th February?). This indicates
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that unspecific police questioning may be present on a regular basis (certainly 
in American interviewing practices) which may impact upon alibi witness 
honesty. Although the responsibility and errors subtheme was present in only a 
small number of cases it does suggest that the police need to ask specific 
questions in order to avoid alibi witnesses deception. This point is implemented 
in Chapter 8, where mock police interviews utilise specific and direct questions 
in assessing alibi witness deception.
This subtheme also demonstrates some negativity towards the police as 
they are suggested to not possess the skills to produce effective and non­
biased (within reason) statements” (participant 148, wrongly accused-innocent- 
false confession condition). This could influence honesty of alibi witness 
evidence as “only naive, trusting of justice people would not give Andrew 
[defendant] an alibi, more fool them! The police are not to be trusted”
(participant 115, wrongly accused- innocent-omission condition). Further 
research has illustrated that attitudes to the police and courts are linked to 
behaviours such as reporting crimes (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler & Fagan, 
2008), obeying speed limits (Elliott, Armitage & Baughan, 2003; 2007), assisting 
police investigations (Reisig, Bratton & Gertz, 2007) and giving evidence in 
court (Viki, Culmer, Eller & Abrams, 2006). Moreover, Dysart and Strange 
(2012) found that the most common reason suggested by police for deception 
from an unmotivated alibi witness, was distrust of the police and the criminal 
justice system. Thus it is logical to suppose that attitudes to the police may also 
influence alibi witness cooperation in the form of providing honest and 
incriminating evidence against a defendant. Previous research has not 
addressed this point, so the impact of attitudes to the police and courts upon the 
honesty/deceptiveness of alibi witness testimony is examined in Chapter 5.
Knowledge of the Law
The current study raised several interesting trends namely the 
importance of the legal right to silence. Evasions (no comment responses) 
were viewed as justified, even when the defendant was thought to be guilty. 
When the defendant was thought by the alibi provider to be guilty, evading 
answering police questions through providing a 'no comment’ response was the
only action viewed as justified by participants (mean> 50 on the scale). The 
non-legal avenues of assisting the defendant were all condemned (lies, 
omissions and false confessions) possibly because participants acknowledged 
that the defendant could pose a risk of reoffending. In fact, when the alibi 
witness thought the defendant was guilty the no comment response was viewed 
as significantly more justified than all other forms of deception, including 
omissions.
In general these findings suggest that participants had some basic legal 
knowledge in terms of awareness of the concept of innocent until proven guilty 
as well as the legal right to silence in police interviews (exercised through a no 
comment response). This awareness was certainly demonstrated by participant 
206 (wrongly accuse-innocent-evasion condition) who stated “she has a right to 
say ‘no comment’...” The subtheme legality of alibi witness’ actions reflects 
views that alibi witness deception acceptability is predicated upon the risk of 
prosecution for the alibi witness. Participant 144 (wrongly accused-innocent- 
false confession condition) stated “... so she’s just getting herself into trouble” 
and participant 135 (wrongly accused-innocent-lie condition) expressed the 
same sentiment that “she is also going against the law by lying”. Although this 
implies some knowledge of the law, this appeared to be limited as only 5.62% of 
the evaluations (38 instances) considered that “Sarah may get in trouble for 
withholding evidence” (participant 185, wrongly accuse-guilty-omission). This 
implies a focus on assisting the defendant rather than widespread consideration 
of legality of actions and risk to alibi witness of prosecutions. Although 
participants considered the risk to the alibi witness they did not appear to be 
able to accurately gauge the legality of the alibi witness’ deception. This 
supports the concept that people act according to what they believe should be 
legal rather than what is legal (Robinson & Darley, 2004; Schoepfer,
Carmichael & Piquero, 2007) and thus make impulsive and imprudent decisions 
(Palmer, 2003). Thus a negative attitude towards deception results 
predominantly from a belief that lying is morally wrong (Gordon & Miller, 2000; 
Saxe, 1999) rather than a belief that it is legally wrong. Research specifically 
examining attitudes to alibi witness deception further supports the idea that 
people are ignorant of the laws pertaining to deception to the police and courts
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(Fawcett, 2006). Thus it seems that believing their deception to be legal may 
actually influence perceptions of alibi witness deception acceptability. Moreover, 
ignorance of the law may be a causal factor in the provision of deceptive alibi 
witness testimony as people must have knowledge of the relevant sanctions if 
they are to deter (Anderson, 2002). Collectively this suggests that the lack of 
public condemnation of false alibi witness evidence coupled with ignorance of 
the relevant law may facilitate the provision of deceptive alibi witness testimony. 
Following on from this, Chapter 6 explores the role of legal knowledge in the 
provision of false alibi witness testimony in further detail.
The right to silence applies to all police interviews and as such is much 
more common knowledge than the legislation pertaining to false alibi witness 
testimony. Thus little knowledge of public justice offences is required to make 
no comment responses by alibi witnesses appear moral. This explains why 
evasions (no comment responses) were viewed as justified when the alibi 
witness thought the defendant was guilty, and when the alibi witness was 
unsure of the defendant’s guilt. The acceptability of the no comment evasion 
may be further explained by cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957).
This theory states that two alternate emotions experienced at the same time 
create a negative emotional state that people find unpleasant, and seek to 
remedy. The interrogation and interview literature has demonstrated how a 
desire to escape pressure can elicit false confessions. This course of action 
often results in the cessation of the interview, and relief of pressure 
(Gudjonsson & Sigurdsson, 1992). Similarly, innocent individuals may feel high 
levels of anxiety when the police suspect their loved one of having committed a 
crime. The desire to relieve this dissonance caused by both reluctance to lie to 
the police and a simultaneous desire to be loyal to their relationship with the 
suspect, could make no comment response to the police an attractive course of 
action. A no comment response could relieve cognitive dissonance as it allows 
the individual to appear loyal to the defendant, whilst simultaneously responding 
in a moral and legal manner. “Just Sarah being his girlfriend won’t want him to 
be in trouble but also won’t want to lie to the police” (participant 207, wrongly 
accuse-innocent-evasion condition) illustrates the dissonance the alibi witness 
is perceived by participants to feel. It is unlikely this is due to the worry
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regarding the defendant reoffending if avoiding conviction. In fact, absent in the 
findings of the content analysis was the consideration of the risk of the 
defendant committing further crimes, and the experience of the victim/s. Thus 
‘no comment’ is an effective strategy to relieve cognitive dissonance, and is 
therefore more attractive to alibi witnesses than other forms of information 
manipulation and deception.
The current quantitative analysis revealed that evasions were seen as 
least justified when the defendant was innocent. Here the evasions were rated 
almost identically to false confessions and posited at the not justified end of the 
scale. One explanation for this finding is that participants equated justifiable 
actions with actions that facilitate justice, thus, in the case of an innocent 
defendant, actions that avoid conviction. This is supported by the theme of 
appropriateness of statement provided by the alibi witness to the police. This 
theme reflected views that the alibi witness was only justified if their deception 
was necessary to ensure justice. This is exemplified by participant 161 who 
states that “...in this sense her lie seems unjustified as it seems an extreme 
step to take to protect some one [sic] and, in this case, an unnecessary one” 
(suspect-unsure-false confession condition). This sentiment is echoed by 
participant 97 when suggesting that “if she believes he didn’t do it then justice 
would have prevailed -  without her having to lie” (wrongly accused-guilty-false 
confession condition). Seventy one instances of the appropriateness of 
statement subtheme were seen, accounting for 10.50% of reasons given.
Although participants viewed no comment responses as justified, several 
participants raised concerns that the alibi witness’ silence implied guilt on the 
part of the defendant. This is illustrated by participant 76 ‘“no comment’ is very 
ambiguous and possibly detrimental to his case” (suspect-unsure-evasion) and 
participant 69 “... [no comment] is generally taken as the individual knows 
something about what they are being questioned” (suspect-innocent-evasion 
condition). Although not common (21 instances or 3.11% of the reasons given) 
the alibi biases theme suggests that evasions (no comment) may not be the 
most effective strategy to aid justice for an innocent defendant. This would 
explain why the alibi witness was not viewed as justified in saying ‘no comment’ 
for an innocent defendant; alibi justifiability depends upon consideration of what
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response will facilitate justice for the defendant, not just perceptions of what is 
right and wrong.
Thus the findings imply that no comment responses are favoured as they 
are a legal way of assisting a potentially guilty defendant. Thus they enable the 
alibi witness to avoid sanction for lying, whilst simultaneously avoiding actively 
revealing incriminating information about the defendant. Implicit in this is the 
concept that assisting a defendant through false evidence provision is a 
complex cognitive activity, thus supporting Rational Choice Theory (Cornish & 
Clarke, 1986). In fact consideration of the benefits and limitations of the 
statement to the police was evident throughout the data. For example, 
participant 206 reflected upon the legality of the alibi witness’ statement when 
stating that “she has a right to say ‘no comment’...” (wrongly accuse-innocent- 
evasion condition). Furthermore participants contemplated the morality of 
withholding information and the need for justice; “it is for the greater good, 
because him being convicted for something he didn’t do is worse than 
withholding info” (participant 209, wrongly accuse-innocent-evasion condition). 
Flowever, people do not always accurately consider the likelihood of negative 
consequences of their actions, and thus act in a way that is most immediately 
satisfying (Ward, Stafford & Gray, 2006).
Love and Altruism
The content analysis revealed that one of the most important factors 
influencing perceptions of the alibi witness’ statement to the police was their 
relationship with the defendant (158 instances or 23.37% of reasons given). 
Relationship to the defendant predominantly influenced decisions through 
considering whether the alibi witness acted through love and loyalty to maintain 
the relationship (131 instances or 19.38% of reasons given). A belief that 
“Sarah [the alibi witness in the given vignette] is protecting someone she loves” 
(participant 163, suspect-unsure-false confession condition) represents this 
theme. This suggests that people view alibis as acceptable and justified if they 
are motivated through love and altruism, thus supporting research implicating 
the role of intentions in ratings of deception acceptability (for example Backbier, 
Floogstraten & Terwogt-Kouwenhoven, 1997). In addition, Bok (1978) suggests
that the acceptability of lies is a function of their position on a continuum from 
altruistic to exploitative motivation. As false confessions were rated as more 
justified than outright lies the quantitative analysis suggests that the selfless and 
altruistic intentions of a false confession negates the full seriousness of this type 
of lie (although these differences did not reach statistical significance).
Conversely, the alibi witness belief about defendant guilt variable did not 
exert a significant main effect upon judgements of alibi witness deception 
acceptability. This is also seen in actual cases such as that of Maxine Carr who 
claimed to have provided a false alibi only because she believed her partner 
was innocent. Moreover, Carr claimed she wanted to avoid the police wrongly 
accusing Huntley as she believed they had in relation to a previous offence.
This apparent altruistic intent behind her actions suggests that she believes this 
will be accepted as a valid justification and preclude any negative repercussions 
to which she may otherwise be subject. The public outcry against Maxine Carr 
was actually so severe that she was forced to take a new identity to ensure her 
safety and she was vilified in the press more than the murderer she sought to 
protect (Jones & Wardle, 2008). Thus it appears that unless a very clear and 
large altruistic act is undertaken (false confession) altruism is not considered as 
mitigation in judgements of alibi witness lies. Moreover, Jones and Wardle 
(2008) suggest that the media did not portray Carr as a perjurer, “she was 
portrayed as an accomplice to a murderer, connoted as the next Myra Hindley” 
(p. 67). Thus media emphasis upon the fact that Carr contravened female 
stereotypes could have contributed to public outrage at her actions. In addition 
to this, moral panic relating to paedophilia and child murder (McCartan, 2004) 
suggests the reaction to Carr’s crime was centred on the nature of the crime 
concealed, rather than solely upon her lies. This suggests sympathy towards 
acts of genuine altruism is not an influential factor in judgements of deception to 
the police.
One facet of the theme of love which emerged in the analysis was that 
alibis were motivated by a desire to maintain a relationship with the defendant, 
as well as a desire to protect them. Thus many participants acknowledged that 
“She might be scared of being without Andrew if he goes to prison” (participant 
163, suspect-unsure- false confession). This contradicts the notion of love
encouraging false alibi witness testimony in a purely selfless manner (Hosch, 
Culhane, Jolly, Chavez & Shaw, 2011) and instead suggests love induces alibi 
witnesses to lie in order to selfishly maintain a relationship with the defendant 
(Zahavi & Zahavi, 1997). Thus costly signalling theory is supported by these 
findings. This highlights that role of the relationship between the defendant and 
alibi witness in promoting false alibi witness evidence. Although it is clear that 
alibi evaluators presume deceptive evidence from individuals related to the 
defendant (Culhane & Hosch, 2004; Hosch, Culhane, Jolly, Chavez & Shaw,
2011; Olson & Wells, 2004), the observed innocence bias suggests that this 
same bias does not generalise to the defendant themself. Instead, evaluators 
do not derive defendant guilt from deceptive alibi witness evidence (Judicial 
Studies Board, 2010). This contrasts with prior research findings that motivated 
alibi witnesses may actually harm a defendant’s case (Culhane, 2005; Dahl, 
Brimacombe & Lindsay, 2008; Lyndsay, Lim, Murando, & Cully, 1986). It is 
unclear as to whether the presumption of deception from motivated alibi 
witnesses reflects an actual inclination toward deception by these individuals. 
Chapter 7 addresses this question through assessing the honesty of alibi 
witness evidence as a function of the relationship to the defendant. However, 
prior studies required participants to take the role of police investigators (Dahl, 
Brimacombe & Lindsay, 2008) or jurors (Culhane, 2005; Lyndsey, Lim, Murando, 
& Cully, 1986) thus priming them to consider the defendant’s guilt. The current 
study vignettes were written from an impartial third-person stance in accordance 
with prior research (Lee & Ross, 1997) and participants were not instructed to 
consider the alibi story from a legal perspective. This may however have 
served to encourage participant identification with the alibi witness and 
therefore foster a belief in the defendant’s innocence.
The quantitative analysis found no significant main effect of the alibi 
witness’ belief regarding the defendant’s guilt (guilty, innocent or unsure) upon 
ratings of alibi witness deception magnitude or deception acceptability. Thus, 
hypothesis 5 (the statements of alibi witnesses will be rated as less deceptive 
when they believe the defendant is innocent compared to when they think he is 
guilty or are unsure of his guilt) was not supported. However, the interaction 
between alibi witness belief and deception type had a significant effect upon
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ratings of alibi witness justifiability. Therefore hypothesis 6 (the statements of 
alibi witnesses will be rated as more justified when they believe the defendant is 
innocent compared to when they think he is guilty or are unsure of his guilt) 
received partial support. Hence, when the alibi witness omitted to tell the police 
information, they were viewed as more justified when they believed the 
defendant was innocent than when they though him guilty. Similarly, when the 
alibi witness was unsure whether the defendant was guilty, their omission to the 
police was judged as more justified than when they believed the defendant to 
be guilty. These findings were echoed in the content analysis as the character 
reference subtheme presented the view that alibi witnesses have special insight 
into the defendant’s guilt and/or level of risk (27 instances or 3.99% of 
justifications). Suggestions that the alibi witness is justified in deceiving the 
police as she would not date someone who was a criminal (and thus is 
protecting an innocent individual) appear to show some participant identification 
with the alibi witness in the vignette; “because it was her boyfriend and 
hopefully she picked a nice enough guy that she knows he would not take part 
in such a crime or any crime” (participant 126, wrongly accused-unsure-lie 
condition). This is further exampled by participant 131 (wrongly accused- 
innocent-lie condition) who states that “Andrew’s girlfriend should know him well 
enough to judge whether or not he committed the crime.” These findings 
therefore also support the concept of an innocence bias raised in relation to the 
guilt subtheme of the major theme accuracy of the alibi witness’ statement.
The fact that the defendant Maxine Carr lied for was subsequently found 
guilty could therefore have caused a hindsight bias to instil the belief that Carr 
should have known Huntley better before supporting his false alibi. A hindsight 
bias is the propensity to overstate the inevitability of the consequence of an 
event once the actual outcome is known (Fischhoff, 1975). Thus the salience of 
the known outcome reduces the salience of other potential outcomes, and 
makes the alternatives harder to imagine occurring (Sanna & Schwarz, 2007).
In support of this Spranca, Minsk & Baron (1991) found that the same deceptive 
behaviour was rated as worse when a negative outcome occurred, compared to 
when a negative consequence did not occur suggesting that a hindsight bias is 
associated with the evaluation of deceptive acts. That the participants in the
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present study were not told whether the defendant in the vignette was convicted 
therefore prevented a hindsight bias and thus affected ratings of the alibi 
witness’ deception. Conversely, public awareness that Carr’s lies attempted to 
protect a murderer caused her to be judged more harshly than if Huntley was 
innocent or there was still uncertainty regarding his guilt. The character 
reference theme shows that deceptive alibi witness evidence is made more 
acceptable by the fact that the alibi witness should know the defendant well 
enough to know he poses no risk. Thus either Carr did not know Huntley well 
enough to lie for him, or knew he was guilty and lied regardless. Coupled with 
the abhorrence associated with the index offence (McCartan, 2004), the 
hindsight bias (Fischhoff, 1975) and poor character reference meant that Carr 
was heavily disparaged in the press.
Limitations
As mentioned in the method section, previous research has indicated 
that people are more lenient towards deception committed by members of the 
same sex (Maier & Lavrakas, 1976). In the current study both the deceiver in 
the vignettes and the majority of participants were female. This implies that the 
deception was viewed as more justified than it would be had a more even 
number of males and females participated in the research. Additionally the 
hindsight bias associated with published cases in which the defendant has been 
convicted of the index offence may lead to lower estimates of real case alibi 
witness deception acceptability. Therefore the uniform view of the alibi witness 
being towards the ‘not justified’ end of the scale may actually overestimate how 
justified the public in general would rate the vignette. Thus public 
condemnation of false evidence provision is potentially rather high and may 
work alongside legal sanctions to deter false evidence provision. The fact that 
the public may view omissions of key evidence to the police as more justified 
than fabricating evidence has a serious implication. Individuals may feel their 
actions will be publically condemned should they attempt to assist a defendant 
through fabricating evidence to the police, and thus be dissuaded from this 
course of action. Conversely the study findings suggest that public 
condemnation of omitting evidence to the police will not be so strong, and so
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this may be a more attractive course of action. Thus the support of hypothesis 
1 and 2 suggest that public reactions to justifiability of omissions compared to 
commissions may be an influential factor concealing information from the police. 
Consequently, two courses of action are implied in deterring false evidence 
provision. Namely as commissions are viewed as less justified than omissions, 
encouraging the public to frame evasions and omissions as lies would make 
these behaviours less justified in the eyes of the public. In turn this may 
decrease the attractiveness of omissions to alibi witnesses and encourage full 
evidence disclosure to the police.
The ecological validity of the study may have been reduced by the use of 
short vignettes, the focus of the miscellaneous subtheme of vignette information. 
Eighteen participants (or 2.66% of reactions to the vignettes) suggested that the 
vignette contained limited information which made the judgement of the alibi 
witness’ statement challenging. For example one participant provided the 
justification of “amount of information given in scenario” (Participant 225,
Wrongly Accused-Unsure-False Confession condition). Although the vignettes 
were limited, this is an established method used for assessing reactions to 
deception (Green et al., 2000; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Schweizer &
Croson, 1999; Spranca Minsk & Baron, 1991). A further limitation of the study 
is the crime of which the defendant was accused in the vignette. Property 
offences have been demonstrated to be the crime most frequently associated 
with false confessions (Gudjonsson & Sigurdsson, 1994) thus were selected as 
the index offence in the vignettes provided to participants in the current study. 
Plowever, the predominantly student sample may have found it challenging to 
imagine their acquaintances committing a burglary and thus judge the alibi 
witness’ deception more harshly. For this reason, Chapter 7 will focus on the 
frequent offence of driving under the influence of alcohol (Hopkin, Sykes,
Groom, & Kelly, 2010) which they may be more likely to imagine their 
acquaintances committing. This offence is similar in seriousness to burglary in 
that it attracts a similar maximum custodial sentence of 14 years (Road Traffic 
Act 1988 s.1, Theft Act, 1968 s.9).
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Summary and Conclusions
The chapter addressed objectives 1 and 2 of the thesis. In brief it 
investigated attitudes towards deception by alibi witnesses in order to generate 
variables for research later in the thesis, as well as examined perceptions of 
different forms of alibi witness deception. As the evaluation of lies is based on 
the same aspects as the provision of lies (Backbier, Hoogstraten & Terwogt- 
Kouwenhoven, 1997) this chapter has revealed aspects of alibi witness 
deception necessitating further study. The study revealed that the variable 
having greatest effect upon participant rating of alibi witness deception was the 
type of deception engaged in by alibi witnesses. In brief, the study supported 
the dichotomy between commission and omission observed in previous 
research (Backbier, Hoogstraten & Terwogt-Kouwenhoven, 1997). Moreover 
the significant interactions between the four levels of the deception type variable 
upon the deception justification dependant variable (see pages 83 and 84) 
partially supports the suggestion that there is a finer distinction between 
evasions, omissions, lies and false confessions (Bradac, 1983; Galasinski, 
2000). This finding is utilised in the ensuing chapters which examine the 
variables that influence alibi witness honesty. Thus the studies reported in 
Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 examine whether participants will provide false alibi 
evidence through evading police questions, omitting incriminating information, 
outright lies and confessing falsely to having committed the index offence.
The study suggested participants considered the legality of lying to the 
police (Criminal Justice System theme, and the greater perceived justifiability of 
evasions), but in general participants seemed unclear as to the law in this area. 
As people must know the law in order for it to deter (Anderson, 2002, Robinson 
& Darley, 2004; Schoepfer, Carmichael & Piquero, 2007), Chapter 6 examines 
whether knowledge of the relevant legislation and sanctions discourages false 
alibi witness evidence. Related to this, participants demonstrated the belief that 
it is the responsibility of the police to gather accurate information from alibi 
witnesses through asking detailed questions. This is followed up in Chapter 8 
of the thesis where specific and direct questions are utilised in interviews with 
alibi witnesses. Negativity towards the police was observed in the data in the 
data and prior research suggests this may lead to non-compliance with the
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police (Viki, Culmer, Eller & Abrams, 2006). Chapter 5 therefore expands on 
this point through assessing the role of attitudes to the criminal justice system in 
the provision of false alibi witness evidence.
Finally, the study suggests that alibi witnesses experience cognitive 
dissonance as they struggle to decide between deceiving the police and failing 
to support a partner. The content analysis revealed that participants calculated 
the necessity and efficacy of deception compared to the risk of alibi witness 
prosecution, illustrating that false alibi provision is not a purely altruistic act but 
a rational choice (Cornish & Clark, 1986). No comment responses dissipate the 
cognitive dissonance and allow alibi witnesses to appear loyal but minimise risk 
of prosecution, thus supporting the concept of moral hypocrisy (Batson et al., 
1997). One of the positives associated with deceptive alibi witness evidence 
was the demonstration of love for the defendant, an influence that will be further 
explored in Chapter 7. Similarly, the study demonstrated that participants 
presumed the defendant to be innocent as alibi witnesses should know the 
defendant well enough to vouch for their good character.
In conclusion, based upon the trends revealed in the current study, 
attitudes to the police and courts, knowledge of pertinent legislation and the role 
of relationship to the defendant upon alibi witness honesty will be examined 
later in the thesis (Chapter 5, 6 and 7 respectively).
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CHAPTER 4: MEASURING ATTITUDES 
TOWARDS THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM AND ALIBI WITNESS HONESTY
This chapter does not seek to directly develop understanding of alibi 
witness deception. Instead, this methodology chapter aims to create new 
questionnaire measures that can be utilised in the later thesis chapters, as well 
as further research, in order to improve understanding of alibi witness deception.
In order to address Objectives 5 and 6 of the thesis (see Chapter 2) it is 
necessary to assess intentions to provide false alibi evidence, and attitudes and 
experience of the criminal justice system. Few studies have examined false 
evidence provision to assist a defendant and none to date have examined the 
motivations and influences upon this behaviour. For this reason there is no 
existing measure of intentions to provide false evidence to assist a defendant 
that can be utilised in the thesis. In order to measure these intentions in the 
later thesis studies (Chapters 5 and 6) it is necessary to develop such a 
measure. Thus objective 3 of the thesis is addressed in the current chapter 
through the development of such a measure. The resultant False Evidence 
Questionnaire is informed by the results of Chapter 3 and the review of the alibi 
literature reported in Chapter 2.
In addition to this, the thesis aims to examine the relationship between 
attitudes to the criminal justice system and alibi witness honesty. As highlighted 
in the literature review chapter (Chapter 2) there has been no research to date 
assessing the influence of attitudes towards the criminal justice system upon 
willingness to provide false evidence. A subsample of the participants in 
Chapter 3 viewed poor interviewing skills, untrustworthiness and bias on the 
part of police as justification for alibi witness deception. Moreover, research has 
demonstrated that negative attitudes towards the police are associated with 
commission of other crimes (Elliott, Armitage & Baughan, 2003; Sunshine & 
Taylor, 2003; Tyler, 2004). There are many methods used to assess attitudes to 
the police and the criminal courts, but most are single item assessments that
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are not representative of the complex views people have of the different areas, 
and associated performance, of the criminal justice system. Furthermore these 
measures lack any empirical reliability testing. Therefore this chapter describes 
the development of a measure of attitudes towards the police and the criminal 
courts that is utilised to address objectives 5 and 6 of the thesis (see Chapter 5)
Alibi Witness Deception
As highlighted in the literature review chapter, it is important that 
intentions to provide false evidence are measured, however there is at present, 
no scale that measures these intentions. Chapter 3 demonstrated that 
participants viewed alibi witness concealments as more justified than their 
fabrications, and that love was a major factor in perceptions of alibi witness 
deception acceptability. Thus it is important that any measure of alibi witness 
honesty take these findings into consideration. Moreover, as the investigation 
and courtroom settings have distinct purposes and rules, the opportunities to 
provide false evidence vary between them. However, the study reported in 
Chapter 3 focused upon deception to the police only. For example, responding 
in the evasive 'no comment' manner with the police is a strategy available within 
the police interview setting. Moreover, people have the legal right to remain 
silent in interviews and may even be advised to do so by legal representatives. 
However, in court the response of ‘no comment’ is not as viable; refusing to 
speak when called to the stand could put witnesses at risk of being charged 
with contempt of court (Contempt of Court Act, 1981). Furthermore, deception 
in the course of the investigation is to a small audience, whereas a large 
audience in court, in conjunction with a court required oath of honesty, may 
discourage deception. Thus, the different contexts with their alternate audiences 
and rules may affect the way in which evidence is delivered (in terms of 
concealments and fabrications) as well as willingness to provide false evidence 
at all. It is important therefore that the intentions to provide false evidence in 
these two different contexts are assessed separately.
108
Attitudes to the Criminal Justice System
In order to assess the role of attitudes to the criminal justice system in 
alibi witness deception, a valid measure of attitudes to the criminal justice is 
required. Measuring attitudes towards the police is problematic due to the fact 
that attitudes held are not one-dimensional; rather numerous complex 
interrelated factors are responsible for attitudes towards police. This is not 
reflected in the single items often used to measure attitudes to the criminal 
justice system (Bennett, 2004; Cao & Zhao, 2005; Hinds & Murphy, 2007). For 
example Cao and Zhao (2005) gauged attitudes to the police with the question 
how much confidence do you have in the police? It is not clear from these 
single item measures, which aspect of police functioning participants should 
regard when responding; diffuse, specific, instrumental or normative (Bennett, 
2004). Thus the reliability of the single item measures of attitudes to the police 
is questionable, and there is a need to develop a more holistic measure that 
takes into account the complex nature of attitudes towards the police. This 
chapter describes the development of a new measure of attitudes towards the 
police and criminal courts, the Attitudes toward the Police and Criminal Courts 
Questionnaire (APCQ), designed to address these limitations.
Summary
In summary the chapter aims to develop and test the structure of a new 
measure of attitudes to the police and criminal courts, the APCQ. In line with 
previous theory and research the APCQ will be structured to include 
assessments of; diffuse support for the police; diffuse support for the courts; 
instrumental support for the police; instrumental support for the courts; 
normative support for the police; and normative support for the courts. A 
second questionnaire assessing intentions to provide false evidence for others, 
the False Evidence Questionnaire (FEQ) will be developed. In line with 
previous research the FEQ will include measures of false alibi evidence in the 
form of both omissions and commissions, and reflect deception to the police 
and criminal courts. Thus this chapter is concerned with the development of 
these measures, rather than any specific hypothesis testing.
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Method
Participants and Procedure
Sampling was based on an opportunity sample and the snowball method 
in which volunteers were encouraged to recruit acquaintances to participate. 
The scales were administered to 153 participants. The sample consisted of 
predominately females (118 females and 35 males) and the mean age of 
participants was 20.52 years (SD= 7.50). Most of the participants identified 
themselves as White British (133) and the rest were Asian (9), African (5), and 
Polish (1)3 and most were students (90.1%). Participants were given paper 
copies of the Attitudes towards the Police and Courts Questionnaire in 
conjunction with the False Evidence Questionnaire.
Materials
The APCQ
The APCQ (Appendix 4) is composed of several distinct sections relating 
to demographic information, interactions with the police, experience of the 
criminal courts, attitudes towards the police and attitudes towards the courts. In 
section 1 six items assess participant experience of the police in terms of 
whether participants have come into direct or indirect (through family or friends) 
contact with the police, how many times they have done so, how recent their 
latest direct contact with the police was and the nature of this contact (for 
example reporting a crime, being questioned as a witness or asking for 
information). Section 2 consists of six questions designed to assess participant 
experience of the Criminal Courts. Questions assess whether participants have 
come into direct or indirect contact with the courts, how many times this has 
occurred, how recent their latest direct contact with the criminal courts was and 
the nature of these contacts (for example as a witness, defendant or as part of 
jury duty).
3 Data regarding ethnicity/race was missing for five participants.
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Questions in sections 3 and 4 of the questionnaire were designed to 
ascertain participant attitudes to the police and criminal courts respectively. 
Items were constructed to reflect the key aspects of attitudes to the police and 
criminal courts revealed through a review of the relevant research literature. 
These focused on issues of diffuse, instrumental and normative support.
Diffuse support is a general attitude toward an institution, whereas specific 
support refers to feelings about an institution based upon particular experiences 
with individuals within that organisation (Easton, 1965). These attitudes are 
measured through three items assessing whether participants respect the aims 
of the police; think that the police are essential to the functioning of society; and 
whether they respect the work that the police do. Perceptions of the legitimacy 
of the criminal courts were assessed with the items I respect the work of the 
criminal courts; I agree with the aims of the criminal courts and I think that the 
criminal courts are essential to the functioning of society.
Instrumental factors of attitudes to the police are perceptions of police 
efficacy in controlling crime and criminal behaviour, police portrayal of 
significant probability of detection and sanction for law breakers (Hinds & 
Murphy, 2007). The crime rate for most crimes in the UK is decreasing, thus a 
belief that it is increasing illustrates poor attitudes towards the police. The items 
I think that the crime rate in my neighbourhood is high and there is no crime 
problem in my neighbourhood assess estimations of crime in the participants' 
local neighbourhood. A low fear of crime should reflect a positive view of the 
performance of the police in controlling crime. Three items assessing whether 
participants believe that the crime rate is increasing; are worried that they will 
be the victim of a crime; and whether they feel safe in their neighbourhood at 
night were used to assess the levels of fear that participants held in relation to 
crime. This again indicates how well people believe the police are performing at 
investigating crime. The higher the perceived arrest rate, the more favourable 
the attitude towards the police is judged to be. Estimations of the police arrest 
rate are measured by the two items I think that the police are effective in 
arresting those who have committed crimes and I think that the perpetrators of 
many crimes go undetected. Although little research exists to suggest what the 
instrumental aspects the courts may be, these were mapped on those of the
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police. Thus instrumental courts items focused upon court sentences as 
indicative of efficacy in controlling crime and criminal behaviour. Therefore the 
perceived appropriateness of sentences administered by the criminal courts is 
assessed by the items the criminal courts are too lenient in their sentencing, I 
think that the criminal courts ensure that justice is done, I believe that the 
criminal courts always hand out appropriate sentences and the criminal courts 
do not give enough offenders custodial sentences.
Normative aspects of satisfaction with the police relate to beliefs 
regarding procedural justice and the fairness with which police conduct 
themselves in each interaction with the public (Hinds & Murphy, 2007). 
Construction of normative items was based upon the elements of police 
encounters indicated as influential in previous literature (see for example Hinds 
& Murphy, 2007; Tyler, 2006). These opinions were measured using ten items 
assessing whether participants believe that police put the needs of the 
community first; work hard to solve crimes; are racist; are corrupt; treat all 
people fairly; are lazy; are bullies; are respectful towards witnesses, suspects 
and victims. Thirteen items are used to gauge how participants think the 
criminal courts conduct themselves. These relate to the respect shown to 
victims, witnesses and defendants, how equally people are treated, corruption 
and racism and the needs of the community. Prior research has implicated 
each of these as important components of attitudes to the courts (see for 
example Flanagan, McGarrell & Brown, 1985; Kaukinen & Colavecchia, 1999). 
All of the attitudes towards the police and courts scales and items are shown in 
Table 7.
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T a b le  7 : A P C Q  S c a le s  a n d  Ite m s
Attitudes towards the Police and Courts Items__________________________________
Police Items 
Legitimacy (Diffuse Support)
I respect the aims of the police
The police are not essential to the functioning of society 
I respect the work that the police do 
Efficacy (Instrumental Support)
I think that the police are effective in arresting those who have committed crimes 
I think that the perpetrators of many crimes go undetected 
There is no crime problem in my neighbourhood 
I am worried that I will be the victim of a crime 
I do not feel safe in my neighbourhood at night 
I think that the crime rate in my neighbourhood is high 
I believe that the crime rate is increasing 
Decorum (Normative Support)
The police treat all people fairly 
The police are respectful towards victims 
I think the police put the needs of the community before all else 
The police work hard to solve crimes 
I believe that the police are racist 
I think that the police are corrupt 
I consider the police to be lazy 
I think that the police are bullies 
The police are respectful towards witnesses 
The police are respectful towards suspects 
Criminal Courts Items
Legitimacy (Diffuse Support)
I respect the work of the criminal courts 
I agree with the aims of the criminal courts
I think that the criminal courts are essential to the functioning of society 
Efficacy (Instrumental Support)
The criminal courts are too lenient in their sentencing 
I think that the criminal courts ensure that justice is done 
I believe that the criminal courts do not always hand out appropriate sentences 
The criminal courts do not give enough offenders custodial sentences 
I believe that the criminal courts treat witnesses with respect 
Decorum (Normative Support)
The criminal courts treat all defendants as innocent until proven guilty 
The criminal courts do not treat everyone equally
Judges in the criminal courts work hard____________________________________
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The criminal courts do not respect the rights of victims 
I believe that the criminal courts do not respect the rights of defendants 
The criminal courts put the welfare of the community before all else 
The criminal courts are not fair
I believe that the criminal courts treat defendants with respect
I believe that the criminal courts are racist
Lawyers in the criminal courts work hard
The criminal courts do not treat victims with respect
I think that the criminal courts are corrupt__________________________
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S c o r in g  th e  A P C Q
The attitudes to the police and the attitudes towards the criminal courts 
items are scored on a likert scale which has responses of strongly agree (1) to 
strongly disagree (5). Thus high scores demonstrate a favourable attitude and 
low scores show an unfavourable attitude. Twenty items assessing attitudes to 
the police give this section potential scores of between 20 and 100. Items in the 
attitudes to the criminal courts section of the questionnaire are similarly scored 
on likert scales. Maximum scores on this section also ranged from between 20 
and 100. On this scale, high scores represent favourable attitudes to the 
criminal courts, whereas low scores reveal unfavourable attitudes towards the 
criminal courts. Ten of the attitudes to the police items were reverse phrased, 
as were ten of the attitudes to the courts items. This was done to encourage 
participant concentration and engagement (e.g. Nunnally, 1967) and reduce 
response bias (Field, 2009).
False Evidence Questionnaire
As people believe they will lie more to conceal the offences of a loved 
one than a stranger (Hosch, Culhane, Jolly, Chavez & Shaw, 2011), love 
justifies alibi witness deception (Chapter 3 Love theme) and there is greater 
scepticism towards motivated alibis, the False Evidence Questionnaire (FEQ, 
Appendix 5) will examine false alibi evidence in relation to a defendant that is a 
‘loved one’ of the alibi witness. The thirteen items were constructed to reflect 
the crimes of perjury, perverting the course of justice, assisting an offender and 
wasting police time. The items focus upon the modes of deception that can be 
implemented to deceive the police and courts validated in Chapter 3. Thus the 
items assess whether participants would deceive the police and the criminal 
courts through outright lies, omission, evasions, and false confessions. Seven 
items were constructed to determine intentions to provide false evidence to the 
police, and six to assess intentions to provide false evidence to the criminal 
courts. These were all scored on a likert scale rated between 1; strongly agree, 
to 5; strongly disagree. A response of unsure lay at the centre of the scale and 
negatively phrased items were incorporated into the design. A willingness to
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deceive the police is demonstrated by a low score, and a tendency towards 
truthfulness is illustrated by a high score on these items. The seven items give 
a willingness to deceive the police potential score of between 7 and 35, and a 
score from 6 to 30 on intentions to provide false evidence to the criminal courts. 
All of the items can be seen in Table 8 below. Totalling the police and courts 
items gave a score of between 13 and 65 for intentions to provide false 
evidence to the criminal justice system as a whole.
Omission was defined as ways of assisting a defendant that involved 
suppressing incriminating evidence. Any way of assisting a defendant that 
entailed fabrication of information was classed as deception through 
commission or fabrication (Galasiriski, 2000). According to this classification, in 
the current data, a total six items referred to acts of omission (3 police items 
and 3 criminal items). Intentions to pretend to forget information, and answer 
‘no comment’ to all questions in a police interview were classed as omissions to 
the police. Intended omissions in court took the form of items assessing 
intentions to pretend to forget information, refusal to testify and withholding 
information to assist a defendant in a criminal court. On the contrary, 5 items 
reflected helping a loved one though the commission of an act (3 police items 
and 2 courts items). The commission items for intended honesty of evidence in 
the criminal court referred to both lying in court and fabricating information. 
Fabricating evidence to the police was assessed through items assessing 
intentions to lie, wrongly confess and contact the police with false information.
A further two items asked participants whether they would tell the entire 
truth to the courts or to the police. As these items did not explicitly refer to acts 
of either omission or commission, some participants disagreeing with this item 
will do so because they are willing to fabricate information, whereas other 
participants may respond in the same way but actually be wiling only to conceal 
information. As it is not possible to determine the ways in which participants 
who disagreed with these items would avoid telling the whole truth, it is 
misleading to fit the items into the commission-omission dichotomy. For this 
reason, these two items were not added to either the omission or commission 
data in the subsequent analyses. Flowever, their inclusion in the questionnaire 
provided participants with an opportunity to reveal more subtle forms of
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omission than the other items. Also forms of commission not covered by the 
other items could also be indicated here. In conjunction with the omission and 
commission items, these two items mean participants can indicate any form of 
information manipulation they may be willing to engage in. Therefore the 
inclusion of these more ambiguous items was important. Table 8 shows the full 
classification of all the items used in the questionnaire.
T a b le  8 : D e c e p tio n  T y p e  o f F E Q  Ite m s
Commission Omission Ambiguous items
Lie to the police
Wrongly confess to the 
police
Contact the police with false 
information
Lie in court
Provide false information in 
court
Withholding relevant information 
from the police
Responding no comment to the 
police
Pretending to forget information 
with the police
Withholding information in court
Refusing to testify in court
Pretending to forget information 
in court
Tell the entire truth to the 
police
Tell the entire truth to the 
criminal courts
Note. Shaded items relate to items assessing the honesty of intended evidence toward police, 
non-shaded items relate to items assessing the honesty of intended evidence toward the 
criminal courts
Ethics
The research was conducted in accordance with the governing principles 
of the Code of Human Research Ethics (2006) established by the BPS. The 
specific study was assessed and approved by the ethics committee at Sheffield 
Hallam University.
Results
Data from 153 pilot participants were entered into SPSS for Windows so 
that the questionnaires could be assessed for reliability and refined. Negatively 
phrased items were reversed prior to analysis.
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Attitudes towards the Police and Courts Questionnaire
T a b le  9 : A P C Q  Ite m  S c o re s
Item
Mean
(SD)
Item
Mean
(SD)
I respect police aims5 4.31(0.68) I respect the work of the criminal courts5
4.08
(0.73)
Police treat people fairly5 3.04(1.00)
I agree with the aims of the criminal 
courts5
4.11
(0.73)
I am worried that I will be the 2.82 Criminal courts treat witnesses with 3.75
victim of a crime (1.14) respect5 (0.77)
I do not feel safe in my 3.00 Criminal courts are essential to the 4.20
neighbourhood at night (1.19) functioning of society5 (0.73)
Police effective at arresting 3.04 Criminal courts too lenient in their 2.26
criminals5 (0.93) sentencing (0.90)
Perpetrators of crime go 2.11 Criminal courts do not treat victims with 3.45
undetected (0.83) respect (0.80)
Police respectful towards 
victims5
3.53
(0.89) Criminal courts corrupt
3.66
(0.84)
Police not essential to the 
functioning of society
4.38
(0.78) Criminal courts ensure justice is done5
3.47
(0.82)
Police put the community 3.12 Criminal courts do not always hand out 1.89
needs first5 (0.91) appropriate sentences (0.74)
No crime problem in my 2.36 Criminal courts do not respect victims' 3.47
neighbourhood5 (1.03) rights (0.73)
I respect police work5 4.18(0.70)
Criminal courts treat defendants as 
innocent until proven guilty5
2.91
(0.92)
Police work hard to solve 3.72 Criminal courts do not treat everyone 2.84
crimes5 (0.84) equally (0.85)
Police are racist 3.61(0.96) Judges in the criminal courts work hard5
3.65
(0.87)
Police are corrupt 3.55(1.00)
Criminal courts do not give enough 
custodial sentences
2.53
(0.82)
Local crime rate is high 3.07(1.12)
Criminal courts do not respect 
defendants' rights
3.27
(0.69)
Police are lazy 3.65(0.86)
Criminal courts put community welfare 
first5
3.24
(0.82)
Police are bullies 3.52(0.98) Criminal courts not fair
3.39
(0.88)
Police respectful towards 3.63 Criminal courts treat defendants with 3.22
witnesses5 (0.77) respect5 (0.67)
Police respectful towards 
suspects5
2.80
(0.80) Criminal courts are racist
3.66
(0.87)
Crime rate is increasing 2.33(0.89) Lawyers in the criminal courts work hard5
4.01
(0.68)
Note. 5 indicates that item was reverse scored to assign high scores to positive ratings of police 
and criminal courts
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The descriptive statistics of the Attitudes towards the Police and Courts 
Questionnaire (APCQ; see Table 9) reveal that overall attitudes to the police 
and courts were towards the more favourable end of the scale. Most items 
showed favourable attitudes towards the police and courts, as demonstrated by 
mean attitude scores of 3 and above (where 3 is unsure, 4 is moderately agree 
and 5 is strongly agree). However, nine of the forty items revealed a negative 
mean attitude towards the police and criminal courts (negative attitudes were 
classed as mean scores below 3). Least favourable attitudes (denoted by low 
scores) were found for the items the criminal courts do not always hand out 
appropriate sentences (M = 1.89, SD = 0.74) and the perpetrators of crime go 
undetected (M = 2.11, SD = 0.83). Most positive attitudes were found for the 
item the police are not essential to the functioning of society (M= 4.38, SD = 
0.78).
Principle Components Analysis was conducted using the Enter method 
and a cut-off point of 0.5. Factors with eigenvalues of 1.0 and above were 
retained in the analysis in accordance with Kaiser's criterion (Kaiser, 1960 cited 
in Field, 2009 p. 632). Ten such values were found (8.933, 3.115, 2.805, 2.147, 
1.849, 1.630, 1.430, 1.275, 1.233, and 1.167) accounting for 63.96% of the 
variance. Examination of the scree plot however suggested that scree may be 
occurring earlier at between the third and seventh factors. Eigenvalues 
obtained were compared with eigenvalues from a randomly generated data 
matrix of the same size (40 variables x 153 respondents x 100 replications) 
produced through Parallel Analysis (Monte Carlo PCA for Parallel Analysis).
T a b le  10 : M o n te  C a rlo  P C A  fo r  P a ra lle l A n a ly s is
Eigenvalue No. Random Eigenvalue Actual Eigenvalue
1 2.15 8.94
2 2.01 3.12
3 1.90 2.81
4 1.80 2.15
5 1.72 1.85
6 1.65 1.63
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Table 10 shows that only the first five random eigenvalues obtained were 
of a greater value than those in the random data set indicating that five factors 
should be retained for further analysis (Pallant, 2005).
A principle axis factoring with orthagonal rotation (varimax) was carried 
out on the items to clarify the number of factors in the solution. Table 11 shows 
the number of markers for each factor according to Watson, Clark, Weber, 
Assenheimer, Strauss and McCormick's (1995) criteria (items that have their 
highest loading on a factor of greater than or equal to |.30|), and also the more 
stringent criteria advocated by Bedford (1997) (factor loading of greater than 
|.30| and where the major loading is |.20| greater than any cross-loadings). 
Examination of the number of marker items for each factor supports the view 
that the data forms five factors (see Table 11).
T a b le  11 : N u m b e r o f M a rk e rs  p e r  F a c to r  in M u lt ip le  F a c to r  S o lu t io n s
No. of Factors in 
Solution
No. of markers for factor number
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
29
(N/A)
2 29 (28) 6(5)
3 28 (23) 6(3) 3(0)
4 29 (23) 6(3) 3(0) 2(0)
5 15(8) 13(5)
12
(3)
6
(4)
6
(5)
6 29 (22) 8(3) 3(0) 1(0)
2
(1)
1
(0)
7 29 (21) 9(3) 4(0) 4
(0)
1
(1)
1
(0)
8 13(7) 14
(7)
6(3) 6
(1)
6
(5)
8
(1)
9 30 (23) 9(3) 6(0) 3
(0)
3
(0)
3
(0)
10 30 (22) 9(2) 6(0) 3
(0)
4
(0)
3
(0)
1
(0)
2 1
(2) (0)
1 1 0
(0) (0) (0)
1 0  0 0
(0) (0) (0) (0)
Note. Varimax rotated loadings presented. Data outside of brackets represent number of 
markers with a primary loading of above |.30| and data within brackets represents number of 
items where the primary loading is above |.30| and |.20| greater than any other loading
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This five factor solution accounted for 39.69% of the variance. Items 
loading heavily onto factor 1 related to Court Functioning such as (for example 
lawyers work hard and I agree with the aims of the criminal courts) whereas 
factor 2 reflected participant views of the Police Institution (police put the 
community first and I respect the aims of the police). The questionnaire was 
designed to measure attitudes towards the police and criminal courts; however 
attitudes towards these two institutions were related. The factor analysis shows 
items relating to both of the police and criminal courts loading onto the same 
factors (see Table 12). This is demonstrated by both police and criminal court 
items loading onto the third factor of Treatment of the Accused and the fourth 
Punishment factor. The final factor represented participant attitudes towards 
Personal Safety.
Table 12: Varimax Rotated Loadings of APCQ Items
Factor No.
Item
1:
Court
Functioning
2:
Police
Institution
3:
Treatment
of
Accused
4:
Punishment
5:
Personal
Safety
Criminal courts are corrupt .652* .096 .389 -.014 .003
Respect criminal court w o rk§ .633* .343 -.104 .116 -.027
Criminal courts treat witnesses 
with respect -
.586* .186 .277 -.010 .174
Judges work hard s .578* .129 .097 .245 -.013
Criminal courts do not respect 
victim's rights
.549* .141 .204 .048 .067
Criminal courts essential to 
society
.527* .188 .051 -.226 -.171
Lawyers in the criminal courts 
work hard -
.513* .228 .088 -.049 -.015
Agree with criminal court aims
a
.508* .230 .009 -.030 -.204
Criminal courts are not fair .478* .129 .352 .273 .168
Criminal courts do not treat 
victims with respect
.421* .135 .279 -.024 .144
Police respectful towards 
witnesses -
.402* .310 .262 .074 .225
Police work hard to solve 
crimes -
.261 .647* .068 .064 -.069
Respect police work - .359 .646* .027 -.113 -.053
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Respect the aims of the police
a
.199 .553* .120 .009 -.020
Police treat all people fairly 3 -.028 .547* .448 .294 .061
Police are respectful towards 
victims
.102 .546* .082 .004 .160
Police are lazy .329 .533* .172 .160 .137
Police put community needs 
f irs t3
.172 .514* .114 .286 .009
Police are bullies .223 .500* .345 .019 .228
Police effective in arresting the 
perpetrators of crime
.146 .449* .027 .281 .083
Police are not essential to the 
functioning of society
.270 .398* -.055 -.334 .079
Criminal courts treat 
defendants with respect9
.241 .011 .646* .008 .098
Criminal courts racist .443 .208 .605* -.058 .013
Police are racist .096 .441 .592* -.029 .052
Criminal courts do not treat 
everyone equally
.165 .092 .586* .297 .138
Police are corrupt .175 .383 .534* -.037 .047
Criminal courts treat 
defendants as innocent until 
proven guilty 3
.034 -.024 .478* -.040 -.052
Police respectful towards 
suspects 3
.011 .197 .474* -.019 .232
Criminal courts do not respect 
defendant's rights
.262 -.047 .357* -.009 .321
Criminal courts too lenient in 
sentencing
.116 .060 -.080 .687* -.018
Criminal courts do not always 
give appropriate sentences
-.030 -.010 .030 .680* .068
Criminal courts ensure justice 
is done3
.404 .254 -.092 .462* .036
Perpetrators of many crimes 
go undetected
-.137 -.003 .149 .433* .013
Criminal courts do not give 
enough custodial sentences
-.036 .098 -.154 .423* .185
Criminal courts put community 
welfare firs t3
.230 .147 .041 .374* -.068
High neighbourhood crime rate .008 .173 .046 -.003 .614*
No neighbourhood crime 
problem 3
-.090 .040 .080 .045 .538*
Do not feel safe in my 
neighbourhood at night
.030 .001 .092 .075 .471*
Worried about becoming victim 
of crime
.030 .031 -.007 -.032 .390*
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Crime rate increasing_____________ -.012_______-.046______ .090________.294_______.368*
Eigenvalues 8.95 3.10 2.81 2.15 1.84
% Variance 22.36 7.75 7.03 5.38 4.60
Cronbach's alpha .85 .84 .80 .69 .64
Note. Shaded rows show items with cross loadings of above |.30|.Items in bold have a loading 
of above |.30| that is greater than |.20| across factors. An asterisk indicates highest loading 
above |.30| for that factor. - indicates that item was reverse scored to assign high scores to 
positive ratings of police and criminal courts.
A minimum factor loading of |.30| was seen for every item in the 
questionnaire demonstrating the importance of all items in assessing attitudes 
towards the police and criminal courts. Thirteen items demonstrated a loading 
of above |.30| on more than one factor (see Table 12) but only three of these 
items were classed as cross-loading in accordance with Bedford's (1997) 
criteria of the primary loading being |.20| greater than the secondary loading 
(the criminal courts are corrupt, I respect criminal court work and the police are 
lazy). As the questionnaire is assessing different aspects of attitudes towards 
the criminal justice system overlap between items on the various factors is to be 
expected. Theoretically it is logical that people's attitudes towards sentencing 
and attitudes towards Court Functioning, for example, will show some cross 
over (demonstrated by the item the criminal courts ensure justice is done). 
Therefore removal of these items is not appropriate as there is a sound 
theoretical basis for the cross-loadings witnessed, rather than them being 
demonstrative of item instability. Cronbach's alpha was conducted on all the 
questionnaire items which gave an acceptable score of .89, suggesting the 
questionnaire was reliable. Cronbach's alpha scores for each factor ranged 
from .85 on factor 1 to .64 on factor 5 (see Table 12). The deletion of any single 
item would not substantially affect the values of Cronbach's alpha for each scale, 
so removal of items on this basis was not deemed necessary.
FEQ
Data collected was entered in SPSS. Negatively worded items were 
reverse scored prior to analysis. Scores on the FEQ police items and the courts 
items were separately totalled providing a range of scores of between seven
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and thirty-five for intended evidence honesty towards the police, and six and 
thirty for intended behaviour to the criminal courts. A high score on each of 
these scales indicates a tendency towards truthfulness and a low score an 
intention to provide false/misleading evidence. As the police and courts are part 
of the criminal justice system as well as individual institutions (Albrecht & Green, 
1977) and prior research has examined them together (Bennett, 2004; Cao and 
Zhao, 2005; Hinds & Murphy, 2007) as well as individually (Jesilow, Meyer & 
Namazzi, 1995; Roberts, 2007), honesty of evidence to the criminal justice 
system as a whole was calculated through totalling the police and courts items. 
This combined score is subsequently referred to as participants intended 
behaviour towards the criminal justice system.
Table 13 demonstrates that participants had the least intentions to 
contact the police with false information (M= 4.10, SD= 0.96), falsely confess 
(M= 3.91, SD= 0.94) and provide false evidence in court (M= 3.81, SD= 0.94). 
Conversely, participants had the greatest intentions to refuse to testify in court 
(M= 2.54, SD= 0.97) and withhold relevant information from the police (M= 2.58, 
SD= 0.98).
Table 13: FEQ Item Mean Scores
Item Mean (SD)
would withhold relevant information from the police 2.58 (0.98)
would not lie to the police3
would respond ‘no comment’ to the Police
would falsely confess to a crime
would contact the police with false information
would tell the entire truth to the police3
would pretend to forget information to the police
would not lie in a criminal court3
would withhold information in court
would pretend to forget information in court
would tell the entire truth in courts3
would refuse to testify in court
would provide false information in court_______
3.01 (0.96) 
2.66 (1.05) 
3.91 (0.94) 
4.10 (0.96) 
2.87 (0.94) 
2.79 (0.96) 
3.44 (0.99) 
2.97 (1.04) 
2.90 (0.95) 
3.00 (0.99) 
2.54 (0.97) 
3.81 (0.94)
Note.3 denotes item reversed prior to analysis
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The mean average score for intentions to provide false evidence to the 
criminal courts was slightly lower (M= 18.66, SD= 4.31) than to the police (M=
21.92, SD= 4.56). The difference in scales for these two items (7 - 35 for police 
items and 6 - 30 for the courts) means that the potential scores available on 
these two items differ. Analysis of the mean item responses shows that 
responses on the police and courts variables differed only very slightly (M= 3.13, 
SD= 0.65 and M= 3.11, SD= 0.72 respectively).
Cronbach's alpha was then conducted on each of these scales to assess 
the internal reliability of each of the questionnaire scales. The intended honesty 
of evidence to the police items and the intended honesty of evidence to the 
courts items each showed high internal reliability (Cronbach's a= .797 and .829 
respectively). The deletion of any single item would not substantially affect the 
values of Cronbach's alpha for these scales, so removal of items was not 
deemed necessary. The police and courts items were added together also to 
provide an overview of participants' intentions to provide false/truthful evidence 
within the criminal justice system in general. This combined score will 
subsequently be referred to as participants intended behaviour towards the 
criminal justice system. The criminal justice system scale had a Cronbach's 
alpha of .894. Kline (1999) suggests that alpha levels of .7 and above are 
satisfactory. The alpha value should not have been artificially increased as a 
relatively small number of items were used to calculate the reliability of each 
scale (Field, 2009).
A Principle Components Analysis was conducted to assess the factor 
structure of the questionnaire, and highlight any items that should be removed. 
The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy (KMO) verified that the 
sample was adequate for factor analysis, KMO =.888. Hutcheson and 
Sofroniou (1999 cited in Field, 2009) class a score of this magnitude as 
representing a 'good' sample. Bartlett's test of Sphericity X2was highly 
significant (p< .001) indicating that factor analysis is appropriate for the data. 
Furthermore, no items produced r scores of greater than .8 suggesting that 
multicollinearity is not a problem with the data (Field, 2009). Due to these 
properties of the data Principle Components Analysis was conducted using the 
Enter method and a cut-off point of 0.5. Factors with eigenvalues of 1.0 and
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above were retained in the analysis in accordance with Kaiser's criterion (Kaiser, 
1960 cited in Field, 2009). Two such values were found (6.055 and 1.633) 
accounting for 59.15% of the variance. Eigenvalues obtained were compared 
with eigenvalues from a randomly generated data matrix of the same size (13 
variables x 153 respondents x 100 replications) produced through Parallel 
Analysis (Monte Carlo PCA for Parallel Analysis). Only the first two actual 
eigenvalues obtained were of a greater value than those in the random data set 
(see Table 14), showing that two factors should be retained for further analysis 
(Pallant, 2005).
Table 14: Monte Carlo PCA for Parallel Analysis
Eigenvalue No. Random Eigenvalue Actual Eigenvalue
1 1.505 6.055
2 1.37 1.633
A principle axis factoring with orthagonal rotation (varimax) was carried 
out on the 13 items to clarify the number of factors in the solution. The two 
factors accounted for a total of 51.62% of the variance. Examination of the 
number of marker items for each factor supports the view that the data forms 
two factors (see Table 15). All thirteen items (Varimax rotated loadings) were 
markers according to the criteria proposed by Watson, et al. (1995) (items that 
have their highest loading on a factor of greater than or equal to |.30|). When 
using the more stringent criteria advocated by Bedford (1997) (major factor 
loading of greater than |.30| and |.20| greater than any cross-loadings) there 
were 11 markers (Varimax rotated loadings). Cronbach's a showed each factor 
to have strong internal reliability (see Table 15).
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Table 15: Varimax Rotated Loadings of the FEQ Items
Factor Number and Name
FEQ Item 1: Omission 2: Commissions
I would tell the entire truth to the police3 .787* .270
I would pretend to forget information in court .779* .196
I would tell entire truth in court3 .776* .337
I would withhold information from the police .730* .238
I would withhold information in court .708* .348
I would pretend to forget answers to the police .707* .162
I would respond 'no comment' to the police .608* .026
I would not lie to the police3 .595* .439
I would refuse to testify in court .470* -.036
I would provide false information in court .160 .764*
I would contact the police with false information .052 .631*
I would not lie in court3 .526 .535*
I would falsely confess .094 .447*
Cronbach's alpha .904 .711
Note. Items in bold have loadings of both above |.30| and above |.20| across factors. An 
asterisk indicates highest loading above |.30| for that factor. - indicates that item was reverse 
scored to assign high scores to positive ratings of police and criminal courts. Shaded rows 
show items with cross loadings of above |.30|.
As can be seen in Table 15, nine items were shown to load primarily onto 
the first factor and they accounted for 35.53% of the variance in intended 
honesty of evidence to the police. These included items relating to deception to 
both the police and criminal courts. All the items on this factor except one 
(whether participants would lie to the police) related to assisting an offender 
through withholding information. Thus Factor 1 was labelled Omissions. The 
two ambiguous items also loaded onto this factor suggesting participants 
interpreted them as relating to withholding rather than fabricating evidence. As 
these items loaded highly onto this factor, and as the value of Cronbach’s a 
would not be substantially increased by their removal, they were kept in the 
factor.
Factor two accounted for 16.09% of the variance in intended truthfulness 
of evidence to the police. Just four items loaded highly onto this factor (see 
below) and it is apparent that these all relate to deception through commission. 
This factor was correspondingly named Commissions:
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■ I would not lie in a criminal court, even if I thought it would help 
someone I love
■ If I thought it would help someone I love, I would falsely confess to a 
crime they were suspected of committing
■ I would contact the police with false information if I thought it would 
help someone I love
■ I would provide false evidence in a criminal court if I thought it would 
help someone I love
Discussion
This study aimed to develop a comprehensive questionnaire to measure 
attitudes to the criminal justice system, based upon previous research literature. 
The resulting APCQ was administered to 153 participants and Principle 
Components Analysis suggested a five factor solution. The measure was 
designed to gather as wide an opinion as possible and so measured diffuse, 
instrumental and normative support for both the police and courts separately. It 
was anticipated that these different types of support would create six different 
factors in the questionnaire; diffuse support for the police; diffuse support for the 
courts; instrumental support for the police; instrumental support for the courts; 
normative support for the police; and normative support for the courts. The 
questionnaire was subjected to factor analysis (principle axis factoring with 
orthagonal (varimax) rotation) to expose any unstable and inappropriate items, 
and to discover the factors inherent within the questionnaire.
APCQ
The APCQ was developed to improve upon the methods used to assess 
attitudes to the police and courts in previous research, and the resulting 
measure provides a useful contribution to the area in several ways. The most 
obvious contribution of the APCQ is that it forms the most comprehensive 
measure of attitudes in this area to date. Thus normative, instrumental and 
diffuse attitudes to the police and courts are measured. This is a definite 
improvement on prior measures that treated attitudes to the criminal justice
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system as one-dimensional. As discussed in the introduction to this chapter, 
prior research into attitudes to the criminal justice system has had several 
limitations. Prior research has not focused specifically upon opinions of the 
criminal courts, although some research suggests that attitudes towards the 
police and courts can differ (Roberts, 2007). Thus the APCQ acknowledges 
this consideration by having separate items assessing attitudes to the police 
and attitudes to the courts as well as an overarching scale of attitudes to the 
police and courts. The second benefit of the APCQ is the reliability it has 
demonstrated. DeVellis (1991) suggests that .65 is an acceptable Cronbach’s a 
value meaning that each factor of the APCQ demonstrated acceptable reliability. 
The internal reliability of the scales was generally high with three factors (Court 
Functioning, Police Institution and Treatment of the Accused) showing 
Cronbach’s a scores of above .80 (Field, 2009).
Inspection of the APCQ individual item loadings on factors revealed 
important discrepancies with the anticipated structure of the APCQ. As stated 
in the chapter introduction it was anticipated that normative, instrumental and 
diffuse support for the police and courts would form six separate factors. The 
analysis revealed that this was not however the case. Instead attitudes to the 
police and courts were demonstrated to share a complex relationship. Thus the 
results demonstrate some support for Albrecht and Green's (1977) assertion 
that attitudes towards the police exist in a larger value system rather than in 
isolation. Similarly, although attitudes to the police and courts do not concur 
entirely Tyler (2006) maintains that a positive correlation exists between the two. 
For example, two factors found in the analysis (Treatment of Accused and 
Punishment) represent attitudes towards both the police and the courts (see 
Table 16). Several court decorum/normative items loaded onto the Treatment 
of the Accused factor. These items reflected how the police treat suspects and 
the courts treat defendants thus the factor can be seen to be internally 
consistent and coherent. It appears that treatment of suspects is viewed as an 
issue relating to the criminal justice system as a whole, rather than specific to 
the police or courts. Similarly, high Cronbach's Alpha scores demonstrate the 
internal reliability of this factor.
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A high Cronbach's Alpha score for the Punishment factor illustrates the 
internal consistency of this factor also. All of the court efficacy items loaded 
onto the Punishment factor as well as one court decorum item. This was 
expected as the main way that the courts can be effective is through 
appropriate and effective sentencing. The item ‘the perpetrators of many 
crimes go undetected’ was designed as a measure of police efficacy. However, 
this item loaded onto the Punishment factor with items predominantly focused 
on the leniency and appropriateness of criminal sanctions. It is appropriate that 
this item load on this factor given that it does not explicitly relate to the police, 
and that it relates to offenders receiving appropriate punishments. This item 
has a solid theoretical reason to load onto this factor however as the police 
failure to apprehend criminals is linked to punishment avoidance, the subject of 
this group of items. Thus although not originally anticipated to sit with these 
items, it is logical that it does so and does not challenge the face validity of the 
factor. Also unanticipated is the item ‘the criminal courts put the welfare of the 
community first.’ However, as the risk to the community is a consideration 
when sentencing decisions are made, this item fits well into this factor.
Conversely, there was no overlap of police and courts items on the two 
dominant factors, Court Functioning and the Police Institution and the final 
factor of Personal Safety. Table 16 shows the factors that each of the items 
loads onto, and the form of support for the police or courts it was designed to 
assess.
Table 16: Attitudes towards the Police Items, Type of Support they Represent and Factor Loadings
Factor and Item Type of Support Assessed
Court Functioning
Criminal courts are corrupt Court Decorum/ Normative
Support
Respect criminal court work - Court Legitimacy/Diffuse Support
Criminal courts treat witnesses with respect - Court Decorum/ Normative
Support
Judges work hard § Court Decorum/ Normative
Support
Criminal courts do not respect victim's rights Court Decorum/ Normative
Support
Criminal courts essential to society Court Legitimacy/Diffuse Support
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Lawyers in the criminal courts work hard -
Agree with criminal court aims - 
Criminal courts are not fair
Criminal courts do not treat victims with respect
Police respectful towards witnesses -
Police Institution
Police work hard to solve crimes -
Respect police work - 
Respect the aims of the police s
Police treat all people fairly §
Police are respectful towards victims 
Police are lazy
Police put community needs first - 
Police are bullies
Police effective in arresting the perpetrators of crime
Police are not essential to the functioning of society 
Treatment of Accused
Criminal courts treat defendants with respect§
Criminal courts racist 
Police are racist
Criminal courts do not treat everyone equally 
Police are corrupt
Criminal courts treat defendants as innocent until proven 
guilty -
Police respectful towards suspects s
Criminal courts do not respect defendant's rights 
Punishment
Court Decorum/ Normative 
Support
Court Legitimacy/Diffuse Support
Court Decorum/ Normative 
Support
Court Decorum/ Normative 
Support
Police Decorum/Normative 
Support
Police Decorum/Normative 
Support
Police Legitimacy/Diffuse Support
Police Legitimacy/Diffuse Support
Police Decorum/Normative 
Support
Police Decorum/Normative 
Support
Police Decorum/Normative 
Support
Police Decorum/Normative 
Support
Police Decorum/Normative 
Support
Police Efficacy/Instrumental 
Support
Police Legitimacy/Diffuse Support
Court Decorum/ Normative 
Support
Court Decorum/ Normative 
Support
Police Decorum/Normative 
Support
Court Decorum/ Normative 
Support
Police Decorum/Normative 
Support
Court Decorum/ Normative 
Support
Police Decorum/Normative 
Support
Court Decorum/ Normative 
Support
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Criminal courts too lenient in sentencing
Criminal courts do not always give appropriate 
sentences
Criminal courts ensure justice is done§
Perpetrators of many crimes go undetected
Criminal courts do not give enough custodial sentences
Criminal courts put community welfare first - 
Personal Safety 
High neighbourhood crime rate
No neighbourhood crime problem -
Do not feel safe in my neighbourhood at night
Worried about becoming victim of crime
Crime rate increasing
Note. - indicates that item was reverse scored to assign high scores to positive ratings of police 
and criminal courts.
The Court Functioning factor consisted mainly of items assessing diffuse 
support and normative support for the courts. The broad title of Court 
Functioning reflects views on the legitimacy of the courts, the effort of those 
working within them and the respect shown to victims and witnesses. 
Interestingly, although respect to victims and witnesses was seen as part of 
Court Functioning, respect for defendants was not included in this factor.
Rather, items pertaining to defendants formed their own factor. One police 
decorum item (measuring respect shown to witnesses) can be seen on the 
Court Functioning factor. This item can be seen to be closely linked to the court 
respect items also in this factor so loads logically onto the Court Functioning 
factor.
No court items loaded onto the Police Institution factor; rather it largely 
reflected issues normative and diffuse support for the police. Thus issues of 
institutional racism, bullying and fairness are included in this factor. Related to
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Court Efficacy/Instrumental 
Support
Court Efficacy/Instrumental 
Support
Court Efficacy/Instrumental 
Support
Police Efficacy/Instrumental 
Support
Court Efficacy/Instrumental 
Support
Court Decorum/ Normative 
Support
Police Efficacy/Instrumental 
Support
Police Efficacy/Instrumental 
Support
Police Efficacy/Instrumental 
Support
Police Efficacy/Instrumental 
Support
Police Efficacy/Instrumental
these items is the item assessing perceptions of police efficacy at arresting the 
guilty. This measure of instrumental support was not expected to sit alongside 
measures of normative and diffuse support for the police. However, in the 
context of this factor, the inclusion of this item is not without reason. Brandi, 
Frank, Worden and Bynum (1994) discovered that experiences of police 
decorum can influence attitudes to the police in general. Thus in the current 
study it is likely that perceptions of police decorum and efficacy could in fact 
shape evaluations of police legitimacy, and explain the existence of this range 
of items on the Police Institution factor. The Personal Safety factor includes 
items pertaining to local crime rate and safety and worry regarding victimisation. 
The items in this section showed the lowest scores and thus the most negative 
views, with the highest being just 3.07 (SD= 1.12) for ratings of neighbourhood 
crime rate. Personal Safety reflected only instrumental support for the police 
and so mapped very closely onto the trend anticipated. Excepting one item, all 
the of the police efficacy/instrumental support items loaded onto this factor. The 
exception is the item ll think that the perpetrators of many crimes go undetected’ 
which maps onto the Police Institution factor. Thus this factor follows the 
anticipated trend well.
When used in conjunction with other measures the APCQ opens new 
avenues for research regarding attitudes towards the police and the criminal 
courts and the factors that may shape these attitudes. In addition to this, the 
effect that opinions of the police and courts have upon behaviour exhibited 
towards them can also be assessed, again in conjunction with other measures. 
This latter application of the APCQ will be enacted in the subsequent chapter by 
using the APCQ in conjunction with the other measure developed in this chapter, 
the FEQ.
APCQ Summary
The Attitudes towards the Police and Courts Questionnaire was 
demonstrated to have a sound theoretical basis, and was validated without the 
need for item removal. The holistic approach taken encompasses aspects of 
efficacy, ideology and courtesy and is a definite strength compared to previous
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one-dimensional measures. This means the diverse responses to different 
aspects of CJS functioning can be gathered making the APCQ more 
representative and less biased to attitudes than single item measures used in 
previous research (see for example Bennett, 2004; Cao & Zhao, 2005; Hinds & 
Murphy, 2007). Although in general it is useful to conduct a check of external 
validity of new questionnaires the weaknesses in existing measures prevent 
valid conclusions being drawn should this be done for the APCQ.
FEQ
This chapter set out to develop a measure of intentions to provide false 
evidence to assist a defendant, the False Evidence Questionnaire (FEQ). Items 
measured false information provided through omission and through fabrications 
of evidence. The measure was planned to have two subscales pertaining to 
intentions to provide false evidence to the police and intentions to provide false 
evidence to the criminal courts, as well as an overarching scale of intentions to 
provide false evidence to the criminal justice system as a whole. The honesty 
of intended evidence to the police and honesty of intended evidence to the 
courts subscales showed good internal reliability (Cronbach’s a> .75) and 
provided some support for the concept that deceiving these two institutions is 
viewed very differently despite their relationship within the criminal justice 
system (Albrecht & Green, 1977; Blumenthal, 1972; Roberts, 2007). The 
overarching scale of intentions to provide false evidence to the criminal justice 
system as a whole illustrated that honesty to these two institutions is still linked.
A Principle Components Analysis was conducted to test the proposed 
structure of the FEQ. This highlighted the presence of two factors which did not 
reflect differences in alibi evidence to the police and courts, but rather 
differences in alibi witness omissions and fabrications. The two factors, 
Omission and Commission, each had high internal reliability; with the Omission 
factor having a particularly high Cronbach’s a of .904. Examination of the 
Cronbach’s a values of each of these scales should any single item be deleted 
showed that these would not greatly change the overall alpha level for that 
scale. As such, each of the scales was validated without the need for item 
deletion.
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As the factor name suggests those items loading onto the Commission 
factor represented deceiving the police through evidence fabrication, namely 
lying in court, falsely confessing to a crime, contacting the police with false 
information and providing false evidence in a criminal court. Interestingly, all 
the Commission items, excepting the item assessing participant willingness to 
lie to the police for a suspect, loaded onto this factor. The reason for this may 
lie in how serious the deception is perceived to be. False evidence and lies 
provided in court are arguably more serious than false evidence provided to the 
police due to the more serious punishments they can attract. This is because 
when a case reaches court, witnesses have been interviewed repeatedly and a 
considerable amount of time can have elapsed. Thus there is clear evidence 
that the deception has been a persistent course of conduct, and thus be eligible 
for more strict punishments should the deception be detected (see Public 
Justice Offence Guidelines and Sentencing Guidelines in Chapter 2). Similarly, 
in contacting the police to provide false evidence, an alibi witness takes 
deliberate action to contact and mislead the police. False confessions are the 
highest risk strategy as the false confessor is likely to face punishment 
regardless of whether the police discover the falsehood. As outlined in the 
literature review, the false confessor is likely to face punishment for the index 
offence if the confession is believed, or for public justice offences should their 
falsehood be revealed. Thus this is a serious form of deception in terms of risk 
of punishment for the deceiver.
This could be seen as fundamentally different to providing false 
responses to police questions when the contact has been initiated by the police, 
which loaded on to the omissions factor. It is very difficult to attribute the 
intentions of the alibi witness to a panic spur of the moment reaction to police 
initiated questioning when the participant has voluntarily contacted the police 
with false information. Thus the forethought and persistence in a course of 
action demonstrated by contacting the police with false evidence means, if 
discovered, the alibi witness is likely to face the more serious of potential 
punishments (see CPS charging standards, Chapter 2). It is also possible that 
omissions are viewed as a less risky strategy due to the increased ability to cite 
reasons other than malicious intent for the falsehood (Vrij, 2008) and the
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increased cognitive complexity associated with lying (Mann, Vrij & Bull, 2002). 
For example a claim of having forgotten relevant information is a plausible and 
acceptable defence to a charge of wilful concealment of evidence. When a 
detailed alibi has been advanced this defence is more problematic to accept. 
Thus from this perspective, greater willingness to assist a defendant through 
omissions than through fabrications is a logical response. The structure of the 
FEQ therefore supports previous research suggesting that omissions are 
viewed as more acceptable than commissions (Spranca et al., 1991) and that 
omissions may be more attractive than commissions to those wishing to 
deceive (Vrij, 2008). This explanation would also explain why the two items that 
did not clearly relate to either commission or omission (‘I would tell the entire 
truth to the police’ and ‘I would tell the entire truth to the criminal courts’) also 
loaded onto the Omission factor. As these items did not clearly relate to 
commissions, participants responded to them in the same way as the Omission 
items. Although these items do not as clearly relate to either omission or 
commission, the deletion of them would not affect the reliability of the Omission 
factor. For this reason, the decision was made that they should remain within 
the factor.
FEQ Summary
Thus the FEQ broadly followed the hypothesised structure in that 
Omission items and Commission items formed two separate factors (Galasiriski, 
2000). The factor structure of the FEQ therefore supports the theorised 
distinction between omissions and commissions raised in the research literature. 
This study therefore adds to the body of literature suggesting that omissions are 
viewed differently (less seriously) than commissions, regardless of their 
consequences. Thus the Omission and Commission scales were demonstrated 
to be an appropriate measure of intended false evidence provision and have a 
strong theoretical basis. As with the APCQ the findings of the FEQ were not 
examined in detail as this present chapter pertains to the creation and reliability 
testing of the measure, rather than the results it generates. However, the 
subsequent Chapter 5 implements the FEQ and examines in detail the 
information this reveals regarding false evidence provision to the police and 
courts
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Limitations of the APCQ and FEQ
One limitation of the measures developed in this chapter is that because 
of the sampling strategy utilised, there are some idiosyncrasies within the 
sample. For example, the sample consisted mainly of student participants. 
However, there are important strengths to the mode of sampling used. For 
example, published cases suggest convictions for false alibis are frequently 
made against young offenders. For example the cases of Maxine Carr, Laura 
Campbell and Fatima Cardoso (“Carr said fake alibi was her idea,” 2003;
“Killer's sister jailed for alibi,” 2006; “Lover is jailed over false alibi,” 2007) all 
featured defendants aged between 20 and 26 years, charged with providing 
false evidence for a defendant. As the APCQ and FEQ were developed 
specifically to examine the relationship between intentions to provide false 
evidence and attitudes to the police and courts (see Chapter 5) it is logical that 
the sample used should be of a similar mean age (20.52, SD= 7.50) as many 
people convicted of this offence. However, this does highlight the need for the 
measures to be validated on a larger sample with a greater age range before 
future findings can be reliably generalised beyond this sample.
Summary and Conclusions
In summary, this chapter sought to develop and validate a measure of 
attitudes towards the police and courts, and a measure of intentions to provide 
false evidence for a defendant. This was conducted to meet Objective 3 and 
Objective 4 of the thesis, and to provide a measure of false evidence provision 
(the FEQ) that could subsequently be used to address Objectives 5, 6 and 7 of 
the thesis. The FEQ police and courts subscales were shown to be reliable, but 
the PCA suggested that the FEQ actually consisted of two different factors, 
Omissions and Commissions. This supported the findings of Chapter 3 and the 
general deception research literature with regards to the different evaluation of 
omissions and commissions (Backbier, Hoogstraten & Terwogt-Kouwenhoven, 
1997; Spranca, Minsk & Baron, 1991), and different level of risk associated with 
omissions and commissions to the police (Vrij, 2008). In summary a reliable 
measure was created that allows measurement of the previously untested
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intentions to provide false evidence for others. Moreover, a valid questionnaire 
of attitudes to the police and courts was created that will improve upon the 
validity and reliability of the single item measures of these attitudes that have 
been used in previous research (Bennett, 2004; Cao and Zhao, 2005; Murphy & 
Hinds, 2007). Although six factors were designed, analysis revealed a five 
factor solution for the APCQ. These five factors did not universally distinguish 
between attitudes to the police and courts, rather the two institutions featured 
together on several of the factors. Despite this fact, the factors produced were 
logical and internally coherent and analysis demonstrated that each possessed 
good internal reliability. Both of these measures (FEQ and APCQ) are utilised 
in the subsequent Chapter 5 and the FEQ is further used in Chapter 6.
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CHAPTER 5: ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND ALIBI 
WITNESS HONESTY
Research has consistently demonstrated that in general attitudes to the 
police and courts are positive (White & Menke, 1982) reflecting general diffuse 
support for the police despite awareness of corruption at the individual level. In 
fact more recent research highlights the improvement in attitudes towards the 
UK police. For example, according to the most recent findings of the British 
Crime Survey (Home Office, 2012), confidence the local police are doing a good 
or excellent job increased between from 50% (when first surveyed in 2005/6) to 
61 % (2010/11). Flanagan, McGarrell and Brown (1985) point out that from a 
practical perspective, public perceptions of the criminal courts could actually 
affect the way in which the public perceive their role within the criminal justice 
system. The suggestion that a person's attitude towards the police and courts 
could be linked with their willingness to comply with the law and assist and 
police investigations has been more recently supported by Reisig, Bratton and 
Gertz (2007) and Tyler and Fagan (2008). Moreover, a feeling of obligation to 
obey the law can override self-interests and the rewards associated with 
breaking the law (Tyler, 2001).
Survey research by Sunshine and Tyler (2003) revealed that holding 
positive views of the police is a strong determinant of willingness to act as a 
witness, report crimes and identify offenders. Conversely, poor interactions with 
the police foster hostility and defiance from the public which manifest 
themselves in non-compliance (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). Following a review of 
the literature regarding attitudes to the police, Decker (1985) highlights the trend 
that people with a negative view of the police are less likely to report crime or 
provide police with information about criminal activity, than those with a more 
favourable attitude. Likewise, Elliott, Armitage and Baughan (2003) found that 
attitudes to the police were positively associated with intentions to obey the 
speed limit. These cases illustrate that positive attitudes towards the police can 
influence intentions to comply with the police in a variety of situations. This
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research therefore suggests that holding a positive opinion of the police could 
discourage individuals from providing false evidence for others.
Only one study to date has examined whether negative attitudes to the 
police and courts manifest themselves in willingness to provide evidence to the 
police. In UK based research Viki, Culmer, Eller and Abrams (2006) examined 
the intentions of Black and White participants to cooperate with the police. 
Participants rated how likely they would be to call the police, provide a witness 
statement to the police, and give evidence in court in relation to hypothetical 
scenarios such as seeing someone attempting to break into a car. Participants 
also completed measures of attitudes to the police, quantity of police contact, 
quality of police contact and behavioural control. Results illustrated that racial 
differences existed in willingness to provide a witness statement and willingness 
to provide evidence in court in that Black participants were significantly less 
willing to engage in both of these behaviours. Furthermore, Black participants 
held significantly more negative attitudes to the police than did White 
participants. Overall, Viki et al. (2006) discovered that attitudes to the police, 
rather than race, formed the strongest predictor of willingness to cooperate with 
the police. Race is not the only demographic factor that may influence attitudes 
to the police as Anderson (2002) and Palmer (2003) suggest that older people 
are deterred from offending due to their greater life experience increasing their 
awareness of the sanctions for offending behaviour. In conjunction with this, 
research shows that young people are more likely to disobey authority and be 
stopped by the police (Skogan, 2006) suggesting that age may predict alibi 
witness honesty.
The research presented clearly implies that attitudes to the police will 
predict willingness to conceal information and produce false alibis in order to 
assist a suspect. This is supported by the responsibility of the criminal justice 
system subtheme which emerged in the content analysis conducted in Chapter 
3. This theme suggested that deception is more likely when alibi witnesses 
have negative attitudes to the criminal justice system as “only naive, trusting of 
justice people would not give Andrew [defendant] an alibi, more fool them! The 
police are not to be trusted” (participant 115, wrongly accused- innocent- 
omission condition). Therefore the findings of chapter 3 support the concept
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that hostility towards the police may encourage alibi witness deception in order 
to assist a defendant avoid conviction. Moreover, this hostility and mistrust may 
be higher amongst those who have been suspected by the police of an offence 
(Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). Thus the role of opinions towards the criminal justice 
system in alibi witness honesty is a valid line of questioning.
Summary
Research has demonstrated that the decision to deceive someone is 
influenced heavily by the perception of whether the recipient is a good or a bad 
person (Lee, 2004). This has implications for the willingness of witnesses and 
suspects to lie to the police, based upon whether they have favourable attitudes 
towards the police and criminal courts. However, little research has specifically 
looked at the effect of perceived 'goodness' of deception recipient upon 
willingness to engage in deception. For example Lee’s (2004) research 
examined the effect of recipient ‘goodness’ upon deception by journalists, rather 
than deception to the police. The present chapter addresses Objective 5 and 
Objective 6 of the thesis through investigating the effect of attitudes and 
experience of the criminal justice system upon alibi witness honesty. The 
Attitudes toward the Police and Courts Questionnaire (APCQ) and the False 
Evidence Questionnaire (FEQ) were utilised to this aim in the ensuing study.
The current study has the broad aim of discovering whether negative views of 
the police and criminal courts are associated with a greater willingness to 
provide false evidence to these institutions. More specifically it is hypothesised 
that:
1. Negative views towards the police and criminal courts will be 
associated with a greater willingness to deceive both of these 
institutions through providing false evidence for a defendant.
2. Experience of being a defendant and/or a police suspect will be 
associated with a greater willingness to deceive both of these 
institutions through providing false evidence for a defendant.
141
Method
Participants
A total of 238 participants were recruited for the research. Analysis 
screened out seventeen participants due to their having high levels of missing 
data, leaving a total of 221 participants in the analysis. Participants ranged 
from 18 years to 62 years of age (M = 23.83 SD = 8.95), and were mostly 
female (n=152) students (90%). The sample predominately consisted of white 
participants (n=199) with few participants identifying as belonging to alternative 
racial groups (n=22).
Design and Materials
The study involved a questionnaire design. The Attitudes towards the 
Police and Criminal Courts Questionnaire (APCQ) was used. The dependent 
variables related to participant’s willingness to provide various forms of false 
evidence to the police to assist their friends and family, as measured through 
the False Evidence Questionnaire (FEQ). This questionnaire has two factors; 
Omissions (for example pretending to forget information and answering ‘no 
comment’) and Commissions (for example volunteering false information and 
falsely confessing). For details of the reliability of the scales of the APCQ and 
FEQ see the preceding chapter.
Procedure
Questionnaire booklets comprising the APCQ and FEQ (see appendices 
4 and 5) were distributed to an opportunity sample of potential participants with 
a request for participation. These were distributed to students on campus and 
in classes at Sheffield Hallam University. Instructions urged participants to 
complete them in the order they were presented. An online version of the 
questionnaire was also created through the website www.surveymonkey.com to 
distribute to potential participants. A weblink to this questionnaire was placed 
on the social networking site Facebook. The weblink was accompanied by a 
request for participants for a study examining attitudes towards to the criminal
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justice system. The questionnaire was designed to be quick to complete 
(approximately 20 minutes in total) to avoid boredom effects.
Ethics
The research was conducted in accordance with the governing principles 
of the Code of Human Research Ethics (2006) and the guidelines for ethical 
practice in psychological research online (2007) established by the BPS. This 
specific study was assessed and approved by the ethics committee at Sheffield 
Hallam University.
Results 
Data Checks
Data from the online and offline (paper) versions of the questionnaire 
were entered into SPSS. Incomplete questionnaires were deleted and the 
distribution of missing data was looked at. Missing data appeared to occur 
randomly, and as it is the most commonly used method for dealing with 
randomly missing values (Buhi, Goodson & Neilands, 2008), missing values 
were substituted with mean item scores. This mean substitution was done for 
all missing values on the attitudes towards the police and criminal courts items 
(a total of ten data points on nine separate items).
The APCQ data collected offline (n= 141) and online (n= 80) was input 
into SPSS. Each item was scored on a 5 point likert scale (ranging from 1; 
strongly disagree to 5; strongly agree) with high scores indicating favourable 
views of the police and courts. Mean scores for each factor of the APCQ were 
calculated for data collected on and off line (see Table 17).
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T a b le  17 : A P C Q  M e a n  R e s p o n s e s  (S D ) A c c o rd in g  to  C o m p le t io n  M o d a lity
APCQ factor Modality Mean (SD)
Offline (n= 141 ) Online (n= 80)
Court Functioning 3.77 (0.50) 3.74 (0.49)
Police Institution 3.65 (0.54) 3.62 (0.60)
Treatment of the Accused 3.25 (0.55) 3.13 (0.63)
Punishment 2.56 (0.52) 2.51 (0.53)
Personal Safety* 2.69 (0.70) 3.14 (0.73)
Note. *p< .001
Smith and Leigh (1997) suggest that data collected through traditional 
means and data collected online should be checked for parity before being 
combined into a single data set. T-tests using mean factor scores on the APCQ 
as the dependant variable and data collection method (offline v online) as the 
independent variable were conducted. These revealed no significant 
differences for data collected through offline and online versions of the 
questionnaire on Court Functioning, t(219)= .470, p= .639, d= 0.06 (very small)4, 
or Police Institution, t(219)= .283, p= .777, d= 0.05 (very small). Similarly there 
were no significant differences in the online and offline data for Treatment of the 
Accused, t(219)= 1.425, p= .156, d= 0.20 (small) and Punishment, t(219)= .753, 
p= .453, d= 0.10 (very small). However, those offline rated their Personal 
Safety lower on average (M= 2.69, SD= 0.70) than those participating online 
(M= 3.14, SD= .73), t(219)= -4.474, p< .001, d= 0.63 (medium).
To determine whether the difference on this factor was the result of 
differences in responding and disclosure online compared to offline, analysis of 
the composition of the online and offline samples was undertaken. Analysis 
demonstrated that across the two samples (offline and online) students gave 
significantly lower mean score for the Personal Safety factor (M= 2.78, SD=
0.73) when compared to non-students (M= 3.02, SD= 0.74), t(219)= 2.184, 
p= .030, d= 0.33 (small). There were far fewer students compared to non­
students in the online sample (n=23 and n=57 respectively) and far fewer non-
4 Effect size (d) was due to the vastly unequal sample sizes (Field, 2009). It is assessed 
according to Cohen’s (1988) classification; 0.20= small, 0.5= medium and 0.8= large.
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students than students in the offline sample (n= 8 and n= 133 respectively) 
suggesting that this could account for the Personal Safety factor scores. A 2x2 
chi2 analysis was conducted to discover if there was an association between 
participation modality (online v offline) and participant occupation (student v 
non-student). The analysis revealed a significant association between students 
in the offline sample and non-students in the online sample, x 2 (1 )= 105.720, 
p< .001, Phi= .692 (p< .001). The standardized residuals were significant for 
both students and non-students in the online and offline samples (all p<.001) 
and the odds ratio indicates that the odds of students participating offline were 
41.15 times higher than students participating online. This suggests that the 
differing participant occupation rather than questionnaire modality is the 
explanation for the difference in Personal Safety scores between the online and 
offline data. Lower mean scores on the Personal Safety factor in the 
predominantly student offline sample, therefore reflect the fact that students are 
more concerned about personal safety than non-students, rather than 
differences between the two mediums of data collection. As such it was 
established that the two data sets were suitable to be combined in order that 
further analysis could occur.
Descriptive Statistics
The variable nature of contact with the police had numerous categories 
that were not mutually exclusive. Here a dummy variable of suspect v non­
suspect was created, as it was considered that being a suspect would have 
greatest impact upon participant attitudes. Seventeen participants reported 
having been a police suspect compared to 204 who had not been a police 
suspect, of which 70 had no prior direct contact with the police. The age of 
those that had been a suspect ranged from 18 to 51 years and had a mean of 
27.18 (SD= 11.05). Only five participants were above this mean age, and of 
these the number of contacts with the police was fairly evenly distributed with 
two having 1 -3 contacts, a further 2 having 4-6 and a final one having 7+. In 
comparison 4 of the under 27 years olds had 1-3 contacts with the police, 3 had 
4-6 contacts and 5 had 7+ contacts with the police. However, as participants 
did not detail the nature of each individual contact with the police, and as the
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participant numbers are so low, it is not possible to ascertain whether younger 
participants reported being a suspect on significantly more occasions than the 
older participants from the current data. Future research should address this 
limitation through collecting more precise data regarding prior experience with 
the police.
Participants had much more limited contact with the criminal courts than 
with the police, with 181 out of the 221 (82%) participants having had no prior 
contact with the courts. The variable of nature of contact with the courts (which 
had numerous levels) was dummy coded as defendant v non-defendant, as this 
was thought to be the most influential form of contact with the courts. Four 
participants reported having been a defendant in court compared to 217 who 
had not been a defendant in court. Twenty-four participants had friends or 
family that had recently been a police suspect, although most of the sample's 
friends and family had not (197). In fact most (123 of the 238) reported that to 
their knowledge their close friends and family had not had any contact with the 
police in the last three months. Relatively few friends and family members of 
the participants had recent contact with the criminal courts. This is consistent 
with participants' own limited experience with the criminal courts in general and 
in particular more recently. As with contact with the police, 24 of the participants 
had friends or family that had been a defendant in a criminal case (197 had not 
had a defendant friend or family member).
Attitudes towards the Police and Courts
Overall attitudes to the police and courts were towards the more 
favourable end of the scale (see Table 18). Most items showed favourable 
attitudes towards the police and courts, as demonstrated by mean attitude 
scores of 3.0 and above (where 3; unsure, 4; moderately agree and 5; strongly 
agree). Flowever, twelve of the forty items revealed a negative mean attitude 
towards the police and criminal courts (negative attitudes were classed as mean 
scores below 3.0). Lowest mean scores were found for the items the criminal 
courts do not always hand out appropriate sentences (M = 1.91, SD = 0.77) and 
the perpetrators of crime go undetected (M = 2.00, SD = 0.82). Participants had
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most favourable responses regarding whether the police were essential to the 
functioning of society (M= 4.38, SD = 0.85).
T a b le  18 : A P C Q  M e a n  (S D ) Ite m  R e s p o n s e s ________________________________________________________________
Item Mean
(SD)
Item Mean
(SD)
I respect police aims®
Police treat people fairly®
I am worried that I will be the 
victim of a crime
I do not feel safe in my 
neighbourhood at night
Police effective at arresting 
criminals®
Perpetrators of crime go 
undetected
Police respectful towards 
victims®
Police not essential to the 
functioning of society
Police put the community needs 
first®
No crime problem in my 
neighbourhood®
I respect police work®
Police work hard to solve crimes- 
Police are racist
Police are corrupt 
Local crime rate is high 
Police are lazy
Police are bullies
Police respectful towards 
witnesses®
Police respectful towards 
suspects®
Crime rate is increasing
4.29 
(0.70)
2.98
(1.03)
3.87
(1 .11)
3.30 
(1.23)
3.00 
(0.96)
2.00 
(0.82)
3.55
(0.90)
4.38
(0.85)
2.95
(0.92)
2.40
(1.10)
4.17
(0.77)
3.82
(.86)
3.51
(0.96)
3.48
(1.02 )
3.24
(1.16)
3.71
(0 .88)
3.54
(0.97)
3.64
(0.78)
2.77
(0.85)
2.45
(0.96)
I respect the work of the criminal 
courts®
I agree with the aims of the criminal 
courts®
Criminal courts treat witnesses with 
respect®
Criminal courts are essential to the 
functioning of society®
Criminal courts too lenient in their 
sentencing
Criminal courts do not treat victims with 
respect
Criminal courts corrupt
Criminal courts ensure justice is done®
Criminal courts do not always hand out 
appropriate sentences
Criminal courts do not respect victims' 
rights
Criminal courts treat defendants as 
innocent until proven guilty®
Criminal courts do not treat everyone 
equally
Judges in the criminal courts work hard®
Criminal courts do not give enough 
custodial sentences
Criminal courts do not respect 
defendants' rights
Criminal courts put community welfare 
first®
Criminal courts not fair
Criminal courts treat defendants with 
respect®
Criminal courts are racist
Lawyers in the criminal courts work 
hard®
4.04
(0.81)
4.06
(0.75)
3.69
(0.80)
4.27
(0.70)
2.29 
(1 .02)
3.46 
(0.81)
3.71
(0.85)
3.49
(0.81)
1.91
(0.77)
3.47 
(0.77)
2.95
(0.97)
2.79
(0.84)
3.65 
(0 .86)
2.60
(0.92)
3.29 
(0.70)
3.12
(0.84)
3.34
(0.93)
3.23
(0.71)
3.65 
(0.94)
4.02
(0.69)
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- indicates that item was reverse scored to assign high scores to positive ratings of police and 
criminal courts and low scores to negative ratings of police and criminal courts
When the factors of the APCQ are studied, it can be seen that 
participants had most negative views of Punishment and Personal Safety (see 
Table 19). This is understandable as Personal Safety is likely to be influenced 
by beliefs regarding punishment severity and perpetrators evading capture and 
punishment. In contrast to this most positive views related to Court Functioning
T a b le  19 : M e a n  (S D ) fo r  E a ch  F a c to r  o f th e  A P C Q
Factor Mean (SD) Cronbach’s Alpha5
Court Functioning 3.76 (0.50) .841
Police Institution 3.64 (0.56) .835
Treatment of the Accused 3.21 (0.58) .814
Punishment 2.54 (0.52) .628
Personal Safety 2.85 (0.74) .680
Descriptive Statistics: Criterion Variables
Of the 221 participants in the final sample 159 intended to assist a 
defendant through at least one type of deception (i.e. false confessing, lying in 
court or contacting the police with false information), and a further 47 were 
unsure as to whether they would be completely honest. Only 15 participants 
intended to be completely honest with regards to a loved one. Table 20 reveals 
that participants reported they were on average more willing to mislead the 
police and criminal courts through their right to refuse to answer questions 
posed by the police. This is illustrated by low mean scores to the items I would 
respond ‘no comment’ to police questions (M= 2.77, SD = 1.14) and I would 
withhold relevant information from police (M= 2.80, SD = 1.08). The lowest 
score witnessed is in relation to the item I would refuse to testify in a criminal
5 C ro n b a c h ’s a lp h a  v a lu e s  fo r  th e  C o u r t F u n c tio n in g , P o lic e  In s t itu tio n , T re a tm e n t o f th e  A c c u s e d  
a n d  P e rs o n a l S a fe ty  fa c to rs  o f th e  A P C Q  d e m o n s tra te d  g o o d  in te rn a l re lia b il ity  (a lp h a s  a ll >  .6 8 0 ) w h ic h  
s e rv e d  to  fu r th e r  v a lid a te  th e  A P C Q  s tru c tu re . T h e  P u n is h m e n t fa c to r  h o w e v e r w a s  s l ig h t ly  le s s  re lia b le  
th a n  th e  .6 5  le ve l re c o m m e n d e d  b y  D e V e llis  (1 9 9 1 ) s u g g e s tin g  th a t th is  fa c to r  re q u ire d  fu r th e r  a t te n t io n  
b e fo re  m o re  w id e s p re a d  u s e  o f th e  A P C Q .
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court (M= 2.65, SD = 1.05) which could be seen as an extension of participants' 
perceived right to silence shaping the types of false evidence they are willing to 
provide. An unwillingness to contact the police with false information (M= 4.27, 
SD = 0.90) further illustrated participants' reluctance to provide false evidence 
through an act of commission. When each of the two factors of the FEQ scales 
are examined, it can be seen that participants scored higher on the Commission 
factor (M= 3.95, SD= 0.71) than the Omission factor (M= 2.97, SD= 0.82) 
illustrating an intention to conceal more evidence than fabricate evidence. 
Cronbach’s alpha scores for the two scales of the FEQ showed each to have 
good internal reliability with Cronbach’s alpha scores of .918 and .720 for the 
Omission and Commission factors respectively.
T a b le  2 0 : M e a n  (S D ) fo r  E a c h  o f th e  In te n tio n  to  P ro v id e  F a lse  E v id e n c e  to  th e  P o lic e  a n d  C o u r ts  Ite m s
Item Mean (SD)
Withhold relevant information from police 2.80 (1.08)
Would not lie to police3 3.18 (1.05)
Would respond ‘no comment’ to police 2.77 (1.14)
Would falsely confess 3.98 (0.96)
Contact the police with false information 4.27 (0.90)
Would tell the entire truth to the police3 3.01 (0.99)
Pretend not to remember the answers to police questions 2.94 (1.07)
Would not lie in a criminal court3 3.58 (1.04)
Would withhold information in a criminal court 3.16 (1.09)
Would pretend not to remember the answers to questions
in a criminal court 3.06 (1.03)
Would tell the entire truth to the criminal courts3 3.18 (1.04)
Would refuse to testify in a criminal court 2.65 (1.05)
Would provide false information in a criminal court 3.97 (0.96)
Mean Average 3.27 (0.72)
Note.3 denotes items that were reversed prior to analysis. Low mean scores
indicate a tendency towards false evidence, high mean scores indicate a 
tendency towards truthful evidence
Inferential Statistics
Two multiple regressions using the enter method were conducted to 
examine the significant predictors of Omission and Commission factor scores 
on the FEQ. Amount of contact with the police and amount of contact with the
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courts, each of the five factors of the APCQ and participant age formed the 
predictors. Furthermore, dummy variables for race (White v Non-White)6, 
nature of contact with the police (suspect v non-suspect) and nature of court 
contact (defendant v non-defendant) were used in the analysis.
Regression 1: Predictors of FEQ Omissions Factor
Mean score on the Omissions factor of the FEQ was used as the 
criterion in the first regression conducted7. The analysis revealed that 
combined, the five factors of the APCQ, age, amount of contact with the police, 
amount of contact with the courts, White v Non-White dummy variable, suspect 
v non-suspect dummy variable and defendant v non-defendant dummy variable 
accounted for 16.6% in the variability in FEQ Omission scores (R2= .166). In 
addition to this, the overall ANOVA was significant (F(11, 209)= 3.778, p< .001) 
and the model generalises reasonably well to the general population (adjusted 
R2= .122). Stein's formula (see Equation 2 below) was used to test the cross 
validation of the model and how well the model predicts scores from a different 
sample. The value of R2 produced here was lower than the actual value of R2 
(R2= .071 calculated through Stein's formula compared to R2= .166 in the model) 
illustrating that the cross-validity of the model could be improved.
E q u a tio n  2 : S te in 's  F o rm u la  fo r C ro s s -M o d e l V a lid a tio n
Adjusted r2 = i - [(^T^i) t^Th) Pir)](1 “R2)
Table 21 below illustrates that age was the strongest predictor of 
Omissions FEQ scores such that every 1 year increase in age, decreased
6 As prior research highlights differences between Whites and Non-Whites in their 
attitudes to the police (see for example Escholtz, Blackwell, Gertz & Chiricos, 2002), data was 
separated into a dummy variable for race (White v Non-White).
7 The sample of 221 cases is sufficient to detect a medium effect size in a multiple 
regression when, as in the current research, there are less than 20 predictors (Field, 2009; 
Maxwell, 2000).
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intended Omissions by 0.03 units, t= 3.611, p< .001. The Court Functioning 
factor of the APCQ also significantly predicted Omissions, although this was a 
negative relationship. Here every increase in positivity toward Court 
Functioning of one unit increased by 0.29 units the amount of evidence 
participants intended to omit (as measured on the Omissions scale,), t= -2.061, 
p= .041. Finally, as attitudes towards the Police Institution increased by one 
unit (became more positive), intentions to omit evidence decreased by 0.36 
units, t= 2.912, p= .004.
T a b le  2 1 : M o d e l o f P re d ic to rs  o f  th e  F E Q  O m is s io n  F a c to r
FEQ Omission Factor
Variable B SE B 8
Constant 0.27 0.72
Age 0.03 0.01 .29**
White v Non-White -0.09 0.18 -.03
Amount of police contact 0.01 0.06 .01
Amount of court contact -0.09 0.10 -.07
Suspect v non-suspect 0.02 0.22 .01
Defendant v non-defendant 0.80 0.43 .14
APCQ - Court Functioning -0.29 0.14 -.17*
APCQ - Police Institution 0.36 0.13 .25*
APCQ - Treatment of the Accused 0.22 0.11 .15
APCQ - Punishment 0.20 0.11 .13
APCQ - Personal Safety -0.03 0.08 -.02
Note. R2= .166 *p< .05 **p<.001
Regression 2: Predictors of FEQ Commission Factor
A second regression was conducted using mean score on the 
Commission factor of the FEQ as the criterion. The same predictors of the five 
factors of the APCQ, age, amount of contact with the police, amount of contact 
with the courts, White v Non-White dummy, suspect v non-suspect dummy and 
defendant v non-defendant dummy variable were used.
The analysis revealed that combined, the predictors accounted for 16.4% 
of the variability in Commission scores on the FEQ (R2= .164) and the model 
was shown to generalise reasonably well to the general population (adjusted
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R2= .120). The overall ANOVA was highly significant, F(11, 209)= 3.731, 
p< .001. The model R2 value (R2= .120) was lower than that calculated through 
Stein's formula (R2= .069) suggesting that the cross-validity of this model could 
be increased.
Examination of Table 22 demonstrates that age is a good predictor of 
anticipated lying through Commission, t= 3.546, p< .001. In this instance as 
age increases by 1 year, anticipated honesty of evidence increases by 0.02 
units. In addition to this the Police Institution factor of the APCQ successfully 
predicted evidence fabrication (as measured on the Commission scale of the 
FEQ). Flere, as positivity towards the Police Institution increased by 1 unit 
participant intentions to lie through Commission decreased by 0.26 units, t= 
2.368, p= .019.
T a b le  2 2 : M o d e l o f P re d ic to rs  o f F E Q  C o m m is s io n  F a c to r
FEQ Commission factor
B SE B 3
Constant 1.39 0.62
Age 0.02 0.01 .28**
White v non-White -0.12 0.16 -.05
Amount of police contact 0.02 0.05 .02
Amount of court contact -0.07 0.08 -.06
Suspect v non-suspect 0.19 0.19 .07
Defendant v non-defendant 0.29 0.37 .06
APCQ - Court Functioning 0.13 0.12 .09
APCQ - Police Institution 0.26 0.11 .20*
APCQ - Treatment of the Accused 0.01 0.10 .004
APCQ - Punishment 0.08 0.10 .06
APCQ - Personal Safety -0.07 0.07 -.07
Note.R2= .164 *p< .05 **p< .001,
A series of oneway ANOVAs was conducted to examine whether the 
type of interaction that participants had experienced with the police and courts 
affected their scores on the APCQ. The dummy variable suspect v non-suspect 
was entered as the independent variable in a series of ANOVAs each with a 
different factor of the APCQ as the defendant variable. Analysis revealed no
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significant differences between suspects and non-suspects on any factor of the 
APCQ (all p> .05). Similarly the defendant v non-defendant dummy variable 
showed no significant differences on any of the APCQ scales (all p> .05).
As the findings for own experience of the police and court were not 
significant, and few participants had friends and family with experience of the 
police and courts, no further analysis was conducted on the impact of the 
experience friends and family had with the police and courts.
Discussion
This chapter of the thesis addressed objectives 5 and 6 of the thesis; 
whether experience of being a suspect and negative attitudes towards the 
criminal justice system shape the intentions of the general population to provide 
false evidence for loved ones. It was hypothesised negative views towards the 
police and criminal courts would be associated with a greater willingness to 
deceive both of these institutions through providing false evidence for others. 
Moreover, personal experience of the police and courts was predicted to be 
associated with greater willingness to provide false evidence for a defendant. 
Two multiple regressions were conducted to test these hypotheses. Participant 
age, participant race (White v Non-White), personal contact with the police 
(suspect v non-suspect), personal contact with the courts (defendant v non­
defendant), personal amount of contact with the police, personal amount of 
contact with the courts and five factors of the APCQ were entered as predictors 
in two separate regressions. FEQ Omission factor scores and Commission 
factor scores formed the criterion variables in the regressions.
Attitudes to the Police and Courts
The hypothesis that participants will view the police and the criminal 
courts in a predominantly positive light was broadly supported as overall 
attitudes to the police and courts were towards the more favourable end of the 
scales used. In fact the majority of APCQ items showed favourable attitudes 
towards the police and courts, as demonstrated by mean attitude scores of >3.0 
on the 5 point scale (where a score of 3.0 represents a response of ‘unsure’).
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When looking at responses on each of the five APCQ factors, the Court 
Functioning and the Police Institution factors were viewed most positively by 
participants. The Police Institution factor of the APCQ measured participant 
views of how honest and hardworking the police are believed to be, as well as 
how legitimate and necessary the police are to society. Similarly many of the 
Court Functioning items related to issues of legitimacy (such as I respect the 
work of the criminal courts and the criminal courts are essential to society) 
suggesting that participants generally viewed the police and courts as legitimate 
institutions.
The increased visibility of the police compared with others working within 
the criminal justice system has been suggested to account for the findings that 
support for the courts is significantly lower than support for the police 
(Hirschfield & Piquero, 2010; Jesilow, Meyer & Namazzi, 1995; Roberts, 2007). 
Kaukinen and Colavecchia (1999) suggest this difference stems from the view 
that the courts are too lenient in their sentencing. In fact the Punishment and 
Personal Safety factors of the APCQ had the lowest mean scores illustrating 
most negative participant attitudes towards these aspects of the criminal justice 
system. These factors related solely to aspects of instrumental support such as 
the appropriateness of sentences and beliefs that neighbourhood crime rates 
are high. This suggests that participants did not think that criminals received 
appropriate sentences and thus left them feeling unsafe. In support of this, 
items reflecting most negative participant views were seen regarding whether 
the courts are too lenient, do not administer appropriateness sentences and 
award too few custodial sentences (1.91 -  2.29 on a scale of 1 -5 where low 
scores indicate negative views of the police and courts). Moreover, although 
attitudes to Punishment were broadly negative, views of the criminal courts as a 
whole (as demonstrated by the Court Functioning factor) were the most positive 
of all the factors. This supports the finding that the courts are not viewed as 
corrupt but rather they are generally thought of positively (Kaukinen & 
Colavecchia, 1999; Roberts, 2007). Thus it appears that participants separately 
evaluated the aims and legitimacy of the criminal courts (Court Functioning 
factor of the APCQ) and the way in which the courts administer these aims 
(Punishment factor of the APCQ). Therefore prior research and the hypothesis
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that participants would view the police and the criminal courts in a 
predominantly positive manner were generally supported in the current study.
Alibi Witness Deception and Attitudes to the CJS
The second hypothesis, that negative views towards the police and 
criminal courts will be associated with a greater willingness to deceive both of 
these institutions through providing false evidence for others, also received 
some support. As a whole, most participants intended to be deceptive through 
at least one means (i.e. responding no comment, refusing to testify or 
pretending to forget incriminating information). The analysis revealed that 
Police Institution scores were positive predictors of both the Omission and 
Commission factor scores. Accordingly as positivity towards the Police 
Institution increased, the fewer Omissions participants anticipated providing for 
a loved one. Thus the more participants viewed the police as a legitimate and 
worthwhile institution, the less evidence they intended to conceal on the behalf 
of a loved one. The Police Institution factor of APCQ was also a predictor of 
scores on the Commission factor on the FEQ. The factor positively predicted 
Commissions meaning that the more fair and important the police were 
perceived to be, the less likely participants reported they would be to lie through 
commission. This supports prior research showing that positive views of the 
police are associated with higher levels of compliance with them (Sunshine & 
Tyler, 2003). Specifically, the assertion that the perceived legitimacy of an 
institution most shapes people's compliance with its rules (Tyler, 2004), was 
supported. Moreover, this supports the findings of the content analysis 
conducted in Chapter 3 which revealed that alibi witness deception acceptability 
is influenced by attitudes to the criminal justice system.
Although little prior research has focused specifically on compliance with 
the courts as a function of attitudes to the courts, research has revealed a 
positive relationship between views of the police and compliance with them 
(Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). Based upon this, it was hypothesised that positive 
views of the courts would also be associated with compliance through high 
levels of intended honesty to the courts. The results indicate that in contrast to 
this, more positive attitudes towards Court Functioning were associated with
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intentions to omit more evidence in relation to a loved one. Thus the more 
individuals respected the work of the courts, believed them to be fair and 
believed lawyers and judges to be hard working, the more incriminating 
evidence they intended to withhold. This appears to contradict the research 
suggesting that deception is deterred by favourable attitudes to the intended 
recipient (Lee, 2004). Although this immediately seems counterintuitive, further 
analysis of the items on the Court Functioning factor of the APCQ provides a 
potential explanation for this finding.
Court Functioning
The Court Functioning factor relates to beliefs regarding how hard 
lawyers and judges work, whether the courts respect the rights of victims and 
treat witnesses with respect. In this way, this Court Functioning factor of the 
APCQ can be seen to be biased towards the needs of the victim. Thus the 
more that lawyers and judges are believed to work hard, be fair and to look after 
the victim, the more chance there is that a guilty defendant will be convicted. 
Conversely, if participants believe that lawyers and judges don’t work hard there 
is less concern that the courts will strive to reach the right conclusion and 
convict the guilty. This means that the more positive one’s view towards Court 
Functioning, the more necessary omitting key information is, if a guilty 
defendant is to avoid conviction. Thus it may not be the case that a positive 
view of Court Functioning deters. Instead the belief that the courts are effective 
and likely to reach the correct verdict would mean that evidence manipulation is 
necessary to assist a guilty defendant avoid conviction. This is supported by 
the criminal justice system appropriateness of statement theme identified in the 
content analysis in Chapter 3. This highlighted the belief that “if she [the alibi 
witness] believes he [the defendant] didn’t do it then justice would have 
prevailed -  without her having to lie” (participant 97, Wrongly Accused-Guilty- 
False Confession condition, Chapter 3). This suggests that the ‘necessity’ of 
deception is a key component in the evaluation of alibi witness testimony (as 
illustrated in Chapter 3) as well as the decision to engage in deception. Thus 
the findings appear to support the logical decision making which is a feature of 
Cornish and Clarke’s (1986) Rational Choice Theory. This conflicts with prior
focus group based research (Fawcett, 2006) illustrating the belief that people 
should conceal information to assist an innocent defendant as this ensured 
justice was done, rather than leaving it to chance. Certainly the larger sample 
in the current research implies the current findings are more reliable. However, 
further testing of the current study findings is necessary due to the limited 
research on this issue.
A belief that the courts work hard to ensure justice, means that deception 
is a high risk strategy as it is implicit that the courts will strive to uncover it. This 
may explain why the Court Functioning factor predicted scores on the 
Omissions factor, but not scores on the higher risk Commissions factor.
Certainly participants scored higher on average on the FEQ Commission factor 
than the Omission factor, illustrating an intention to conceal more evidence than 
fabricate evidence. As previously mentioned, due to the difficulty of assigning 
innocent motivations to fabricated information, evidence fabrication 
(Commission) is a higher risk strategy than evidence concealment (Omissions). 
The fact that the Court Functioning factor failed to significantly predict 
Commissions, suggests that participants viewed this course of action as posing 
too high a level of risk to themselves. This would seem to support the concept 
that risk to self, as well as benefit to defendant, factor into decisions regarding 
intended false evidence provision.
Scores on the Personal Safety, Treatment of the Accused and 
Punishment factors of the APCQ did not significantly predict anticipated 
Omissions or Commissions on the FEQ. The attitudes towards Court 
Functioning factor of the APCQ assessed both diffuse and specific support for 
the courts. Diffuse support was assessed through items assessing participant 
beliefs as to whether the courts are corrupt, treat victims and witnesses with 
respect, respect victim's rights, and whether the courts are a necessary and 
valid institution. Normative support however was assessed through measuring 
participant views of how hard the lawyers and judges work. The factors of the 
APCQ that did not relate to legitimacy (Personal Safety, Treatment of the 
Accused and Punishment) failed to significantly predict anticipated compliance 
(as measured through FEQ scores). Legitimacy and shared moral values are 
important in shaping confidence in the police (Jackson & Sunshine, 2007) rather
than evaluations of crime risk. The current study suggests that legitimacy and 
common values are also important in predicting behaviour towards the police. 
Similarly, evaluations of crime risk (as measured through the Personal Safety 
factor of the APCQ) were not predictive of intended honesty of evidence to the 
police and courts for a defendant. Thus Tyler’s (2004) assertion that it is the 
perceived legitimacy of an institution, rather than individual encounters, that 
most shapes people's compliance with its rules, is supported by the current 
research.
Suspect/Defendant Experience
The current study found that experience of being a suspect or a 
defendant compared to not having been a suspect or defendant had no impact 
upon the honesty of evidence participants anticipated they would provide in 
relation to a loved one suspected of a crime. However, it was predicted that 
experience of the police and criminal courts would be associated with a greater 
willingness to deceive both of these institutions through providing false evidence 
for others. This does conflict with some of the theories in the area suggesting 
that negative experiences of the police (which suspects and defendants can be 
presumed to have had) lead to negative attitudes and non-compliance with the 
police (Skogan, 2006). However, it may be the case that suspects and 
defendants do not all have a negative experience of the police and courts. In 
support of this, the current study revealed no significant differences between 
suspects and non-suspects, and defendant compared to non-defendants, on 
any factor of the APCQ. This illustrates that those participants with experience 
of being a suspect did not have more negative views of any aspect of the police 
and courts compared to non-suspects.
A very small proportion of the sample indicated that they had been a 
police suspect or a defendant in the last five years. This meant the power 
associated with the analysis of these variables was very low and the risk of type 
II errors cannot be discounted from the study. However, the current study 
findings supports prior research that possessing a criminal record is not a 
reliable indicator of negative attitudes towards the police (Primeau, Helton, 
Baxter & Rozelle, 1975) and thus is not associated with poor cooperation and
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deceptive evidence provision. The current findings strongly suggest that 
possessing a criminal record is not a necessary feature of false alibi witnesses.
Participant Age
Age was the strongest predictor of Omission and Commission scores 
with younger participants anticipating being more deceptive than older 
participants. Skogan (2006) suggests that young people hold more negative 
views of the police and are less compliant with because they are more likely to 
get into trouble with the police, and are more likely to be victims of violent crime. 
Thus younger participants would be expected to score lower on the Police 
Institution and Treatment of the Accused factors of the APCQ if they were 
indeed suspected more frequently. This is due to these factors measuring 
assessments of police fairness and efficacy. This trend was not found, 
suggesting that younger participants' being less positive about the police and 
courts was not a function of their having more unfavourable suspect interactions 
with the police. Given the lack of effect of possessing criminal convictions 
outlined above, the lack of support for Skogan’s findings is unsurprising. 
However, a limitation of the APCQ is that it specified that participants should 
only report encounters with the police over the last five years. This was due to 
the fact that being suspected by the police for a minor offence when a child, 
such as littering or underage drinking, could distort the results amongst the 
predominantly young adult participants. However, this limitation may have 
masked some genuine and influential encounters occurring over five years 
before study participation. Hence these time limitations on these items of the 
APCQ should be removed prior to future use of the APCQ with a sample of 
older participants.
An alternative explanation for the effect of age upon intended evidence 
honesty is that older participants are more knowledgeable about the 
consequences of providing false evidence, and thus are more deterred by this 
(Anderson, 2002; Palmer, 2003). Certainly more life experience could account 
for this. This would certainly fit with the findings regarding age and prior 
convictions upon alibi witness honesty. However, the data currently collected 
does not allow this hypothesis to be tested. Instead the subsequent Chapter 6
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will explore whether a greater awareness of the consequences of false 
evidence provision does indeed deter lying for others.
The final hypothesis stated that White participants would be more willing 
than non-White participants to provide false evidence to the police and courts to 
assist a defendant. Conversely, no significant effect of race was found in the 
data. There are two possible explanations for this finding. Primarily the 
previous research has largely looked as the impact of race upon attitudes, 
rather than upon behaviour towards the police (see for example Escholtz, 
Blackwell, Gertz & Chiricos, 2002; Howell, Perry & Vile, 2004; Tuch & Weitzer 
1997). This research has generally found that ethnic minority groups hold lower 
opinions of the police than do the White majority (Escholtz, Blackwell, Gertz & 
Chiricos, 2002). Thus it could be the case that although race impacts upon 
attitudes, it does not shape behaviour to the police. Accordingly, Scaglion and 
Conlon (1980) found that personal experience of crime shapes attitudes to the 
police to a greater extent than socioeconomic variables including race and age. 
The research on the link between attitudes and behaviour would certainly 
suggest that there is not a simple linear relationship between these two 
variables. Alternatively, the low number of non-Whites compared to Whites in 
the current sample could have prevented differences between these two groups 
being made evident. Further analysis with a larger sample of non-White 
participants would allow this to be explored further.
Summary and Conclusions
The current study addressed Objectives 5 and 6 of the thesis; whether 
attitudes towards and experience of the criminal justice system affect alibi 
witness evidence honesty. The five scales of the APCQ were used as 
predictors alongside the participant age, race (White v Non-White), type of 
contact with the police (suspect v non-suspect) and courts (defendant v non 
defendant). Two separate multiple regressions were conducted using these 
predictors, one with the criterion variable of FEQ Omission factor scores, and 
the other with FEQ Commission factor scores as the criterion variable.
As predicted participant views of the police and the criminal courts were 
generally positive. Views of Court Functioning were a negative predictor of 
willingness to deceive the police and courts, with more positive views of the 
courts predicting greater willingness to omit evidence. This inverse of the 
hypothesised trend was explained with reference to perceptions of the necessity 
and efficacy of deceptive alibi witness evidence. Thus the findings illustrated 
that the appropriateness of the alibi witnesses’ statement is important not only 
to the evaluation of false alibi witness evidence (see Chapter 3), but also the 
provision of false alibi witness evidence. Thus further support was found for the 
role of risk assessment in the provision of deceptive alibi witness evidence.
The results also demonstrated that views of the Police Institution 
positively predicted alibi witness Omissions and Commissions. This in line with 
previous research revealing that viewing the police as a legitimate institution is 
associated with greater compliance (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). Additionally, the 
findings are in line with those of Chapter 3; that attitudes to the criminal justice 
system affect evaluations of alibi witness deception acceptability. This implies 
that police should be more suspicious of the evidence provided by hostile alibi 
witnesses who view the police as an illegitimate institution. Similarly the 
findings suggest that improving public perceptions of the police would help 
mitigate against deceptive alibi witness evidence. Although improving attitudes 
to the police and courts alone will not prevent false alibi witness evidence being 
provided, given the other benefits of positive views of the police (Elliott,
Armitage & Baughan, 2003; Reisig, Bratton & Gertz, 2007; Tyler & Fagan, 2008 
Viki, Culmer, Eller & Abrams, 2006) this can only be encouraged.
The chapter findings highlight the need for further research on this topic. 
In particular the assertion that age positively predicted of false evidence 
provision requires examination. Obviously individuals must be aware of the 
legal sanctions associated with false alibi provision if it stands any chance of 
deterring their deception (Anderson, 2002). As false alibi witnesses are 
relatively infrequently highlighted in the media, a lack of understanding of the 
consequences may contribute to false alibis provision. This theory will be 
explored in greater detail in the subsequent Chapter 6, as the possible deterrent 
effect of knowledge of the relevant law is examined.
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CHAPTER 6: KNOWLEDGE OF THE LAW
AND ALIBI WITNESS HONESTY
Chapter 5 found that age was a positive predictor of alibi witness honesty. 
It was suggested that this finding was due to the greater knowledge of the 
possible sanctions associated with false alibi provision gained through greater 
life experience. Prior small scale research suggests that members of the public 
mistakenly do not believe concealing crime relevant information to be a criminal 
offence (Fawcett, 2006). However, this research utilised participants aged 22 
years suggesting that their young age may be responsible for their ignorance. 
The similarly young sample in Chapter 3 revealed some knowledge of the law 
with regards to the legal right to silence, although their views regarding false 
alibi evidence appeared to be based more on their personal morals than actual 
legislation (Schoepfer, Carmichael & Piquero, 2007). Moreover, 
misunderstandings regarding the specific details of the public justice offence 
legislation (under which providing false evidence for others will be prosecuted) 
were evident. This indicates that ignorance of the legislation may in fact 
facilitate false alibi provision as people struggle to accurately gauge the costs 
and benefits (Palmer, 2003) associated with this behaviour. It is not clear 
however, whether this lack of clear understanding of the legislation influences 
people's intentions to breach the law to assist a suspect. To this end, the 
current chapter addresses thesis Objective 7; whether knowledge of relevant 
legislation and prior convictions affects alibi witness honesty.
Anderson (2002) points out that in order for the law to deter, individuals 
must be aware of that law. Knowledge of the law can be defined as people's 
understanding of the specifics of a piece of legislation, the punishments 
associated with a course of action and the probability of these punishments 
occurring (Anderson, 2002). Some offences frequently reported in the media 
(such as murder and robbery), and offences of which many people have first­
hand experience (such as muggings and burglaries) are likely to be better 
known and understood than less commonly discussed offences such as 
providing false evidence for others. Furthermore, although the general principle
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of a law may be well understood, the intricacies relating to the necessary and 
sufficient conditions and the related punishments may not be understood 
(Robinson & Darley, 2004). Prior research (for example see Payne, Gainey, 
Triplett & Danner, 2004; Pilliavin, Gartner, Thornton & Matseuda, 1986) has 
assessed the effect of punishment severity and probability upon people's 
criminal behaviour. Payne, Gainey, Triplett and Danner (2004) point out that 
the way in which people act in relation to the law is likely to be influenced by 
their attitudes and perceptions about the associated punishment. Research has 
examined the role of the celerity (swiftness of punishment), severity and 
likelihood ot punishment upon engagement in criminal behaviour (Stafford & 
Warr, 1993; Thurman, 1989; Wright, Caspi, Moffit, & Paternoster, 2004). These 
are based on the theory of operant conditioning (Skinner, 1904-1990) and 
cognitive social learning models which consider the role of the individual in the 
pattern of stimulus-response-consequence model (Bandura, 1986; 1997).
Pilliavin, Gartner, Thornton & Matseuda (1986) assert that an individual's 
perception of probability of punishment is a more salient factor in their criminal 
behaviour than the severity of punishment. Much research has focused upon 
the role of severe and probable punishment in intentions to engage in tax 
evasion (see for example Thurman, 1989). These studies show that tax 
evasion is engaged in less and seen as a less attractive course of conduct 
when highly probable and severe punishments are present. However, Freeman 
and Watson (2006) found that perceptions of likelihood of arrest were not 
associated with future intentions to re-offend amongst a sample of prison 
inmates. This would suggest that other factors are salient in the decision to 
commit crime. However, Williams and Hawkins (1986) suggest that those 
heavily emerged in criminal activity will have different perceptions of risk than 
those with little criminal experience. Brown and Esbenson (1988) suggest that 
those who have not committed offences have unrealistically high expectations 
of punishment certainty. This is thought to be due to non-offenders having no 
personal or vicarious experience of punishment avoidance meaning their 
punishment perceptions originate solely from TV and media reports of solved 
cases (Stafford & Warr, 1993). As the media feature many solved cases, non­
offenders have raised estimations of punishment likelihood. Additionally, a
163
questionnaire administered to American teenagers found that observing other 
people avoiding sanction for an illegal behaviour was associated with reduced 
perceptions of own apprehension likelihood (Paternoster & Piquero, 1995). In 
line with this it may well be the case that observing other individuals receiving 
punishment will reduce likelihood of observers engaging in that criminal activity.
Although persuasive, it remains the case that many behaviours are 
performed despite knowledge of their illegality. For example, the act of 
homicide (murder, manslaughter and infanticide) is well known to be illegal, and 
yet 642 actual and 525 attempted homicides were recorded in 2010/2011 
(Recorded Crime Statistics for England and Wales 2002/3 -  2010/11).
Although many of these offences may stem from impulsive reactions to 
situational stimuli others are likely to result from rational assessment of the 
costs and benefits associated with that behaviour (Cornish & Clark, 1986). For 
instance, the 215 murders carried out by Harold Shipman were apparently 
motivated by a desire for money, as evidenced by his forgery of one his victim’s 
will (The Shipman Enquiry, 2005). Thus although the specific murders 
committed by Shipman may stem from impulsivity and opportunity, without the 
prior desire for money and belief that the crime would be undetected these 
opportunities would not be taken. Indeed the UK criminal justice system is 
predicated upon the understanding that most crime is planned and rational.
Thus the Crown Prosecution Service charging standards for public justice 
offences (2011) consider whether an individual’s behaviour “was spontaneous 
and unplanned or deliberate and elaborately planned” when considering the 
severity of charge to bring against a suspect/offender. Although the alibi 
witness may think they are acting in a rational manner, their erroneous belief 
that the action is legal leads to inaccurate cost and benefit appraisal and 
accordingly an impulsive decision to provide a false alibi is made (Palmer,
2003). This trend is certainly suggested in the findings of chapter 3.
Summary
There is no research specifically addressing people's knowledge of the 
legislation governing providing false evidence for others. Public justice offences 
appear relatively rarely in the media so it is likely that most people do not have
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a thorough understanding of these crimes and their associated punishments. 
Thus it is possible that ignorance of the offences of perjury, perverting the 
course of justice, wasting police time and assisting an offender could be 
involved in intentions to commit these crimes to assist others. Chapter 3 and 
Chapter 5 certainly suggest that participant alibi evaluation and provision 
respectively, were shaped by ignorance of the illegality of false alibi provision.
An experimental approach to studying the role of legal deterrence in 
intentions to provide a false alibi is most appropriate. This provides control over 
extraneous variables and allows participant's actual legal knowledge to be 
manipulated through the provision of legal information to certain conditions.
This is essential given the implication that participants may have very little 
knowledge of the law surrounding false alibi evidence. Other commonly used 
methodologies, such as examination of arrest rates (total arrests divided by total 
number of reported offences) are limited in that they do not consider the 
multiple policy and individual factors that could shape crime rates (Cameron, 
1987; Cloninger, 1994). This chapter therefore manipulates participant's 
knowledge of the law relating to providing false evidence for others. If 
ignorance of the law is a factor, those participants who are not aware of the 
legislation relevant to false alibi provision (control condition) would be expected 
to provide more false evidence to assist a love one, than those aware of the 
illegality of this act (legislation and cases conditions). In addition to awareness 
of the illegality of this act, awareness of others receiving punishment for this 
behaviour should further raise participant's estimations of punishment likelihood 
(cases condition). Thus participants in the cases condition who are aware of 
convictions for this behaviour would be expected to intend to provide even more 
truthful evidence than those unaware of other people's convictions. The 
anticipated pattern of results is detailed in Figure 9.
F ig u re  9 : H y p o th e s is e d  M o d e l o f R e s u lts
Intentions to provide Control Legislation Cases Intentions to provide
false evidence condition condition condition
______
honest evidence
Increasing honesty of alibi
witness’ evidence
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More specifically the following hypotheses were proposed:
1. Experimental Manipulation: Self-reported legal knowledge (relevant to public 
justice offences) will be significantly higher amongst participants in the cases 
condition and the legislation condition, compared to the control condition
2. Legal Knowledge- Participants in the cases condition and the legislation 
condition will intend to provide more truthful evidence to the police than will 
participants in the control condition
3. Legal Knowledge- Participants in the cases condition and the legislation 
condition will intend to provide more truthful evidence to the criminal courts 
than will participants in the control condition
4. Legal Knowledge- Participants in the cases condition and the legislation 
condition will intend to provide more truthful evidence to the criminal justice 
system as a whole than will participants in the control condition
Pilot Study 
Method
Participants
Participants were recruited in university classes and through snowball 
sampling. They ranged from 18 years of age up to 71 years of age (M= 23.19, 
SD= 9.65). The majority of the 150 participants were female (121) and most of 
the sample were white British (n= 129). Participants were mostly students (n= 
114) recruited via an opportunity sample. This recruitment prevented 
systematic bias in existing legal knowledge being introduced into the research.
Design, Materials and Procedure
An experimental between participants design was employed in the 
research. The independent variable of legal knowledge was manipulated 
through the material provided to participants. The legislation condition was 
given legislation regarding public justice offences. Participants in the cases 
condition were given legislation regarding public justice offences and short 
examples of people convicted under this legislation for providing false evidence
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for others. The control condition was given no relevant legislation regarding 
public justice offences and no examples of prosecutions under these laws. The 
2 scales of the FEQ formed the dependant variables (see Chapter 4). The 
success of the manipulation of participant's legal knowledge was checked with a 
single item requiring participants to rate their knowledge of perjury, perverting 
the course of justice, assisting an offender and wasting police time on a scale of 
0-978.
Ethics
The research was conducted in accordance with the governing principles 
of the Code of Human Research Ethics (2006) and guidelines for ethical 
practice in psychological research online (2007) established by the British 
Psychological Society (BPS). The specific study was assessed and approved 
by the Ethics committee at Sheffield Hallam University.
Results 
Experimental Manipulation of Legal Knowledge
An ANOVA was conducted to assess the success of the experimental 
manipulation of participants' legal knowledge. Self-rated knowledge of the 
legislation pertaining to wasting police time, perverting the course of justice, 
perjury and assisting an offender on a scale ranging from bad (0) to good (97) 
formed the dependant variable. Condition (control, cases and legislation) 
formed the independent variable. Lowest mean scores for legal knowledge 
were witnessed in the legislation condition (M= 51.50, SD = 25.18) with the 
control and cases conditions rating their legal knowledge as higher on average 
(M= 54.12, SD= 25.54 and M= 57.52, SD = 23.80 respectively). The full range 
of the legal knowledge scale was utilised by participants in the legislation and 
cases and legislation conditions, but no participants in the control condition 
rated their understanding of the relevant law as being within the 10% of the 
'poor' end of the scale. Contrary to expectations the analysis revealed no
8 A 0-100 scale was created but the printing process reduced this to 0-97
167
o i id | j i t ! i  o . rv iiu w iu u y t! u i m e  L d w  d iiu  m iiu i  v v im eb b  n u n e b iy
significant differences in self-reported legal knowledge between the three 
conditions, F(2, 147)= .738, p= .480, co=< .01 (very small)9, indicating that the 
experimental manipulation of participant legal knowledge was not successful. 
Subsequent analysis uncovered no further trends in this data.
Discussion
The aim of this study was to ascertain whether ignorance of the law 
pertaining to public justice offences was associated with greater intentions to 
provide false evidence assist another individual, compared to individuals that 
were knowledgeable about the consequences of such action. The analysis 
revealed that, contrary to expectations, those participants given relevant 
legislation to read, did not rate themselves as significantly more knowledgeable 
than the naive control group. This meant that the non-significant experimental 
hypotheses cannot be reliably rejected as the results could be due to the 
apparent unsuccessful experimental manipulation, rather than a lack of effect of 
legal knowledge upon intentions to provide false evidence for others.
The apparent failure of the experimental manipulation of legal knowledge 
could be the result of poor self-assessment (Brown & Coulter, 1983; DePaulo & 
Pfeifer, 1986; Toussignant & DesMarchais, 2002), rather than the failure of the 
manipulation itself. In relation to this, Howard, Schmeck and Bray (1979) 
suggest that receiving information in the form of experimental manipulation can 
actually reveal to participants that they know less than first believed on that 
topic. In comparison control groups have no way of knowing that their 
knowledge of a topic is limited and so overestimate their understanding. This 
explanation is modelled in Figure 10.
9 Omega squared (ca2) is used where possible as this provides the least biased effect 
size measure (Field, 2009); .1= small, .6= medium and .14= large (Kirk, 1996).
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F ig u re  10 : H y p o th e s is e d  m o d e l o f re s u lts  b e fo re  a n d  a fte r  e x p e r im e n ta l m a n ip u la t io n 10
B e fo re /n o  e x p e r im e n ta l A fte r  e x p e r im e n ta l m a n ip u la t io n
m a n ip u la t io n
R e le v a n t la w  th e  
p a r t ic ip a n t k n o w s
R e le v a n t le g a l in fo rm a t io n  th e  
in d iv id u a l is  a w a re  th a t 
th e y  d o n ’t fu lly  k n o w
R e le v a n t le g a l in fo rm a t io n  th a t th e  
in d iv id u a l d o e s  n o t k n o w  a n d  th a t th e y  
a re  u n a w a re  th a t th e y  d o  n o t k n o w
It is therefore possible that inaccurate measurement of legal knowledge 
rather than a failure of legal knowledge to impact upon intended truthfulness of 
evidence for others, could explain these findings. Consequently the hypotheses 
cannot be reliably rejected In order to assess the accuracy of participants' self- 
reported legal knowledge, a concurrent objective measure of legal knowledge 
was implemented into the main study.
Main study 
Method
Participants and Procedure
Twenty six participants took part in the control condition and cases 
condition, with 24 participants in the legislation condition. Potential participants 
were provided the study web link via email and through the social networking 
site 'facebook'. Participants ranged from 18 years to 39 years with a mean age 
of 30.97 (SD= 10.14). Twenty-six of the participants were male but the majority
10 With acknowledgement to Par Anders Granhag (2009, personal communication) for 
the development of this model.
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(48) were female. Almost the entire sample was White British (67 participants), 
with one Irish participant, one Asian participant and seven participants not 
disclosing their racial background. Most of the participants were either students 
(27) or in professional occupations (22).
Materials and Design
The materials were amended slightly to take into consideration the 
problems of self-assessment highlighted in the pilot study. The materials were 
as follows:
Legislation
Legislation material contained the relevant legislation on public justice 
offences summarised into an appropriate format. This included legal definitions 
and sentencing guidelines pertaining to perjury, perverting the course of justice, 
assisting an offender and wasting police time. Information from the Crown 
Prosecution Service website (www.cps.gov.uk) was abridged to create an 
accurate but accessible account of the relevant statutes. A brief description of 
the difference between Magistrates Court and Crown Court was also included, 
as reference is made as to which of these courts each offence is tried in. Also 
outlined were the sentencing guidelines that the police use in deciding which 
charge to bring against a suspect. The legal information was compiled through 
analysing the relevant legislation pertaining to perjury, perverting the course of 
justice, assisting an offender and wasting police time. The legislation governing 
each crime was condensed into single paragraph summaries that were simple 
and quick to read and that avoided legal jargon. This variable was implemented 
to manipulate participant perception the punishment severity, which prior 
research suggests influences participation in criminal behaviour (Wright, Caspi, 
Moffit & Paternoster, 2004).
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Cases
Three examples of cases of perverting the course of justice, perjury and 
assisting an offender were compiled through searches on the BBC news 
website (bbc.co.uk/news). Cases were selected if they related to a criminal 
case and if the individual convicted was not involved in the primary offence (and 
thus could be said to deceive the police and/or criminal courts for the benefit of 
another with no conceivable personal benefit, and considerable risk of detriment 
to themselves). All of the information referred to past cases where a conviction 
had been secured. Included in the information were the high profile details of 
the trial Maxine Carr in 2003 who was convicted of perverting the course of 
justice but cleared of two counts of assisting an offender. The other cases 
reported did not receive as much national media attention and were likely to be 
less familiar to participants. This information was included to increase 
perceptions of punishment probability (Wright, Caspi, Moffit & Paternoster,
2004).
Legal Knowledge
Self-reported legal knowledge was measured in the study using visual 
analogue scales. The possible scores ranged from 0 (poor) to 100 (good). 
Improving on the pilot study, an objective test of legal knowledge was 
incorporated in the study materials. This was an 8 item questionnaire 
measuring knowledge of sentencing, the court in which each crime is tried, 
offence necessary conditions, and the relative seriousness of assisting an 
offender, perjury, wasting police time and perverting the course of justice.
Three items required participants to indicate the appropriate charge to bring 
against an offender detailed in a short case study. Three of the items were 
scored out of four and the remainder allocated a single mark for correct 
answers. This gave a minimum potential score of 0 (poor) and a maximum of 
16 (excellent knowledge of the public justice offence legislation).
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False Evidence Questionnaire
The False Evidence Questionnaire is described in detail in Chapter 3 
(see Appendix 5). In brief, it consists of 9 items measuring intended Omissions 
(for example pretending to forget information and answering ‘no comment’) and 
4 items assessing intended Commissions (for example volunteering false 
information and falsely confessing) to assist a loved one who is a suspect or 
defendant. Each item is scored on a likert scale from (strongly agree) to 5 
(strongly disagree).
The materials were ordered as follows for each of the three conditions. 
Participants in the legislation condition read the relevant legislation before 
completing a self-report measure of legal knowledge. They then completed the 
objective test of legal knowledge, followed by the False Evidence Questionnaire, 
and finally repeated the measure of self-reported legal knowledge. The 
materials for the cases condition was exactly the same but for the addition of 
brief summaries of three real cases of individuals who had been convicted for 
conspiring to pervert the course of justice and/or perjury. This information 
followed the relevant legislation but preceded all the measures. The control 
condition did not receive any relevant legislation or cases. They completed a 
self-report measure of legal knowledge, the objective test of legal knowledge 
and the False Evidence Questionnaire subsequent to repeating the measure of 
self-reported legal knowledge. An example of the materials for the cases 
condition can be seen in Appendix 6.
Ethics
The research was conducted in accordance with the governing principles 
of the Code of Ethics and Conduct (2006) and guidelines for ethical practice in 
psychological research online (2007) established by the BPS. This specific 
study was assessed and approved by the ethics committee at Sheffield Hallam 
University.
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Results
Data was collated and entered into SPSS 16 for analysis. Negatively 
worded items were reversed to ensure meaningful data.
The Experimental Manipulation
A one-way ANOVA revealed a significant difference between the three 
conditions in their objective levels of legal knowledge, F(2,73) = 4.16, p= .019, 
oo= .28 (very small). Post hoc tests (with Bonferroni correction) revealed a 
significant difference in objective legal knowledge scores between the control 
condition (M=6.69, SD= 2.24) and legislation condition (M= 8.54, SD= 2.50), 
t(48)= -2.757, p= .004. This represented a medium effect, r= .37. A significant 
difference between the cases condition and control condition was observed, 
t(50)= 2.287, p= .013, such that the cases condition scored higher on average 
(M= 8.23, SD= 2.60) than the control condition. This represented a medium 
effect, r= .31.
No significant difference in the objective legal knowledge scores between 
the legislation condition and the cases condition were anticipated (as they 
received the same legal information) and this was confirmed in the analysis, 
t(48)= -.430, p= .669. This represented a very small effect, r= .06. It can 
therefore be concluded that the experimental manipulation was a success. A 
full analysis of the data was subsequently carried out.
Self-Reported Legal Knowledge
The descriptive statistics for the experimental manipulation (see Table 23) 
reveal that self-reported legal knowledge 1 was on average similarly high in the 
cases condition (M= 45.00, SD= 21.82) and legislation condition (M= 44.04,
SD= 19.79) when compared to the control condition (M= 38.00, SD= 22.03). All 
conditions show a reduction in mean scores on the self-reported legal 
knowledge time point 2 in comparison to time point 1, indicating that answering 
the objective questions caused participants to re-evaluate their assessments of 
their legal knowledge. This reduction in self-reported legal knowledge between 
time points 1 and 2 is more pronounced in the control condition where the mean
score reduced by 12.50 than the legislation and cases condition which saw, 
between time points 1 and 2, reductions in the mean of .3.37 and 4.23 
respectively. A paired samples t-test revealed that across the whole sample 
self-reported ratings of legal knowledge were significantly different at time 
points 1 and 2, t(74) = 3.338, p= .001, r= .36 (medium). Thus self-ratings of 
legal knowledge significantly reduced across the sample as a whole after 
completion of an objective measure of legal knowledge. This therefore 
suggests that the objective test provided a benchmark of legal knowledge that 
was previously lacking. This concept is supported by t-tests (with a Bonferroni 
correction) showing that although self-reported legal knowledge 1 was higher 
than self-reported legal knowledge 2 in both the cases condition and the 
legislation condition, this trend was not significant (t(25)= 1.286, p= .210, r= .25 
(small) and t(23)= 1.945, p= .064, r= .38 (medium) respectively). On the 
contrary, a significant reduction in self-reported legal knowledge between time 
point 1 and time point 2, t(24)= 2.960, p= .007, r= .52 (large) suggests that 
without legal information (as provided to the other conditions prior to self-rated 
legal knowledge test 1) or the objective test, the control condition initially 
overestimated their own legal knowledge.
T a b le  2 3 : S e lf-R a te d  a n d  O b je c t iv e  L e g a l K n o w le d g e _________________________________________________________
Condition N Self-rated legal 
knowledge 1 
Mean (SD)
Self-rated legal 
knowledge 2 
Mean (SD)
Reduction 
between time 
points 1 and 2
Objective legal 
knowledge Mean 
(SD)
Legislation 24 44.04 (19.79) 40.67 (20.43) -3.37 8.54 (2.50)
Cases 26 45.00 (21.82) 40.77 (20.38) -4.23 8.23 (2.60)
Control 25 38.00 (22.03)1 30.32 (21.44) -12.50 6.69 (2.24)
Total 75 42.36 (21.21) 37.03 (21.06) -5.11 7.80 (2.55)
Note. 11 participant in the control condition did not provide data for the subjective legal 
knowledge 1 measure
The Self-Reported and Objective Legal Knowledge Relationship
Participants in the control condition had the lowest average objective 
legal knowledge scores (M=6.69, SD= 2.24) when compared to the legislation 
and cases conditions which showed remarkably similar mean scores (M= 8.54, 
SD= 2.50 and M= 8.23, SD= 2.60 respectively). A Pearson's correlation 
revealed that across the whole sample objective legal knowledge showed a
significant but weak positive relationship to initial subjective scores of legal 
knowledge (subjective legal knowledge 1) r= .322, p= .005. Correlations 
between self-reported legal knowledge at time point 1 and objective legal 
knowledge within each condition were all non-significant; control, r= .199, 
p= .341; legislation, r= .351, p= .093; and cases conditions, r= .332, p= .098.
Objective legal knowledge and the subjective assessment of legal 
knowledge made at time point 2 (subjective legal knowledge 2) showed a 
stronger correlation, r= .531, p< .001 although this was still only a moderately 
strong correlation. A moderately strong significant correlation was observed 
between objective legal knowledge and subjective legal knowledge 2 scores for 
the cases condition (r= .571, p= .002). The correlation between these variables 
was significant though not as strong in the control condition (r= .477, p= .014) 
and the legislation condition (r= .430, p= .036). Thus all conditions were more 
accurate at assessing their own knowledge of the law after completing the 
objective test (time point two) than before completing the objective legal 
knowledge test. This shows that the objective test provided a benchmark by 
which participants could assess their own legal knowledge.
Intentions to Provide False Evidence
5 instances of missing data on the FEQ items were replaced with the 
mean score for that item (correct to 2 decimal places). Each of the intentions to 
provide false evidence items was scored on a scale of 1 -5 with high scores 
indicating intentions to provide truthful evidence. Thirteen participants indicated 
that they would be completely honest in response to all the FEQ items. The 
majority of participants (42) intended to be deceptive through at least one 
means and a further 21 participants were unsure whether they would be honest 
in all potential ways. Analysis of the mean scores for each of the FEQ items 
(see Table 24) reveals that across the three conditions participants were least 
likely to agree to provide false evidence through falsely confessing (M= 4.28, 
SD= 0.89) and providing false information in a criminal court (M= 4.38, SD= 
0.80). Conversely, participants were on average most willing to provide false 
evidence for others through refusing to testify in a criminal court (M= 2.88, SD=
1.11) and responding 'no comment' to questions posed by the police (M= 3.14,
SD= 1.29). Overall it appears that participants were more willing to help a loved 
one through omitting to tell information to the police and criminal courts (such as 
through pretending to forget information and refusing to testify) and less willing 
to provide false evidence through acts of commission (for example; lying and 
falsely confessing).
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On a possible range from 13 (would definitely provide false evidence 
through every form) to 65 (would not provide false evidence of any kind) FEQ 
scores for all conditions revealed a tendency towards providing generally 
truthful evidence (see Table 25). Intentions to provide false evidence to the 
criminal justice system as a whole were greater in the legislation condition (M= 
46.34, SD= 10.73) and the control condition (M= 46.11, SD= 7.16) than the 
cases condition which on average intended to be most truthful (M= 50.00, SD= 
9.80). Items were classified as either omissions or commissions in accordance 
with the factors of the FEQ discovered in Chapter 4 (see Table 15). The 
Cronbach’s alpha scores for Omissions (.876) and Commissions (.750) 
indicated that these scales had good internal reliability (DeVellis, 1991).
Scores for the individual commission items for the sample as a whole 
were generally higher (M = 3.28 - 4.59) than for Omission items (M = 2.88 - 
3.53). This would appear to support the assumption raised previously that 
participants were less willing to help a loved one through engaging in an act of 
commission than they were through an act of omission (see Chapter 2). 
Analysis of the confidence intervals for mean Omissions and mean 
Commissions revealed no overlap (3.04 - 3.47 and 4.08 - 4.38 respectively).
A MANOVA using Pillai’s trace revealed no significant difference in total 
intended honesty of evidence on either the Omission or Commission scales of 
False Evidence Questionnaire, l/= .0.74, F(4, 146) = 1.399, p=.237, partial 
rf=  .037. A oneway ANOVA demonstrated no significant differences between 
the experimental conditions (legislation, cases and control) on the FEQ as a 
whole F(2,73) = 1.412, p= .250, oo = .17 (very small).
Table 25: Mean (SD) FEQ Score by Condition
Condition N FEQ score
Legislation 24 46.34 (10.73)
Cases 26 50.00 (9.80)
Control 26 46.11 (7.16)
Note. Low scores indicate statement agreement and 
tendency towards false evidence, high mean scores 
indicate statement agreement and tendency towards 
truthful evidence
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Intended Evidence Honesty - Self Rated Legal Knowledge
A Pearson's correlation revealed no significant relationship between 
perceived knowledge of the relevant legislation (self-report legal knowledge 2) 
and total intentions to provide false evidence to the criminal justice system as a 
whole (r= .094, p= .419). Thus it appears that self-rated legal competence did 
not significantly influence intentions to provide false evidence for others. No 
significant relationship was found between perceived knowledge of the relevant 
legislation (self-report legal knowledge 1) and total intentions to provide false 
evidence to the criminal justice system as a whole (r= .008, p= .947).
Discussion
The study set out to discover whether intentions to provide false 
evidence for others were influenced by knowledge of the law. It was 
hypothesised that participants in the experimental conditions would be less 
willing to provide false evidence compared to those in the control condition due 
to their knowledge of the potential sanctions for doing so. Results did not 
support this hypothesis with no significant differences observed on the FEQ as 
a whole, or on either its subscales. Thus the study findings fail to support the 
notion that ignorance of the illegality of actions is involved in the provision of 
false alibi evidence. Knowledge of the law and awareness of implementation of 
legal sanctions was not found to deter false alibi witness testimony. Moreover, 
intended honesty of evidence was not found to be correlated with self-rated 
legal knowledge, showing that individual perceptions of legal comprehension do 
not affect alibi witness honesty/deceptiveness. It was further hypothesised that 
self-rated knowledge of the relevant legislation would not correlate with actual 
knowledge of these laws. Two measures of self-reported legal knowledge were 
taken, one after the experimental manipulation but prior to (self-reported legal 
knowledge 1), and one subsequent to the objective test (self-reported legal 
knowledge 2). Across the whole sample, correlations between objective legal 
knowledge and self-reported legal knowledge 1 were significant but weak, 
whereas correlations between self-reported legal knowledge 2 and objective 
legal knowledge were significant and moderately strong. The data illustrates
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that after completing the questionnaire participants in general significantly 
reduced their self-ratings of relevant legal knowledge. These results are in line 
with the anticipated trend advanced in hypothesis 4; self-assessed legal 
knowledge will reduce after completion of an objective test of legal knowledge. 
Moreover, they imply that poor accuracy in gauging own knowledge of the 
relevant laws was improved after completing the objective test.
Scores on the objective test of legal knowledge were significantly higher 
in the legislation compared to the control condition. No significant differences 
on the objective legal knowledge test were observed between the cases and 
legislation conditions. Scores on the objective legal test were higher in the 
cases condition than the control condition, as predicted. However, as the cases 
condition did not receive information that would enhance their performance on 
this test compared to the legislation condition, no difference was to be expected. 
Thus it can be concluded that the lack of support for the hypotheses was not 
merely a function of experimental manipulation failure.
Age
The investigation reported in this chapter was in part prompted by the 
Chapter 5 finding that age was a significant positive predictor of alibi witness 
honesty. It was suggested that greater age was associated with increased 
knowledge of the law which in turn deterred false evidence provision. However, 
the lack of significant effect of legal knowledge manipulation in the current 
chapter demonstrates that this interpretation is unlikely to be accurate. Instead 
it seems likely that the alternative explanation proffered in Chapter 5 is indeed 
accurate; young people are more likely to have negative views of the police 
(Skogan, 2006). The analysis in Chapter 5 only assessed the impact of being a 
suspect or non-suspect upon alibi witness honesty. However, the fact that 
young people are more likely to be stopped by the police (Skogan, 2006) may 
have a more general impact upon opinions of the police, and ultimately alibi 
witness honesty. Participants may not have classed these informal encounters 
with the police as being a suspect, even though the police may have suspected 
them of general antisocial behaviour. However, the Chapter 5 data was not 
varied enough in regards to participant age (M=30.97, SD= 10.14) and APCQ
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detail to test this supposition. Amending the APCQ to get more detailed 
description of participant contact with the police would enable future research to 
address this issue.
Omissions and Commissions
Results illustrated that most participants were willing to assist a loved 
one in at least one way. Moreover, participants would be more willing to assist 
a loved one through concealing information, than they would through fabricating 
information. This supports the concept of risk evaluation in the decision to 
provide deceptive alibi evidence found in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. Moreover, 
this supports research showing that fabrications may be less preferable to alibi 
witnesses than omissions (Feinberg, 1984) as fabrications are more cognitively 
demanding (Vrij 2008) and thus easier to detect (Vrij, Mann, Fisher, Leal, Milne 
& Bull, 2008). The findings presented in this chapter can be seen to correspond 
with those of Dhami and Mandel (2010) in that the probability of punishment 
(manipulated in the current study by providing examples of prior convictions for 
the offence in question) did not significantly reduce participants' intentions to 
provide false evidence for others. Additionally, when omissions and 
commissions are detected, there is evidence that the law often treats them 
differently (Feinberg, 1984) as omissions can be relatively easily explained 
away as the result of forgetting, ignorance or confusion (Spranca, Minsk & 
Baron, 1991). This reduced chance of detection means that the witness 
minimises their own risk of prosecution and supports the concept that alibi 
witnesses carefully consider their evidence honesty in line with rational choice 
theory (Cornish & Clark, 1986) and in support of the findings in Chapter 3 and 
Chapter 5.
The Morality of False Alibis
The slight truth bias witnessed on the results for this study could 
represent a disinclination to breach the law in this way due to moral reasons. 
The moral outcry resulting from the false alibi Maxine Carr provided for her 
boyfriend (Ian Huntley who was subsequently convicted of two murders) would
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certainly suggest that this behaviour is viewed as very morally reprehensible 
(see for example The Times Online, November 1, 2004). This would explain 
the similarity in intentions to provide false evidence between the control and 
legislation conditions where no deterrent effect of punishment probability was 
found. Thus overall low intentions to provide false evidence could be caused by 
negative views of these crimes, rather than by deterrence. Certainly Wright, 
Caspi, Moffitt and Paternoster (2004) discovered that deterrence perceptions 
had the greatest impact upon 'criminal prone' individuals. This is suggested to 
be due to the criminal decision making of persistent offenders being driven by a 
costs-benefits analysis, whereas personal and societal morals prevent 
infrequent offenders from even conducting an accurate cost-benefit analysis. 
Thus a further deterrence of punishment is likely to have little impact on 
infrequent offenders (Silberman, 1976). Chapter 5 studied the effect of criminal 
history upon intentions to provide false evidence to assist a loved one and 
found only modest results. This would imply that the truth bias was not a 
function of the probable naivety of the participants.
Supporting the concept of false evidence provision being an immoral act, 
several cases of people informing the police of the crimes of their family 
members, have been reported in the media. For example Neil Metcalfe 
reported his son’s gun possession, Mandy Iceton reported her son’s thefts and 
Carol Saldinack reported her sons’ assault to the police. The findings of 
Chapter 3 support this as the relationship between alibi witness and defendant 
was the most dominant theme in participant evaluations of false alibi 
acceptability. The fact that the false alibi was provided to protect a loved one 
actually made the alibi more justified in the eyes of participants than if the alibi 
was not done out of love for the defendant. Moreover, small scale focus group 
research (Fawcett, 2006) indicated that protecting family and romantic partners 
through lying to the police is viewed as morally acceptable and even desirable. 
Thus the unwillingness to lie for a defendant witnessed in the current Chapter is 
unlikely to be the sole result of viewing this behaviour as immoral.
The findings support the concept of moral hypocrisy (Batson, Sager, 
Garst, Kang, Rubchinsky & Dawson, 1997) in that participants appeared moral 
and loyal but avoided the associated costs (prosecution) by only taking the
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lowest risk strategy (omission rather than fabrication). These findings therefore 
support the trends highlighted in Chapter 3 in implying that it is not a purely 
altruistic motivation (calculation that omission is less likely to be detected and 
thus stands more chance of assisting the defendant) that explains the 
inclination towards intending to help others through omitting information rather 
than fabricating it found in the current results. Instead, through omitting to tell 
the criminal justice system all relevant information people can appear to be loyal, 
moral and selfless, but in actuality put their own liberty first. This evidences 
Rational Choice Theory as participants maximise the benefit whilst 
simultaneously minimising the risks of false alibi provision. Given that this crime 
is often committed by individuals with no involvement in the index offence, it is 
only logical to conclude that the relationship to the index offence defendant is 
important in the decision to provide false evidence to the police (see literature 
review chapter). In accordance with Rational Choice Theory, the benefit of 
preserving the relationship may outweigh the costs of possible legal and social 
sanctions if the risks are actually evaluated accurately. Thus the preservation 
of a relationship may encourage participants to view providing false evidence as 
morally justified, regardless of possessing a full understanding of the sanctions 
associated with the act of offending. Clearly this is a factor that requires further 
analysis. For this reason, the relationship between defendant and alibi provider 
is investigated in Chapter 7.
Backfire Effect
In the current research, the cases condition received short summaries of 
three cases of individuals convicted for providing false evidence to assist a 
relative. Although it was anticipated that these would enhance participants' 
perceptions of the likelihood of punishment occurring for this behaviour, this 
effect did not appear to occur. Rather, the cases conditions showed a greater 
(though not significant) tendency towards providing false evidence to the 
criminal justice system than the control or legislation conditions. Participants 
interpreting these cases as examples of loyalty and selflessness on the part of 
the false evidence providers could explain these findings. Just as the findings 
of Chapter 3 illustrate, relationship to defendant appears to be central in
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perceptions of alibi acceptability, these findings indicate that it also influences 
the provision of alibi evidence. Thus, instead of making participants more 
fearful of punishment, these cases seem to have had a backfire effect (Broeder, 
1959; see also Cook, Arndt & Lieberman, 2004) and actually highlighted the 
importance of the relationship between the defendant and the false evidence 
provider. This supports the concept of false alibis being an altruistic act of love 
and loyalty for the defendant (Kivivuori, 2007, Chapter 3). The FEQ refers to 
the deception that individuals would carryout for a loved one. Although the 
findings of this chapter and Chapter 3 strongly suggest that alibi witness 
relationship to defendant is a strong determinant of alibi honesty, without 
manipulating the alibi witness’ relationship to the defendant, the precise role 
that relationship to defendant has upon alibi honesty is unclear. Future 
research should look to confirm this supposition through manipulating the alibi 
witness defendant relationship and measuring alibi witness honesty. This is 
the aim of the ensuing Chapter 7.
Robinson and Darley (2004) state that people base their knowledge of 
the law on what they believe the law should be, rather than what the law 
actually proscribes. Schoepfer, Carmichael and Piquero (2007) asked 
participants to rate both what the law is and should be in relation to a particular 
crime. Results illustrated “a discord between what they perceive happens in the 
criminal justice system and what they perceive should happen in the criminal 
justice system” (Schoepfer, Carmichael & Piquero, 2007 p. 159). Thus 
believing that helping an innocent defendant is moral, may lead participants to 
underestimate the likelihood and/or severity of the associated punishments, 
despite evidence to the contrary. Putting a relationship before all other 
considerations may allow participants to feel that manipulating the evidence 
they provide to the criminal justice system is a morally acceptable behaviour, 
despite awareness of its illegality. This could mean that although participants in 
the experimental conditions read the legal information with which they were 
provided and objectively knew the risks of offending, a belief that helping a 
defendant is moral, prevented them from accurately applying those sanctions to 
their own actions. These findings support Anderson’s (2002) suggestion that 
personal moral intuitions are used to predict the law. Participants may have
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rather naively thought that as their motivations were sincere (to help a loved 
one)11 the courts would not legally sanction their behaviour. Together, these 
findings indicate that deceptive alibi witness testimony does not stem form 
ignorance of the law, but rather from perceptions of the importance of the 
relationship with the defendant.
Response Shift
The current findings support the prior research findings of poor 
participant performances at self-assessment, despite the availability of objective 
tests (though not access to objective test results) to aid assessment 
(Toussignant & DesMarchais, 2002). These results support the concept of a 
response shift (Howard, Ralph, Galunick, Maxwell, Nance & Gerber, 1976); 
insufficient information available at the first testing prevents participants from 
validly rating their functioning on the dimension under test. Caputo and 
Dunning (2005, p. 488) state that “it is exactly when people are most 
unknowledgeable that they are the least successful at identifying, and thus 
reporting, the breadth and depth of their ignorance.” This naivety at initial 
testing is likely to be compounded by bravado, whereby participants do not want 
to admit the shortcomings in their knowledge. Moreover, Howard, Schmeck 
and Bray (1979) suggest that experimental manipulation can actually bias self- 
report measurement scales as it can actually reveal to participants that they 
know less on the topic under question than first believed. Thus in the current 
research, those in the experimental conditions are likely to have given more 
accurate initial ratings of their legal knowledge due to the legal information they 
were given exposing to them the complexity of the topic. However participants 
in the control condition presumed their limited knowledge reflected the full 
extent of the legislation in this area as they had not read the legal information to 
dissuade them from this view. This would explain why, contrary to expectations, 
when compared to the legislation and cases conditions that received
11 This of course, presumes that individuals were thinking of an innocent defendant 
when deciding how they would act, although no measures were undertaken to ensure this. 
However, the results of study 1 (see chapter 3) revealed that opinions of alibi witness' deception 
were not influenced by the actual innocence or guilt of the defendant.
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information designed to improve their knowledge, the control condition scored 
only slightly (non-significantly) lower on the self-reported legal knowledge 1. 
This supports the model proposed in the pilot study (repeated in Figure 11 
below).
Figure 11: Hypothesised model of results before and after experimental manipulation
After experimental 
manipulation
Before/no experimental 
manipulation
Relevant law the 
participant knows
Relevant legal information the 
individual is aware that 
they don’t fully know
Relevant legal information that the 
individual does not know and that they 
are unaware that they do not know
The use of an objective assessment of legal knowledge highlighted the 
inability of participants to rate their own knowledge accurately, and how the self- 
rating used in study 1 was not accurate. This inability to rate one's own 
knowledge is the probable cause of the apparent failure of the experimental 
manipulation of legal knowledge in the research in the pilot study, rather than a 
failure to manipulate actual legal knowledge. The current study shows that 
legal knowledge does not affect intentions to provide false evidence for others 
and that knowledge of the law and other's infringements of it does not act as a 
deterrent when considering providing false evidence for others.
Summary and Conclusions
In summary, this chapter addressed objective 7 of thesis; whether 
awareness of the relevant legislation affects intentions to provide deceptive alibi 
evidence for a loved one. Knowledge of the law was manipulated and alibi
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honesty measured using the FEQ. The analysis revealed no significant 
differences in intended honesty of evidence between the conditions suggesting 
that false alibis are not a product of ignorance of the law. The findings therefore 
do not support deterrence theory (Stafford & Warr, 1993) or the role of 
conditioning. Instead Tonry’s (2001) and Robinson and Darley’s (2004) 
argument that criminal sanctions do not deter criminal behaviour was supported. 
This implies that raising public awareness about the law pertaining to false alibi 
evidence will not serve to prevent this behaviour from occurring.
The findings support the concept of Moral Hypocrisy (Batson, Sager, 
Garst, Kang, Rubchinsky & Dawson, 1997) as participants were most willing to 
provide false evidence through the lowest risk strategies (Vrij, 2008) of 
information omission.12 This reinforced the underlying costs and benefits 
(Cornish & Clark, 1986) appraisal occurring in relation to false alibi provision. 
Thus the benefit of assisting a loved one greatly exceeds the risks associated 
with this illegal behaviour. The main benefit of this behaviour was assisting a 
loved one to avoid imprisonment, thus demonstrating that loyalty to the 
relationship (Kivivuori, 2007) is paramount in false alibi provision. This is further 
highlighted by the backfire effect witnessed in the cases condition whereby 
honesty was highest when examples of deceptive alibi witness conditions were 
provided. It seems that these served to highlight the importance of the 
relationship to the defendant and thus lead to higher levels of deception. Given 
that this chapter and the preceding Chapter 5 solely examined alibis provided 
for a “loved one” it is important that future research address alibi provision for 
defendants of differing relationships to the alibi witness. This should indicate 
the influence of relationship type and relationship closeness upon alibi honesty.
The results illustrated that self-rated and actual knowledge of the 
relevant legislation are, at best, only moderately strongly correlated. The 
findings therefore supported prior research illustrating response shift (Howard, 
Ralph, Galunick, Maxwell, Nance & Gerber, 1976). This illustrates the 
limitations of self-report measures in psychological research. The potential for
12 although not a significant trend.
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erroneous self-assessment and bravado means that actual behaviour could 
differ from FEQ scores. This highlights the need for empirical testing of the 
relationship between projected alibi honesty and actual alibi honesty. This is a 
point that the subsequent Chapter 7 will address.
In conclusion, the study has demonstrated that knowledge of the relevant 
legislation does not have a deterrent effect on people's intentions to provide 
false evidence to assist others. Instead further research should address the 
closeness of the defendant’s relationship to the alibi witness in order to more 
fully understand deceptive alibi witness testimony.
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CHAPTER 7: RELATIONSHIP TO
DEFENDANT AND ALIBI WITNESS
HONESTY
Olson and Well’s (2004) alibi evaluation taxonomy (see Figure 2 Chapter 
2) suggests that alibi evaluators presume that defence witnesses with a prior 
social or familial relationship to the defendant will provide false evidence to 
assist them. Indeed the alibi research literature tends to differentiate between 
related/motivated and unrelated/un-motivated alibi witnesses. Whereas 
related/motivated alibi witnesses have a pre-existing relationship to the 
defendant (such as a family member, spouse or friend) and may have a 
motivation to lie for them, unmotivated/unrelated alibi witnesses have no 
personal investment in the outcome of the case due to having no or very little 
familiarity with the defendant (such as a stranger or neighbour). The 
motivated/unmotivated dichotomy is supported by Lyndsay, Lim, Murando and 
Cully’s (1986) mock juror study which discovered that having an alibi 
corroborated by the defendant’s brother-in-law (motivated) was associated with 
more guilty verdicts than an alibi corroborated by a stranger (unmotivated), or 
an alibi with no corroboration.
More recent research also confirms that more acquittals are delivered 
when the unmotivated alibi witnesses rather than motivated alibi witnesses 
testify on the defendant’s behalf (Culhane & Hosch, 2004). The general 
conclusion drawn is that jurors are sceptical of related alibi witness as the prior 
relationship provides an incentive to lie for the defendant. This conclusion is 
supported by the finding in study 1 of this thesis (see Chapter 3) that love and 
loyalty to the defendant was the most commonly cited factor affecting 
perceptions of alibi witnesses. Thus a motivated alibi witness may raise the 
likelihood of conviction compared having no alibi witness (Burke & Turtle, 2004; 
Lyndsay, Lim, Murando & Cully, 1986). However, other research has 
demonstrated that motivated alibi witnesses do not significantly increase or 
decrease the frequency of guilty verdicts (Culhane & Hosch, 2004) meaning 
that they have little effect on a defendant’s case. The alibi evaluation research
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is at present limited and trends are not entirely clear, a product of the differing 
contexts in which alibi evaluations have been examined as well as subtle 
differences in the dependant variables implemented (Olson & Wells, 2004b). It 
is clear that there is widespread alibi scepticism; scepticism that is enhanced by 
the closeness of relationship between alibi witness and defendant (Culhane & 
Hosch, 2004).
There is no research to date examining whether jurors’ heightened 
suspicion of deception among friends and family of the defendant is actually 
warranted. For example according to theories of altruism false alibi evidence 
should be most common amongst genetic relations of the defendant as these 
individuals may want to signal loyalty to the defendant (Zahavi & Zahavi, 1997), 
have a high degree of genetic relatedness (Hamilton, 1964) and have a high 
chance of the favour being repaid (Trivers, 1971). Although friends and 
romantic partners have lower genetic relatedness frequency of previous and 
future contact means some altruism may occur. However, desire to 
demonstrate loyalty may be higher for romantic partners compared to friends as 
the loyalty signalled by a false alibi is an attractive trait to romantic partners 
(Zahavi & Zahavi, 1997). Finally relatedness to unmotivated alibi witnesses is 
low and there is little desire to demonstrate loyalty or receive reciprocal favours. 
This means that unmotivated alibi witnesses would be expected to be least 
deceptive and genetically related motivated alibi witnesses the most deceptive. 
Thus varying juror scepticism towards motivated alibi witnesses based on the 
varying levels of attachment between defendant and alibi witness appears 
logical. However, there is little empirical evidence to suggest whether this 
scepticism is accurate, and whether there are differences in deception likelihood 
between different forms of motivated alibi witnesses (i.e. mother compared to 
partner or friend).
One small scale piece of research found that participants believed 
individuals should demonstrate family loyalty by concealing incriminating crime 
relevant information from the police (Fawcett, 2006), thus implying that false 
evidence amongst familial defence witnesses may be fairly common. Moreover, 
as highlighted in the literature review (Chapter 2) and study 1 (Chapter 3) 
defence witnesses may not only lie for a defendant, they may also omit
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information and evade answering questions. Cases demonstrate that some 
individuals report the offender’s transgressions to the police rather than conceal 
them. The academic research suggests that this approach is rare and instead 
strongly suggests that alibi witnesses generally attempt to conceal the 
transgressions of family and partners (see the findings of Chapter 3; Hosch, 
Culhane, Jolly, Chavez & Shaw, 2011). However, research has neglected to 
examine whether these forms of alibi witness evidence manipulation are 
influenced by the relationship between the defendant and alibi witness.
Therefore it is unclear whether judicial instructions are required to counteract 
jurors’ alibi scepticism bias (Olson & Wells, 2004b).
Previous research (Chapters 5 and 6) examined how participants in the 
role of defence witness thought they would behave, rather than how they 
actually behaved in police interviews. Although a commonly used methodology, 
research highlights the potential for discrepancies between measures of 
attitudes and intentions, and actual behaviour (Krosnick & Petty, 1995 cited in 
Wallace, Paulson, Lord & Bond, 2005). Participant bravado and naivety may 
lead participants to overstate the likelihood of concealing information from the 
police for a suspect, and thus inflate estimates of defence witness deception 
frequency. This highlights the need for empirical testing in this area to reveal 
whether juror alibi scepticism is warranted, or whether judicial instructions 
pertaining to alibi evidence are required.
Summary
The current chapter relates to Objective 8 of the thesis; whether the 
defendant-alibi witness relationship affects the amount of evidence about a 
guilty offender disclosed by alibi witnesses. Mock witness interviews with 
serving police officers provide a more realistic situation in order to assess 
amount of incriminating evidence disclosure by mock defence witnesses. This 
methodology has, to date, not been used to examine defence witness behaviour. 
Using a mock interview in conjunction with an earlier measure of intended 
disclosure of incriminating evidence will enable the relationship between 
intended behaviour and actual behaviour in police interviews to be examined. 
Thus the current research employs an experimental mock police interview
paradigm to examine the level of crime relevant information revealed by 
motivated (mother, romantic partner or friend) and unmotivated (new colleague) 
alibi witnesses. Having three levels of motivated alibi witnesses will allow more 
detailed examination of the distinction between motivated and unmotivated alibi 
witnesses to be conducted. Moreover, incriminating evidence concealment for 
the different forms of motivated alibi witness should indicate whether this 
altruistic act is a gift (Kivivuori, 2007) solely for genetic relations (Hamilton, 1964) 
or is based on the principle of mutual reciprocity (Trivers, 1971). Thus the study 
will indicate whether the suspect-defence witness relationship influences the 
amount of incriminating evidence intended to be disclosed, and actually 
disclosed, to the police.
It is hypothesised that the closer the relationship between alibi witness 
and defendant, the less crime relevant incriminating information will be revealed. 
Thus it is expected that most information will be concealed for one’s mother, 
followed by a romantic partner, best friend and finally a new colleague.
Moreover, it is anticipated that a significant positive relationship will be found 
between prospective evidence honesty (measured through the crime scenario) 
and actual evidence honesty (mock interview).
Method 
Design
The research followed an independent measures experimental design.
The relationship between the participant and the suspect in a hit-and-run crime 
scenario formed the independent variable. This had four levels, participant as 
Romantic Partner, Best Friend, Child or New Colleague of the suspect. These 
four groups were chosen to represent a range of familial and social 
relationships, and relationships of differing closeness. In particular, the new 
colleague condition represents an ecologically valid and situationally 
appropriate unmotivated control condition in accordance with the conditions 
utilised in prior research. The dependant variables in the study are the amount 
of evidence incriminating the alibi witness intended to disclose in a police 
interview, and the amount of crime relevant information actually disclosed in a 
mock police interview by the participant.
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Participants
A total of 59 participants were recruited through an opportunity sample at 
Teesside University to take part in a study examining ‘individual differences and 
the legal system’. Participants were allocated to conditions on a rota system. 
Fifteen participants were excluded as they neglected to fill out the half of the 
ECR-R (n= 4), had high anxiety levels (n= 8), declined to be interviewed (n= 1), 
or the video equipment did not record their interview (n= 2). This left a total of 
forty four participants in the sample, ten each in the romantic partner and 
mother conditions, and twelve in the best friend and new colleague conditions. 
Participants ranged in age from 18-52 years with a mean age of 23.68 (SD=
9.11). Thirty four of the participants were females compared to 10 males13.
Materials
A hit-and-run crime scenario was developed for the current study and 
required participants to imagine that, whilst under the influence of alcohol, 
someone known to them was responsible for a hit-and-run incident. Property 
crime was used in the crime vignettes in Chapter 3 as Gudjonsson and 
Sigurdsson (1994) found that offenders most frequently reported having falsely 
confessed to property crime than any other offence. It was suggested in the 
discussion section of Chapter 3 that the ecological validity of the study may 
have been reduced by participants being unable to imagine their acquaintance 
committing a burglary. However, it may be easier for non-offending participants 
to imagine themselves and their acquaintance being involved in a drink driving 
hit-and-run, as self-report studies reveal this to be a relatively frequent offence. 
For example, Department for Transport research indicates that 5% of people 
have driven when they thought they were over the legal limit, and a further 20- 
40% of people have driven after consuming alcohol (Hopkin, Sykes, Groom, & 
Kelly, 2010). Thus an acquaintance being involved in an incident whilst driving 
under the influence of alcohol is not too implausible for participants to imagine.
13 Although a small sample this was associated sufficient power given a medium effect
size
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The offence is comparable to the burglary scenario used in Chapter 3 as both 
have a similar maximum custodial sentence of 14 years (Road Traffic Act 1988 
s.1, S9 Theft Act 1968). Thus a drink driving hit-and-run may be a more valid 
scenario in which participants can imagine themselves.
Dependent upon condition, the police suspect in this scenario was said 
to be the romantic partner, best friend, mother or new colleague of the 
participant. The participant was said to have been with the suspect earlier in 
the evening and witnessed the suspect driving in the direction of the hit-and-run 
shortly before it occurred after drinking copious alcohol. Participants were 
instructed to imagine that the hit-and-run scenario was real and to think 
carefully about how they would act. They were instructed to imagine the 
suspect was their romantic partner/best friend/mother/new colleague and 
answer the questions accordingly. Participants read the hit-and-run crime 
scenario before answering a series of 14 items pertaining to the details of the 
incident contained in the scenario that they would disclose to the police (i.e. the 
suspect was drinking alcohol; the suspect was drunk, the suspect admitting 
having a collision). In brief the scenario outlined the fact that the suspect had; 
consumed copious alcohol, driven under the influence of alcohol, told the 
participant they had a collision, fled the scene of the collision and asked the 
participant to conceal this information from the police. The items were each 
rated on 100mm visual analogue scales with the anchors of ‘reveal’ and 
‘conceal.’ High scores were indicative of revealing incriminating evidence, and 
low scores associated with concealing incriminating evidence from the police. A 
fifteenth question asked participants to provide any additional information that 
they would tell the police. An example hit-and-run crime scenario can be seen 
in Appendix 7.
These same 15 items were utilised in a mock interview about the hit-and- 
run incident conducted by a uniformed serving police officer. These questions 
represented the questioning stage of the witness and suspect interviews 
(Oxburgh & Dando, 2011). The interviewer was naive to the aims of the study 
to prevent bias in their performance. The participants were informed that they 
were being interviewed as the police believed that they had information about 
the suspect in a suspected hit-and-run incident that had recently occurred.
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Each participant interview was filmed using unobtrusive wall mounted video 
cameras to allow later coding of participant responses. Participant responses to 
each of the interview items (excluded the final open ended item) were classified 
as either ‘reveal’ or ‘conceal’. All responses that did not fully reveal the 
suspect’s actions (such as ‘no comment’ and ‘unsure’) were coded as 
concealments. For example responses of no comment or I wasn’t there were 
coded as concealments as they do not fully reveal the extent of the suspect’s 
involvement in the incident. Twenty two sets of interview data selected at 
random (50% of the data) established that the reveal/conceal coding system 
had good test-re-test reliability (100%) and inter-rater reliability with the 
independent coding of a research assistant (91%). Cohen’s Kappa for the inter­
rater reliability was .79 showing the coding reliability to be ‘excellent’ (Fleiss, 
1981).
Spielberger's (1983) State Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) was used to 
screen out highly anxious individuals who would be put under undue stress by 
the police interview. This is an established measure that has acceptable 
internal consistency and test-retest reliability (Barnes, Harp & Jung, 2002).
Prior to interview, participants also completed the ECR-R (Experiences in Close 
Relationships-Revised) developed from Brennan, Clark & Shaver’s (1998) ECR. 
This measure of relationship closeness was used to assess whether 
relationship closeness rather than genetic closeness to the suspected offender 
in the scenario influenced level of evidence disclosure. The ECR-R consists of 
two scales; attachment-related anxiety (how secure people are that others will 
be available and responsive to them) and attachment related avoidance (how 
comfortable people are depending upon others). Each scale is measured 
through18 items presented in a randomised order and is demonstrated to have 
good internal reliability of .9. The ECR-R as a whole has been shown to be the 
better of the dominant attachment scales available (Fraley, Waller & Brennan, 
2000; Sibley & Liu, 2004). Participants were instructed to fill out the ECR-R 
about their relationship with their mother, romantic partner, best friend or new 
colleague depending upon the condition to which they were assigned. 
Instructions stated that participants should consider how they feel, or if not 
applicable at the present time how they would feel, about that individual in
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general. This instruction controlled for participants not having a romantic 
partner or new colleague, for example, at the time of participation.
To prevent high attrition rates, measures of intended and actual evidence 
disclosure were taken in a single time point raising the potential of a 
consistency bias affecting participant interview responses. To counteract this 
consistency bias a 45 minute distractor task of a variety of additional 
questionnaires was implemented between the hit-and-run scenario 
questionnaire and the mock police-interview. The distractor questionnaires 
were; the NEO-FFI (NEO Five Factor Inventory) developed by Costa and 
McCrae (2010) to measure personality; the Juror Bias Scale (JBS) developed 
by Kassin and Wrightsman (1983) and the APCQ (Attitudes towards the Police 
and Courts Questionnaire) developed in Chapter 4. These measures were 
selected as they centred upon individual differences and the legal system, 
which participants were informed was the focus of the study. Moreover, each 
questionnaire had a theoretical link to evidence disclosure allowing for future 
analysis of this data. In addition to the questionnaires, information forms, 
consent forms and debrief forms for both the questionnaire and interview stages 
of the study were implemented. Additionally, participants rated how real they 
felt the mock interview to be using a visual analogue scale.
Procedure
The study involved two distinct stages. At stage 1, after gathering 
informed consent, participants were given the STAI, NEO-FFI3, hit-and-run 
scenario and questions (Appendix 7), ECR-R (Appendix 8), JBS and APCQ to 
complete. To compensate for possible order effects the questionnaire 
presentation was counter-balanced (Robson, 2002). The test of interest was 
the hit-and-run scenario and questions, which participants were later 
interviewed about. Once these tests were completed, STAI scores were 
calculated. Eight participants scoring above the 70th percentile on this state
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anxiety inventory were classed as highly anxious and following debriefing were 
excluded from further participation14.
Remaining participants were informed of the opportunity to be 
interviewed by a serving police officer as a witness in the hit-and-run case they 
had previously answered questions on. Participants were encouraged to 
imagine that their associate was the suspect, and answer the police questions 
accordingly. Those consenting to this additional stage provided further 
informed consent to be interviewed and filmed. Upon consent, participants 
were shown to the waiting room of the mock-police station where they were 
allocated five minutes to re-read the hit-and-run scenario to prevent forgetting of 
the scenario affecting interview performance. This is consistent with witnesses 
in real life thinking about the offence prior to interview. However, to avoid 
consistency bias participants were not provided with the associated 
scenario/interview questions.
Upon entering the interview room the police officer introduced himself 
and briefly explained that they were being interviewed as the police believed 
that they had information about a hit-and-run incident in which a teenager was 
seriously injured. As the findings reported in Chapter 3 indicated that alibi 
witness deception was a product of vague police questioning, specific closed 
questioning was selected to ascertain whether this prevented alibi witness 
deception. Thus participants were asked 14 specific questions based on those 
completed in the written measure of intended honesty of evidence were used in 
the interview. This had the additional benefit of allowing intended and actual 
evidence disclosure to be compared, and observing whether participants would 
lie through commission as well as omission. Following these questions 
participants were given the opportunity to provide any additional information, or 
ask their own questions. The same uniformed police officers conducted all the 
interviews. He was instructed to treat the interviewees as they would treat 
actual witnesses they encounter but to use the same question phrasing in order 
to ensure parity in the data. Upon completion of the interview, participants rated 
the realism of the interview and again completed the STAI before being fully
14 See the participants section for details of the final sample.
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debriefed about the aims and methodology of the research. Any participants 
that were anxious (as measured by STAI state anxiety scores above the 70th 
percentile) were given a lengthier debrief and were shown a short happy video 
clip followed by the STAI to ensure all participants left the study in a positive 
state of mind (Hill, Memon & McGeorge, 2008).
Ethics
The research was conducted in accordance with the governing principles 
of the Code of Human Research Ethics (2006) established by the BPS. This 
study was assessed and approved by the ethics committee at Sheffield Hallam 
University and Teesside University.
Results 
Projected Evidence Honesty
Across almost all items, concealment of evidence incriminating the 
suspect was anticipated to be most likely in the mother condition (M= 37.43, 
SD= 27.84) and least likely in the new colleague condition (M= 69.65, SD=
21.04). This broadly supports the concept that relationship closeness 
influences disclosure of evidence incriminating the suspect. However, there 
was little difference observed in intended honesty of evidence in the romantic 
partner (M= 51.90, SD= 23.87) and best friend conditions (M= 52.93, SD= 
22.66). Across all conditions, participants were least likely to anticipate 
revealing that they were instructed by the suspect to conceal their involvement 
in the hit-and-run from the police. Conversely, participants were most likely to 
reveal that the suspect drove the same type of car involved in the offence (see 
Table 26).
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T a b le  2 6 : H it-a n d -R u n  S c e n a r io  M e a n  (S D ) R e s p o n s e s  b y  C o n d it io n
Item MotherCondition
Romantic
Partner
Condition
Best Friend 
Condition
New
Colleague
Condition
Total
The suspect drives a red 82.80 86.90 88.50 84.75 85.82
Vauxhall Corsa (24.79) (17.06) (17.36) (21.55) (19.75)
The suspect drank alcohol 50.70 69.50 67.00 81.25 67.75
that night (41.91) (30.44) (30.77) (18.52) (31.79)
The suspect was tipsy that 36.30 59.70 67.08 74.50 60.43
night (37.69) (35.83) (28.02) (21.86) (33.05)
The suspect was drunk that 21.10 53.80 30.42 60.33 41.77
night (29.11) (38.69) (30.68) (29.98) (35.02)
The suspect drove you 59.40 80.10 83.67 88.42 78.64
home that night (38.10) (28.89) (26.70) (13.03) (28.72)
You were concerned
whether the suspect was 29.70 55.00 65.92 73.33 57.23
safe to drive after the (38.01) (44.22) (34.55) (24.94) (38.04)
alcohol they had consumed
The suspect has driven 
after consuming similar 
quantities of alcohol before
13.30
(29.60)
13.70
(19.58)
19.17
(24.21)
52.17
(35.51)
25.59
(31.82)
The suspect drove away 41.40 62.20 61.58 82.42 62.82from your house at 
11.25pm that night (37.79) (38.28) (33.71) (17.33) (34.46)
The suspect drove along
Smith Street between 43.40 59.70 60.83 82.83 62.61
11.25pm and 11.35pm that (36.08) (29.77) (38.09) (17.78) (33.36)
night
The suspect admitted 
hitting something in Smith 
Street that night
43.50
(40.21)
51.90
(37.23)
58.50
(38.81)
71.67
(28.92)
57.18
(36.56)
The suspect told you they
weren’t concentrating on 18.70 45.90 35.83 53.92 39.16
their driving at the time of (29.73) (33.43) (36.68) (38.39) (36.22)
the incident
The suspect admitted they 
did not stop to see what 
they had hit
37.30
(40.12)
53.90
(37.52)
45.58
(42.01)
65.75
(35.26)
51.09
(38.93)
The suspect is responsible 31.40 28.40 38.50 54.92 39.07
for the hit-and-run incident (40.15) (30.00) (35.52) (36.80) (36.13)
The suspect asked you to 
conceal the incident from 
the police
15.00
(20.18) 5.90 (6.31)
18.41
(26.45)
48.92
(36.40)
23.11
(29.79)
Total 37.43 51.90 52.93 69.65 52.72(27.84) (23.87) (22.66) (21.04) (25.68)
Note. Prospective evidence honesty was rated on a 0 (conceal) to 100 (reveal) scale.
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Data met assumptions for parametric testing so a oneway ANOVA was 
conducted. This revealed a significant difference between the four conditions 
on the mean total honesty of the evidence participants intended to provide 
about a suspect, F(3, 40)= 3.38, p= .027, cj= .37. This represents a medium to 
large effect size. Post hoc t-tests with Bonferroni correction revealed a 
borderline significant difference in intended honesty when the suspect was a 
new colleague compared to their mother, t(20)= -3.093, p =  .018, r= 0.57 (large). 
All other post hoc comparisons were non-significant; romantic partner v mother 
t(18)= 1.248, p = .228, r= 0.29 (small to medium), romantic partner v best friend 
t(20)= -.103, p =  .919, r= 0.02 (very small), romantic partner v colleague t(20)= - 
1.855, p =  .078, r= 0.38 (medium), mother v best friend t(20)= -1.441, p =  .165, 
r= 0.31 (medium), best friend v colleague t(22)= -1.874, p =  .074, r= 0.37 
(medium).
The Interview
Participant responses to each of the interview items were coded by the 
researcher as either ‘reveal’ or ‘conceal’ (see procedure section). Table 27 
details the frequency of conceal and reveal responses to each item in the 
interview by condition. It is evident that all participants revealed the car that the 
suspect drove and that the suspect drove them home on the night of the hit- 
and-run.
As anticipated concealing incriminating information occurred least 
frequently for new colleague suspected of offending (31.0%). In the mother 
condition 53.6% responses to interview questions involved concealing 
incriminating information. Contrary to expectations, more evidence was 
concealed when the suspect was the alibi witness’ best friend (55.1%) opposed 
to their partner (46.8%). Chi2 analysis revealed that there was a significant 
association between alibi witness-defendant relationship (child, romantic partner, 
best friend, new colleague) and frequency of concealing and revealing 
incriminating evidence/ 2 (3)= 24.10, p <  .001. Cramer’s V= .20 (p <  .001) 
reveals this to be a highly significant medium effect size (Cohen, 1988). 
Consultation of the standardized residuals revealed that significantly more 
information was revealed and significantly less information concealed than
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would be expected by chance when the defendant was a new colleague (p<.01). 
However, associations between alibi witness-defendant relationship and 
evidence honesty in other conditions were non-significant (all p> .05).
T a b le  2 7 : F re q u e n c y  o f C o n c e a lin g  a n d  R e v e a lin g  In c r im in a tin g  E v id e n c e  in th e  M o c k - In te rv ie w
Item Response MotherCondition
Romantic
Partner
Condition
Best
Friend
Condition
New
Colleague
Condition
Total
The suspect 
drives a red
Conceal 0 0 0 0 0
Vauxhall Corsa Reveal 10 10 12 12 44
The suspect 
drove away from 
your house at
Conceal 1 2 1 0 4
11.25pm that 
night
Reveal 9 7 11 12 38
The suspect 
drank alcohol that
Conceal 4 1 5 2 12
night Reveal 6 9 7 10 32
The suspect was 
tipsy that night
Conceal 6 4 7 5 22
Reveal 4 6 5 7 22
The suspect was 
drunk that night
Conceal 9 8 10 8 35
Reveal 1 2 2 4 9
The suspect 
drove you home
Conceal 0 0 0 0 0
that night Reveal 10 10 12 12 44
You were 
concerned 
whether the 
suspect was safe
Conceal 8 5 6 6 25
to drive after the 
alcohol they had 
consumed
Reveal 2 5 6 6 19
The suspect has 
driven after 
consuming similar
Conceal 7 8 12 5 32
quantities of 
alcohol before
Reveal 3 2 0 7 12
The suspect Conceal 2 4 2 3 11
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drove along Smith 
St between 
11.25pm and 
11.35pm that 
night
Reveal 8 6 10 9 33
The suspect 
admitted hitting 
something in 
Smith Street that 
night
Conceal
Reveal
7
3
5
5
8
4
1 21 
11 23
The suspect told 
you they weren’t 
concentrating on 
their driving at the 
time of the 
incident
Conceal
Reveal
8
2
7
3
12
0
8 35 
4 9
The suspect 
admitted they did 
not stop to see 
what they had hit
Conceal
Reveal
7
3
5
5
8
4
2 22 
10 22
The suspect is 
responsible for 
the hit-and-run 
incident
Conceal
Reveal
8
2
9
1
10
2
7 34 
5 10
The suspect 
asked you to 
conceal the 
incident from the 
police
Conceal
Reveal
8
2
7
3
11
1
5 31 
7 13
Total Conceal 75 (53.6%) 65 (46.8%) 92 (55.1%) 52 (31.0%)
Total Reveal 65 (46.4%) 74 (53.2%) 75 (44.9%) 116(69.0%)
Relationship between Projected and Actual Honesty
A hierarchical multiple regression was conducted to examine the effect of 
alibi witness-defendant relationship closeness (as measured by the ECR-R) and 
intended honesty of evidence, upon the honesty of evidence provided in the 
mock police interview. The frequency of concealing incriminating evidence in 
response to the 14 police interview questions was calculated providing each 
participant with a score ranging from 0 (conceal nothing) to 14 (conceal 
everything). This total score formed the outcome variable, with mean projected 
evidence honesty the sole predictor at step 1, and both attachment avoidance
and attachment anxiety at step 2 hierarchical multiple regression15. Eight 
instances of missing data spread evenly across the ECR-R data (attachment 
avoidance and attachment anxiety) were replaced with the item mean for that 
condition (Buhi, Goodson & Neilands, 2008). Attachment anxiety and 
attachment avoidance (both in relation to the suspect) were non-significant 
predictors of the amount of incriminating information concealed by alibi 
witnesses in police interviews, contributing only 4% of variance (see Table 28). 
Conversely, at Step 1 of the model projected honesty significantly accounts for 
30% (R2= .30) of the variance in the amount of incriminating information 
concealed by alibi witnesses in police interviews, F(1, 42)= 17.988, p< .001. 
Thus as projected evidence honesty increases by 1 unit, number of 
concealments in actual police interviews decreases by .08 units, t(42)= -4.241, 
p< .001. The R2 value obtained using Stein’s formula (.26, see Equation 2, 
Chapter 5) is similar to the actual value of R2 (.30), showing the Step 1 model to 
have good cross validity.
T a b le  2 8 : P re d ic to rs  o f T o ta l N u m b e r  o f C o n c e a lm e n ts  in P o lic e  In te rv ie w
Concealments in police interview
B SE B p
Step 1
Constant 10.14 1.08
Projected honesty -0.08 0.02 -.55**
Step 2
Constant 3.38 4.12
Projected honesty -0.07 0.02 -.49*
Attachment avoidance 0.40 0.35 .15
Attachment anxiety 0.76 0.66 .15
Note: R2= .30 for Step 1, AR2= .05 for Step 2 (p> .05). * p< .05, **p< .001.
Discussion 
Alibi Witness-Defendant Relationship
False alibi evidence was outlined in the literature review (see Chapter 2) 
to be a form of altruism, as it involves benefiting others through risk to self.
15 Experimental condition was an inappropriate predictor due to having 4 levels, so level of 
attachment to suspect (ECR-R) was used in its place.
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Thus it was hypothesised that the closer the relationship between alibi witness 
and defendant, the less crime relevant incriminating information would be 
revealed. The results demonstrated incriminating evidence was concealed less 
often for a new colleague than for other individuals. In fact, the new colleague 
condition was the only experimental condition significantly associated with 
revealing incriminating evidence about the suspect. This demonstrates partial 
support for hypothesis one, and the suggestion raised in Chapter 6 that 
relationship between alibi witness and defendant influences false alibi provision. 
The findings therefore indicate that jurors should in actual fact be more 
suspicious of a motivated alibi witness compared to an unmotivated alibi 
witness. Nonetheless considerable further research is needed on this topic 
before weight can be assigned to the trends uncovered.
Although participants anticipated revealing least incriminating evidence 
about their mother, motivated alibi witnesses were not associated with 
concealing incriminating information about the defendant in the interview.
Limited research has compared the effect of differing forms of motivated alibi 
witnesses such as friends, siblings or parents or those related to the defendant 
by marriage. For example, Dahl, Brimacombe and Lindsay (2009) examined 
the impact of alibi testimony from a close friend or a colleague upon mock- 
investigators when an eyewitness had positively identified the suspect. The 
study showed that ‘arresting’ the suspect was significantly more likely when the 
suspect’s alibi was provided by a friend compared to a colleague. Dahl et al’s. 
(2009) findings suggest that the chosen link between friends is seen as more 
motivation to provide false alibi testimony than the situationally enforced link to 
a colleague. Certainly the current chapter findings suggest that this bias 
amongst jurors may have a valid basis as an unmotivated new colleague 
suspect was significantly associated with alibi witnesses revealing evidence 
incriminating the suspect, whereas an association between revealing 
incriminating information and the defendant being one’s best friend was not 
observed.
To date research specific to motivated alibi witness testimony is limited, 
meaning most research has used a mock jury paradigm to compare reactions to 
alibis provided by non-motivated alibi witness, such as shop assistants with
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motivated romantic partner alibis witnesses (Golding, Stewart, Yozwiak, Djadali 
& Sanchez, 2000; Olson & Wells, 2004b). This research indicates that mock 
jurors presume that romantic partners will lie to assist the defendant. When 
looking at differences in perceptions of different types of motivated alibi 
witnesses, Lindsay, Lim, Murando and Cully (1986) discovered that in a non- 
familial brother-in-law alibi witness does not reduce mock jurors guilty verdicts 
compared to having no alibi witness. In a development of this research, Hosch, 
Culhane, Jolly, Chavez and Shaw (2011) manipulated the relationship between 
defendant and alibi witness in fifteen case scenarios presented to mock jurors. 
The defendant was said to be related by genetics, marriage (including relatives- 
in-law) or was a non-kin acquaintance to the defendant of varying social 
closeness. Increased scepticism was observed amongst the mock jurors 
towards biologically related alibi witnesses compared to marriage and socially 
related alibi witnesses. Further, the research showed that participants 
themselves reported being more likely to provide a false alibi for a biological 
relation compared to a defendant they were linked to either socially or through 
marriage. However, the differences between alibi witnesses related to the 
defendant biologically (mother), socially (best friend) and romantically (girlfriend) 
were not supported in the current study. This could be a result of the differing 
crimes in the two studies (Hosch et al. used an armed robbery whereas the 
current study used a hit-and-run). However, the discrepancy could also result 
from the intentional measure used by Hosch et al. and the behavioural measure 
utilised in the present study. Although the relationship between intentions and 
actual behaviour was strong, it was not perfect, indicating that participants may 
overestimate their likelihood of corroborating certain deception alibis. When 
looking at who would provide a false alibi, Hosch et al. (2008) found that not 
only a majority of participants reported being able to find someone to support a 
false alibi, but a friend or parent was believed to be willing to support a false 
alibi more than any other familial or social relation.
The current study findings illustrate that there is no clear association 
between deceptive evidence and motivated alibi witnesses. Thus the juror bias 
towards motivated alibi witnesses does not seem entirely well founded. The 
current study findings therefore contradict the trends suggested by the alibi
205
evaluation research that genetically related alibi witnesses would provide more 
deceptive evidence than social or romantically related alibi witnesses (Golding 
et al., 2000; Hosch et al., 2011; Olson & Wells, 2004b). Thus no support for the 
conceptualisation of altruism as a product of genetic relatedness (Hamilton, 
1964) was found. Instead the association between honest evidence by 
unmotivated alibi witnesses implies the frequency of interactions and 
consequent opportunities for reciprocity (Trivers, 1971) may be involved in false 
alibi witness testimony. However, as there was also no association between 
motivated alibi witnesses and honest evidence, it seems that influences other 
than solely the alibi witness’ relationship to defendant (familial, romantic or 
social) are involved in the decision of motivated alibi witnesses to provide false 
alibi evidence.
Korchmaros and Kenny (2001) examined responses to a vignette where 
participants were forced to choose between risking self-harm or leaving 
someone in life threatening danger. Results indicated that risking self-harm 
through protecting another was dependent upon emotional closeness to the 
individual at risk. Emotional closeness was measured using a single item 
measured on a 7 point scale from not very close to very close. They concluded 
that emotional closeness mediates the effect of genetic relatedness upon 
altruism in that “people are not simply calculators of costs and benefits acting in 
response to information specifying amount of shared genes and reproductive 
value. There is another component: emotional closeness” (Korchmaros and 
Kenny, 2001, p. 264). Conversely, relationship attachment (measured through 
the anxiety and avoidance scales of the ECR-R) was not a significant predictor 
of evidence honesty in the current study. Although Korchmaros and Kenny 
acknowledge that emotional closeness does not account for all the variance in 
altruism likelihood, it is surprising that it did not contribute at all to evidence 
honesty in the current study. The ECR-R was chosen to measure relationship 
closeness as it is a valid and reliable measure (Fraley, Waller & Brennan, 2000, 
Sibley & Liu, 2004) that is isn’t subject to differences based on individual 
conceptualisations of the term ‘close.’ The fact that the ECR-R measures 
attachment rather than emotional closeness per se was not anticipated to be 
problematic due to the fact that intimacy and emotional closeness are actually
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based upon attachment (Bauminger, Finzi-Dottan, Chasan & Har-Even, 2008). 
However, there is still the potential for some discrepancy between emotional 
closeness and attachment. Future research should employ measures of both 
attachment and emotional closeness (for example the Shulman, Laursen, 
Kalman & Karpovsky Intimacy Scale, 1997) in order to further elucidate this 
complex behaviour. However, Jolly (2010) found that relationship satisfaction, 
investment, commitment, and quality of alternative partners did not predict alibi 
witness honesty.
It should be noted that the current chapter reports one of the first studies 
examining whether the relationship between defendant and alibi witness effects 
actual alibi witness honesty. Certainly, the role of emotional closeness rather 
than merely relationship closeness in false alibi witness testimony is a point that 
necessitates further research attention. What is clear from the chapter findings 
is that individual differences may be involved in motivated alibi witness honesty.
Calculation of risk
As posited throughout the thesis, false alibi evidence is understood to 
result from consideration of the risks and benefits associated with this course of 
action (Cornish & Clarke, 1986). Item analysis of the hit-and-run scenario and 
police interview response support this perspective. Accordingly, items that pose 
most risk of incriminating the participant themselves were most likely to be 
associated with an answer that protected the participant. For example, did the 
suspect ask you to conceal the hit-and-run from the police? was associated with 
the highest level of both projected and actual concealments. This item can be 
seen to directly implicate the participant as they could be charged with a crime 
against justice, or charged as an accessory after the fact. Thus concealing this 
information from the police can be seen as an effective low risk strategy for the 
alibi witness to assist the defendant and minimise risk to self. Conversely the 
item most commonly revealed was the type of vehicle driven by the suspect.
The ease with which the police could detect this lie presumably deterred 
participants from concealing this information. This is supported by the finding 
that all participants across all conditions revealed this information in the police
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interview. Thus the findings of the current study support the role of risk 
calculation identified in Chapter 3 and Chapter 6 .
Relationship between Projected and Actual Honesty
As hypothesised, a significant positive relationship was found between 
prospective evidence honesty (measured through the crime scenario) and 
actual evidence honesty (mock interview). Intended honesty of evidence was a 
strong significant predictor of actual honesty of evidence provided in a mock- 
police interview. This shows that intentions did predict actual behaviour 
(Wallace, Paulson, Lord & Bond, 2005). That intended evidence honesty 
strongly predicts actual evidence honesty suggests that prospective scores are 
not solely a results of bravado. Moreover, the fact that the prospective hit-and- 
run scenario was administered in a pack of other distractor questionnaires 
means that consistency bias isn’t responsible for the relationship between 
intended and actual alibi witness honesty. Moreover, the prospective and 
behavioural measures of false evidence utilised in this chapter is a real 
improvement of previous research methods which used invalidated prospective 
measures. Although criticism has been levelled at projective measures of 
behaviour these findings demonstrate that they can reliably be used to assess 
alibi witness honesty. The findings of the current study therefore validate the 
use of the projective FEQ measures in Chapter 5 (attitudes to the police and 
courts and false alibi provision) and Chapter 6 (knowledge of the law and false 
alibi provision) of the thesis. Thus the thesis has developed a new methodology 
and tool to assess alibi witness behaviour. This provides a new avenue for alibi 
witness research and will facilitate further research and understanding on this 
new aspect of forensic psychology.
Limitations
‘Actual’ alibi witness honesty was measured through a mock police 
interview which could be criticised for lack of realism. This process occurred as 
it is not possible to establish the ground truth in actual police interviews, even 
when a conviction is secured. Moreover, access to a large sample of interviews
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with alibi witnesses was not possible and research based on single case studies 
can be misleading (Loftus & Guyer, 2002). As highlighted in Chapter 1, the 
experimental approach permits the relatively newly identified phenomena of 
alibi witness evidence to be studied in light of existing psychological theory 
(Berman & Cutler, 1996) and is consistent with the approach taken in the limited 
existing alibi witness research (for example Allison, Mathews, Michael & Choi, 
2009; Burke & Turtle, 2004; Culhane & Hosch, 2004; Dahl, Brimacombe & 
Lindsay, 2009). Despite the artificial nature of the mock police interview, 
participants on average rated the interview as towards the realistic end of the 
scale provided (M= 64.98, SD= 25.80)16. Moreover, the ecological validity of 
the study was enhanced through a serving uniformed police officer conducting 
the interviews in a realistic mock police station. Anecdotal feedback from 
participants highlighted the perceived realism of the interview situation and the 
nerves felt in the interview setting. This effect was even reported by a former 
police officer participating in the study. Raised state anxiety levels (measured 
with the STAI) exhibited in most participants subsequent to being interviewed 
support the notion that the realism of the interview was as high as possible, 
given the experimental nature of the research. Moreover, high state anxiety 
levels meant eight participants were excluded from taking part in the interview. 
This proportion of participants with high anxiety is greater than would be 
expected, suggesting that the prospect of the interview raised state anxiety 
levels, thus supporting the ecological validity of the study. Although the sample 
size was small, the study had sufficient power to detect significant effects, and 
the cross validity of the regression model was high (see results section) 
indicating that the predictive value of intended honesty of evidence upon actual 
interview honesty can be generalised beyond the present sample. This 
evidence all supports the conclusion that the mock nature of the research does 
not greatly limit the generalizability of the findings. Furthermore, this again 
supports the use of prospective measures of alibi honesty in place of 
behavioural assessments.
16 Measured on a scale of 0 (unrealistic) to 100 (realistic)
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The young sample employed in the study is valid given the previous 
research illustrating that young people are more likely to disobey the authority 
and be stopped by the police (Skogan, 2006). Chapter 5 demonstrated that age 
is a significant predictor of intended alibi evidence honesty such that increasing 
age is associated with increasing honesty. The current chapter investigated the 
effect of the relationship between suspect and alibi witness upon alibi witness 
honesty. Differences due to the relationship between the suspect and alibi 
witness should be more pronounced amongst this younger sample, therefore 
using a young sample increased the likelihood of false alibi provision in general. 
Therefore using a sample of young participants maximised the chances of 
observing any effects of relationship upon alibi honesty and minimises the 
likelihood of type 2 errors occurring. Thus the strong association between 
strangers and alibi honesty, and the more complex pattern for familiar others 
may not have arisen with an older sample. This is not to say that a type 1 error 
has occurred, rather a much greater sample would be necessary to find similar 
trends in older individuals due to the reduced likelihood of false alibis in general, 
a great challenge in terms of recruitment. However, replication of the current 
research is necessary given that it represents the initial study of the provision of 
alibi evidence by motivated and unmotivated alibi witnesses. Building on this 
research basis, future research should examine the alibi witness and defendant 
relationship in a more generalizable sample. However, given that this study is 
the initial study of its type, the findings initiate a promising avenue for future 
research using this novel research paradigm. Although further research with a 
larger sample and more diverse sample would be recommended, the sample 
employed is not a limitation of the current study.
Implications for practice
Previous research shows that juror scepticism is greater towards 
motivated alibi witnesses than to alibi witnesses unrelated to the defendant 
(Hosch et al., 2010). The current study suggests that this is not an unfounded 
bias as there was a significant association between unmotivated alibi witnesses 
and revealing the truth in police interviews. However, a single unmotivated alibi 
witness condition was utilised in the study (new colleague) highlighting the need
for further research involving further types of unmotivated alibi witnesses. 
Conversely motivated witnesses were not associated with either concealing or 
revealing implicating information about the suspect, showing that there is a 
complicated relationship between motivated alibi witnesses and alibi honesty. 
The current study demonstrates that not all motivated alibi witnesses are 
necessarily equally likely to lie, implying that jurors may require direction from 
the judge to counteract their general alibi witness bias, and their more specific 
motivated alibi bias. As the research regarding juror evaluations of alibi 
evidence is limited and slightly contradictory, and this is the first study of its kind, 
further research is needed to elucidate this complex relationship before valid 
and reliable recommendations to practice can be made.
In Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 omissions were more common than 
commissions. Moreover in the current study there was evidence of risk 
evaluation in relation to which questions were answered deceptively. This has 
implications for the cognitive interview technique which may be used with 
witnesses as the emphasis this places on free recall and open questions 
provides the opportunity for omissions if probing questions are not utilised. The 
current research utilised a closed question approach as research shows a 
preponderance of closed questions in police interviews, despite training to avoid 
this (Ministry of Justice, 2011; Davies, Westcott & Horan, 2008; Fisher, 
Geiselman & Raymond, 1987; Oxburgh, Myklebust & Grant, 2010). Thus the 
interviews implemented in the present study mirrored actual (albeit incorrect) 
police interview procedure as well as facilitated appropriate data analysis 
techniques. The role of interview approach in allowing concealment of 
information as opposed to fabrications by alibi witnesses would be a valid line of 
future research as the findings of Chapter 3 certainly suggest that alibi 
witnesses would be more honest in response to closed questions than open 
questions, due the greater acceptability of lying through omission. Moreover, 
Schweitzer and Croson (1999) discovered that participants were influenced by 
direct questions, in that they reported being less likely to lie about the condition 
of a hypothetical car they were selling when asked directly about whether it had 
a specific problem, than when they are not asked directly. These findings 
contradict previous investigative interviewing research regarding the efficacy of
211
open questions with suspects (for example Davies, Westcott & Horan, 2008; 
Oxburgh & Dando, 2011; Oxburgh, Myklebust & Grant, 2010) and therefore 
warrants future research attention.
Summary and Conclusions
The current chapter interview found a significant association between 
amount of information concealed and experimental condition (relationship to 
suspect), such that a suspect being a new colleague was associated with 
revealing incriminating information. No significant association between the 
other conditions and amount of information concealed was found.
Consequently, there was no evidence that individuals were more likely to 
provide a false alibi to assist a defendant in order to prove loyalty to a romantic 
relationship (Kivivuori, 2007; Zahavi & Zahavi, 1997). Although evidence 
honesty was significantly associated with non-motivated alibi witnesses (new 
colleague), there was no association between actual alibi honesty for motivated 
alibi witnesses (child, best friend or romantic partner). Therefore some support 
was found for the concept that false alibis are provided based on likelihood of 
mutual reciprocity (Trivers, 1971). It was suggested that the sample employed 
should be broadened in future research to be more representative of the 
population as a whole. This would allow the effect of defendant and alibi 
witness relationship longevity upon alibi witness honesty to be ascertained, a 
factor limited by the young age of the current sample. Moreover, research 
implementing a measure such as the Shulman, Laursen, Kalman and 
Karpovsky Intimacy Scale (1997) would enable intimacy between alibi witness 
and defendant as opposed to attachment to be examined.
The study supported the concept that individuals carefully consider the 
positives and negatives associated with each course of action before deciding 
to provide false evidence. This supports the findings of Chapter 5 and Chapter 
6 that false alibi provision is not an irrational response to a pressured situation. 
Tentative support was therefore found for the suggestion that police need to 
employ probing questions when interviewing alibi witnesses in order to minimise 
evidence concealments and maximise the chances of receiving a thorough and 
accurate account.
In conclusion the current chapter offers a valid first step into 
understanding the role that defendant-alibi witness relationship has upon 
honesty of alibi witness evidence. Further research examining how alibi 
evidence from motivated and unmotivated alibi witnesses is evaluated by jurors 
is required before recommendations regarding judicial instructions about alibi 
witness evidence can be made.
213
CHAPTER 8: MOCK JUROR EVALUATIONS 
OF ALIBI EVIDENCE
One factor that may induce people to provide false evidence for others is 
the belief that their falsehood will be undetected in court, and that it will aid the 
defendant's case. Limited prior research (Culhane, 2005; Culhane & Hosch, 
2004; Golding, Stewart, Yozwiak, Djadali & Sanchez, 2000) suggests however 
that motivated alibis witnesses (those witnesses with a prior relationship with 
the defendant) are treated with considerable suspicion by jurors and may not 
aid the defendant’s case. The alibi evaluation literature in general is scarce, 
thus little research has directly assessed the weight assigned to alibi evidence 
relative to other forms of evidence. In effect research attention has been 
focused upon prosecution eyewitnesses (see for example Bradfield Douglass, 
Neuschatz, Imrich & Wilkinson, 2010) at the expense of understanding the role 
of alibi witness testimony. Moreover, researchers have recently suggested that 
alibi timing (alibi disclosed during initial investigations opposed to alibi 
disclosure during the trial) may be of importance to alibi evaluations (Mathews & 
Allison, 2010). Despite evidence that delayed ambush alibi testimony may be 
common (Turtle & Burke, 2003; Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, 2008) 
no research has examined how this delaying strategy affects alibi evaluations. 
The research reported in this chapter therefore examines the influence of alibi 
evidence from motivated and unmotivated alibi witnesses upon trial verdicts, 
and compares this to trials involving no alibi. Moreover, the stage of the 
investigation at which the alibi is disclosed will be examined for effects upon 
juror’s verdicts and assessments of evidence veracity. As a whole this chapter 
aims to uncover how alibi timing and witness relationship impacts upon juror 
decision making.
Alibi Evaluation Research
The literature is very scarce on alibi research (Sommers & Douglass, 
2007). Where an alibi has been included, generally it has not been the main 
focus of the research. Most of the alibi evaluation research has examined the
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role of the relationship between defendant and alibi witness, revealing that 
jurors have increased scepticism towards motivated alibi witnesses (witnesses 
with a prior relationship to the defendant) compared to unmotivated alibi 
witnesses (for example, Burke & Turtle, 2004; Olson & Wells, 2004). The 
findings of Chapter 7 of this thesis supported this apparent juror bias in that 
unmotivated alibi witnesses were found to be associated with the provision of 
truthful evidence. However, the findings relating to motivated alibi witnesses 
were less clear. The limited research on this point suggests that alibis are only 
considered by jurors when there is a lack of other strong evidence in the case 
(Shpurik & Meissner, 2004). Golding et al., (2000) found that unmotivated alibi 
witnesses countering DNA evidence, reduced guilty verdicts. However, to date 
there is no UK based alibi research (Olson & Wells, 2004a; Culhane, Hosch & 
Kehn, 2008) highlighting the need to understand the perception of alibi evidence 
by British jurors.
Olson and Charman (2011) demonstrated that just 48 hours after initially 
providing their genuine alibi, mistakes forced 36% of innocent mock suspects to 
change the content or evidence supporting their alibis. This demonstrates that 
alibi change is a frequent occurrence. However, as highlighted in the literature 
review (see Chapter 2) delaying the disclosure of an alibi in order for the 
defence to gain an advantage through ambushing their trial, may be a common 
strategy. Thus far, no research has examined whether ambush alibis influence 
juror evaluations of that alibi, and evaluations of defendant guilt. Sommers and 
Douglass (2007) assessed how individual mock detectives assessed alibis at 
the police investigation stage of proceedings, and how mock jurors evaluated 
alibis at trial, although this did not directly assess ambush strategies. 
Nonetheless the results indicated that alibis were considered stronger when 
rated in the police investigation context compared to the trial context. Sommers 
and Douglass suggested this was due to a view that the alibi must be weak if 
the case proceeded to trial despite the presence of an alibi. Similarly, Dysart 
and Strange (2012) found that police generally thought changes to alibis were 
the result of lies, despite being aware of the limitations of memory. Thus the 
results support Olson and Wells’ (2004b) alibi scepticism hypothesis. The 
findings of this research however also suggest that ambush alibis in court will
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be viewed more negatively than alibis disclosed in a timely fashion. This is due 
to the delayed disclosure preventing investigation of the alibi and thus 
strengthening of the alibi scepticism hypothesis. It is therefore important to 
explore how ambush alibis are evaluated by jurors. Moreover, as in real cases 
both alibi timing and alibi witness/defendant relationship may not be wholly 
independent, it would be beneficial to discover how these variables interact.
Summary
There is scarce research on evaluations of alibi evidence. Research 
illustrates that mock jurors differently assess the testimony of motivated and 
unmotivated alibi witnesses. There is however no research pertaining to 
evaluations of ambush alibis although research suggests this may be a strategy 
used in the courtroom. Furthermore, previous research has tended to assess 
alibi evidence in isolation, with little research assessing the relative strength of 
alibi evidence compared to other trial evidence such as DNA, fingerprints and 
eyewitnesses. Thus the current study examines perceptions of the strength of 
timely alibis and ambush alibis, and the strength assigned to alibis from 
motivated and unmotivated alibi witnesses. It is hypothesised that:
1. More not guilty verdicts will be reached when an unmotivated alibi witness is 
present compared to a motivated alibi witness.
2. More not guilty verdicts will be reached when a timely alibi is provided 
compared to an ambush alibi.
3. Alibi evidence from motivated witnesses will be rated as less reliable than 
evidence from unmotivated alibi witnesses.
4. Ambush alibi evidence will be rated as less reliable than timely alibi 
evidence.
5. Support will be found for the alibi scepticism hypothesis.
Pilot Study
The materials were initially developed and piloted to ensure their clarity 
and appropriateness. The trial summary was intended to illicit a 'guilty' verdict 
in the no alibi witness control condition, so that the influence of alibi witness
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testimony could be assessed in relation to this. The defence argument came 
from the defence barrister’s opening statement, the defendant, the defendant’s 
friend and, dependent upon experimental condition, an alibi witness. 
Conversely the prosecution case consisted of evidence from the victim, a 
forensic scientist, the attending paramedic and an eyewitness. However, 
piloting of the materials for each condition in small groups of 4 - 11 persons 
revealed that not guilty verdicts were consistently returned in all conditions. 
This suggested that the prosecution case was not strong enough in that 
reasonable doubt existed even in the absence of an alibi witness (control 
condition). Thus it was not clear whether the experimental conditions returned 
a not guilty verdict because they believed the alibi witness testimony, or 
because the prosecution case in general was weak. To address this issue, a 
default guilty verdict needed to be rendered in absence of an alibi. Thus if the 
alibi witness affected decision making, participants in the experimental 
conditions would return a not guilty verdict that could be compared to the guilty 
control group verdict. Conversely, they could return guilty verdicts, illustrating 
that the alibi witness testimony had little effect on their decision making. 
However the prosecution evidence provided could not be so conclusive that it 
was impossible for the alibis presented to be genuine. Thus the materials were 
amended to include more detailed evidence from the paramedic to support the 
victim’s injuries being serious, and evidence to possibly place the defendant at 
the scene of the crime in the form of a police officer discussing inconclusive 
CCTV footage of the incident17. Individually this prosecution evidence was not 
conclusive, but together was sufficient to render the necessary default guilty 
verdict in the control (alibi witness absent) condition.
17 CCTV footage clearly identifying the defendant would, by default, mean that the alibi 
was false. Instead the fact that the CCTV footage was not clear meant that it may depict the 
defendant, or that the alibi witness may be accurate.
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Main Study
Participants and Procedure
Participants were recruited through an opportunity sample of psychology 
students, as well as participants from a community sample recruited through a 
snowballing technique. The study was hosted online through the 
SurveyMonkey website (www.survevmonkev.com). Web links to each version 
of the study (one for each condition) were distributed to potential participants 
through the SONA psychology research participation scheme at Teesside 
University and on www.facebook.com. The first webpage of the study informed 
participants of the study ethical considerations, and also asked people to 
participate only if the met the requirements for UK jury duty. A total of 180 
participants took part, 36 in each condition. The sample was predominantly 
female with 48 males compared to 131 females (1 participant did not record 
their sex). The mean age of participants was 21.15 (SD= 9.69) years, with 
participants ranging from 18-63 years of age. The majority of participants 
were students (74.4%) followed by professional occupations (12.2%) and 
associate professional and technical occupations (5.6%).
Design
A between participants experimental design was implemented for the 
study. The experimental manipulation occurred in the written trial summary 
provided to participants. The alibi witness was either motivated (girlfriend of the 
defendant) or unmotivated (neighbour of the defendant). These relationships 
were selected as both alibi witnesses would be able to correctly identify the 
defendant due to their prior relationship. Due to the timing and nature of the 
crime (early hours of the morning), the neighbour could provide a plausible 
reason for seeing the defendant (putting out dustbin) whereas a complete 
stranger may be presumed to be intoxicated. Thus in order to control for 
extraneous variables the defendant’s girlfriend formed the motivated witness, 
and a neighbour that knew the defendant by sight only formed the unmotivated 
alibi witness. A timely alibi occurred when the defendant revealed their alibi to 
the police in interviews, whereas the ambush alibi occurred when the defendant 
was said to have only revealed an alibi witness in court. The relationship
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between the defendant and the alibi witness and the stage at which alibi 
evidence was disclosed by the defendant were systematically manipulated to 
create 5 experimental conditions:
1. No alibi witness
2 . Motivated timely alibi
3. Motivated ambush alibi
4. Unmotivated timely alibi
5. Unmotivated ambush alibi
The effect of the experimental manipulation was measured in terms of 
both the verdict, verdict confidence, and the perceived reliability of each type of 
evidence presented in the case.
Materials
Participants were presented with an inventory of a juror information sheet, 
trial summary, case indictment, and questionnaire. These materials were 
presented in a series of linked webpages (see Appendix 9 for a sample). The 
participant information outlined how jurors are selected and the role that they 
play in court. This information was provided to highlight the gravity of serving 
as a juror in a criminal case. The indictment and trial summary were checked 
by a qualified lawyer to ensure the charge of grievous bodily harm brought 
against the defendant was appropriate to the injuries in the scenario, and that 
sufficient evidence existed that a trial could reasonably occur.
The format of the trial summary was based on that implemented by 
Golding et al. (2000) comprising of a brief overview of the facts of the trial, the 
prosecution's case and finally the defence's case. The trial related to a fictional 
case of an alleged grievous bodily harm (GBH) of a man outside a nightclub 
due to the potential ceiling effects a more serious and emotive crime could 
create. Moreover, a fictitious event was chosen to ensure that participants did 
not have any personal involvement in the offence. However, to encourage 
participants to take the case seriously and try to reach the ‘correct’ participants 
were informed that the case was genuine.
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The defence and prosecution opening statements outlined the date and 
timing of the alleged incident, introduced the witnesses that the prosecution and 
defence would produce, and stated that the defendant pleaded not guilty. The 
evidence of each witness was presented in a single paragraph and cross 
examination responses were also provided to expose the potential weaknesses 
of each witness's evidence.
The prosecution witnesses included in the case were the victim, a police 
officer, a forensic scientist, a door attendant and a paramedic. Their evidence 
demonstrated that the victim’s injuries were serious and most likely intentional 
and gave inconclusive circumstantial evidence that the defendant was 
responsible. For example, the police officer testified that someone matching the 
defendant’s description was seen running away from the scene on CCTV, 
although the footage was poor quality, so only the height and build of the 
offender could be seen. The door attendant testified that the apparently drunk 
defendant was in the area 30 minutes before the incident. Furthermore the 
scientist testified that the defendant’s fingerprint was on a bottle which had been 
used to strike the victim. The victim testified that he had a minor altercation with 
the defendant earlier in the night but did not see his attacker. This level of 
evidence was necessary to construct a case that in real life would reach court, 
without being so conclusive that any alibi testimony would be obviously false. 
Moreover, as alibis are suggested to be only considered by jurors when other 
evidence is weak (Shpurik & Meissner, 2004), all the prosecution evidence was 
deliberately circumstantial and inconclusive. Thus, there was sufficient 
evidence that the defendant could stand trial, but not so much evidence that his 
alibi (where presented) could not be plausible and accurate.
The defence witnesses included the defendant, a friend of the defendant 
and, in the experimental conditions only, an alibi witness. In his testimony, the 
defendant stated that the altercation was minor and he did not attack the victim. 
This assertion was supported by the defendant’s friend. The critical evidence 
that varied between conditions was that relating to the defendant's alibi. In the 
no alibi condition the defendant claims to have been home alone at the time of 
the crime, with no supporting evidence presented. The unmotivated alibi 
conditions contained testimony from the neighbour of the defendant, claiming to
220
have seen the defendant at home 15 minutes prior to the attack. Under cross 
examination the alibi is exposed to be weak as the neighbour admits that the 
defendant could have left his home address without her knowledge and that she 
could be mistaken regarding the night she witnessed the defendant arriving 
home. In contrast to this in the motivated alibi witness conditions an alibi was 
supplied for the defendant by his girlfriend who claimed the defendant arrived 
home 15 minutes to the incident. The defendants' girlfriend admits under cross 
examination that the defendant could have left the house without her knowledge 
once she fell asleep. In the ambush alibi conditions, under cross examination 
the alibi witness states I don't know why I didn't tell the police that I saw Michael 
get home that night. I only remembered a couple of days ago. Thus it is 
implied that the alibi witness was aware earlier in the investigation that the 
defendant was a suspect, but did not offer an alibi. The defendant gives the 
exact same response under cross-examination I don't know why I didn't tell the 
police that my neighbour saw me get home that night. I only remembered a 
couple of days ago.
The Crown Court Bench Book (Judicial Studies Board, 2010) suggests 
that judges should remind jurors that 1) jurors should be instructed that there is 
no burden on the defendant to prove that he was elsewhere, and 2 ) a lying 
defendant is not necessarily a guilty defendant. However, bearing in mind the 
paucity of alibi research, the necessity of these instructions and the accuracy of 
point 2 is unclear. Furthermore, these instructions are advised rather than 
legally required. Thus the current study did not include these directions in order 
to ascertain whether they are indeed necessary, and whether they should 
become a legal requirement.
Participants then indicated their verdict, (Guilty, Not Guilty) as well their 
confidence in this decision (rated from 0 ; not at all confident to 100 ; completely 
confident). Further questions asked participants to the reliability and influence 
of the door attendant, victim, defendant, defendant's girlfriend/neighbour (if 
present), the DNA evidence, the fingerprint evidence, the forensic scientist, the 
paramedic, the defendant's friend and the CCTV footage. All of these variables 
were rated on a scale ranging from 0 (not at all reliable/not at all influential) to 
100 (completely reliable/completely influential). The final section of the
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questionnaire required participants to rate on likert scales the influence and 
reliability of the different types of evidence in criminal cases in general18.
Ethics
The research was conducted in accordance with the governing principles 
of the Code of Human Research Ethics (2006) and guidelines for ethical 
practice in psychological research online (2007) established by the BPS. The 
specific study was assessed and approved by the ethics committees at 
Sheffield Hallam University and Teesside University. The deception regarding 
the case authenticity was revealed in the debrief stage of the study where 
participants were also provided with the researcher’s contact details.
Results 
Verdict
As anticipated, across all conditions the majority of participants found the 
defendant guilty (125 guilty verdicts compared to 55 not guilty). The default no 
alibi witness condition rendered 23 guilty verdicts and 13 not guilty verdicts. 
Similarly hearing an unmotivated timely alibi and unmotivated ambush alibi 
conditions led to 23 guilty and 13 not guilty verdicts. In comparison 30 guilty 
verdicts and just 6 not guilty were seen in the motivated ambush alibi condition 
and 26 guilty 10 not guilty in the motivated timely alibi condition. This suggests 
that a motivated alibi witness actually detracts from defendant’s case and 
makes guilty verdicts more likely. However, an unmotivated alibi witness had 
no impact on perceptions of guilt compared to having no alibi witness. See 
Table 29 for this data.
18 This data was not analyzed in detail as it did not directly pertain to the question of 
interest for this chapter
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Table 29: Mean (SD) Verdict and Verdict Confidence by Condition
Condition3 Verdict Frequency Verdict Verdict
Confidence Confidence
No Alibi Guilty 23 71.09 (14.61)
Not Guilty 13 73.46 (13.90)
Motivated Timely Alibi Guilty 26 77.19 (11.74)
Not Guilty 10 65.50 (12.12)
Motivated Ambush Alibi Guilty 30 75.37 (18.37)
Not Guilty 6 51.67 (16.02)
Unmotivated Timely Alibi Guilty 23 68.04 (15.65)
Not Guilty 13 52.62 (22.36)
Unmotivated Ambush 
Alibi
Guilty 23 73.52 (9.11)
Not Guilty 13 55.23 (26.38)
71.95 (14.21)
73.95 (21.82) 
71.42 (19.91) 
62.47 (19.54) 
66.92 (19.24)
Note. 3 n=36
A 2x2x2 hierarchical loglinear analysis was conducted to assess the 
influence of alibi witness (motivated, unmotivated) and alibi timing (timely, 
ambush) upon participant verdict (guilty, not guilty). The main effect of verdict 
was significant, X2(})=  25.78, p<.001, indicating that significantly more 
participants voted guilty (n= 102) than voted not guilty (n= 42). All other main 
effects and interactions were not significant (all p> .05) indicating that the 
motivation and timing of the alibi witness’ evidence had no impact upon 
participant verdicts. Further, Chi2 analyses were conducted to compare each of 
the experimental alibi containing conditions with the no alibi condition. These 
were all non-significant (all p> .05) indicating no significant association between 
condition and verdict.
Confidence in verdict was rated on a scale of 0 (not at all confident) to 
100 (completely confident). Across the whole sample, participants voting guilty 
(M= 73.27, SD= 14.59) were on average more confident in their verdict choice, 
than those reaching a not guilty verdict (M= 60.10, SD= 20.79), t(178)= 4.758, 
p< .001. Average confidence scores ranged from 62.47 (SD= 19.53) in the 
unmotivated timely alibi condition to 73.94 (SD= 12.82) in the motivated timely 
alibi condition.
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Table 29 illustrates that participants hearing no alibi, and those hearing a 
timely or ambush alibi from the defendant’s girlfriend were more confident in 
their verdict, than participants hearing an alibi from the defendant’s neighbour.
A oneway ANOVA19 was conducted to examine the effect of condition 
(unmotivated timely alibi, motivated timely alibi, unmotivated ambush, motivated 
ambush alibi, no alibi) upon verdict confidence (0; not at all confident- 100; 
completely confident). Although the overall ANOVA was significant, F(4, 175)= 
2.54, p= .042, co= .18 (small), post hoc Bonferroni tests did not support this 
difference (all p> .05).
Reliability of Case Evidence
Table 30 reveals that the DNA evidence and the forensic scientist who 
presented this evidence were rated as the most reliable forms of evidence in the 
case (M= 83.32, SD= 22.08 and M= 81.30, SD= 19.40 respectively). The only 
‘scientific’ evidence not to be rated so highly reliable is the CCTV footage (M= 
52.10, SD= 25.31) which is admitted in the case to be poor quality.
T a b le  3 0 : M e a n  (S D ) C a s e  E v id e n c e  R e lia b il ity  a c ro s s  C o n d itio n s
Evidence Type Reliability
Prosecution Scientific Evidence
DNA 83.32 (22.08)
Fingerprint 80.72 (22.02)
Forensic Scientist 81.30 (19.40)
Paramedic 78.36 (23.65)
CCTV Footage 52.10 (25.31)
Prosecution Person Evidence
Door attendant 65.29 (24.46)
Victim 58.04 (26.50)
Defence Person Evidence
Defendant 31.90 (22.05)
Alibi witness 40.39 (24.98)
Defendant’s friend 41.71 (23.71)
Note. 0= Not at all reliable, 100 = completely
reliable
19 Conducting a oneway ANOVA allowed for the ‘no alibi’ condition to be included in this 
analysis as this condition straddled both the Alibi Timing and Alibi Witness variables
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Table 30 reveals that participants perceived the least reliable evidence to 
be that provided by the defendant, alibi witness and defendant’s friend; namely 
the defence case. Each of these evidence types were solidly towards the lower 
not at all reliable side of the 0-100 visual analogue scale. The final group of 
evidence seen is the eyewitness prosecution evidence consisting of testimony 
from the victim and the door attendant, neither of whom saw the crime occur. 
Thus the average reliability ratings of the victim and door attendant evidence 
(M= 58.04, SD= 26.50 and M= 65.29, SD= 24.46 respectively) are lower than 
those for the scientific evidence, but higher than the defence evidence.
T a b le  3 1 : M e a n  (S D ) R e lia b il ity 3 o f A lib i W itn e s s  E v id e n c e  a n d  D e fe n d a n t E v id e n c e  b y  e x p e r im e n ta l 
c o n d it io n
Evidence
type
No Alibi 
Witness
Motivated
Timely
Alibi
Motivated
Ambush
Alibi
Unmotivated 
Timely Alibi
Unmotivated 
Ambush Alibi
Mean
Average
across
conditions
Alibi
Witness
N/A 33.50
(24.60)
33.33
(25.27) 56.75 (23.17) 37.97 (19.68)
40.39
(24.98)
Defendant 41.25(22.37)
36.33
(23.74)
37.47
(23.11) 38.78 (20.62) 35.67 (21.04)
37.90
(22.05)
Note. a0; Not at all reliable, 100; completely reliable
Ratings of defendant reliability were generally low (less than 50% of 
available scale) and appeared influenced by the type of alibi evidence 
presented (see Table 31). The defendant was rated most reliable when they 
had no alibi witness (M= 41.25, SD= 22.37) and least reliable when an 
unmotivated witness supported their ambush alibi (M= 35.67 SD= 21.04). A 
2x2 ANOVA revealed no significant main effects of alibi timing or alibi witness 
on ratings of defendant reliability (F(1, 140)= .071, p= .790, co2= -.007 (very 
small) and F(1, 140)= .007, p= .931, oo2= -.007 (very small) respectively). There 
was no significant interaction between these variables, F(1, 140)= .331, p=
.566, u)2= -.005 (very small).
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Table 31 also illustrates that across the sample as a whole the alibi 
witness’ evidence20 was rated as rather unreliable (M= 40.39, SD= 24.98). 
Variation was found between alibi conditions, with the unmotivated timely alibi 
(M= 56.75, SD= 23.17) witness perceived as the most reliable, and motivated 
ambush alibi witness the least reliable witness (M= 37.97, SD= 19.68). A 2x2 
ANOVA was conducted to examine the effect of alibi timing (timely, ambush) 
and alibi witness (motivated, unmotivated) upon perceptions of alibi witness 
reliability in the case provided. This revealed a significant main effect of alibi 
witness, F(1, 140)= 12.92, p< .001, co2= .07 (medium), and alibi timing, F(1, 
140)= 5.96, p= .016, w2= .03 (very small). Thus timely alibis (M= 45.13, SD= 
26.46) were perceived to be significantly more reliable than ambush alibis (M= 
35.65, SD= 22.61), and unmotivated alibi witnesses (M= 47.36, SD= 23.35) 
were believed to be significantly more reliable than motivated alibi witnesses 
(M= 33.42, SD= 24.76). There was also a significant interaction between alibi 
timing and alibi witness, F(1, 140)= 5.75, p= .018, co2= .03 (very small). Thus a 
timely unmotivated alibi witness (M= 56.75, SD= 23.17) was perceived as 
significantly more reliable than an ambush unmotivated alibi witness (M= 37.97, 
SD= 19.68). Similarly, timely alibis from an unmotivated alibi witness were seen 
to be significantly more reliable than timely alibis from a motivated alibi witness 
(M= 33.50, SD= 24.60). Flowever, there was no significant difference between 
the timely and ambush alibis provided by motivated alibi witnesses. These 
findings are illustrated in Figure 12 below.
20 All case evidence was scored between 0 (not at all reliable) and 100 (completely
reliable)
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F ig u re  12 : T h e  E ffe c t o f A lib i W itn e s s  a n d  A lib i T im in g  u p o n  R a tin g s  o f S e lf-R e p o r te d  A lib i W itn e s s  
R e lia b ility
ALIBI_WITNESS
 MOTIVATED
 UNMOTIVATED
TIMEY AMBUSH
ALIBIJNMING
Discussion 
Summary of results
Several of the hypotheses were supported by the data (see Table 32). 
Specifically the hypothesised trends with regards to the effect of alibi witness 
motivation and alibi timing upon ratings of alibi witness reliability were supported.
T a b le  3 2 : S u m m a ry  o f F in d in g s  in R e la tio n  to  th e  H y p o th e s e s
Hypothesis Supported
1 More Not Guilty verdicts will be reached when an Unmotivated 
Alibi Witness is present compared to a Motivated Alibi Witness.
No - seeChi2 analysis 
page 221
2 More Not Guilty verdicts will be reached when a Timely Alibi is 
provided compared to an Ambush Alibi.
No -  see Chi2 analysis 
page 221
3 Alibi evidence from Motivated Witnesses will be rated as less 
reliable than evidence from Unmotivated Alibi Witnesses.
Yes -  see 2x2 ANOVA 
page 225
4 Ambush Alibi evidence will be rated as less reliable than Timely 
Alibi evidence.
Partially -  see 2x2 
ANOVA page 225
5 Support will be found for the Alibi Scepticism Hypothesis. Yes -  see Table 30 
page. 223
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This study found that alibi witness motivation had a significant effect 
upon perceptions of alibi witness reliability, such that motivated alibi witnesses 
were seen as significantly less reliable than unmotivated alibi witnesses. 
Moreover, more guilty verdicts were reached when the alibi witness was 
motivated compared to having an unmotivated alibi witness, or no alibi witness 
(although this trend was not significant). Together this cautiously suggests that 
whereas an unmotivated alibi witness has no impact upon a defendant’s case, a 
motivated alibi witness actually harms their defence. This is in accordance with 
previous research regarding the effect of alibi witness upon alibi believability 
(Allison & Brimacombe, 2010). Hamilton's rule (1964) states that degree of 
relatedness between individuals predicts the probability of an altruistic act. 
Jurors seem to apply this rule when evaluating alibi testimony as motivated alibi 
witnesses were perceived as less reliable, presumably because they were 
thought to be more likely to lie for the defendant. Related to this, Hosch, 
Culhane, Jolly, Chavez and Shaw (2011) found that motivated alibi witnesses 
with a biological relation to the defendant were viewed as less reliable than 
those related only by marriage. However, both of these witnesses were less 
reliable than an alibi witness motivated by a social relationship with the 
defendant. In the current study, the girlfriend of the defendant (motivated alibi 
witness) was viewed as a less reliable alibi witness than the neighbour of the 
defendant (unmotivated alibi witness). Thus a girlfriend alibi witness is viewed 
similarly to a marriage related witness, rather than a socially related alibi 
witness.
Ambush Alibis
Prior research illustrates that statement inconsistency is commonly 
associated with deception (Mann, Vrij & Bull, 2004), although it remains unclear 
whether this belief is accurate (Granhag & Stromwall, 2000; Vrij, 2008). Thus in 
the current study it was expected that the inconsistent nature of the ambush 
alibi testimony would correspondingly increase conviction rates when ambush 
alibi evidence was present. Results demonstrated that a changing alibi (in the 
form of an ambush alibi) was perceived as less reliable than an alibi witnesses 
that provided their evidence in a timely manner, providing apparent support for
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the presumption that inconsistency is a sign of deception (Mann, Vrij & Bull,
2004). Similarly, although only 28% of police officers surveyed by Dysart and 
Strange (2012) believed that it was very or extremely likely that a suspect could 
be mistaken about their whereabouts the majority of participants (81%) thought 
alibi change was indicative of the original alibi being a lie. Conversely, only 19% 
thought alibi changes were due to mistaken memory showing that despite 
awareness of the limitations of alibi witness memory, police are still generally 
suspicious of changes to alibi stories. On this point, Berman and Cutler (1996) 
found that novel evidence in court (evidence not previously included in the 
investigation) was seen as more reliable than contradictory evidence in court, 
and contradictions between pre-trial and in court evidence.
There were some differences between Brewer and Burke’s (2002) 
research and the current study; namely that the current study featured new 
evidence from a new witness, rather than new/ inconsistent evidence from an 
existing witness. Thus, these results suggest that an alibi witness that 
contradicts themselves is perceived as less reliable than an alibi witness whose 
testimony ambushes the court. Brewer and Burke (2002) suggest that changes 
to testimony erode perceptions of witness confidence in court, a factor 
consistently demonstrated to be associated with jury guilty verdicts (Cutler,
Penrod & Dexter, 1990) despite the inaccuracy of this association (Sporer,
Penrod, Read & Cutler, 1995). This explains why the decreased reliability of 
the ambush alibi witness (as indicated by participants) was not sufficient to 
impact upon mock juror verdicts in the current study; although less reliable than 
a consistent witness, they were more reliable than an inconsistent witness. 
However, the current study is the first to manipulate the constancy of alibi 
witness testimony rather than eyewitness testimony (Berman & Cutler, 1996; 
Brewer & Burke, 2002). The exploratory nature of the research and lack of 
comparative research means the findings should be treated with caution.
However, they provide a new avenue for future research on the issue of alibi 
witness testimony.
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Verdicts
Although the current findings support the concept of a negative bias 
regarding alibi witnesses, the results indicate that the defendant’s perceived 
reliability (and guilt) remains unaffected by having an unreliable alibi witness21. 
This could be because the alibi evidence was amongst the least influential 
evidence (as self-reported) to the mock juror’s decision making. This supports 
the assertion that jurors consider alibi testimony when lacking other evidence 
against the defendant (Shpurik & Meissner, 2004). This contradicts the results 
of similar studies which found higher guilt ratings when a motivated alibi witness 
testified. However, participants did believe that alibi witness testimony had 
influenced their judgements, even though this didn’t translate to actual verdicts. 
Utilising a continuous measure of guilt Hosch et al. (2011) found that a 
corroborating alibi witness reduced belief in defendant guilt by 22%. However, 
whether this reduction translates into a not guilty verdict is dependent upon 
participant formulations of the ‘reasonable doubt’ standard (Dhami, 2008) which 
have been shown to vary widely (Horowitz, 1997). Horowitz demonstrated that 
reasonable doubt varies from 60% to 90% certainty in guilt, meaning that a 22% 
reduction22 may not be sufficient to convince participants of the defendant’s 
innocence. As a dichotomous verdict (guilty, not guilty) was requested from 
participants it is not possible to ascertain whether the ambush evidence had a 
more subtle effect upon levels of perceived guilt. As Olson and Wells (2004b) 
highlight, guilt estimates are not always sensitive enough to measure 
perceptions of alibis. However, collecting a continuous measure would not 
allow overall verdict to be gathered due to individual differences in the 
reasonable doubt standard. Furthermore, as in real world settings jurors are 
only offered dichotomous verdicts, this format was most appropriate for 
participant responses.
Although participants recognised ambush alibis as unreliable or weak 
evidence, they did not appear to believe they reflected a malicious intent to 
ambush the courts or commit perjury. This is evidenced in the fact that the
21 According to participant ratings of evidence reliability
22 This presumes that jurors approach the case with a presumption of guilt. See the 
section on the story model for further information on this.
230
unreliability of the ambush witness did not affect ratings of defendant reliability. 
Olson and Charman (2011) point out that poor memory may lead to either; an 
inability to recall one’s whereabouts; a mistaken account of one’s whereabouts; 
or a lack of support (or convincing support) for one’s alibi. In support of this, 
Olson and Wells (2003) found that when questioned about their alibi just 48 
hours after providing it participant’s alibis for a given date frequently changed. 
The frequency of changes was greater when the alibi was required for a date 3 
months previously (42%), compared to 3 days previously (30%). This supports 
the suggestion that an alibi story may drastically change over time as external 
sources (such as a diary or other’s accounts) are consulted to verify 
whereabouts at the critical time. On this point, Skowronski, Betz, Thompson 
and Shannon (1991) found that although participants were good at recalling 
which day of the week an event occurred, they frequently cited the wrong week. 
Similarly Kurbat, Shevell and Rips (1998) found that when asked to produce 
alibi corroboration, many participants provided evidence to show where they 
should have been (such as a university timetable) rather than proof they were 
actually there (such as CCTV footage of them in a class). They termed reliance 
on this form of evidence the calendar effect.
The calendar effect may be exacerbated if the individual is unaware at 
the time of the crime that they will later be required to state their whereabouts at 
the. Thus when an alibi is requested, guessing, and subsequent changes to the 
alibi may occur (Olson & Wells, 2003). In contrast to this, eyewitnesses may be 
expected to have more accurate memory as the event is more likely to be 
significant at the time of memory encoding (Brewer, 1988). Thus, changes to 
an alibi should be expected and viewed with less scepticism than changes to 
eyewitness testimony (Olson & Charman, 2011). This appears to be somewhat 
the case as although there is a presumption that motivated alibi witnesses will 
lie (Burke & Turtle, 2004; Olson & Wells, 2004), there does not appear to be a 
similar presumption that all ambush alibi witnesses will lie, as ambush testimony 
only significantly reduced perceptions of unmotivated alibi witness reliability.
The findings instead suggest that participants attributed the lack of reliability of 
unmotivated ambush alibis to “memory failure, mistaken alibi generation, and 
weak alibi corroborability” (Olson & Charman, 2011 p. 15) rather than malicious
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intent. However, the exploratory nature of this research necessitates further 
research on this point. Future research should use a mock jury paradigm to 
evaluate whether alibi witness testimony proven to be false compared to 
unproven false or genuine alibi witness evidence, affects perceptions of 
defendant reliability and juror verdicts.
Alibi Scepticism Hypothesis
The case was deliberately biased towards a guilty verdict in the control 
No Alibi condition, in order that the relative effect of an alibi could be 
ascertained. However, the case was based upon circumstantial evidence so 
that the presence of an alibi would allow Not Guilty verdicts to be returned. Alibi 
evidence had no significant effect upon the frequency of guilty verdicts returned. 
In fact, defendants were rated as most reliable when no witness was presented 
to support their alibi. This is likely due to the fact that participants in general 
rated the alibi testimony as amongst the least reliable evidence in the case 
(second only to the defendant themself) thus supporting the alibi scepticism 
hypothesis (Olson & Wells, 2004b). Moreover, the finding that weak alibis do 
not affect juror decision making (Dahl, Brimacombe & Lindsay, 2009) was 
specifically supported with Ambush alibis and Motivated alibis rated less reliable 
than Timely and Unmotivated alibis. Turtle & Burke (2001) suggest that this is 
due to an overestimation of the ease with which an alibi can be proved. This in 
turn makes jurors sceptical of changes to alibi evidence (Culhane, 2005).
In support of previous research (Culhane, 2005; Lyndsey, Lim, Murando, 
& Cully, 1986) the current study findings suggest that rather than enhancing a 
defendant’s case, the presence of an alibi witness actually harms the 
defendant’s case in court. The current study results support Culhane’s (2005) 
implication that even when an alibi witness is available, defendants may have a 
stronger case if they claim there is no witness to support their alibi. This finding 
is contrary to intuition and would seem to encourage innocent defendants to 
commit perjury in order to be believed by jurors. Additionally, these findings 
suggest that prosecution barristers must only highlight the presence of an alibi 
witness, regardless of their relationship to the defendant, in order to strengthen 
their case. Moreover, drawing juror attention to ambush alibis or motivated alibi
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witnesses should serve to greatly reduce juror perceptions of defendant 
reliability. The limited amount of research on this issue means that caution and 
further research is required prior to these suggestions being implemented in 
practice.
The Story Model
The greater frequency of guilty than not guilty verdicts supports the 
predominant model of juror decision making, the Story Model (Pennington & 
Hastie, 1986) as well as the innuendo effect (Wegner, Wenzlaff, Kerker & 
Beattie, 1981). Hence the alibi witness testifying last in the case allowed an 
irreversible ‘guilty’ story to be established that biased jurors from considering 
later defence information. A corresponding confirmation bias (Darley & Gross, 
1983) prevented jurors from integrating the later exonerating alibi evidence into 
their schema (Turtle & Burke, 2003). In support of this, the defence evidence 
(alibi witness, defendant and defendant’s friend) was seen as less reliable than 
the prosecution evidence, supporting Shpurik and Meissner’s (2004) suggestion 
that jurors only consider alibi evidence when the prosecution case is weak.
CS! Effect
The strong scientific evidence presented early in the case in conjunction 
with generalised alibi scepticism seems to have prevented jurors from 
considering the later alibi evidence (Shpurik & Meissner, 2004). The public 
tendency to exaggerate the accuracy and availability of scientific evidence 
(Lieberman, Carrell, Miethe & Krauss, 2008) is known as the CSI effect 
(Schweitzer & Saks, 2007). Support for this trend was found in that the 
scientific evidence (DNA, fingerprint and forensic scientist) was rated the most 
reliable evidence across all conditions. Previous research demonstrates jurors 
can rely on mistaken eyewitness identification (Wells et al. 1998) thus the fact 
that evidence from prosecution non-expert witnesses was seen as less reliable 
is an interesting and positive finding.
The CSI effect further suggests that the evidence actually presented in 
trials often disappoints jurors as little (or no) forensic science is presented, or
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the evidence that is presented does not live up the standards that television 
programmes such as CSI set (Schweitzer & Saks, 2007). Thus research 
suggests that less weight than probability would suggest, is actually assigned 
by jurors to DNA evidence (Nance & Morris, 2002; Nance & Morris, 2005; 
Schklar & Diamond, 1999). This trend was not witnessed in the data, potentially 
because the scientific testimony provided was brief or because of limited 
understanding of the mechanism by which the CSI effect operates (Turner, 
2012). Thus the scientific testimony did not mention the probability of human 
laboratory error, the factor demonstrated by Schklar and Diamond to be the 
most worrying element of DNA evidence.
Limitations
As well as rating the specific case evidence, participants rated the 
reliability and influence of trial evidence in cases in general. This was intended 
to indicate whether the current case was seen as containing any particularly 
biased evidence. Ratings of evidence in general and the specific case were 
very similar suggesting that the findings can be generalised to further cases.
The online nature of the study may be seen as a limitation for two 
reasons; the potential for different response patterns online, and the lack of jury 
deliberation. In relation to the former, the analysis conducted in Chapter 5 
revealed no effect of presentation modality (online or offline) in an examination 
of influence of attitudes to the criminal justice system upon alibi witness 
evidence. Moreover, Pezdek, Avila-Mora and Sperry (2009) tested the impact 
of trial presentation upon verdicts in a mock jury study of eyewitness testimony. 
Their findings illustrated that the pattern of findings was consistent regardless of 
whether participants read a written trial transcript or watched a video of the trial. 
This led them to conclude that jury research can be conducted using trial 
transcripts without compromising the external validity of the study. In fact 
Diamond (1997) points out that while less extensive trial summaries lack 
ecological validity, their use is entirely appropriate in gauging the reactions 
different experimental conditions have towards particular evidence 
manipulations.
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Another aspect of the modality was the computer based nature of the 
data collection. This is a method that has been used in prior jury research. For 
example Olson and Wells (2004a) had participants rate alibis using a computer 
programme. Moreover Evans and Schreiber (2010) used online data collection 
in their jury study examining evaluations of intoxicated eyewitnesses. Evidence 
demonstrates that the findings of psychological research conducted using web 
technology do not substantially differ from that collected using traditional pen 
and paper methodology (Gosling, Vazire, Srivastava & John, 2004). The use of 
web delivery prevented the inclusion of a deliberation in the study. Bray and 
Kerr (1979) found just 52% of mock-jury research conducted between 1969 and 
1979 involved deliberations. Furthermore, to date, deliberations have not been 
used in the research examining mock juror evaluations of alibi evidence (for 
example Sommers & Douglass, 2007; Olson, 2004; Burke & Turtle, 2004; 
Culhane & Hosch, 2004). This is due to extensive interviews with real jurors 
revealing that deliberations play a very small role in juror verdicts (Bornstein, 
1999; Kalven & Zeisel,1966; Meyers, Brashers & Hanner, 2000). Indeed 
experimental research shows that deliberations are not necessary for ecological 
validity as pre-deliberation ballots correlate highly with final verdicts (Stasser, 
Kerr & Bray, 1982).
Gosling et al., suggest that the samples generated through web based 
research are just as representative as those gathered through traditional 
research methods. Moreover Smith and Leigh (1997) found that the only 
difference in internet and traditional (pen and paper) samples appears to be that 
internet samples seem to be broader and more diverse. Despite this 
observation, a large imbalance in numbers of male and female participants 
occurred in the study. Although some prior research indicates that female 
jurors are more likely to convict (Fischer, 1997) this finding is restricted 
specifically to sexual assault trials (Memon & Shuman, 1998; Moran & Comfort, 
1982). Thus as a whole the methodology and sample used in the study is valid 
and appropriate and highly unlikely to have biased the research findings.
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Summary and Conclusions
In summary this chapter aimed to assess whether alibi scepticism bias 
observed in American mock juror studies (Olson & Wells, 2004; Culhane, Hosch 
& Kehn, 2008) is prevalent in the UK population. The findings supported the 
prevalence of alibi scepticism in the UK sample as alibi evidence was deemed 
amongst the least reliable evidence presented in the case. More specifically, a 
general negative defence bias was witnessed that supported the Pennington 
and Hastie’s Story Model of juror decision making (1986; 1988), thus furthering 
Turtle & Burke’s (2001) assertion that people underestimate the difficulty of 
evidencing a genuine alibi.
The current study examined the specific impact of alibi timing (timely, 
ambush) and alibi witness motivation (motivated, unmotivated) upon juror 
decision making. In support of prior research (Burke & Turtle, 2004; Olson & 
Wells, 2004b; Culhane, Hosch & Kehn, 2008) motivated alibi witnesses were 
perceived as significantly less reliable than unmotivated alibi witnesses. 
However, the defendant was perceived as most reliable when they had no 
witness to support their alibi. As changes to testimony have been associated 
with deception and decreased credibility (Berman & Cutler, 1996; Mann, Vrij & 
Bull, 2004) it was anticipated, and indeed found, that Timely alibis would be 
viewed as more reliable than Ambush alibis. That neither of these trends 
translated into juror verdicts suggests that a ‘weak’ alibi alone is not sufficient to 
convince a jury of a defendant’s guilt. Rather the findings demonstrate that 
although evidencing an alibi is perceived to be easier than reality (Turtle &
Burke, 2001) inaccurate alibis are not automatically assumed to be indicative of 
guilt. Instead memory failure, mistakes and weak alibi corroboration (Olson & 
Charman, 2011) are all accepted as influencing alibi reliability. Thus although 
unmotivated timely alibi witnesses were perceived as providing the most reliable 
alibi evidence possible, having an alibi witness in general compared to having 
no alibi witness, decreased ratings of defendant reliability.
The findings imply that highlighting the presence of alibi witness 
testimony will strengthen the prosecution case, especially where a motivated 
and/or ambush alibi is presented. Although this alone may not result in a guilty 
verdict, it may serve to greatly strengthen the case against the defendant. As
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this is the only study addressing this issue, further research should examine the 
efficacy in securing convictions of the prosecution undermining of alibi witness 
testimony, prior to educating barristers on this issue.
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CHAPTER 9: GENERAL DISCUSSION AND
FUTURE WORK
False evidence provided by alibi witnesses has the potential to cause 
serious harm in that guilty suspects can avoid prosecution, innocent people can 
be put at risk of arrest and the police may miss the opportunity to gather 
important evidence (Crown Prosecution Service, 2011). In fact in America only 
mistaken eyewitness testimony contributes to more miscarriages of justice than 
alibi evidence. Moreover, research from The Innocence Project indicates that 
juror beliefs about what constitutes weak alibi evidence, leads to false 
convictions (Connors, Lundregan, Miller & McEwen, 1996; Wells, Small, Penrod, 
Malpass, Fulero & Brimacombe, 1998). The empirical research supports this, 
revealing general alibi scepticism (Dahl, Brimacombe & Lindsay, 2009), and 
increased scepticism directed towards alibi witnesses who are assumed to have 
a motivation to lie (Allison & Brimacombe, 2010; Dahl & Price, 2011; Olson & 
Wells, 2004). Limited research has examined the construction of alibis but has 
done so from the perspective of the defendant rather than that of the alibi 
witness (Culhane, Hosch & Kehn, 2008; Kurbat, Shevell & Rips, 1998; Olson & 
Charman, 2011). Thus prior to this thesis it was unclear whether defendants 
are correct in presuming their relatives will lie on their behalf.
This thesis had the broad aim of developing understanding of the 
provision and evaluation of deceptive alibi witness evidence. Through 
reviewing the relevant research literature (see Chapter 2) several variables of 
potential influence to alibi witness evidence honesty were uncovered namely; 
individual constructions of deceptive behaviour (Chapter 3); attitudes towards 
the criminal justice system (Chapter 5); knowledge of the relevant legislation 
(Chapter 6); the relationship between alibi witness and defendant (Chapter 7). 
Moreover, the research indicated that alibi evaluators may be sceptical of 
ambush alibis which appear inconsistent with previous evidence provided by 
defendants. Thus the alibi evaluation research was expanded through 
consideration of the role of alibi timing and alibi witness motivation upon mock 
juror decision making (Chapter 8). The examination of these variables formed
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the 9 objectives of this thesis. This chapter discusses the main findings of the 
thesis in relation to these nine objectives, and the previous alibi research.
Objective 1
The first objective of this thesis was to determine whether the type of 
deception used by alibi witnesses influences perceptions of alibi witness 
testimony acceptability. This objective was addressed in Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6 
of the thesis. As outlined in Chapter 2 the extant deception research and alibi 
research have focused almost exclusively upon lies. However, other forms of 
deception, such as omissions, evasions and false confessions may be used by 
defence witnesses to deflect investigator or juror suspicion from a defendant. 
Although the distinction between these types of deception has been validated in 
the general deception research (Bradac, 1983; Galasiriski, 2000; Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1982; Spranca, Minsk & Baron, 1991) the forensic deception literature 
has not looked at the acceptability of different forms of deceptive alibi witness 
evidence.
Each of these chapters demonstrated a difference between omitting 
evidence (encompassing both evasions and omissions), and 
fabricating/commissions (involving both false confessions and lies). The thesis 
has shown that omissions and evasions are viewed as more acceptable, and 
more likely to be engaged in by alibi witnesses, than lies and false confessions. 
This supports the concept that deceptive alibi witnesses plan their deception 
(Crown Prosecution Service, 2011) and weigh up the benefits and drawbacks 
(Cornish & Clark, 1986) before condoning the least risky (Vrij, 2008) and legal 
forms of deception (evasions). A tendency towards the concealment of 
incriminating evidence was interpreted as reflecting the belief that lies may be 
easier to detect than concealments (Vrij, Mann, Fisher, Leal, Milne & Bull, 2008) 
making omissions a lower risk strategy for alibi witnesses.
This finding implies that the police should be aware of not only what is 
said in interviews, but also what is not said. As alibi witnesses are less willing 
to lie than conceal information, by phrasing questions in a manner that prevents
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Omissions23, alibi witnesses may be left with little alternative than to tell the 
truth. Thus asking specific closed questions may facilitate alibi witness honesty. 
Contrary to these findings UK investigative interviewing procedures advocate 
using open and non-leading questions (Davies, Westcott & Horan, 2008; Fisher, 
Geiselman & Raymond, 1987; Oxburgh, Myklebust & Grant, 2010). However, 
given that research indicates that open questions are not consistently used (for 
example Davies, Westcott & Horan, 2008; Dysart & Strange, 2012; Oxburgh & 
Dando, 2011; Oxburgh, Myklebust & Grant, 2010) the impact of police 
questioning upon alibi witness honesty is unclear. This is certainly an avenue 
that future alibi research should explore given the implications for police 
interview practice. Moreover, closed questions may also lead to a higher 
number of ‘no comment’ interviews as this response is appropriate to all 
questions. Future research should examine whether no comment responses 
deflect or heighten suspicion of alibi witnesses.
Objective 2
The second objective of the thesis was to discover some of the factors 
that shape perceptions of the justification of false alibis that can be manipulated 
in the subsequent chapters of the thesis. This was due to a lack of research 
directly assessing the provision and perceptions of false alibi testimony. The 
literature review (Chapter 2) suggested that the relationship between alibi 
witness and defendant, attitudes to the criminal justice system, actual and 
perceived guilt of the defendant, and knowledge of the law may potentially 
influence the honesty of alibi witness evidence. With the exception of the 
former no research had overtly linked these variables to alibi witness honesty 
evidence. Thus perceptions of alibi witness deception acceptability were 
collected in Chapter 3 in order for their impact upon alibi witness honesty to be 
tested in Chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8. This ensured that the variables studied in 
these study chapters were indeed relevant to alibis.
23 In this instance ‘omission’ is taken to mean the concealing of pertinent information 
rather than an ‘evasion’; avoiding addressing the key issue posed in the question.
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The findings of Chapter 3 revealed that in general deceptive alibi 
evidence was not viewed as particularly justified, thus supporting the general 
alibi scepticism hypothesis derived from mock juror research (Olson & Wells, 
2004b). As discussed in relation to objective 1, the variable exerting the 
greatest effect upon views of alibi witness deception acceptability was the type 
of deception (lie, false confession, evasion, omission) used by the alibi witness. 
Similarly, the responsibility for the truth was placed upon the interviewing 
techniques employed by the police, and the skill of the police in conducting 
accurate information gathering interviews was questioned showing some 
hostility to the police. Given the research presented in Chapter 2 regarding the 
effect of attitudes to the criminal justice system upon cooperation with the police 
(Elliott, Armitage & Baughan, 2003; Reisig, Bratton & Gertz, 2007; Sunshine & 
Tyler, 2003; Tyler & Fagan, 2008; Viki, Culmer, Eller & Abrams, 2006), an 
analysis of attitudes to the criminal justice system was implemented in Chapter 
4 of the thesis. Related to this, some misunderstanding of the legislation was 
found suggesting that ignorance of the law may contribute to alibi witness 
deception. The findings suggested that alibi witnesses act according to what 
they believe should be legal rather than what is legal (Robinson & Darley, 2004; 
Schoepfer, Carmichael & Piquero, 2007). This variable was examined further in 
Chapter 6 of the thesis revealing that knowledge of the law did not in fact have 
a significant effect upon alibi witness honesty (See Objective 7).
The alibi witness’ relationship to the defendant was cited in the content 
analysis data as a strong influence upon assessments of false evidence 
justifiability, which supported Triver’s (1971) rule of reciprocal altruism. This 
finding reinforced prior research illustrating the effect of the relationship 
between alibi witness and defendant upon alibi evaluators (for example Dahl, 
Brimacombe & Lindsay, 2009; Dahl & Price, 2011; Matthews, Michael & Choi, 
2009; Mathews & Allison, 2010). Furthermore, support was found for 
Hamilton’s rule (1964) which considers the degree of relatedness between 
provider and recipient of an altruistic act upon altruism likelihood. Thus Chapter 
7 examined in detail the effect of the relationship between alibi witness and 
defendant upon alibi witness evidence honesty in police interviews (see 
Objective 8 for a summary of these findings).
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The most surprising finding of Chapter 3 was that no significant effect of 
defendant guilt upon ratings of alibi witness deception acceptability was found. 
This suggested an innocence bias in relation to the defendant that mirrors the 
general deception truth bias (Bond & DePaulo, 2006; Vrij & Baxter, 1999; Vrij; 
2008). However alibi witness perceptions of defendant guilt did influence 
opinions of alibi witness deception acceptability (Backbier, Hoogstraten & 
Terwogt-Kouwenhoven, 1997). This finding was implemented in the design of 
Chapter 7 of the thesis as the alibi witnesses here were explicitly questioned 
about a guilty suspect. Moreover as Chapter 3 and much of the alibi research 
to date (e.g. Dahl & Price, 2011; Matthews, Michael & Choi, 2009) examined 
reactions to other’s deception, Chapters 5, 6 and 7 of the thesis focused upon 
whether these factors influence one’s own decision to provide false evidence for 
others.
Objective 3
The third objective of the thesis was to develop a measure of alibi 
witness intentions to provide false evidence; the false evidence questionnaire 
(FEQ). As previous research largely considered the perspective of defendants 
rather than alibi witnesses, prior to this thesis there were no existing measures 
of false alibi witness evidence. This meant that a measure focused upon the 
alibi witness perspective of alibi evidence was created for the thesis.
As detailed above, Chapter 3 demonstrated a distinction in the evaluation 
of fabrications and concealment by alibi witnesses. Moreover, significant 
interactions between the type of deception and alibi witness’ belief in the 
defendant’s guilt suggest that different forms of deception should be 
acknowledged in future alibi witness deception research. As previous research 
has suggested difference in attitudes to the police and courts, the effect of these 
two settings upon alibi provision was explored. Finally, as previous research 
indicated that motivated alibi witnesses are more likely than unmotivated alibi 
witnesses to provide false evidence (Sommers & Douglass, 2007) and Chapter 
3 verified the importance of the defendant-alibi witness relationship, the 
questionnaire focused solely on false evidence provided by motivated alibi 
witnesses. Thus the FEQ asked whether alibi witnesses would fabricate and
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conceal evidence relating to a ‘loved one.’ The term loved one was selected 
rather than asking about each type of motivated alibi witness relationship to the 
defendant. This was due to critique of the within participants design utilised in 
other research due to potentially leading participants (Hosch, Culhane, Jolly, 
Chavez & Shaw, 2011) which would have been exacerbated by the copious 
questioning needed to consider deception type and a range of alibi witness 
motivations.
Analysis (PCA) revealed the FEQ was logical and internally coherent and 
had two highly reliable factors; Omissions and Commissions. Thus the 
structure of the questionnaire supported the findings of Chapter 3, that 
fabrication and concealment are distinct. Moreover, intentions to provide 
deceptive alibi evidence were found in Chapter 7 to correlate well with actual 
honesty of alibi evidence, therefore supporting the validity of projective 
measures of alibi witness honesty. Thus the FEQ is a key contribution to 
knowledge created by the thesis as it was utilised in Chapters 5 and 6 (see 
Objectives 5, 6 and 7) and will facilitate future alibi witness deception research.
Objective 4
This thesis aimed to develop a questionnaire to measure attitudes 
towards the criminal justice system; the Attitudes towards the Police and Courts 
Questionnaire (APCQ). This aim was based on the findings of Chapter 3 as 
well as previous research indicating that good interactions with the police foster 
a feeling of personal obligation and responsibility to assist the police (Tyler,
2001; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). The APCQ was developed to consider 
numerous interrelated aspects of attitudes to the police and courts which prior 
research failed to consider (see for example Cao & Zhao, 2005; Hinds &
Murphy, 2007). Thus, Chapter 5 sought to assess whether negative attitudes 
towards the criminal justice system shape intentions to provide false evidence 
for a loved one. In line with the contact hypothesis, it further measured whether 
experience of the criminal justice system shapes intentions to provide false 
evidence for others. To facilitate this aim, in Chapter 4 developed the APCQ to 
measure attitudes to the criminal justice system.
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The APCQ was found to possess five distinct factors; Court Functioning, 
Police Institution, Treatment of the Accused, Punishment and Personal Safety. 
Each of the factors was found to have a sound theoretical basis and high 
internal reliability. The APCQ demonstrated support for Albrecht and Green's 
(1977) notion that the police are not viewed in isolation but as part of the larger 
CJS. However, use of the measure in later chapters of the thesis supported the 
internal reliability of the factors, and the finding of significant effects support the 
validity of the APCQ. The APCQ was demonstrated to be one of the most 
comprehensive measures of attitudes to the police and courts to date taking into 
consideration attitudes towards diverse aspects of police and court aims, 
functioning and behaviour. The creation of the APCQ is a key contribution to 
knowledge of the thesis and will facilitate further alibi research, as well as more 
general research into the factors affecting and affected by attitudes to the police 
and courts.
APCQ and FEQ Validity
Construct validity is difficult to establish in any questionnaire, however by 
assessing the face validity, objectivity and reliability of a questionnaire a good 
indication of validity can be established (Robson, 2002). As discussed in 
Chapter 4 the face validity of the FEQ and APCQ were both high and each had 
a solid theoretical underpinning. The fact that two factors of the APCQ (Court 
Functioning and Police institution) were found to be significant predictors of the 
FEQ Omissions factor, and Police Institution was a positive predictor of the FEQ 
Commissions factor (see Chapter 5) further supports the validity of these 
questionnaires. The FEQ data collected in Chapter 4, Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 
showed both the Omission and Commission scales to have good internal 
reliability as illustrated by Cronbach’s alpha scores of above .7 (DeVellis, 1991). 
Moreover, the subscales of the APCQ were demonstrated in Chapter 4 and 
Chapter 5 to have good internal reliability, as indicated by sound Cronbach’s 
alpha scores. The only factor falling short of the acceptable Cronbach’s alpha 
of .68 (DeVellis, 1991) was the Punishment factor which just fell short (.628) 
meaning that further validation of this scale is recommended. Further validation
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of each of the questionnaires could be initiated through factor analysis of 
subsequent APCQ and FEQ data24.
Objectives 5 and 6
The fifth objective of the thesis was to discover whether negative 
attitudes towards the criminal justice system shape the intentions of the general 
population to provide false evidence for a loved one. Related to this, Objective 
6 was to discover whether experience of the criminal justice system shapes the 
intentions of the general population to provide false evidence for a loved one. 
These objectives were based on recent research showing that police officers 
believe distrust of the police and CJS to be one of the main reasons why 
unmotivated alibi witnesses provide false evidence (Dysart & Strange, 2012). 
Additionally research shows that positive attitudes of the police and courts are 
associated with cooperation and abiding other laws (Elliott, Armitage &
Baughan, 2003; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Viki, Culmer, Eller & Abrams, 2006). 
The objectives were addressed in Chapter 3 and Chapter 5 of the thesis.
Some hostility to the police was evident in the Chapter 3 qualitative data 
in that the responsibility for uncovering the truth was placed on the police, rather 
than on alibi witnesses to volunteer incriminating information about the 
defendant. However, Chapter 5 found that contact with the police and courts 
generally and more specifically being a suspect or defendant did not affect alibi 
witness honesty25. Moreover, as in previous research (Kaukinen &
Colavecchia, 1999) attitudes to the police and courts were generally positive. 
This finding suggests that suspects and defendants do not have an overly 
negative experience of the CJS and, that this does not have a lasting impact 
upon their cooperation in this arena (in terms of alibi witness evidence at least).
When looking at attitudes to the criminal justice system (rather than 
experience) Chapter 5 illustrated that as positivity towards the APCQ Police
24 This was not conducted as it would prevent the other primary objectives of the thesis 
from being realised. Completing this additional analysis will be considered in future prior to 
publication of the chapters using these measures.
25 Although it should be noted that very few participants reported having been a suspect 
or defendant which may have affected the power of these analyses.
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Institution factor increased, intentions to omit and fabricate crime relevant 
information decreased. This supports prior research findings that attitudes 
towards the police and police legitimacy shape compliance with the police 
(Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler, 2004). The findings also suggest that improving 
views of police legitimacy will discourage alibi witness deception.
Conversely, the Court Functioning APCQ factor was shown to be a 
significant negative predictor of alibi witness honesty. This poses a problem for 
criminal justice practice as the more effective the courts are perceived to be, the 
more deception alibi witnesses intended to exhibit. It was suggested that this 
was due to deception being seen as more “necessary” in order to assist the 
defendant when the court was functioning well. This was due to a 
preponderance of items assessing helping victims loading on this factor. This 
complements prior research demonstrating that deceptive alibi witnesses chose 
the most effective strategy to ‘give justice a helping hand’ (Fawcett, 2006) as 
well as the risk evaluation present in the Chapter 3 qualitative content analysis 
Legality of Alibi Witness’ Actions subtheme. Thus the findings illustrated that 
the appropriateness of the alibi witnesses’ statement affects the honesty of both 
the provision and evaluation (see Chapter 3) of alibi witness evidence. This 
supported the concept that false alibi witness evidence is a planned act 
involving risk evaluation. Further research is required to investigate the role of 
attitudes to the courts upon alibi witness honesty, in order to identify 
preventative measures.
In summary the thesis found that attitudes to the police affected 
perceptions of alibi witness deception acceptability. Although enhancing the 
credibility of the police as a whole should encourage alibi witnesses honesty, it 
is unclear as to how the courts may facilitate alibi witness honesty.
Objective 7
Objective 7 was to establish whether ignorance of the pertinent 
legislation affects the honesty of evidence intended to be provided to the 
criminal justice for a loved one by the general population. As ignorance may be 
associated with unwittingly breaking the law (Anderson, 2002) awareness of its
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illegality may discourage people from providing false evidence for others. 
Moreover, it was suggested that greater knowledge of the law associated with 
increasing age may account for the Chapter 5 finding that Age was a significant 
positive predictor of alibi witness honesty. Chapter 3 showed that alibi witness 
deception was not viewed as wholly unacceptable, suggesting that participants 
evaluated alibis according to what they thought the law should be rather than 
what it actually is (Robinson & Darley, 2004; Schoepfer, Carmichael & Piquero, 
2007). Chapter 3 further revealed that although omissions and evasions were 
both more acceptable than lies and false confessions, evasions (no comment 
responses) were on the whole the most acceptable form of false alibi witness 
evidence (significant interactions in the quantitative data). It was suggested that 
that no comment responses were the most acceptable due to participant 
perceptions that a no comment response is always a legal response. This view 
was supported by the qualitative content analysis in Chapter 3 whereby the 
onus to find the truth was placed upon the police. Thus moral hypocrisy, 
ignorance of the law and the resolving of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957) 
were offered as explanations for the tendency towards evasions found in 
Chapter 3.
Participant knowledge of the legislation pertinent to deception in the 
criminal justice system was examined further in Chapter 6. After establishing 
the success of the experimental manipulation Chapter 6 concluded that 
knowledge of the law does not affect the honesty of alibi witness evidence. An 
interesting finding of the study was that participants were very poor at assessing 
their level of understanding of public justice offences. Initially participants 
overestimated their understanding and it required an objective test to implement 
a response shift (Howard, Ralph, Galunick, Maxwell, Nance & Gerber, 1976) to 
more realistic estimations of understanding. Just as actual knowledge of the 
law did not significantly affect alibi witness honesty, perceived understanding of 
the relevant legislation is not associated with alibi witness honesty. The 
findings were interpreted as reflecting a belief that assisting a loved one is more 
important than knowing or following the law. This point was followed up in 
Chapter 7 to address Objective 8 of the thesis. Thus a key contribution of the 
thesis is the discovery that raising public awareness of the legislation and
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convictions for deception is unlikely to discourage alibi witnesses from providing 
false evidence.
Objective 8
The eighth objective of this thesis was to discover the effect of the 
relationship between defendant and alibi witness upon alibi witness honesty. 
This objective was informed by the findings of Chapters 3, 6 and 7.
The analysis of Chapter 3 highlighted the importance of the relationship 
between defendant and alibi witness in evaluations of alibi witness deception. 
This character reference concept suggested that alibi witnesses are familiar 
enough with the defendant to know whether they posed a risk of offending. This 
would explain why defendant guilt did not have a significant effect on 
perceptions of deceptive alibi acceptability in Chapter 3. Therefore Chapter 3 
appeared to find an innocence bias towards defendants, similar to the truth bias 
seen in the wider deception research (Millar & Millar, 1997, Vrij, 2008). The 
findings of Chapter 3 implied that the consideration of “misplaced loyalty to a 
relative/friend” (Crown Prosecution Service, 2011) in deciding whether to press 
charges against deceptive alibi witnesses is therefore appropriate. Moreover, 
the results mirror the concept that good intentions can negate deception 
seriousness (Backbier, Hoogstraten & Terwogt-Kouwenhoven, 1997) illustrated 
in the general deception literature. In general Chapter 3 suggested that 
deception should be more common amongst motivated alibi witnesses. The 
main Chapter 3 finding in relation to Objective 8 was that assisting a defendant 
through supporting their false alibi demonstrates loyalty, a character strength 
that is attractive to long-term romantic partners and friends (Zahavi & Zahavi, 
1997).
As Chapter 3 looked at perceptions of the relationship between 
defendants and alibi witnesses, Chapter 7 implemented a behavioural measure 
to assess the role of relationship to defendant upon alibi witness honesty. The 
findings showed that unmotivated alibi witnesses (new colleague) were 
significantly associated with the provision of honest alibi evidence. Thus the 
findings suggest that, in terms of deception likelihood, the perception that
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unmotivated alibi witnesses are the strongest form of person alibi corroboration 
(Dahl, Brimacombe & Lindsay, 2009; Golding, Stewart, Yozwiak, Djadali & 
Sanchez, 2000; Olson & Wells, 2004b) is valid.
However, no clear association between deceptive evidence and 
motivated alibi witnesses was observed in Chapter 7, showing that although 
people believe that their relations would support their false alibi (Culhane,
Hosch & Kehn, 2008) they may actually overestimate the ease of having their 
alibi corroborated (Olson & Wells, 2004). Moreover, Hosch, Culhane, Jolly, 
Chavez & Shaw (2011) found that participants were more willing to lie for a 
biological than social relation, contradicting the findings of Chapter 7 (no 
association with deception or truth was found for familial, romantic or social 
relations). The difference may be due to differing crimes involved in the studies 
(Hosch et al. used an armed robbery case compared to the hit-and-run in 
Chapter 7) or the intentional measure used by Hosch et al. and the behavioural 
measure utilised in the present study. Although the relationship between 
intentions and actual alibi witness deception was strong it was not perfect. This 
indicates that Hosch et al’s participants may have overestimated their likelihood 
of lying for certain defendants.
Given that only Chapter 7 of this thesis and Hosch et al. (2011) have 
studied false alibis from the alibi witness perspective, further research is 
required to further elucidate the effect of alibi witness relationship with the 
defendant upon alibi witness honesty. However, it can be concluded that the 
thesis presented a novel approach to assessing the relationship between alibi 
witness and defendant upon alibi witness deception. This experimental 
paradigm can be utilised in the further research which is necessary to improve 
understanding of this aspect of alibi evidence. Certainly the findings imply that 
juror scepticism to all alibis should be discouraged, and it is important that jurors 
be made aware that research has not found a clear link between motivated alibi 
witnesses and deception. Thus it should be impressed upon jurors that 
motivated alibi witness testimony is not necessary ‘weak’ evidence, and that 
‘weak’ alibis are not necessarily indicative of guilt (Connelly, 1983).
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Objective 9
The final objective of this thesis was to assess the impact of alibi timing 
and the relationship between defendant and alibi witness upon juror decision 
making. Research suggests that ambush alibi testimony may be common in 
courts (Turtle & Burke, 2003; Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, 2008) 
despite evidence disclosure rules. Despite calls for research on this issue 
(Matthews & Allison, 2010), prior to this thesis it was unknown whether ambush 
evidence provides defendants with an advantage in court, or whether the 
inconsistent nature of their defence reduces perceptions of defendant credibility 
(Brewer, Potter, Fisher, Bond, & Luszcz, 1999; Kerans, 1998; Vrij, 2008). 
Moreover, given the prior evidence suggesting juror biases towards motivated 
alibi witnesses (Allison & Brimacombe, 2010; Burke & Turtle, 2004; Culhane & 
Hosch, 2004; Golding, Stewart, Yozwiak, Djadali & Sanchez, 2000; Hosch, 
Culhane, Jolly, Chavez and Shaw, 2011) the interaction between alibi witness 
motivation and timing were assessed in Chapter 8.
It was found that alibi witness timing and motivation did not have a 
significant effect on verdicts or juror ratings of defendant reliability. It therefore 
appears that ‘weak’ alibi witnesses were not seen as indicative of defendant 
guilt (Connelly, 1983). In contrast to this, ratings of alibi witness reliability were 
significantly influenced by alibi witness timing and motivation as there was a 
significant main effect of alibi timing and alibi witness motivation, and a 
significant interaction between these variables. Unmotivated alibi witnesses 
seemed to be viewed as fairly honest, as their perceived reliability was 
significantly reduced by an ambush strategy; timely unmotivated alibi witnesses 
were rated significantly more reliable than ambush unmotivated alibi witnesses. 
However, there was no difference in the perceived reliability of timely motivated 
alibi witnesses and ambush motivated alibi witnesses. It is suggested that for 
motivated alibi witnesses a type of floor effect may have occurred as their 
reliability (lower than that of timely alibi witnesses) was not significantly affected 
by ambush strategies. Thus the additional discrediting information (ambush 
alibi) could not further reduce the very low perceptions of motivated alibi witness 
reliability.
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The examination of alibi timing was a unique development of the thesis, 
and the findings suggest that ambush alibis were seen as unreliable due to 
“memory failure, mistaken alibi generation, and weak alibi corroborability”
(Olson & Charman, 2011 p. 15; see also Kurbat, Shevell & Rips, 1998) rather 
than deliberate deception (Mann, Vrij & Bull, 2004). Thus Mathews and 
Allison’s (2010) suggestion that timing of alibi disclosure may affect juror 
decision making received some support. Thus it may still be the case that 
jurors require judicial direction in order to correct this element of alibi bias.
Although alibi witness evidence did not affect ratings of the defendant, 
the alibi witness and defendant were rated as the most unreliable evidence in 
the case. Thus although defendants are not presumed to be guilty, they are not 
seen as particularly reliable. Certainly the results supported the CSI effect 
(Schweitzer & Saks, 2007) and the innuendo effect established by the 
defendant even being in court (Wegner, Wenzlaff, Kerker & Beattie, 1981). 
Therefore the findings of Chapter 8 reinforce prior findings of juror presumptions 
of motivated alibi witness deception (Allison & Brimacombe, 2010; Burke & 
Turtle, 2004; Culhane & Hosch, 2004; Golding, Stewart, Yozwiak, Djadali & 
Sanchez, 2000; Hosch, Culhane, Jolly, Chavez & Shaw, 2011). However, the 
lack of significant differences in verdict between the conditions implies that the 
presence of alibi witnesses neither aids nor hinders a defendant’s case, this 
means that guidance may still be required as to the fact that unmotivated alibi 
witnesses can make errors due to memory which means that they are not 
necessarily more reliable than motivated alibi witnesses.
Given that there is limited research in this area, further examination of 
juror evaluations of alibi evidence is required. However, in general the findings 
of Chapter 8 imply that although they do not harm the defendant’s case, 
regardless of motivation and timing, alibi witnesses do not actively aid the 
defence. Moreover, although jurors possess a negative bias towards motivated 
alibi witnesses, weak alibis are not inferred as a sign of defendant guilt. It is still 
advisable to direct jurors about alibi evidence however, as there appears to an 
inappropriate blanket dismissal of alibi witness evidence (Shpurik & Meissner, 
2004).
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Limitations of the thesis
Although efforts were made to ensure the thesis presents a systematic 
and scientific examination of alibi witness evidence, as with any psychological 
research limitations to the research exist. A brief discussion of these limitations 
will now be presented.
Intentions to Provide False Alibi Evidence
Chapter 5 and 6 of the thesis measured participant intentions to provide 
false evidence. This methodological approach was based on that implemented 
in prior alibi research (Culhane, Hosch & Kehn, 2008; Hosch, Culhane, Jolly, 
Chavez & Shaw, 2011). However, there is the potential for discrepancies to 
arise between projected and actual behaviour (Krosnick & Petty, 1995 cited in 
Wallace, Paulson, Lord & Bond, 2005). Several reasons therefore influenced 
the adoption of this methodology. Initially, as highlighted in the literature review, 
this offence is prosecuted relatively infrequently and as such a limited sample of 
offenders is available for study. Attempts to secure interviews and court 
transcripts with individuals with convictions for false alibi provision were not 
successful. However, these two methods were not without their flaws as the 
offender’s own agenda (interview data), and constraints of avenues of legal 
questioning (court transcripts) could lead to biased and skewed data. Moreover, 
the limited samples associated with these methods prevent the generalisation of 
findings to the wider false evidence providing population. Finally, intentions 
have been demonstrated as the strongest predictor of other forms of law 
breaking behaviour, such as to exceeding the speed limit (Conner, Lawton, 
Parker, Chorlton, Manstead & Stradling, 2007; Elliott, Armitage & Baughan,
2003; 2007). Thus questionnaires and experiments utilising the general 
population’s intentions to provide false evidence were appropriate to the thesis 
aims. Moreover, limitations associated with the measurement of intended 
behaviours in Chapter 5 and 6 were addressed in Chapter 7, where intended 
behaviours were contrasted with actual behaviours.
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Participant sample
The samples utilised throughout the thesis consisted of predominantly 
female students. Although critique may be offered regarding the young student 
sample utilised throughout the thesis, this is standard methodology for 
deception research (Vrij, 2008; Warren, Schertler & Bull, 2009) and alibi 
research (Culhane & Hosch, 2004; Culhane & Hosch, Hosch, Culhane, Jolly, 
Chavez & Shaw, 2011; Dahl, Brimacombe & Lindsay, 2009). Furthermore, prior 
research indicates minimal differences between students and the general public 
in forensic psychology research (Bornstein, 1999). The age differences found 
show that young people view lying as more acceptable than older adults (Arnett 
Jenson, Jenson Arnett, Feldman & Cauffman, 2004). However, Arnett Jenson 
et al. studied only reactions to lies told to parents of high school and college 
students, with mean ages of 15.6 (SD= 1.08) and 20.4 years (SD= 1.23) 
respectively. Thus whether the college students differ from older adults is 
unclear. In fact, age is a variable that has been largely neglected in previous 
research due to the emphasis upon lie detectors rather than the liars 
themselves.
Based upon Hamilton’s rule of genetically related altruism, Hosch, 
Culhane, Jolly, Chavez and Shaw (2011) suggest that women may be more 
altruistic than men. Although a search of media reporting and legal databases 
highlights more cases of females than males being convicted for false alibi 
witness evidence, the difficulty in adequately locating these cases (due to 
reporting and recording) means this finding is anecdotal at best. Prior studies 
indicate some interesting findings relating to gender and deception in social 
settings; specifically a diary study illustrated that the frequency of lying (defined 
as intentionally trying to mislead someone) in everyday life is approximately the 
same for males and females (Depaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer & Epstein,
1996). However, DePaulo et al.’s findings illustrated that males told significantly 
more self-centred lies; lies which protected the liar from upset or 
embarrassment or provided them with a personal gain, whereas females told 
significantly more other-oriented lies; lies told assist another gain an advantage 
or protect them from upset or embarrassment. This finding was more recently 
supported by Feldman, Forrest and Happ (2002) who utilised DePaulo et al.’s
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coding system in their study of deception in new social interactions. Thus it 
seems that women are more likely than men to tell lies to assist others, whereas 
men are more likely to tell lies that help themselves. Therefore the female 
participant dominance in the current thesis means that those individuals most 
likely to exhibit deceptive alibi witness evidence (arguably an other-oriented lie) 
were sampled. Thus the samples used in the thesis tap into those most likely to 
display the behaviours of interest; false alibi witness evidence. This may mean 
that the thesis findings imply a greater frequency of false alibi evidence than 
would be expected in the general population. In addition although the number 
of subtle lies and exaggerations did not differ, Feldman et al. (2002) found that 
men told more outright lies than women. Given the different nature and 
consequences of social deception and false alibi witness deception further 
research is necessary to explore these implications.
Finally, Flosch, Culhane, Jolly, Chavez and Shaw (2011) found that alibi 
witnesses were more willing to lie for people who actually existed (this was not 
measured in this thesis) suggesting that the findings of the thesis could actually 
represent conservative estimates of deceptive alibi witness testimony. Further 
research following the paradigm implemented in Chapter 7 utilising a measure 
of actual defendant existence, would help address this point.
Future Research
The literature regarding alibi witnesses has largely been limited in scope 
to assessing the effect on verdicts of the relationship between alibi witnesses 
and defendants. The current thesis expanded understanding by previously 
unexamined aspects of alibi testimony. Although presenting a clear contribution 
to knowledge in this area, this thesis represents only the beginning of 
understanding how alibi testimony is received in the courtroom. Given the 
newness of this research area, and exploratory nature of the thesis, it is 
unsurprising that the thesis raised many questions. Answering all of these was 
beyond the scope of the thesis but present clear recommendations for future 
research.
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Hitherto research has solely utilised the prototypical definition of a false 
alibi; that is an entirely fabricated story regarding the defendant’s location at the 
time of the crime. A main contribution of the thesis is the discovery that defence 
witnesses may actually be more likely to omit than fabricate information. Thus a 
key recommendation for future alibi research is to utilise this finding in 
examining alibi witness omissions and commissions in accordance with the 
classifications discovered in Chapter 4 of the thesis. Utilising the FEQ in future 
research will help achieve this goal. Given the tendency towards omission 
found in the thesis, this approach should allow for a more comprehensive 
picture of deceptive alibi witness evidence to be uncovered.
In practice alibi stories can take a variety of forms, however, to date 
Mathews and Allison’s (2010) is the sole study directly assessing alibi story 
content. The current thesis (Chapter 3 and Chapter 8), as with previous 
studies, involved an innocuous alibi story (at home/asleep). However, Mathews 
and Allison discovered that a salacious alibi is more beneficial to suspects than 
an innocuous alibi. The content of the alibi story could therefore greatly affect 
juror decision making and certainly requires further empirical research.
Following on from this future research should utilise the mock juror paradigm to 
evaluate the impact of proven false motivated and unmotivated alibi witness 
testimony upon juror decision making. This will clarify whether jurors see 
changes to alibis as indicative of poor memory (Kurbat, Shevell & Rips, 1998; 
Olson & Charman, 2011), or whether they do in fact presume malicious intent 
(Mann, Vrij & Bull, 2004).
At present alibi instructions are recommended in court, although there is 
no empirical data illustrating either their necessity or positive effect upon jurors. 
Chapter 8 of the thesis did not employ these instructions in order to examine the 
biases present without judicial alibi instructions. The thesis indicates that some 
instructions may be required, although given the exploratory nature of the thesis 
further research is required. In combination with this, research examining the 
subjective reasoning of mock jurors in alibi witness cases would be useful in 
improving understanding of the type of alibi instructions that may be necessary.
The current thesis assessed the role of certain factors in the decision to 
provide false alibi evidence to the police. It also examined the impact that this
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alibi evidence has upon jurors in the courtroom setting. Between these two 
stages however, alibi testimony may be subject to police scrutiny. There is little 
understanding of police estimates of deception frequency by defence witnesses 
and the impact this has upon interviewing behaviour (excepting Dysart & 
Strange, 2012), although confirmation bias (Darley & Gross, 1983; Snyder,
1984) has been consistently demonstrated to impact upon police interviewing 
procedure (Kassin, Goldstein & Savitsky, 2003; Hill, Memon & McGeorge, 2008; 
O’Brien, 2009). Given the plethora of research regarding the poor detection 
rates of suspect deception (for a review see Vrij, 2008) future research could 
explore the detection of alibi witness deception. This illustrates the need for 
further understanding of police beliefs regarding alibi evidence if solid 
recommendations for practice are to be made. It is therefore recommended 
that future research examine police interviews with defence witnesses with 
particular reference to alibi witness motivation and confirmation bias. This 
would highlight whether police officers hold similar alibi biases to jurors, or 
whether little suspicion is directed towards alibi witnesses at the police 
investigation stage of legal proceedings. This would address the Chapter 3 
findings which implied that alibi witnesses saw omissions as less likely than lies 
to arouse police suspicion.
Given the individual differences in alibi honesty found throughout the 
thesis, future research assessing these is recommended. In particular, 
understanding how the emotional closeness to the defendant, age and sex of 
the alibi witness affect false alibi evidence would clarify some of the 
interpretation presented in the thesis and develop the alibi research literature. 
This research is essential if recommendations are to be made regarding the 
evaluation of alibi evidence by police and jurors.
Concluding Remarks
Since the commencement of this thesis more research attention has 
turned to the topic of alibi evidence. This thesis is one of the first pieces of 
research to examine alibi witness evidence from the alibi witness perspective 
(see also Hosch et al., 2011). By increasing understanding of false alibi witness 
evidence in this way the thesis makes an important contribution to knowledge.
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In particular the development of the FEQ forms a key contribution of this thesis, 
that could facilitate future research assessing the variables affecting alibi 
witness honesty from the alibi witness perspective.
The tendency towards alibi witnesses omitting key information rather 
than fabricating false evidence is interesting and has implications for the 
academic research in this area. Hitherto the alibi research has solely examined 
false alibis in the strict definition (a false story as to the location of the defendant 
at the time of the crime). However, this thesis illustrates that actually defence 
witnesses may be likely to conceal information than fabricate a false story. 
Moreover, the thesis reveals that concealment of information may occur due to 
a view that the onus is on police to uncover the truth, rather than upon 
witnesses to volunteer the truth. This would explain why participants were more 
likely to conceal information than fabricate information. The thesis therefore 
suggests that alibi evaluators may increase the chances of alibi witnesses 
revealing their incriminating information if more specific probing questions are 
used. However, given that this contradicts existing investigative interviewing 
research, further empirical research in needed on this point before any 
recommendations for practice can be initiated.
The use of an experimental approach to examine the provision of 
motivated and unmotivated alibi witness evidence (Chapter 7) provides a 
unique perspective to this research area. This research demonstrated that 
although unmotivated alibi witnesses are associated with honest evidence the 
dichotomy between motivated and unmotivated alibi witnesses is not as clear as 
the previous research suggests. The thesis has revealed that some warning to 
jurors to rectify motivated alibi witness scepticism may be necessary, as 
deception amongst motivated alibi witnesses is not guaranteed. Similarly the 
finding that attitudes to the police and courts influence false alibi provision has 
direct applications to the criminal justice system. Explicitly, it suggests that 
through improving the reputation of police legitimacy alibi witness deception 
may be reduced.
The potential for serious harm and miscarriages of justice associated 
with poor understanding of alibi witness evidence highlights the need for further 
psychological study of this relatively new research area. As a whole the
257
findings of this thesis present a solid basis from which further systematic 
research into false alibi witness testimony can be conducted.
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Appendix 1: Sample materials used in Chapter 3
INSTRUCTIONS
This study is looking at truthful and deceptive statements and behaviours. You will be 
required to read a short story and then answer three questions about your attitudes 
towards the story. Questions 1 and 2 will require you to respond by putting a vertical 
mark on a sliding scale. Feel free to use the whole of the scale. For example:
TRUTH LIE
CONSENT
You will not have to write your name anywhere on the questionnaire. Please fill out 
your unique identifier code below using the format; first two letters of your mother's 
maiden name, day of your birth followed by the first two digits of your house number.
I agree to take part in this research project, and understand I am free to refrain from 
answering any questions I do not wish to answer. I have been assured I will not be 
penalised in any way for withholding information. I understand that my data will be kept 
confidential and I am happy that any questions I had have been answered to my 
satisfaction.
By signing below you agree that you have understood your rights and agree to 
participate.
Signature ..............................  Date .............................
□  Male □  Female Age ..........
Occupation .........................
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ANDREW IS WRONGLY ACCUSED BY THE POLICE OF BURGLARING A HOUSE. 
HIS GIRLFRIEND SARAH BELIEVES THAT ANDREW BURGLED THE HOUSE. 
SARAH WAS WITH HIM EARLIER IN THE EVENING BUT SHE CAN NOT PROVIDE 
AN ALIBI FOR THE TIME OF THE CRIME. WHEN THE POLICE ASK SARAH 
"WHERE WAS ANDREW ON THE NIGHT THE HOUSE WAS BURGLED?" SARAH 
SAYS "NO COMMENT."
1. Please mark on the line below where you feel the statement in bold above 
belongs.
TRUTH ----------------------------------------------------------------------------  LIE
2. Please mark on the line below where you feel the statement in bold above 
belongs.
TRUTH LIE
3. Please write down any factors or ideas that influenced your response to question 2. 
These can be factors within the story or other factors that you feel are important
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Summary of all 24 vignettes created by systematically crossing the following 
variables:
1. Police action taken (suspected/wrongly accused)
2. Alibi witness belief (guilty/innocent/unsure)
3. Deception type (lie/omission/evasion/false confession)
Wrongly Accused-Guilty-Evasion Condition
ANDREW IS WRONGLY ACCUSED BY THE POLICE OF BURGLARING A HOUSE. HIS 
GIRLFRIEND SARAH BELIEVES THAT ANDREW BURGLED THE HOUSE. SARAH WAS 
WITH HIM EARLIER IN THE EVENING BUT SHE CAN NOT PROVIDE AN ALIBI FOR THE 
TIME OF THE CRIME. WHEN THE POLICE ASK SARAH "WHERE WAS ANDREW ON THE 
NIGHT THE HOUSE WAS BURGLED?" SARAH SAYS "NO COMMENT."
Suspected-Unsure-Evasion Condition
ANDREW IS SUSPECTED BY THE POLICE OF BURGLARING A HOUSE. HIS GIRLFRIEND 
SARAH IS UNSURE WHETHER ANDREW BURGLED THE HOUSE. SARAH WAS WITH HIM 
EARLIER IN THE EVENING BUT SHE CAN NOT PROVIDE AN ALIBI FOR THE TIME OF THE 
CRIME. WHEN THE POLICE ASK SARAH "WHERE WAS ANDREW ON THE NIGHT THE 
HOUSE WAS BURGLED?" SARAH SAYS "NO COMMENT."
Suspected-lnnocent-Evasion Condition
ANDREW IS SUSPECTED BY THE POLICE OF BURGLARING A HOUSE. HIS GIRLFRIEND 
SARAH DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT ANDREW BURGLED THE HOUSE. SARAH WAS WITH 
HIM EALIER IN THE EVENING BUT SHE CAN NOT PROVIDE AN ALIBI FOR THE TIME OF 
THE CRIME. WHEN THE POLICE ASK SARAH "WHERE WAS ANDREW ON THE NIGHT 
THE HOUSE WAS BURGLED?" SARAH SAYS "NO COMMENT."
Wrongly Accused- Innocent-Evasion Condition
ANDREW IS WRONGLY ACCUSED BY THE POLICE OF BURGLARING A HOUSE. HIS 
GIRLFRIEND SARAH DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT ANDREW BURGLED THE HOUSE. 
SARAH WAS WITH HIM EARLIER IN THE EVENING BUT SHE CAN NOT PROVIDE AN ALIBI 
FOR THE TIME OF THE CRIME. WHEN THE POLICE ASK SARAH "WHERE WAS ANDREW 
ON THE NIGHT THE HOUSE WAS BURGLED?" SARAH SAYS "NO COMMENT."
Wrongly Accused-Unsure-Evasion Condition
ANDREW IS WRONGLY ACCUSED BY THE POLICE OF BURGLARING A HOUSE. HIS 
GIRLFRIEND SARAH IS UNSURE WHETHER ANDREW BURGLED THE HOUSE. SARAH 
WAS WITH HIM EARLIER IN THE EVENING BUT SHE CAN NOT PROVIDE AN ALIBI FOR 
THE TIME OF THE CRIME. WHEN THE POLICE ASK SARAH "WHERE WAS ANDREW ON 
THE NIGHT THE HOUSE WAS BURGLED?" SARAH SAYS "NO COMMENT."
Suspected-Guilty-Evasion Condition
ANDREW IS SUSPECTED BY THE POLICE OF BURGLARING A HOUSE. HIS GIRLFRIEND 
SARAH BELIEVES THAT ANDREW BURGLED THE HOUSE. SARAH WAS WITH HIM 
EARLIER IN THE EVENING BUT SHE CAN NOT PROVIDE AN ALIBI FOR THE TIME OF THE 
CRIME. WHEN THE POLICE ASK SARAH "WHERE WAS ANDREW ON THE NIGHT THE 
HOUSE WAS BURGLED?" SARAH SAYS "NO COMMENT."
Wrongly Accused-Guilty-False Confession Condition
ANDREW IS WRONGLY ACCUSED BY THE POLICE OF BURGLARING A HOUSE. HIS 
GIRLFRIEND SARAH BELIEVES THAT ANDREW BURGLED THE HOUSE. SARAH WAS
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WITH HIM EARLIER IN THE EVENING BUT SHE CAN NOT PROVIDE AN ALIBI FOR THE 
TIME OF THE CRIME. WHEN THE POLICE ASK SARAH "WHERE WAS ANDREW ON THE 
NIGHT THE HOUSE WAS BURGLED?" SARAH SAYS "ANDREW DID NOT BURGLE THE 
HOUSE, I DID."
Suspected-Unsure-False Confession Condition
ANDREW IS SUSPECTED BY THE POLICE OF BURGLARING A HOUSE. HIS GIRLFRIEND 
SARAH IS UNSURE WHETHER ANDREW BURGLED THE HOUSE. SARAH WAS WITH HIM 
EARLIER IN THE EVENING BUT SHE CAN NOT PROVIDE AN ALIBI FOR THE TIME OF THE 
CRIME. WHEN THE POLICE ASK SARAH "WHERE WAS ANDREW ON THE NIGHT THE 
HOUSE WAS BURGLED?" SARAH SAYS "ANDREW DID NOT BURGLE THE HOUSE, I 
DID."
Suspected-lnnocent-False Confession Condition
ANDREW IS SUSPECTED BY THE POLICE OF BURGLARING A HOUSE. HIS GIRLFRIEND 
SARAH DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT ANDREW BURGLED THE HOUSE. SARAH WAS WITH 
HIM EARLIER IN THE EVENING BUT SHE CAN NOT PROVIDE AN ALIBI FOR THE TIME OF 
THE CRIME. WHEN THE POLICE ASK SARAH "WHERE WAS ANDREW ON THE NIGHT 
THE HOUSE WAS BURGLED?" SARAH SAYS "ANDREW DID NOT BURGLE THE HOUSE, I 
DID."
Wrongly Accused-lnnocent-False Confession Condition
ANDREW IS WRONGLY ACCUSED BY THE POLICE OF BURGLARING A HOUSE. HIS 
GIRLFRIEND SARAH DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT ANDREW BURGLED THE HOUSE. 
SARAH WAS WITH HIM EARLIER IN THE EVENING BUT SHE CAN NOT PROVIDE AN ALIBI 
FOR THE TIME OF THE CRIME. WHEN THE POLICE ASK SARAH "WHERE WAS ANDREW 
ON THE NIGHT THE HOUSE WAS BURGLED?" SARAH SAYS "ANDREW DID NOT 
BURGLE THE HOUSE, I DID."
Wrongly Accused-Unsure-False Confession Condition
ANDREW IS WRONGLY ACCUSED BY THE POLICE OF BURGLARING A HOUSE. HIS 
GIRLFRIEND SARAH IS UNSURE WHETHER ANDREW BURGLED THE HOUSE. SARAH 
WAS WITH HIM EARLIER IN THE EVENING BUT SHE CAN NOT PROVIDE AN ALIBI FOR 
THE TIME OF THE CRIME. WHEN THE POLICE ASK SARAH "WHERE WAS ANDREW ON 
THE NIGHT THE HOUSE WAS BURGLED?" SARAH SAYS "ANDREW DID NOT BURGLE 
THE HOUSE, I DID."
Suspected-Guilty-False Confession Condition
ANDREW IS SUSPECTED BY THE POLICE OF BURGLARING A HOUSE. HIS GIRLFRIEND 
SARAH BELIEVES THAT ANDREW BURGLED THE HOUSE. SARAH WAS WITH HIM 
EARLIER IN THE EVENING BUT SHE CAN NOT PROVIDE AN ALIBI FOR THE TIME OF THE 
CRIME. WHEN THE POLICE ASK SARAH "WHERE WAS ANDREW ON THE NIGHT THE 
HOUSE WAS BURGLED?" SARAH SAYS "ANDREW DID NOT BURGLE THE HOUSE, I 
DID."
Wrongly Accused-Guilty-Lie Condition
ANDREW IS WRONGLY ACCUSED BY THE POLICE OF BURGLARING A HOUSE. HIS 
GIRLFRIEND SARAH BELIEVES THAT ANDREW BURGLED THE HOUSE. SARAH WAS 
WITH HIM EARLIER IN THE EVENING BUT SHE CAN NOT PROVIDE AN ALIBI FOR THE 
TIME OF THE CRIME. WHEN THE POLICE ASK SARAH "WHERE WAS ANDREW ON THE 
NIGHT THE HOUSE WAS BURGLED?" SARAH SAYS "ANDREW DID NOT BURGLE THE 
HOUSE BECAUSE HE WAS WITH ME."
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Suspected-Unsure-Lie Condition
ANDREW IS SUSPECTED BY THE POLICE OF BURGLARING A HOUSE. HIS GIRLFRIEND 
SARAH IS UNSURE WHETHER ANDREW BURGLED THE HOUSE. SARAH WAS WITH HIM 
EARLIER IN THE EVENING BUT SHE CAN NOT PROVIDE AN ALIBI FOR THE TIME OF THE 
CRIME. WHEN THE POLICE ASK SARAH "WHERE WAS ANDREW ON THE NIGHT THE 
HOUSE WAS BURGLED?" SARAH SAYS "ANDREW DID NOT BURGLE THE HOUSE 
BECAUSE HE WAS WITH ME."
Suspected-lnnocent-Lie Condition
ANDREW IS SUSPECTED BY THE POLICE OF BURGLARING A HOUSE. HIS GIRLFRIEND 
SARAH DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT ANDREW BURGLED THE HOUSE. SARAH WAS WITH 
HIM EARLIER IN THE EVENING BUT SHE CAN NOT PROVIDE AN ALIBI FOR THE TIME OF 
THE CRIME. WHEN THE POLICE ASK SARAH "WHERE WAS ANDREW ON THE NIGHT 
THE HOUSE WAS BURGLED?" SARAH SAYS "ANDREW DID NOT BURGLE THE HOUSE 
BECAUSE HE WAS WITH ME."
Wrongly Accused-lnnocent-Lie Condition
ANDREW IS WRONGLY ACCUSED BY THE POLICE OF BURGLARING A HOUSE. HIS 
GIRLFRIEND SARAH DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT ANDREW BURGLED THE HOUSE. 
SARAH WAS WITH HIM EARLIER IN THE EVENING BUT SHE CAN NOT PROVIDE AN ALIBI 
FOR THE TIME OF THE CRIME. WHEN THE POLICE ASK SARAH "WHERE WAS ANDREW 
ON THE NIGHT THE HOUSE WAS BURGLED?" SARAH SAYS "ANDREW DID NOT 
BURGLE THE HOUSE BECAUSE HE WAS WITH ME."
Wrongly Accused-Unsure-Lie Condition
ANDREW IS WRONGLY ACCUSED BY THE POLICE OF BURGLARING A HOUSE. HIS 
GIRLFRIEND SARAH IS UNSURE WHETHER ANDREW BURGLED THE HOUSE. SARAH 
WAS WITH HIM EARLIER IN THE EVENING BUT SHE CAN NOT PROVIDE AN ALIBI FOR 
THE TIME OF THE CRIME. WHEN THE POLICE ASK SARAH "WHERE WAS ANDREW ON 
THE NIGHT THE HOUSE WAS BURGLED?" SARAH SAYS "ANDREW DID NOT BURGLE 
THE HOUSE BECAUSE HE WAS WITH ME."
Suspected-Guilty-Lie Condition
ANDREW IS SUSPECTED BY THE POLICE OF BURGLARING A HOUSE. HIS GIRLFRIEND 
SARAH BELIEVES THAT ANDREW BURGLED THE HOUSE. SARAH WAS WITH HIM 
EARLIER IN THE EVENING BUT SHE CAN NOT PROVIDE AN ALIBI FOR THE TIME OF THE 
CRIME. WHEN THE POLICE ASK SARAH "WHERE WAS ANDREW ON THE NIGHT THE 
HOUSE WAS BURGLED?" SARAH SAYS "ANDREW DID NOT BURGLE THE HOUSE 
BECAUSE HE WAS WITH ME."
Wrongly Accused-Guilty-Omission Condition
ANDREW IS WRONGLY ACCUSED BY THE POLICE OF BURGLARING A HOUSE. HIS 
GIRLFRIEND SARAH BELIEVES THAT ANDREW BURGLED THE HOUSE. SARAH WAS 
WITH HIM EARLIER IN THE EVENING BUT SHE CAN NOT PROVIDE AN ALIBI FOR THE 
TIME OF THE CRIME. WHEN THE POLICE ASK SARAH "WHERE WAS ANDREW ON THE 
NIGHT THE HOUSE WAS BURGLED?" SARAH SAYS "HE WAS AT MY HOUSE THAT 
EVENING."
Suspected -  Unsure -  Omission Condition
ANDREW IS SUSPECTED BY THE POLICE OF BURGLARING A HOUSE. HIS GIRLFRIEND 
SARAH IS UNSURE WHETHER ANDREW BURGLED THE HOUSE. SARAH WAS WITH HIM
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EARLIER IN THE EVENING BUT SHE CAN NOT PROVIDE AN ALIBI FOR THE TIME OF THE 
CRIME. WHEN THE POLICE ASK SARAH "WHERE WAS ANDREW ON THE NIGHT THE 
HOUSE WAS BURGLED?" SARAH SAYS "HE WAS AT MY HOUSE THAT EVENING."
Suspected-lnnocent-Omission Condition
ANDREW IS SUSPECTED BY THE POLICE OF BURGLARING A HOUSE. HIS GIRLFRIEND 
SARAH DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT ANDREW BURGLED THE HOUSE. SARAH WAS WITH 
HIM EARLIER IN THE EVENING BUT SHE CAN NOT PROVIDE AN ALIBI FOR THE TIME OF 
THE CRIME. WHEN THE POLICE ASK SARAH "WHERE WAS ANDREW ON THE NIGHT 
THE HOUSE WAS BURGLED?" SARAH SAYS "HE WAS AT MY HOUSE THAT EVENING."
Wrongly Accused-lnnocent-Omission Condition
ANDREW IS WRONGLY ACCUSED BY THE POLICE OF BURGLARING A HOUSE. HIS 
GIRLFRIEND SARAH DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT ANDREW BURGLED THE HOUSE. 
SARAH WAS WITH HIM EARLIER IN THE EVENING BUT SHE CAN NOT PROVIDE AN ALIBI 
FOR THE TIME OF THE CRIME. WHEN THE POLICE ASK SARAH "WHERE WAS ANDREW 
ON THE NIGHT THE HOUSE WAS BURGLED?" SARAH SAYS "HE WAS AT MY HOUSE 
THAT EVENING."
Wrongly Accused-Unsure-Omission Condition
ANDREW IS WRONGLY ACCUSED BY THE POLICE OF BURGLARING A HOUSE. HIS 
GIRLFRIEND SARAH IS UNSURE WHETHER ANDREW BURGLED THE HOUSE. SARAH 
WAS WITH HIM EARLIER IN THE EVENING BUT SHE CAN NOT PROVIDE AN ALIBI FOR 
THE TIME OF THE CRIME. WHEN THE POLICE ASK SARAH "WHERE WAS ANDREW ON 
THE NIGHT THE HOUSE WAS BURGLED?" SARAH SAYS "HE WAS AT MY HOUSE THAT 
EVENING."
Suspected-Guilty-Omission Condition
ANDREW IS SUSPECTED BY THE POLICE OF BURGLARING A HOUSE. HIS GIRLFRIEND 
SARAH BELIEVES THAT ANDREW BURGLED THE HOUSE. SARAH WAS WITH HIM 
EARLIER IN THE EVENING BUT SHE CAN NOT PROVIDE AN ALIBI FOR THE TIME OF THE 
CRIME. WHEN THE POLICE ASK SARAH "WHERE WAS ANDREW ON THE NIGHT THE 
HOUSE WAS BURGLED?" SARAH SAYS "HE WAS AT MY HOUSE THAT EVENING."
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Appendix 2: Coding scheme developed for use in Chapter 3
RELATIONSHIP
Personal motives
Feelings of guilt
Feelings of love
Showing that she cares for him
Expectation to lie for partner
B - Love
It being justified as he is her boyfriend/she’s his girlfriend
Feeling emotionally obliged to lie for him/ help him______
Pressure/desire/need to help boyfriend________________
Participants would act in same way
Fear of jeopardising relationship
Fear partner won’t trust her
Maintaining relationship when one partner in prison 
Pressure/desire/need to maintain the relationship 
Avoiding conflict within the relationship___________
Avoiding betrayal of partner/relationship
Loyalty/disloyalty
Protecting partner
Personal knowledge of the defendant
Trusting defendant
Defendant a good person
C - Character reference Alibi Witness wouldn’t date a criminalAttachment/feelings biasing alibi witness’ judgement of 
defendant
Giving partner the benefit of the doubt
Wanting to believe partner is innocent
ACCURACY OF ALIBI WITNESS STATEMENT
Guilt of defendant/alibi witness
Defendant innocent/guilty
Reference to timings i.e. could have done it as couldn’t 
give alibi for whole night___________________________
D - Guilt Can’t vouch for defendant’s whereaboutsLack of evidence_____________________
Alibi witness is/may/not be guilty________
Defendant is/may/not be guilty
Alibi witness believes defendant is innocent
Alibi witness doubts defendant
Honesty of answer
Facts are what matter
E - Features of the alibi witness’ 
statement
Whole truth/completely honest
No false info in Alibi witness’ answer
Silence isn’t a lie
Vague/inaccurate answer
Alibi witness is attempting to deceive/mislead police
F - Alibi biases
Alibi witness must be hiding something if they can’t give
an alibi____________________________________________
‘No comment’ means alibi witness has something to hide 
‘No comment’ means alibi witness doesn’t know the
answer to the guestion______________________________
If they were guilty they would alibi each other__________
Alibi witness waited until the end to say anything to the
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
G - CJS responsibility/errors Police treat defendants unfairly
Police pressure caused false confession
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Poor/vague questioning
Police can’t be trusted
CJS flawed
‘No comment’ interpreted as a lie by the police
Defendant must have a criminal record if police suspect 
him
Alibi witness is falsifying evidence
Alibi witness is hampering police investigation
Preventing guilty from being caught/punished
Illegality of lying to the police
H - Illegality of alibi witness’ Alibi witness could get into trouble
actions Police will find the truth regardless
Police there for a reason
Shouldn’t protect guilty
The statement won’t affect the police investigation
Should respect the law
Should protect innocent people
Lying is wrong
Lying to the police is wrong
For the greater good
I - Appropriateness of statement You should give as much info as possible to the police
Don’t need to lie
Legal right to silence
Other ways to help the defendant
Defendant has other sources for alibi
MISCELLANEOUS
Alibi witness drunk
J - Health of alibi 
witness/defendant
Alibi witness is emotional
Alibi witness has mental illness
Defendant may have good reason for lying such as a 
drug problem
K - Vignette information Not enough information to make a decisionAlibi witness contradicts self
L - Other Truth is relativeQuestions over likelihood of a female burglar
Every part of the participants’ response should be coded. However, each
sentence/unit of speech is coded once only. For example:
'Sarah has her own justification for providing an alibi as he is her boyfriend (B -
Relationship - Love), therefore she presumably doesn't want him to get into trouble and possibly
go to prison (B - Relationship - Love) This statement is also justifiable as Andrew was at her
house that evening (E - Features of the Alibi Witness’ Statement), there is no indication in the
story as to the police asking her between what times he was at her house (G - Criminal Justice
System - Criminal Justice System Responsibility/Errors).'
So in the example above each part of the response is coded but no single
sentence/unit is coded twice. As above, each participant can have several of the same 
or different categories within their response
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Appendix 4: APCQ 
Instructions
• Please read and sign the consent form before completing this booklet
• Please complete the following questions in the order they are presented
• Try to be as honest as possible
• When given a choice of answers, please circle the response that most clearly
corresponds with your views
• Your responses will be kept completely confidential
ID Code
You will not have to write your name anywhere on the questionnaire. Please fill out 
your unique identifier code below using the format; first two letters of your mother's 
maiden name, day of your birth, first two digits of your house number. For example 
PA0524
Personal Details
Age:__________ Sex: □  Male □  Female Race:__________
Please state your occupation: _______________________
Contact Information
Please return this questionnaire in the freepost envelope provided.
Hannah Fawcett
Psychology Tel: 0114 225 2499
111 The Lodge Email: H.Fawcett@shu.ac.uk
Collegiate Crescent Campus 
Sheffield Hallam University
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Section 1
The following questions ask about the experience of the police of you and your close 
friends and family. Please read the questions carefully and answer by ticking the 
boxes that most closely matches your response. Please complete each question in the 
order it is presented.
1. Have you ever come into direct contact with the police?
EH Yes EH No (Please go to question 5)
2. How many times have you ever come into direct contact with the police?
□  1-3
□  4-6
□ 7+
3. How recent was the latest direct contact you had with the police?
□  Within the last three months 
n  Within the last twelve months 
D  Within the last 5 years
D  More than 5 years ago
4. How would you classify the nature of the direct contacts?
□  Reporting a crime
□  Questioned as a witness
□  Questioned as a suspect
□  Asking for information (i.e. directions)
□  Friend/family member is in the police
□  Professional capacity
D  Other (please provide brief details)_________________________________
5. Has a close friend or family member had direct contact with the police within the last 
three months?
□  Yes □  No (Please go to question 7) □  Unsure (Please go to question 7)
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6. How would you classify the nature of the direct contacts your friend or family 
member had with the police?
□ Reporting a crime
□ Questioned as a witness
□ Questioned as a suspect
□ Asking for information (i.e. directions)
□ Friend/family member is in the police
□ Professional capacity
□ Other (please specify)
Section 2____________________________________________________________
The following questions ask about the experience of the criminal courts of you and your 
close friends and family. Please read the questions carefully and answer by ticking the 
boxes that most closely matches your response. Please complete each question in the 
order it is presented.
7. Have you ever come into direct contact with the criminal courts?
□  Yes □  No (Please go to question 11)
8. How many times have you ever come into direct contact with the criminal courts?
□ 1-3
□  4-6
□  7+
9. How recent was the latest direct contact you had with the criminal courts?
□  Within the last three months
□  Within the last twelve months
□  Within the last 5 years
□  More than 5 years ago
10. How would you classify the nature of the contacts?
□  Defendant in a criminal case
^Were you acquitted? □  Yes □  No 
^  Witness in a criminal case
□  Jury duty
^  Professional capacity
□  Other (please specify) _______________________________________
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11. Has a close friend or family member had direct contact with the criminal courts 
within the last three months?
□  Yes □  No (Please go to question 13) □  Unsure (Please go to question 13)
12. How would you classify the nature of the direct contacts your friend or family 
member had with the criminal courts?
□  Defendant in a criminal case 
D  Witness in a criminal case
□  Jury duty
□  Professional capacity -----------------------------------------------------------------
□  Other (please specify)
Section 3
The following questions ask about your views of the police. Please read the questions 
carefully and answer by circling the number that most closely reflects your response. 
Please complete each question in the order it is presented.
13. I respect the aims of the police
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Moderately Unsure Moderately Strongly
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree
14. The police treat all people fairly
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Moderately Unsure Moderately Strongly
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree
15. I am worried that I will be the victim of a crime 
1 2  3 4
Strongly Moderately Unsure Moderately Strongly
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree
16. I do not feel safe in my neighbourhood at night
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Moderately Unsure Moderately Strongly
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree
307
17. I think that the police are effective in arresting those who have committed crimes 
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Moderately Unsure Moderately Strongly
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree
18. I think that the perpetrators of many crimes go undetected
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Moderately Unsure Moderately Strongly
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree
19. The police are respectful towards victims
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Moderately Unsure Moderately Strongly
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree
20. The police are not essential to the functioning of society
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Moderately Unsure Moderately Strongly
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree
21. I think the police put the needs of the community before all else
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Moderately Unsure Moderately Strongly
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree
22. There is no crime problem in my neighbourhood
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Moderately Unsure Moderately Strongly
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree
23. I respect the work that the police do
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Moderately Unsure Moderately Strongly
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree
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24. The police work hard to solve crimes
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Moderately Unsure Moderately Strongly
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree
25. I believe that the police are racist
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Moderately Unsure Moderately Strongly
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree
26. I think that the police are corrupt
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Moderately Unsure Moderately Strongly
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree
27. I think that the crime rate in my neighbourhood is high
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Moderately Unsure Moderately Strongly
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree
28. I consider the police to be lazy
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Moderately Unsure Moderately Strongly
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree
29. I think that the police are bullies
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Moderately Unsure Moderately Strongly
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree
30. The police are respectful towards witnesses
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Moderately Unsure Moderately Strongly
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree
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31. The police are respectful towards suspects
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Moderately Unsure Moderately Strongly
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree
32. I believe that the crime rate is increasing
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Moderately Unsure Moderately Strongly
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree
Section 4____________________________________________________________
The following questions ask about your opinions of the criminal courts. Please read the 
questions carefully and answer by circling the number that most closely reflects your 
response. Please complete each question in the order it is presented.
33. I respect the work of the criminal courts
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Moderately Unsure Moderately Strongly
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree
34. I agree with the aims of the criminal courts
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Moderately Unsure Moderately Strongly
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree
35. I believe that the criminal courts treat witnesses with respect
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Moderately Unsure Moderately Strongly
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree
36. I think that the criminal courts are essential to the functioning of society 
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Moderately Unsure Moderately Strongly
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree
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37. The criminal courts are too lenient in their sentencing
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Moderately Unsure Moderately Strongly
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree
38. The criminal courts do not treat victims with respect
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Moderately Unsure Moderately Strongly
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree
39. I think that the criminal courts are corrupt
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Moderately Unsure Moderately Strongly
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree
40. I think that the criminal courts ensure that justice is done
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Moderately Unsure Moderately Strongly
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree
41. I believe that the criminal courts do not always hand out appropriate sentences 
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Moderately Unsure Moderately Strongly
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree
42. The criminal courts do not respect the rights of victims
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Moderately Unsure Moderately Strongly
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree
43. The criminal courts treat all defendants as innocent until proven guilty 
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Moderately Unsure Moderately Strongly
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree
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44. The criminal courts do not treat everyone equally
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Moderately Unsure Moderately Strongly 
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree
45. Judges in the criminal courts work hard 
1 2 3
Strongly Moderately Unsure
Agree Agree
Moderately
Disagree
5
Strongly
Disagree
46. The criminal courts do not give enough offenders custodial sentences 
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Moderately Unsure Moderately Strongly
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree
47. I believe that the criminal courts do not respect the rights of defendants 
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Moderately Unsure Moderately Strongly
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree
48. The criminal courts put the welfare of the community before all else 
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Moderately Unsure Moderately Strongly
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree
49. The criminal courts are not fair 
1 2 3
Strongly Moderately Unsure
Agree Agree
Moderately
Disagree
5
Strongly
Disagree
50. I believe that the criminal courts treat defendants with respect 
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Moderately Unsure Moderately Strongly 
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree
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51. I believe that the criminal courts are racist
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Moderately Unsure Moderately Strongly
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree
52. Lawyers in the criminal courts work hard
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Moderately Unsure Moderately Strongly
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree
This is the end of the questions
Appendix 5: FEQ 
Instructions
• Please read and sign the consent form before completing this booklet
• Please complete the following questions in the order they are presented
• Try to be as honest as possible
• When given a choice of answers, please circle the response that most clearly 
corresponds with your views
• Your responses will be kept completely confidential
ID Code
You will not have to write your name anywhere on the questionnaire. Please fill out 
your unique identifier code below using the format; first two letters of your mother's 
maiden name, day of your birth, first two digits of your house number. For example 
PA0524
Personal Details
A g e :__________  Sex: □  Male □  Female Race:__________
Please state your occupation: ________________________
Contact Information
Please return this questionnaire in the freepost envelope provided.
Hannah Fawcett
Psychology Tel: 0114 225 2499
111 The Lodge Email: H.Fawcett@shu.ac.uk
Collegiate Crescent Campus 
Sheffield Hallam University
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Section 1
Please answer the following questions with how you would behave in the future, 
not about how you have acted in the past. You should not reveal first-hand 
experience of deceiving the police and courts as it is you future intentions that are of 
interest. Read the questions carefully and answer by circling the number that most 
closely reflects your response. Please complete each question in the order it is 
presented.
1. If I thought it would help someone I love, I would withhold relevant information when 
interviewed by the police
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Moderately Unsure Moderately Strongly
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree
2. Even if I thought lying would help someone I love, I would not lie when interviewed 
by the police
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Moderately Unsure Moderately Strongly
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree
3. If I thought it would help someone I love, I would respond ‘no comment’ to all 
questions in an interview with the Police
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Moderately Unsure Moderately Strongly
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree
4. f I thought it would help someone I love, I would falsely confess to a crime they 
were suspected of committing
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Moderately Unsure Moderately Strongly
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree
5. I would contact the police with false information if I thought it would help someone I 
love
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Moderately Unsure Moderately Strongly
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree
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6. I would tell the entire truth to the police even if it harmed the case of someone I love
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Moderately Unsure Moderately Strongly
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree
7. I would pretend not to remember the answers to police questions if I thought that it 
would help someone that I love
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Moderately Unsure Moderately Strongly
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree
Section 2
Please answer the following questions about how you would behave in the future, 
not about how you have acted in the past. You should not reveal first-hand 
experience of deceiving the police and courts as it is you future intentions that are of 
interest. Read the questions carefully and answer by circling the number that most 
closely reflects your response. Please complete each question in the order it is 
presented.
8. I would not lie in a criminal court, even if I thought it would help someone I love
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Moderately Unsure Moderately Strongly
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree
9. I would withhold information in a criminal court if I thought it would help someone I 
love
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Moderately Unsure Moderately Strongly
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree
10.1 would pretend not to remember the answers to questions in a criminal court if I 
thought that it would help someone that I love
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Moderately Unsure Moderately Strongly
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree
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11.1 would tell the entire truth to the criminal courts even if it harmed the case of 
someone I love
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Moderately Unsure Moderately Strongly
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree
12.1 would refuse to testify in a criminal court if I thought my testimony would harm the 
case of someone I love
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Moderately Unsure Moderately Strongly
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree
13.1 would provide false information in the criminal court if I thought it would help 
someone I love
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Moderately Unsure Moderately Strongly
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree
This is the end of the questions
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1. In s tru c tio n s
This questionnaire is about your knowledge and understanding of the law.
The questionnaire is designed to be completely anonymous, the IP address of your computer will not be 
stored and there is no section for you to fill in your name. You will be asked however to  state your 
gender, age, occupation and ethnic origin. You are free to  leave blank any question you do not wish to 
answer.
Filling out this questionnaire is taken as you providing informed consent fo r your data to be used in this 
research. This means tha t you are not able to withdraw this questionnaire from the study once it has 
been submitted as there will be no way of linking you with your questionnaire.
Please only complete the questionnaire if you are over 18 years of age.
You will be required to read some infomation abut the law. Please read all of the information on each 
page carefully and make sure you understand it  before continuing
2 .
1. Gender
j  M ale 
£  y  Fem ale
2. Age
3. Occupation
4. Race/Ethnic Origin
3.
The Law
Public Justice Offences are those tha t hinder or frustrate the adm inistration o f justice, the work of the 
police, prosecutors and courts. The main types of public justice offence are perverting the course of 
justice, assisting an offender, wasting police time and peijury. Some of these are tried in a Magistrates 
Court where locally appointed Magistrates, drawn from the public rather than a ju ry , decide whether the 
defendant is guilty. Other more serious cases can only be tried in a Crown Court. This has both a ju ry  
and a legally trained Judge. The ju ry  decide whether the defendant is guilty and the Judge then decides 
on the ir sentence.
Wasting police time
A charge o f wasting police time (section 5(2) Criminal Law Act 1967) can be brought against an 
individual who provides false information in the course of a police investigation. Cases o f wasting police 
tim e are tried in a Magistrates Court. The greatest possible penalty for this offence is a sentence of six 
months' imprisonment and/or a fine.
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1. In s tru c tio n s
This questionnaire is about your knowledge and understanding of the lav/.
The questionnaire is designed to  be completely anonymous, the IP address of your computer w ill not be 
stored and there is no section for you to fill in your name. You will be asked however to state your 
gender, age, occupation and ethnic origin. You are free to  leave blank any question you do not wish to 
answer.
Filling out this questionnaire is taken as you providing informed consent for your data to be used in this 
research. This means tha t you are not able to withdraw this questionnaire from the study once it has 
been submitted as there will be no way of linking you with your questionnaire.
Please only complete the questionnaire if  you are over 18 years o f age.
You will be required to read some infomation abut the law. Please read all of the information on each 
page carefully and make sure you understand it before continuing
1. Gender
£ y  Fem ale
2. Age
3. Occupation
4. Race/Ethnic Origin
3.
The Lav/
Public Justice Offences are those tha t hinder or frustrate the adm inistration o f justice, the work of the 
police, prosecutors and courts. The main types o f public justice offence are perverting the course of 
justice, assisting an offender, wasting police time and pe iju iy . Some of these are tried in a Magistrates 
Court where locally appointed Magistrates, drawn from the public rather than a ju ry , decide whether the 
defendant is guilty. Other more seiious cases can only be tiied  in a Crown Court. This has both a ju ry  
and a legally trained Judge. The ju ry  decide whether the defendant is guilty and the Judge then decides 
on the ir sentence.
Wasting police time
A charge of wasting police time (section 5(2) Criminal Law Act 1967) can be brought against an 
individual who provides false information in the course of a police investigation. Cases o f wasting police 
tim e are tried in a Magistrates Court. The greatest possible penalty fo r this offence is a sentence o f six 
months' imprisonment and/or a fine.
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Perverting the course of justice
Perverting the course of justice attracts a maximum penalty o f life imprisonment. In order to commit this 
offencer the behaviour must occur when the course of justice is in progress in the form of a police 
investigation, court case, or event from which it is reasonable to suppose tha t a police investigation will 
follow. This offence must be tried in a Crown Court. As perverting the course o f justice may apply to  a 
wide range of acts, its use is reserved fo r only the most setious incidences o f interference w ith the 
administration of justice. There were on average 8891 convictions each year between 1995 and 2005 for 
perverting the course of justice.
P erju ry
Perjury occurs when a lawfully sworn witness in court makes a statement tha t they know or believe to 
be false (Section 1 Perjury Act 1911). The statem ent must be im portant to the case being tried in the 
court. This offence is friable only in a Crown Court and carries a maximum penalty of seven years 
imprisonment and/or a fine. Corroboration is always needed before an individual can be charged with 
perjury. Perjury is commonly viewed as one of the most serious criminal offences as it undeimines the 
principles at the ve iy  foundation of the crim inal justice system. Between 1995 and 2005 there were on 
average 246 convictions a year fo r perjury.
Assisting an offender
The criteria for th is offence are tha t the principal offender has committed an arrestable offence, the 
accused individual knows or believes tha t the principal offender has committed the offence and the 
accused does an act with the intention to impede the apprehension or prosecution of the offender. 
Punishment for assisting an offender is based upon the punishment applicable to the principal offence 
tha t they assisted someone with. Due to this, the penalty fo r assisting an offender can vary between 
three and ten years' imprisonment. Assisting an offender can be tried in e ither a Magistrates Court or a 
Crown Court, depending upon which court the main offender tha t they are accused of assisting, must be 
tried in.
Sentencing Guidelines
Sometimes the same act o f deception could be prosecuted as any of the above crimes. In this case the 
police and the Crown Prosecution Service have considerable discretion in choosing which charge to 
bring. They use the following guidelines to decide which of the range of possible charges would be most 
appropriate. The guidelines consider whether the suspects' conduct:
• was spontaneous and unplanned or deliberate and elaborately planned
• was momentary and irresolute or prolonged and determined
• was motivated by misplaced loyalty to a re lative/friend or was part of a concerted effort to avoid, 
pervert, or defeat justice
• whether the activities of the defendant drew in others
• was intended to  result in trivia l or 'serious harm' to the administration of justice
• resulted in trivial or 'serious harm' to the administration of justice.
Serious harm refers to behaviour that:
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• enables a potential defendant in a serious case to  evade arrest or commit fu rthe r offences
• causes an accused to be granted bail when he m ight otherwise not have
• avoids a police investigation fo r disqualified driving or other serious offences
• misleads a court
• puts another person in real jeopardy of arrest/prosecution or results in the arrest/prosecution of 
another peison
• avoids a mandatory penalty such as disqualification
• results in the police losing the opportunity to obtain im portant evidence in a case.
8.
You will now be given short summaries of three cases to read. These are real cases where people have 
been convicted fo r providing false evidence to  the police and/or the criminal courts.
Case 1
In 2005 Lisa Unwin was convicted with her boyfriend Craig Moran of conspiring to  pervert the course of 
justice and sentenced to 15 months in ja il. Unwin claimed gang member Moran was at home watching 
videos at the time of a raid on a jewellers in which a woman was shot. Moran was convicted of 
conspiring to rob the shop after being found in a getaway car near the murder scene. Mr Justice Gibbs 
said "people must be made to realise tha t providing false alibis is a grave matter and when the false alibi 
is provided in connection with a really serious crime, the m atter is more serious."
Case 2
In 2003 Maxine Carr was sentenced to th ree-and-a-half years in prison when convicted of conspiring to 
pervert the course of justice. She was however cleared o f two counts of assisting an offender. Carr 
admitted providing a false alibi for her boyfriend Ian Huntley by saying she was with him at the ir home 
when Holly Wells and Jessica Chapman went missing. In actual fact she was filmed on CCTV in a 
different town a t the tim e of the ir disappearance and murder. Ian Huntley was found guilty of the 
murders of school girls Holly Wells and Jessica Chapman and given two life sentences. Carr claimed she 
believed Huntley was innocent and that she only lied to the police in order to protect him.
Case 3
In 2006 Laura Campbell was jailed fo r four years after admitting two counts of perverting the course of 
justice and one of perjury. Campbell told police tha t her half brother Damien Hanson had been at her fla t 
at the time City banker John Monckton was stabbed to death and his wife attacked during a raid a t the ir 
home. Campbell provided the alibi after being asked by Hanson, and then repeatedly tried to  "corrupt" 
her friend Sade Haye to endorse her lie. Hanson was convicted fo r the murder of John Monckton and the 
attempted murder of his wife.
This is the end of the information. You will now be asked a short series of questions about your 
knowledge of pe tju iy, perverting the course of justice, assisting an offender and wasting police tim e
9.
5. On a scale of 0 -  100 how good would you say your knowledge of the  
laws of perjury, perverting the course of justice, assisting an offender and 
wasting police time is?
O =  poor 100 = good
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10.
6. Please indicate which of the following crimes has the greatest maximum  
punishment on a scale of 1 - 4 (w here 1 is the least serious and 4 is the 
most serious)
Perjury |
Wasting police tim e
Perverting the course |
of Justice
Assisting an offender
11.
For the following questions you will be given a sho it summary of an individual's behaviour and will need 
to  decide which charge ( if any) out a list o f options the police will use. Please read this information 
carefully and make sure you fully understand it before attempting to  answer the question. Please tick 
the answer you th ink is correct, not the answer you would like to  be correct.
7. Graham is suspected of murdering Lennie and dumping his dismembered  
torso on moor land. Graham's half brother Lee believes that he is innocent. 
To help his half brother, Lee makes a hoax phone call to the police falsely 
suggesting th at Lennie’s death occurred at a tim e when it would have been 
impossible for Graham to kill him.
W hat offence ( if  any) do the police charge Lee w ith?
O  PeOurY
( ^ }  W asting police tim e  
r  y Perverting the course of justice  
~j Assisting an offender 
Mo offence 
Q  I  don’t know
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8. Fatima meets Rico in a nightclub on the night that Charles is fatally  
stabbed there . Rico is charged w ith  Charles's death. Fatima stands in the 
witness box in court and says th a t Rico (now  her boyfriend) w as not a t the  
nightclub the evening Charles was stabbed, but at home w ith  her.
W hat offence ( i f  any) do the police charge Fatima with?
Q  Perjury
Q j  w asting  police tim e
Perverting the course of justice  
Assisting an offender  
^ j  No offence  
I  don't know
9. Shahid is a law yer who represents John, a man who is charged w ith  
abduction and extortion. A fter John threatens him, Shahid agrees to te ll the 
police that he and John were in a m eeting when the alleged abduction and 
extortion was said to have been com m itted.
W hat offence ( i f  any) do the police charge Shahid with?
Q  Perjury
£  j  W asting police tim e  
(  ^ Perverting the course of justice  
^ A s s i s t i n g  an offender  
No offence 
I  don’t know
12.
The following questions are designed to assess your knowledge of the terms, sentencing and courts 
associated with some British laws. Please read the questions carefully you must tick only one response. 
Please tick the answer you think is correct not the answer you would like to be correct.
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10. The maximum sentence for perverting the course of justice is (Please 
tick only one response):
(  J  Dependent upon the  main Index offence  
f  y  Community service
Six m onths’ Im prisonm ent an d /o r a fine  
^ ,  Three years im prisonm ent a n d /o r a fine  
I  don’t know
11. Suspected cases of wasting police tim e are always tried in (Please tick 
only one response):
^ ^ M agistrates Court 
("^ ) Crown Court 
£ j  Court of Appeal 
(" Family Court 
Q  I  don’t know
13.
The following questions are designed to assess your knowledge of the terms, sentencing and courts 
associated with some British laws. Please tick the answer/s you th ink is/are correct, not the answer/s 
you would like to be coirect.
Please read the questions carefully - you may tick multiple responses.
12. Which criteria must be satisfied to bring a conviction for Assisting an 
Offender? (tick which ones are applicable)
□  The principal o ffender has com m itted an arrestab le  offence
□  The accused individual knows th at the principal o ffender has com m itted the offence
□  The accused individual believes that the principal offender has com m itted the offence
□  The accused Individual does an act with the intention to impede the apprehension or prosecution of the  
offender
□  The act done by the accused Individual must result In serious harm
□  I don’t know
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13. Which of the following is /a re  necessary condition/s for the offence of 
Perjury? (tick which ones are applicable)
■ ^  A lawfully sworn witness in court makes a statem ent that they know to be false 
' A lawfully sworn witness in court makes a statem ent that they believe to be false
□  The s tatem ent must be im portant to the  case being tried in the court
□  The statem ent must have corroboration
□  I  don't know
14. Copy of page:
14. On a scale of 0 - 100 how good would you say your knowledge of the  
laws of perjury, perverting the course of justice, assisting an offender and 
wasting police time is?
0 = poor 100 = good
15. I f  I  thought it would help someone I  love, I  would withhold relevant 
information when interviewed by the police
(  ) Strongly agree 
(  ) M oderately agree  
Q y  Unsure
(  y  Moderately disagree  
^  y  Strongly disagree
16. Even if I  thought lying would help someone I  love, I  would not lie when 
interviewed by the police
Q y  Strongly agree  
y  M oderately agree  
r  y Unsure
^  y M oderately disagree  
( y  Strongly disagree
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17. I f  I  thought it would help someone I  love, I  would respond 'no com m ent' 
to all questions in an interview  with the Police
,! Strongly agree  
f  ) M oderately agree  
Unsure 
!, )  M oderately disagree  
r j )  Strongly disagree
18. I f  I  thought it would help someone I  love, I  would falsely confess to a 
crime they were suspected of committing
£ y Strongly agree 
Q  M oderately agree  
£"~y Unsure
£  y M oderately disagree  
 ^ y  Strongly disagree
1 9 .1 would contact the police w ith false information if I  thought it would 
help someone I  love
Strongly agree 
^ j M oderately agree  
Unsu rer \W
£  j! M oderately disagree  
Q  Strongly disagree
2 0 .1 would tell the entire truth to the police even if it harmed the case of 
someone I  love
S-\^ y  Strongly agree  
£ J) M oderately agree 
Unsure 
o M oderately disagree  
^  J Strongly disagree
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2 1 .1 would pretend not to rem em ber the answers to police questions if I  
thought that it would help someone that I  love
Q j  Strongly agree 
(  y M oderately agree  
Unsure 
C j  M oderately disagree  
Q y  Strongly disagree
16.
22. I  would not lie in a criminal court, even if I  thought it would help 
someone I  love
(  y  Strongly agree  
M oderately agree  
{ ^ )  unsure
r  y  M oderately disagree  
j  Strongly disagree
23. I  would withhold information in a criminal court if I  thought it would help 
someone I  love
^  ~j Strongly agree  
Q y  M oderately agree  
^  y Unsure
Moderately disagree  
f  J Strongly disagree
2 4 .1 would pretend not to rem em ber the answers to questions in a criminal 
court if I  thought that it would help someone that I  love
r  y  Strongly agree  
Q y M oderately agree  
l^ y  Unsure
(_ ) M oderately disagree  
Strongly disagree r-
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2 5 . 1 would tell the entire truth to the criminal courts even if it harmed the 
case o f someone I  love
£  J  Strongly agree  
f  M oderately agree  
Unsure 
 ^ 1 M oderately disagree  
yy  Strongly disagree
26. I  would refuse to testify in a criminal court if I  thought my testim ony  
would harm the case of someone I  love
y ^ Strongly agree  
M oderately agree  
Unsure  
y y M oderately disagree  
I, y  Strongly disagree
27. I  would provide false information in the criminal court if I  thought it 
would help someone I  love
£  ~y Strongly agree 
( j  M oderately agree  
y y  Unsure
y  M oderately disagree  
j  Strongly disagree
17.
This is the end of the questions. Thank you fo r your paiticipation
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Please read the following information carefully as you will be asked a series of 
questions on it. Imagine you and your mother in this situation.
You meet your mother at an Italian restaurant at 9pm. The restaurant is busy 
and so you order a bottle of wine while you wait for a table. After 15 mirlutes you are 
shown to a table in a secluded booth at the back of the restaurant. When your main 
course arrives you order another bottle of wine to share. You both feel quite tipsy at 
this point. You have nice evening and finish the second bottle of wine. You each order 
a coffee with a shot of whisky in it with your desert. By the time you finish your meal 
and pay both you and your mother are quite drunk.
When you leave the restaurant, your mother tells you that they drove their car to 
the restaurant. You are worried whether it is safe for your mother to drive after the 
alcohol they have consumed. Your mother tells you they are fit to drive and offer you a 
lift home. It is dark and it is raining so you accept the offer rather than walk home. Your 
mother tells you they have driven after drinking a similar amount before.
You get into their red Vauxhall Corsa and your mother drives you the 10 
minutes to your home and drops you off at 11.25pm. Your mother then drives off to 
their home a further ten minutes away. You are concerned about their ability to drive 
safely. At 11.30pm you send a text message to your mother to make sure they arrived 
home safely. Your mother calls you back at 11.35pm to say they have got home. Your 
mother tells you that they hit something on Smith Street after leaving your house. They 
say that they weren’t concentrating and did not see anything until they hit it. Your 
mother isn’t sure what they hit as they didn’t stop to check. They ask you not to tell 
anyone as they are concerned they will get into trouble.
Two days later the police ask you to come into the police station to be 
interviewed. The police officer tells you that a teenager was seriously injured in a hit- 
and-run on Smith Street at about 11.30pm two days earlier. A red Vauxhall Corsa was 
seen driving away from the scene by a witness. The police officer says that neighbours 
saw a similar red Corsa outside your house not long before the incident. You realise 
that this is the collision that your mother told you they were involved in, and that they 
must have hit a teenager.
At the police station, the police ask you some questions about that night. Put a 
vertical mark on the line to show how likely it is that you would reveal each of the 
following pieces of information in the interview.
Remember, to imagine that you and your mother are really in this 
situation.
1. Your mother drives a red Vauxhall Corsa
Definitely not reveal Definitely reveal
2. Your mother drank alcohol that night
Definitely not reveal Definitely reveal
3. Your mother was tipsy that night
Definitely not reveal Definitely reveal
4. Your mother was drunk that night
Definitely not reveal Definitely reveal
5. Your mother drove you home that night
Definitely not reveal Definitely reveal
6. You were concerned whether your mother was safe to drive after the alcohol 
they had consumed
Definitely not reveal Definitely reveal
7. Your mother has driven after consuming similar quantities of alcohol before
Definitely not reveal Definitely reveal
8. Your mother drove away from your house at 11.25pm that night
Definitely not reveal Definitely reveal
9. Your mother drove along smith street between 11.25pm and 11.35pm that 
night
Definitely not reveal Definitely reveal
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10. Your mother admitted hitting something in smith street that night
I----------------------------------------------------------------------------1
Definitely not reveal Definitely reveal
11. Your mother told you they weren’t concentrating on their driving at the time 
of the incident
I----------------------------------------------------------------------------1
Definitely not reveal Definitely reveal
12. Your mother admitted they did not stop to see what they had hit
I----------------------------------------------------------------------------1
Definitely not reveal Definitely reveal
13. Your mother is responsible for the hit-and-run incident
I---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1
Definitely not reveal Definitely reveal
14. Your mother asked you to conceal the incident from the police
I---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1
Definitely not reveal Definitely reveal
Please state below anything else you would say to the police officer about the incident
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1. Consent
This study involves you acting as a juror. You will need to read a summary of a real court case and decide whether the 
defendant is guilty or not guilty of grievous bodily harm. Grievous bodily harm means serious bodily harm. It is for you to 
decide whether the harm the alleged victim received is serious, whether it was inflicted by the defendant, and whether he 
did so intentionally. You will then be required to answer a series of questions about the decision you reached. The study 
has been approved by the ethics committee at Teesside University.
In order to participate you must be eligible for UK jury duty. This means that you must not ever have been sentenced to 
imprisonment, or a term of detention, of 5 years or more in the last 10 years served any part of a sentence of 
imprisonment or detention, received a suspended or been subject to a community order. You must not suffer, or have 
suffered, from a mental illness, psychotic disorder, mental handicap or severe mental handicap which means you are 
resident in a hospital or other similar institution or that you regularly attend treatment by a medical practitioner
Before taking part please read your rights:
* You must be over 18 years of age to take part 
Your computer IP address will not be stored
* Only the research team will have access to participant raw data
* Your data will be kept confidential
* You can withdraw at any point by navigating off the webpage without being penalised
BY CLICKING NEXT YOU ARE AGREEING THAT YOU MEET THE REQUIREMENTS FOR JURY DUTY (AS LISTED 
ABOVE) AND THAT YOU PROVIDE YOUR INFORMED CONSENT TO TAKE PART IN THE STUDY.
2. Background information
1. PLEASE FILL IN THE INFORMATION BELOW.
You will need to quote this unique ID code in an email to H.FawcettStees.ac.uk if you 
wish to withdraw your data from the study. You can withdraw your data for up to 1 week 
after taking part.
EXAMPLE
If you were bom in December, your mother's maiden name was Smith and you lived at 
number 4, your code would be: DEC S M 0 4
MONTH OF YOUR 
BIRTH
FIRST LETTER OF 
MOTHER'S MAIDEN 
NAME
jECOND l e t t e r  
OF MOTHER'S 
MAIDEN NAME
HOUSE NUMBER 
FIRST DIGIT
HOUSE NUMBER 
SECOND DIGIT
2. Are you
y Male 
Qy Female
3. Please state your age
d  
d
4. Please state your occupation
5. Please state your ethnicity/race
d
d
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3. Opening speeches
CASE OVERVIEW
This is a criminal trial for the alleged grievous bodily harm of Andrew Jones by the defendant Michael Lowe. It is alleged 
that Andrew Jones was attacked by Michael Lowe at approximately 12.30am on 1st June 2010 in the car park behind 
Basement nightclub in Broadfield. Please read the case carefully and make sure that you understand all the evidence.
PROSECUTION BARRISTER'S OPENING SPEECH
We are here to show you that Michael Lowe caused grievous bodily harm to the victim, Andrew Jones. Mr Lowe was so 
angry that Andrew Jones spilt a drink over him; he waited behind Basement nightclub in order to get revenge. We will 
show how the defendant was seen in the area in the lead up to the attack, how his fingerprints were found on the bottle 
used to attack Mr Jones, and how his clothing and build are consistent with those of a man filmed on CCTV running away 
from the scene of the crime. We will call witnesses to the stand, the victim Andrew Jones, the responding police Officer 
Pc. Smith, Basement door attendant Joe Powell, Forensic Scientist Dr. Read, and paramedic Stacey Clark.
DEFENCE BARRISTER'S OPENING SPEECH
Michael Lowe has entered a plea of not guilty. Although he was soaked by Andrew Jones' drink, he wasn't angry by this 
and did not get revenge. The CCTV footage could be of anyone as the quality is poor. The fingerprints are not conclusive 
evidence as Mr Lowe admits he left his empty beer bottle behind the club on his way home. Mr Lowe was at home at the 
time of the attack and was not responsible. We will call three witnesses to the stand to demonstrate this, the defendant 
Michael Lowe, his friend Chris Simms, and his girlfriend Sarah Whitehead.
4. Prosecution case7 ; v m V - \
WITNESS 1: VICTIM ANDREW JONES 
Response to the prosecution questions
At about 1Q.3Dpm on the 31st May I was jostled in the club and accidentally spilled my drink over Michael Lowe. I did not 
know him at all at this point. Mr Lowe got angry and shouted 'I'll teach you to be more careful.’ Chris Simms then pulled 
Mr Lowe away before he could hit me. I carried on with my night out and did not see him again. At about 12.30am I 
become separated from my friends so I left Basement. I left the club and went to the car park behind where it was quiet 
to call them. I had only been there for a second when I felt something hit the back of my head. I blacked out and don't 
remember anything else until I woke up in hospital. I was in a lot of pain and had to have time off work because of my 
injuries.
Response to the defence questions
I admit that I didn't see who attacked me but I don't know of anyone else that holds a grudge against me.
WITNESS 2: BASEMENT DOOR ATTENDANT JOE POWELL 
Response to the prosecution questions
I saw Mr Lowe leave the club at approximately 11,55pm. He was obviously quite drunk and was still drinking a bottle of 
lager and trying to use a mobile phone. I told him he couldn't drink outside the club and he swore at me aggressively and 
then headed off in the direction of the car park. I didnt hear him again. At 12.30pm I heard a shout and glass breaking 
behind the club. I ran back there and found Andrew Jones unconscious and bleeding on the floor. I called for an 
ambulance and the police and waited with him until it arrived.
Response to the defence questions
I didnt see the attack or see the defendant for about 30minutes previous to the attack.
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5. Prosecution case
WITNESS 3: PARAMEDIC STACY CLARK 
Response to the prosecution questions
I received a call at 12.32 am to go to Basement nightclub. I found Andrew Jones around the back of the club. He had 
sustained a cut and swelling to the back of the head, a broken cheekbone, a broken jaw, bruising to the stomach and 
bruising to the back. I took him to hospital for treatment. The injuries looked like he had been hit on the back of the head 
with a bottle and punched and kicked repeatedly.
Response to the defence questions 
No questions asked
WITNESS 4: FORENSIC SCIENTIST DR. READ 
Response to the prosecution questions
I analysed a broken beer bottle covered in blood found at the scene of the crime. I found fingerprints matching those of 
the defendant on the neck of the bottle, consistent with the bottle being held upside down. The blood on the broken base 
of the bottle matched that of the victim Andrew Jones. In my view the bottle was likely held by the neck and used to 
strike Mr Jones across the back of the head. The fingerprint evidence strongly suggests this was done by the defendant.
Response to the defence questions
It is possible but highly unlikely that there is another explanation for the fingerprints on the bottle but they are consistent 
with it being used upside down as a weapon.
WITNESS 5: PC SMITH
Response to the prosecution questions
I arrived on the scene at 12.45pm. The victim had been taken to hospital. I interviewed the bouncer and asked to see the 
CCTV footage. This did not capture the attack but did show a man of the same height and build as the defendant running 
away at 12.31am. The man on the CCTV was also wearing jeans and a dark shirt as the defendant was on that night.
Response to the defence questions
I have a lot of experience of watching poor quality CCTV Footage and believe that it shows the defendant running away 
from the victim.
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6. Defence case
WITNESS 1: DEFENDANT MICHAEL LOWE 
Response to the defence questions
Andrew Jones spilt his drink on me but I wasn't too upset by this. I didn't threaten him, I was only joking. I got separated 
from my friend Chris Simms at around 11,50pm and left the club. I took my bottle of lager outside to finish while I called 
Chris. After a couple of minutes the bouncer asked me to leave so I went home. I threw the bottle away behind the club 
when I walked past. It's a 20 minute walk to my house and I got in at about 12.15am. My girlfriend woke up when I got 
home and then we both went straight to sleep. I stayed at home until 9am.
Response to the prosecution questions
As my girlfriend was asleep, she can't confirm that I stayed at home until Sam. I don't know why I didnt tell the police 
that my girlfriend saw me get home that night. I only remembered a couple of days ago.
WITNESS 2: CHRIS SIMMS
Response to the defence questions
I was with Michael Lowe in the nightclub when Andrew Jones spilt his drink. Michael was annoyed but not overly so. We 
were separated at about 11.45pm. I didn’t see him again until the next day. He tried calling my mobile just before 
midnight but I didn't hear it and only realised I missed his call on my way home at 1.30am.
Response to the prosecution questions
Yes I pulled Michael away when the drink was spilt over him. He wouldn't have hit Andrew Jones though, I was just 
making sure.
WITNESS 3: SARAH WHITEHEAD 
Response to the defence questions
I have been in a relationship with the defendant for about 2 years and live with him. It's a 20 minute walk from the club to 
our house. I was in bed and was woken at around 12.15am on the night in question by Michael returning home. We both 
went to sleep straight away and stayed at home until 9am.
Response to the prosecution questions
I suppose it is possible that Michael could have returned to the club again without my knowledge but I think I would have 
woken up. I don't know why I didn’t tell the police that I saw Michael get home that night. I only remembered a couple of 
days ago.
7. Decision questionnaire
You will now be asked a series of questions about the case you have deliberated. Please read each question carefully 
and answer as hoenstly as possible.
Please consider the evidence you have read very carefully.
Grievous bodily harm means serious bodily harm. To return a guilty verdict you must be confident beyond reasonable 
doubt that:
1} the harm the alleged victim received is serious
2) it was inflicted by the defendant
3) and if so, that the defendant did so intentionally
6 .1 think the defendant was
OGuit* o Not guilty
7. On a scale of 0-100 how confident are you in your verdict?
0 = not at all confident 
100 = completely confident
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8. The following questions relate to your beliefs regarding the RELIABILITY of the 
evidence in this case. The reliability refers to how accurate you think the evidence is. 
0 = not at all reliable 
100 = completely reliable
Reliability
The floor attendant | |
The victim | I
The defendant ,
The aefenaanrs girlfriend | |
The DNA |
The fingerprint evidence |
The forensic scientist |
The paramedic | |
The flefenaanrs tnena | |
The CCTV footage | |
9. The following questions ask about how much the different types of evidence 
presented in this case INFLUENCED YOUR VERDICT. 
0= not at all 
100 = completely
infuence
The floor attenaant | [
The victim | |
The defendant | |
The defendant's ginrrlend __________ |
The DNA |
The fingerprint evidence
The forensic scientist |
The paramedic
The defendant's mend | |
The CCTV footage | |
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10. The following questions relate to your beliefs regarding the reliability of evidence IN 
CASES IN GENERAL. The reliability refers to how accurate you think the evidence is.
0 = not at all reliable 
100 = completely reliable
reliability
Eyewitnesses 
VJdims 
Defendants 
Defence witnesses 
DMA
Fingerprint evidence 
Exoert witnesses 
CCTV footage
□
11. The following questions ask about how much the different types of evidence 
presented INFLUENCE VERDICTS IN CASES IN GENERAL
0 = not at all 
100 = completely
Eyewitnesses 
Victims 
Defendants 
Defence witnesses 
DNA
Flngerpnnl evidence 
Expert witnesses 
CCTV rootage
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10. Thank you
This is the end of the questions. This study was looking at juror evaluation of evidence and the case was not in fact a real 
court case.
Should you have any further questions please contact h.fawcett@tees.ac.uk 
Thank you for taking part.
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